De septem septenis

De septem septinis, London British Library MS Harley 3969, fol. 206v

THE mystagogical work De septem septenis (On the Seven Sevens) is a curious medieval treatise. It was written in the early 12th century — but probably not by the scholastic philosopher, John of Salisbury, to whom it’s attributed.  The overall orientation is Christian, yet it includes references to Hermetic, Platonic and Chaldean teachings. Its title refers to seven groups of seven things each:

1. Seven steps to learning;
2. Seven liberal arts;
3. Seven windows of the soul (two eyes, two ears, two nostrils and mouth);
4. Seven faculties of the mind (animus, mens, imaginatio, opinio, ratio, intellectus, memoria);
5. Seven cardinal and theological virtues;
6. Seven types of contemplation (meditatio, soliloquium, circumspectio, ascensio, revelatio, emissio, inspiratio); and
7. Seven principles of Nature.

It is not to be confused with De quinque septenis (On the Five Sevens), a more traditionally themed work by Hugh of St. Victor that relates the seven petitions of the Lord’s Prayer, the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, the seven Beatitudes, the seven virtues, and the seven deadly sins. That work became the source of many medieval illustrations of the so-called Wheel of Sevens.

The background of Septem septenis — what little we can surmise from the internal evidence — is most interesting.  According to Németh (2013), a single sentence in Martianus Capella’s 5th century Latin work, De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii (On the Marriage of Philology and Mercury) — a popular work in the Middle Ages and principle source on the divisions of education known as the Trivium and the Quadrivium — made an ambiguous reference to what was understood to be an ancient work on “divinization,” called the egerimion. The Septem septimis, Németh suggests, is an attempt of an anonymous medieval Christian writer to either reconstruct or imitate the fabled egerimion, which it explicitly mentions.

The seven sections of Septem septimis appear somewhat cobbled together from various sources. Section 6 is an abridged version of De contemplatione et ejus speciebus (On Contemplation and its Species), a work possibly by Richard of St. Victor. Section 7 may have some connection with the School of Chartres, which studied and commented on the cosmological theories of Plato’s Timaeus.

Is this just a mishmash — some student forgery or prank?  Or is there an internal consistency and coherent message, which the author wishes to communicate in a very creative and non-traditional way?  As there has been no modern interest in the work (it’s never been translated) it’s perhaps too early to say.

As discussed in the last post, Google Latin-to-English translation has reached now reached a respectable level of accuracy.  Below are lightly edited Google translations of the Section 1 and part of Section 6.  The former sets the stage by claiming the authority of ancient Greek and Chaldean writings — which, the author claims, unlike the Latin tradition, are not limited by a narrow focus on rationalism.  The latter passage discusses a kind of contemplation which the author calls ascension.

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Sect. 1. Prima septena de septem modis eruditiomis

Section 1.  The First Seven are the Seven Modes of Learning

CHALDAEI et Græci sapientiam quærunt: Latine veritatem inquirunt: illi quærunt et inveniunt, quia mores cum scientia componunt; isti inquirunt et non inveniunt, quia disputationis potius cavillationi quam veritatis inquisitioni insistunt.

The Chaldaeans and Greeks seek wisdom, Latins inquire after truth. The former seek and find, because they combine morals with knowledge; the latter search and do not find, because they dispute and cavil rather than only search for truth.

Cavillosa vero disputatio ingenium exercendo excitat, in qua si moram fecerit obtundit et fascinat: quod quidem in invio et non in via veritatis hebes et palpans errat; veritatis autem inquisitio cotis vice clarum ingenium et subtile reddit: in viam regiam mentem dirigit, mentis oculos ad ardua erigit.

A caviling discussion may exercise and awaken the intellect, but, if prolonged, it stuns and fascinates: which, indeed, errs dull and groping and not in the path of truth. But a genuine search for truth on the other hand makes the intellect clear and subtle: it directs the mind in the royal road, it raises the eyes of the mind to the heights.

Et licet hisce oculis quandoque quædam aperiantur quæ latuerunt, adhuc tamen multa latent, quæ comprehendi non possunt, vel subtilitate, quia sensum effugiunt, vel obscuritate, quia nec studium nec ingenium admittunt, vel immensitate, quia rationem et intellectum excedunt. Hinc est igitur quod divina quædam sunt quæ in manifestationem veniunt et ad cognitionem se exponunt. Sed quoniam subtilia, difficilia et ardua sunt, tanquam inscrutabilia fere omnes prætermittunt. Hæc prima rerum principia, id est rerum causæ latentes et cognitiones dicuntur. De quibus præclara Chaldæorum tantum scripta ad majorem veritatis evidentiam scrutantur.

And though these eyes may sometimes reveal some things which were hidden, yet many things are still hidden which cannot be comprehended, either by subtlety, because they escape the senses, or by obscurity, because they admit neither study nor genius, or by immensity, because they exceed reason and Intellect. Hence it is that there are divine things which come into manifestation and expose themselves to knowledge. But since they are subtle, difficult, and arduous, almost everyone dismisses them as inscrutable. These are called the first principles of things, that is, the latent causes of things and knowledge. Of which only the famous writings of the Chaldeans are carefully searched for the greater evidence of the truth.

Alia vero quædam divina tam profunda, tam occulta, tam intima et omnino impenetrabilia sunt, ut nulla ratione scrutari, nullo intellectu percipi, nulla sapientia investigari possint. Unde Apostolus Quod notum Dei et manifestum est in illis. Quum dicit quod notum Dei est, id est noscibile de Deo, ostendit plane ex his quæ Dei sunt et in Deo aliquid esse manifestum, aliquid occultum. Sed quod manifestum est, per scientias posse contingi.

Things are so deep, so hidden, so intimate, and completely impenetrable, that they cannot be rationally studied, perceived by any understanding, or investigated by any wisdom. Wherefore the Apostle says, What is known of God and is manifest in them. When he says that what is known of God, that is, that is knowable of God, he clearly shows that from the things that are of God and in God there is something manifest, something hidden. But what is clear is that it can be reached through science.

Quod prorsus absconditum est, nulla ratione posse penetrari. Et haec sunt secreta illa, quæ non licet homini loqui. Proinde, ut in Apostolo scribitur, Sapientiam inter perfectos loquimur. Sapientia namque Pallas, id est nova dicitur, quia scandens ad eam minoratur. Minerva vel Athena, id est immortalis, vocatur, quia verbo et opere eam sequens ad immortalitatem rapitur. Hæc igitur Tritonia, id est trina notio, nuncupatur, quia humano animo sapientia illustrato engerimion, id est surrationis liber aperitur, in quo ab humanis ad divina surgere septem septenis eruditur, et ad trinam, humanæ scilicet naturæ, angelicæ et divinæ, notionem ascendere perfectius instruitur.

What is completely hidden cannot be penetrated by rationality. And these are those secrets which it is not lawful for a man to speak. Therefore, as it is written in the Apostle, we speak wisdom among the perfect. For wisdom is Pallas, that is, it is said to be new, because when one ascends to it, it diminishes. Minerva or Athena, that is, immortal [JU: apparently from athanatos, undying], is called because following her in word and deed he is carried away to immortality. Therefore this Tritonia, that is, the triple concept, is called, because in the human mind, enlightened wisdom engerimion, that is, the book of resurrection is opened, in which it is learned to rise from the human to the divine seven sevens, and to ascend more perfectly to the triple concept, that is, the human nature, the angelic and the divine is instructed.

Septem sunt modi primæ septenæ, quibus humanus animus in perfectam eruditionem introducitur. Primus modus est, omnium artium doctrinam velle, secundus est delectari quod velis: tertius instare ad id quod delectat: quartus, concipere quod instat: quintus, memorare quod concipit, sextus invenire aliquid simile: septimus ex his omnibus extorquere quod est utile.

There are seven ways, the first seven, by which the human mind is introduced into perfect learning. The first way is to desire the learning of all arts, the second is to delight in what you want, the third to insist on what delights, the fourth to conceive what is urgent, the fifth to remember what one conceives, the sixth to discover similitudes, the seventh to wring from all these things that are useful.

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Sect. 6. Sexta septema de septem generibus contemplationis

Section 6.  The Sixth Seven are the Seven Kinds of Contemplation

SEXTA septena de septem generibus contemplationis sequitur, in quibus anima requiescens jucundus immoratur. Septem sunt contemplationis genera, meditatio, soliloquium, circumspectio, ascensio, revelatio, emissio, inspiratio. […]

The sixth seven are the seven kinds of contemplation that follow, in which the soul rests and dwells in delightf. There are seven kinds of contemplation: meditation, soliloquy, survey [or scrutiny], ascension, revelation, release, and inspiration. […]

Quarta species. Ascensio.

Ascensio est ad immortalia in excelsis animi digressio; unde Propheta: “Beatus vir, cujus est auxilium abs te ascensiones in corde suo disposuit” [cf. Vulgate Psa 83:6, beatus homo cuius fortitudo est in te semitae in corde eius]. Tres sunt ascensiones in corde suo dispositae.

The ascent to immortality is the highest going of the soul; whence the Prophet: Blessed is the man whose strength is in You, whose heart is set on pilgrimage. [Psa 84:5; NKJV] There are three ascents arranged in his heart.

Tres sunt ascensiones Christi: tres quoque nostri. Prius enim Christus ascendit in montem, deinde in crucem, tandem ad patrem.

There are three ascents of Christ: ours are also three. For first Christ ascended the mountain, then the cross, and finally to the Father.

In monte docuit discipulos; in cruce redemit captivos; in coelo glorificavit electos.
In monte doctrinam protulit humilitatis; in cruce formam expressit caritatis; in coelo coronam præbuit felicitatis.
In primo præbuit lumen scientiæ; in secundo culmen justitiæ; in tertio numen gloriæ.

He taught the disciples on the mountain; He redeemed the captives on the cross; He glorified the elect in heaven.
On the mountain he brought forth the doctrine of humility; on the cross he expressed the form of charity; He gave a crown of happiness in heaven.
In the first place He provided the light of knowledge; in the second summit of justice; in the third divine glory.

Tres sunt nostri ascensiones; prima in actu; secunda in affectu; tertia in intellectu.

Three are our ascents: first in action; second in affect; third in understanding.

[JU: So in addition to the traditional distinction between the affective and intellective divisions of the human soul, the author introduces a third aspect of our nature, action or activity.  Ascent occurs on all three.]

Ascensio vero actualiter triplex; prima in confessione culparum; secundain largitione eleemosynarum; tertia in contemptu divitiarum, prima in operibus poenitentiæ; secunda in operibus misericordiæ; tertia in operibus consummatæ justitiae; prima meretur veniam; secunda gratiam; tertia gloriam.

Ascension in action is threefold: first in confession of faults; second, giving of alms; third in contempt of riches: the first in works of penitence, the second in works of mercy, the third in works of consummate righteousness; the first merits forgiveness, the second grace, the third glory.

[JU: The author is weaving together in a plausible way Hermetic and Platonic themes of divinisation with traditional Christian virtues of self-examination, compunction, humility, and charity.]

Ascensio affectualis triplex: prima est ad perfectam humilitatem; secunda ad consummatam caritatem; tertia ad contemplationis puritatem.

Affective ascent is threefold: first to perfect humility; second to consummate charity; third to purity of contemplation.

Ascensio vero intellectuali illuminat et imperat; actus illuminatur et obtemperat; affectus illuminat, et illuminatur, et intellectui obtemperat et actui imperat.

Intellectual ascent illuminates and commands; action is enlightened and obeyed; affect enlightens and is enlightened, and obeys the understanding and commands action.

[JU: This paragraph seems to dense for Google to reliably translate.  The main idea is that there is dynamic interplay between the ascents of action, affect and understanding: mutual illumination and directing.]

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Bibliography

Baron, Roger (ed.). De contemplatione et ejus speciebus (La Contemplation et Ses Espèces). Desclée, 1955.

Giles, J. A. (ed.). De septem septenis. In: Joannis Saresberiensis postea episcopi camotensis opera omnia, vol. V: Opuscula.  Oxford, 1848; 209−238. Reprinted in Jacques-Paul Migne, Patrologia Latina, vol. 199, cols. 945−965. Paris, 1855. [Latin text] [Latin text]

Hugh of St. Victor. De quinque septenis. Jacques-Paul Migne, Patrologia Latina, vol. 175, cols. 405B−414A. Paris, 1854.

Németh, Csaba. Fabricating philosophical authority in the Twelfth Century: The Liber Egerimion and the De septem septenis. Authorities in the Middle Ages. De Gruyter, 2013; 69−87.

Manuscripts

Cambridge Corpus Christi College MS 459 fol. 99r-107v.

London British Library Harley MS 3969 fol. 206v−215v.

first draft: 19 Nov 2022; please excuse typos

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The Seven Vices and Fifty Subvices of Medieval Christianity

Tree of Vices” from Speculum Virginum, Walters Art Museum Ms. W.72, fol. 25v

AS  a previous post on the Seven Virtues and Fifty Subvirtues of Medieval Christianity is one of the most oft-visited here, it seems fitting to supply a sequel on vices and subvices.  Joint diagrams of virtues and vices are found in many medieval manuscripts.  The closest we have to a text source is De fructus carnis et spirits, a work of the 11th century, today tentatively attributed to Conrad of Hirsau  (c. 1070 – c .1150) and previously to Hugh of St. Victor (c. 1096 –1141).

An important patristic source for the medieval diagrams is Gregory the Great’s Moralia in Job, 31.xlv.87−88. Spencer (2014, 177 f.; cf. Straw, 2005, 38 f.) lists the vices/subvices as found both in Gregory and Cassian. Medieval tree diagrams are fairly consistent concerning the vices, but variation exists in subvices (these vary in number from 48 to 52; again we’ll just say roughly 50).

Just as the virtues and subvirtues are rooted in Humility, the vices and subvirtues derive from a common parent, Pride (superbia).

We should not look at these vices and subvices as mere historical curiosities.  They have modern relevance at the level of practical cognitive psychology: each corresponds to a significant form of negative thinking common to us all,  which we need to overcome.  There is considerable interest in the application of ancient Stoic virtue ethics to modern life.  The patristic and medieval literature on the virtues and vices is an extension (and arguably more refined version) of Stoic moral psychology and ought to interest us at least as much.

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I. VAINGLORY (vana gloria)

1. Hipocrisy (hypocrisis)
2. Disobedience (inobedientia)
3. Boasting (lactantia)
4. Presumption (praesumptionis)
5. Arrogance (arrogantia)
6. Talkativeness (loquacitas)
7. Obstinacy (pertinacia)

II. ENVY (invidia)

1. Hatred (odium)
2. Envying others’ good fortune (afflictio in prosperis)
3. Exulting in others’ adversity (exsultatio in adversis)
4. Malice (malitia)
5. Detraction (detractio)
6. Bitterness (amaritudo)
7. ‘Whispering’ (susurratio); “by which, either by a hiss of hateful flattery or contempt, one is roused to the hatred of the other.”

II. ANGER (ira)

1. Accusation (clamor)
2. Blasphemy (blasphemia)
3. Insult (contumelia)
4. Mourning or dwelling on an injury by another (luctus)
5. Reckless outburst (temeritas)
6. Fury (furor)
7. Indignation (indignatio)

IV. SADNESS (tristitia)

1. Despair (desperatio)
2. Rancor (rancor)
3. Mental torpor (torpor)
4. Fear and anxiety (timor; menti fluctuans angustia)
5. Acidie (acidia)
6. Complaint (querela)
7. Pessimism (pusillanimitas)

V. AVARICE (avaritia)

1. Love of money (philargyria)
2. Perjury (perjurium)
3. Violence (violentia)
4. Usury (usura)
5. Fraud (fraus)
6. Robbery (rapina)
7. Deceit (fallacia)

VI. GLUTTONY (Ventris ingluvies)

1. Drunkenness (ebrietas)
2. Overeating (crapula)
3. Dulness of sense and in understanding (mentis hebetatio)
4. Laziness (languor)
5. Delicacy of appetite; desire for delicious foods beyond one natural needs (delicatio)
6. Disregard of health (oblivio)

VII. LUST (Luxuria)

1. Voluptuous pleasure (voluptas)
2. Lewdness (lascivia)
3. Languid rejection of virtue (ignavia)
4. Rash, consuming desire (petulantia)
5. Weakness of spirit or body given over to indulgence (titubatio)
6. Enticement (blanditiae)
7. Excessive sensual delight (deliciae)

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Bibliography

Bliss, James and anonymous (trs.). St. Gregory the Great: Morals on the Book of Job. Three vols. Library of the Fathers. Oxford, 1844−1850. Book 31.

Bloomfield, Morton. The Seven Deadly Sins: An Introduction to the History of a Religious Concept, with Special Reference to Medieval English Literature. East Lansing, 1952; repr. 1967.

Goggin, Cheryl Gohdes. Copying manuscript illuminations: The Trees of Vices and Virtues. Visual Resources, 2004, 20:2-3, 179−198. https://doi.org/10.1080/0197376042000207552

Hugo de S. Victore (attr.). De fructibus carnis et spiritus. J. P. Migne. Patrologia Latina, Paris, 1854; cols. 997−1010 (rough diagrams of the Tree of Vices and Tree of Virtues appear at the end of the work).  Latin text is online: http://mlat.uzh.ch/?c=2&w=HuDeSVi.DeFrCaE

Katzenellenbogen, Adolf. Allegories of the Virtues and Vices in Medieval Art from Christian Times to the Thirteenth Century. Alan J. P. Crick (tr.). London: Warburg Institute, 1939.

Kerns, Brian (tr.). Gregory the Great: Moral Reflections on the Book of Job. Six vols. Liturgical Press, 2014−2022. (English translation of Latin critical edition.)

Mews, Constant J. (ed.). Listen, Daughter: The “Speculum virginum” and the Formation of Religious Women in the Middle Ages. The New Middle Ages Series. Palgrave, 2001.

Newhauser, Richard G. In the Garden of Evil: The Vices and Culture in the Middle Ages. Toronto, 2005.

Robertson, D. W. The Doctrine of Charity in Mediaeval Literary Gardens: A Topical Approach through Symbolism and Allegory. Speculum, vol. 26, no. 1, 1951, pp. 24–49. Reprinted in: Robertson, Durant Waite. Essays in Medieval Culture. Princeton University Press, 1980 (repr. 2014); pp. 21−50.

Powell, Morgan. Gender, Reading, and Truth in the Twelfth Century: The Woman in the Mirror. Arc Humanities Press, 2020.

Straw, Carole E. Gregory and Cassian on the cardinal vices. In: Richard G. Newhauser (ed.), In the Garden of Evil: The Vices and Culture in the Middle Ages, Toronto, 2005, pp. 35−58.

Tucker, Shawn R. The Virtues and Vices in the Arts: A Sourcebook. Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2015.

Young, Spencer E. Scholarly Community at the Early University of Paris: Theologians, Education and Society, 1215–1248. Cambridge University Press, 2014; Ch. 5, Parisian theologians and the seven deadly sins. (pp. 168−207).

Watson, Arthur. The Speculum Virginum with special reference to the Tree of Jesse. Speculum, vol. 3, no. 4, 1928, pp. 445–69.

Wenzel, Siegfried. The Seven Deadly Sins. Speculum 43, 1968, 1−22.

Art: “Tree of Vices” from Speculum Virginum, Walters Art Museum Ms. W.72, fol. 25v; early 13th century manuscript from the Cistercian abbey of Himmerode, Germany.

The Thirty Seraphic Virtues of the Middle Ages

British Library, MS Arundel 83-1, The Howard Psalter, fol. 5v, ca. 1310–20; for other versions of the figure, see here.

THE short work, On the Six Wings of the Cherubim (De sex alis cherubim) enjoyed great popularity in monastic communities during the 12th and 13th centuries. Its authorship is a little confusing. The first part seems to be an edited excerpt from Hugh of St. Victor’s (c. 1096−1141) work, On the Moral Ark of Noah (De arca Noe morali). The second part is by an anonymous author. An earlier attribution of the entire work to Alan of Lille (d. 1203) is incorrect. Marie-Therese d’Alverny (1980) suggested the Cistercian, Clement of Llanthony, as a possible source, but this is highly speculative.

The second part is what interests us. It discusses not cherubim, but the six wings of the seraphim in Isaiah 6:2. Each wing corresponds to a higher-order virtue, and each wing has five feathers, corresponding to specific virtues. The aim is to summarize in a simple form the life of Christian perfection. The work is interesting in its own right, but also in that it set the stage, so to speak, for major philosophical and devotional works by Richard of St. Victor (d. 1173; The Mystical Ark or Benjamin Major) and St. Bonaventure (1221–1274; The Soul’s Journey into God), both of whom use the image of a six winged seraphim as a vehicle of examining contemplative ascent to God.

Many medieval manuscripts of On the Six Wings include annotated diagrams of the six-winged angel. Sometimes the figure appears without the accompanying text. In the latter case, artists varied considerably in the virtues named.

A summary of the wings and feathers from On the Six Wings is supplied below. Readers are referred to the English translations of Bridget Balint and of Steven Chase.  The Latin text is found Migne PL 210:267A−280C.

CONFESSION (confessio)

Mournful avowal of one’s own weakness, ignorance, and malice

1. Truth (veritas); sincerity of confession.
2. Wholeness (integritas); a confession should be complete, not shortened or divided
3. Steadfastness (furmitas); a confession should be steadfast and firm
4. Humility (humilitas); a person making confession should have a humble mind, humble tongue, and humble aspect
5. Simplicity (simplicitas); one should reproach ones weakness, ignorance, and wickedness, defending nothing, excusing nothing, minimizing nothing.

REPARATION (satisfaccio)

1. Renunciation of sin (peccati abrenuntiatio)
2. Outpouring of tears (lacrymarum effusio)
3. Mortification of the flesh (carnis maceratio)
4. Almsgiving (eleemosynarum largiti)
5. Devotion of prayer (orationis devotio)

III. PURIFICATION OF THE FLESH (munditia or purita carnis)

1. Modesty of gaze (visus pudicitia); shuts out wantonness, lest the eye look desiring on another person
2. Chastity of hearing (auditus castimonia); do not listen to an insulting voice, words of those who curse and blaspheme, false accusations, lies or provocations
3. Decorousness of scent (olfactus modestia); seeks the aroma of goodness by works of mercy.
4. Temperance in eating (gustus temperantia)
5. Sanctity of touch (tactus sanctimonia)

PURITY OF MIND (puritas mentis)

1. Decorous and proper emotion (affectus sinceri rectitudo)
2. Delight of the mind in the Lord (mentis in Domino delectati); Delight thyself also in the LORD; and he shall give thee the desires of thine heart. (Psalm 37:4); contemplation engenders and shapes this feather.
3. Pure and well-ordered thought (munda etordinata cogitatio)
4. Holiness of will (voluntatis sanctitudo)
5. Sound and pure intention (simplex et pura intentio)

LOVE OF NEIGHBOR (dilectio proximi)

1. Avoid injury to others by word or deed (nulli nocere verbo vel opere)
2. Do good in every word and deed (omnibus prodesse, verbo et opere)
3. Liberality (verae liberalitatis fortitudine); be magnanimous and generous, not niggardly.
4. Lay aside soul for brethren (animam profratre ponere); Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends. (John 15: 13)
5. Persevere in fraternal love (in his perseverare)

LOVE OF GOD (dilectio Dei)

1. Long for and strive after nothing other than God (aliud quam Deum non concupiscit)
2. Distributes this love actively among brothers, sisters, and the world for the sake of God (propter Deum sua distribuit)
3. Reserve nothing for themselves but relinquish all things in God’s name (propter Deum nihil sibi reservat,sed omnia relinquit)
4. Deny self for God alone (propter Deum se ipsum abnegat)
5. Persevere in love of God (in his perseverat)

Readings

Anonymous. De sex alis cherubim. Attr. Alan of Lille. PL 210:265A−280C. Paris: J. P. Migne, 1855. Latin text.

Balint, Bridget (tr.). The Seraph’s Six Wings. In: Mary Carruthers and Jan M. Ziolkowski, The Medieval Craft of Memory, University of Pennsylvania, 2002, pp. 83−102.

Carruthers, Mary J. Ars oblivionalis, ars inveniendi: the cherub figure and the arts of memory. Gesta, vol. 48, no. 2, 2009, pp. 99–117.

Carruthers, Mary J. Clan Carruthers — clan crest — seraph or cherub. Clan Carruthers International website. 27 May 2020.

Chase, Steven (tr.). De sex alis cherubim (On the Six Wings of the Cherubim). In: Steven Chase (ed.), Angelic Spirituality: Medieval Perspectives on the Ways of Angels, Paulist Press, 2002; pp. 121−145.

Cousins, Ewert H. (ed.). Bonaventure: The Soul’s Journey into God. Paulist Press, 1978.

d’Alverny, M-T. Alain de Lille: problèmes d’attribution. In: eds. H. Roussel and F. Suard, Alain de Lille, Gautier de Châtillon, Jakemart Giélée et leur temps, Lille, 1980, pp. 27–46.

Zinn, Grover A. (ed.). Richard of St. Victor: The Twelve Patriarchs, The Mystical Ark and Book Three of The Trinity. Paulist Press, 1979.

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The Archetypal Meaning of Hercules at the Crossroads

Annibale Carracci, The Choice of Hercules (1596)

THE ATHENIAN philosopher and rhetorician, Prodicus, a contemporary of Socrates, wrote an essay commonly known as Hercules at the Crossroads, which he often delivered orally to appreciative crowds. A moral allegory of deep psychological significance, it describes a young Hercules at a crossroads confronted by two women who personify Vice and Virtue.  Each appeals to him to take a different route: Lady Vice claims the easy path will lead to pleasure and happiness; Lady Virtue reminds him that the road to true and lasting satisfaction is the harder and more toilsome route.

Our best source of the story is Xenophon’s dialogue Memorabilia (2.1.21–34), wherein Socrates is presented as relating Prodicus’ story to a young protege named Aristippus (evidently not the eponymous founder of the Cyrenaic philosophical sect).

Thanks to Xenophon, the story was well known and often alluded to throughout antiquity and beyond. Philo of Alexandria (fl. ca. 20 AD), the Jewish Middle Platonist philosopher (and, as it happens, the virtual father of Christian allegorical interpretation of the Bible), expanded on Prodicus’ theme in a discussion of the ‘two wives of the soul’ (On the Sacrifices of Cain and Abel 1.5.21−34).  Philo’s treatment is quite interesting in its own right, in part because of his remarkable list (section 1.5.31) of over 150 negative adjectives to describe a votary of Pleasure.  Readers of Philo will recognize the connection of the story with his allegorical interpretation of the Garden of Eden myth.

Centuries later, St. Ambrose of Milan (fl. 390 AD), in Cain and Abel 4.13−5.15, paraphrased Philo’s discussion and connected it with the ‘strange woman‘ (Uebersax, 2009) in the Book of Proverbs (Prv 2:16−19; 5:3−8; 5:15−19; 5:20; 6:24−26; 7:5−27; 9:13−18; 20:16; 22:14; 23:27−35; 27:13, 15), a personification of pleasure and/or folly, and opponent of the virtuous ‘wife of thy youth.’ (Prv 5:15−19).

Cicero, in On Moral Duties (1.32.118; 3.5.25), a work addressed to his son, mentions Prodicus’ tale in the context of choosing ones career.  Others, too, have understood the tale as referring choosing one’s long term course in life.  However we have good reason to believe the story has a deeper psychological and more existential meaning. One clue to the deeper meaning is the strong appeal of the story throughout the centuries to the artistic imagination.  As Erwin Panovsky (1930) in a seminal work on art history describes, Prodicus story elicited scores of paintings and drawings beginning in the Renaissance.

Another clue to a deeper meaning is to see how this same theme is expressed in many variations throughout antiquity.  The earliest and best known example in the Greek tradition is Hesiod’s Works and Days 1.287−294.

Wickedness (κακότητα; kakotes) can be had in abundance easily: smooth is the road and very nigh she dwells. But in front of virtue (ἀρετῆς; arete) the gods immortal have put sweat: long and steep is the path to her and rough at first; but when you reach the top, then at length the road is easy, hard though it was.
Source: Hesiod, Works and Days 1.287−294 (tr. Evelyn-White)

This passage serves as a virtual epitome of book 1 of Works and Days, which also contains the Pandora and Ages of Man myths, both allegories of the moral fall.

The Judgment of Paris

Sandro Botticelli, Judgment of Paris (c. 1488)

In Greek mythology, a similar trope is found in the Judgment of Paris, where Paris (prince of Troy and brother of Hector) must choose which goddess is more beautiful: Athena, Hera or Aphrodite — allegorically symbolizing Wisdom, domestic virtue, and sensory pleasure, respectively.  His choice of Aphrodite over Athena and Hera led to the Trojan War.  If we understand the Trojan War as allegorically symbolizing the principle of psychomachia, or conflict between virtuous and unvirtuous elements of the human psyche, then the Judgment of Paris may be understood as symbolizing a depth-psychological dynamic that precipitates a fundamental form of  inner conflict.

Plato cites the above passage of Hesiod in two of his works (Republic 2.364d  and Laws 4.718e−719a). Moreover, in two underworld myths presented in his dialogues (Republic 10.614c−d and Gorgias 524a−527a), he describes a parting of two paths — one associated virtue and leading to the Isles of the Blest, and one associated with vice and leading to punishment in Tartarus. If we understand the underworld as symbolizing depth-psychological processes, it suggests that Plato is saying that orienting our mind wrongly leads to internal self-inflicted punishments, the ultimate aim of which is to educated and reform us (Gorgias 525b−c).

The Pythagorean Y

The same trope of a parting of the ways in an underworld journey is found in Book 6 of Virgil’s Aeneid (Smith, 2000).  Further, an epigram attributed (probably incorrectly, but perhaps written within a century of Virgil’s death) describes what is commonly called the Pythagorean Y (so-named because of the resemblance of ‘Y’ to a forking path):

This letter of Pythagoras, that bears
This fork’d distinction, to conceit prefers
The form man’s life bears. Virtue’s hard way takes
Upon the right hand path, which entry makes
(To sensual eyes) with difficult affair ;
But when ye once have climb’d the highest stair,
The beauty and the sweetness it contains,
Give rest and comfort, far past all your pains.’
The broadway in a bravery paints ye forth,
(In th’ entry) softness, and much shade of worth;
But when ye reach the top, the taken ones
It headlong hurls down, torn at sharpest stones.
He then, whom virtues love, shall victor crown
Of hardest fortunes, praise wins and renown:
But he that sloth and fruitless luxury
Pursues, and doth with foolish wariness fly
Opposed pains (that all best acts befall).
Lives poor and vile, and dies despised of all.
(tr. George Chapman)

Like Hercules at the Crossroads, the Pythagorean Y inspired many Renaissance works of art.

The theme of two paths associated with a choice or judgment concerning virtue vs. wickedness occurs throughout the Old and New Testament.  Perhaps best known is Psalm 1 (traditionally called The Two Paths).

When we find the same theme like this so prominently expressed across many times and traditions, it implies some universal, archetypal psychological dynamic of fundamental significance. That, I believe, is the case here. This is not a simple, prosaic morality tale such that “one must choose good and not evil.” Rather it confronts us with the existential fact — readily verifiable by introspection and close attention to thoughts — that we are always, every moment at our lives, faced with the two paths:  we can direct the immediate energies of our mind towards seeking physical pleasure, or to virtue, spirituality and higher cognitive activity.  When we choose the latter, all is well. Our mind is a harmony.  This is the path of life. But the moment we stop actively choosing virtue, our mind lapses into its immature state dominated by the pleasure principle; we are no longer true to our genuine nature, and a cascading sequence of negative mental events ensues.

This is not unlike the Freudian distinction between the pleasure principle and the reality principle, which, according to him, it is the principal task of the ego to broker.  However in this case, the reality principle is replaced by what we might call the virtue principle:  that our psyche is, in its core, fundamentally aligned with virtue.  In a sense this is still a reality principle — but, here the reality is that our nature seeks virtue.

To choose the path of virtue, wisdom and righteousness on an ongoing basis is not easy. It is, rather, as Plato calls it, the contest of contests (Gorgias 526e) and requires a degree of resolve and effort we may perhaps rightly call Herculean.

❧

Bibliography

Colson, F. H.; Whitaker, G. H. (trs.). Philo: On the Sacrifices of Abel and Cain. In: Philo, Volume 2. Loeb Classical Library L227. Harvard University Press, 1929.

Evelyn-White, Hugh G. (tr.). Hesiod: Works and Days. In: Hesiod, Homeric Hymns and Homerica. Loeb Classical Library L057. Harvard University Press, 1943.

Marchant, E. C. Xenophon: Memorabilia and Oeconomicus. Harvard University Press, 1923. http://data.perseus.org/texts/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0032.tlg002.perseus-eng1

Miller, Walter (tr.). Cicero: De Officiis. Loeb Classical Library L030. Harvard University Press, 1913. https://archive.org/details/deofficiiswithen00ciceuoft

Panofsky, Erwin. Hercules am Scheidewege und andere antike Bildstoffi in der neueren Kunst, Studien der Bibliothek Warburg 18, Leipzig, 1930.

Rochette, Bruno. Héraclès à la croissé des chemins: un topos dans la literature grécolatine. Études Classiques 66, 1998, 105−113.

Savage, John J. (tr.). Saint Ambrose: Hexameron, Paradise, and Cain And Abel. Fathers of the Church 42. Catholic University of America, 1961.

Smith, Richard Upsher. The Pythagorean letter and Virgil’s golden bough. Dionysius 18, 2000, pp. 7−24. https://dialnet.unirioja.es/revista/10126/A/2000

Uebersax, John S.  The strange woman of Proverbs. 2009. https://catholicgnosis.wordpress.com/2009/05/19/the-strange-woman-of-proverbs/

1st draft, 1 Mar 2020

St. Augustine and Intellectual Vision

Gerard Seghers (attr). The Four Doctors of the Western Church, Saint Augustine of Hippo

ST. AUGUSTINE, in several works, but most famously in Book 12 of On the Literal Meaning of Genesis (De Gen ad lit), developed a typology of ‘vision’ that became very influential throughout the Middle Ages, and which still merits our interest today. His main concern is not vision per se, but rather to use vision as a metaphor for knowing or cognition, and especially mental insight and knowledge of divine things.  His basic scheme is a tripartite division:

Corporeal vision.  The lowest form of vision is ordinary seeing by means of the eye, or bodily vision (visio corporalis). By this vision we see objects in the material world.

Spiritual vision. Above this is the mental vision by which we see images in the mind, either as memories of past sense experience, or products of the imagination. This he calls spiritual vision (visio spiritualis) — but this term requires an explanation. This vision is not spiritual in the sense that we understand that word today.  Rather, the connection with ‘spirit’ derives from ancient theories of perception, wherein it was believed that sense experience involved stimulation of a semi-material fluid (pneuma) that permeated the body.  Therefore a more apt term might be imaginative vision.

Intellectual vision. This all leads up to what really interests Augustine: the highest level of vision, which he calls intellectual vision (visio intellectualis). Unlike the other two forms of vision, intellectual vision sees things that have no connection with physical objects or their images.  It includes what a Platonist or Neoplatonist might call the ‘intellection of Forms’ (noesis): for example, by intellectual vision we can ‘see’ that bisecting a triangle always produces two triangles, and that 5 is greater than 4.  But for Augustine, intellectual vision is much more than Platonic or Plotinian noesis, and includes a wider range of cognitive activity, including what today we would call insight or (some kinds of) intuition.

Intellectual vision is, in fact, a pivotal concept in Augustine’s philosophy.  It plays an important role for him in contemplative ascent to God, in the relationship of Jesus Christ to the individual soul, and in understanding what faith means.  Hence he takes care to supply examples so readers can understand intellectual vision and observe it at work in their own minds.  It probably wouldn’t be an exaggeration to suggest that Augustine’s notion of intellectual vision is critical to understanding his important role not only in Christian philosophy, but in the history of human consciousness.

In De Gen ad lit 12 Augustine supplies many examples of intellectual vision.  These include the ability to see and understand virtues (12.24.50; 12.31.59), truth (12.26.54), love and (within limits) God (12.28.56; 12.31.59).  He also suggests that it’s by means of intellectual vision that we can recognize allegorical meanings of Scripture, and distinguish valid from spurious spiritual visions and understand the meanings of the latter.

De videndo Deo

We also learn more about intellectual vision in a book-length letter Augustine wrote to Paulina, known as On seeing God (De videndo Deo). He is trying to help Paulina understand what it means to ‘see God,’ with particular reference to certain verses of Scripture, such as Matthew 5:8 (Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God.)  More specifically, he wishes to help her see God herself.

The letter reveals in a most remarkable way his humanism and pastoral concern.  Having ‘seen’ God himself, he has an intense, earnest desire to help others do the same. (This humanistic and personal view of Augustine stands in contrast with the common modern perception of him shaped by later appropriation and narrow interpretation of his teachings by later Scholastic and academic theologians.)

His concern is to show that God is seen by intellectual, not bodily vision. But first he must help Paulina understand what intellectual vision is, or, rather, to witness its operation in her own mind. For this purpose in chapters 38 to 41 he employs a novel and effective device: he has her reflect on her inner response to the various arguments and propositions advanced in his letter up to this point. He asks her to review his preceding discussion, noting which points ones she’s found credible and which she’s doubted; and then to notice the inner ‘vision’ by which the recognizes her varying degrees of belief:

But examine in this whole discussion of ours what you have seen, what you have believed, what you still do not know, either because I have not spoken of it, or you have not understood, or you have not judged it credible. Among the points which you have seen to be true, distinguish further how you saw them: whether it was by recalling that you had seen them through the body, such as heavenly or earthly bodies, or whether you never perceived them by corporeal sight, but, by looking upon them with your mind only, observed that they are true and certain, such as your own will, about which I believe you when you speak, for it is true I cannot see it myself as it is seen by you. And when you have distinguished between these two, notice, too, how you make your distinction. (De videndo Deo 38; italics added)

Whether we believe or doubt, we see that we do so.  We also see that we we find some sources more credible than others.  Paulina does not place equal credence in the opinions of Augustine and Ambrose.  And she instinctively believes Scripture even more:

Note this, therefore, after you have carefully and faithfully examined and distinguished what you see; in making your distinction assess the actual weight of evidence on what you believe in this whole speech which I have been making to you, since I began to speak to you in this letter, and in it note to what extent you lend your faith to what you do not see. You do not put the same faith in me as you do in Ambrose … ; or if you do think that we are both to be weighed in the same balance, of course you will not compare us in any way with the Gospel, or put our writings on the same footing with the canonical Scriptures. …

Therefore, you yield faith to these words [of Ambrose and myself] in one way, but to the divine words in quite a different way. Perhaps some little doubt has crept into your mind about us; that we may be somewhat less than clear about some of the divine words, and that they are interpreted by us, not as they were said, but as we imagine them. … About the divine Scriptures, however, even when they are not clearly understood, you have no doubt that they are to be believed. But you surely observe and see this weighing of belief or non-belief, and the difficulty of knowing, and the storms of doubt, and the devout faith which is owed to the divine utterances; all these you see in your mind as they are, and you do not doubt in the least that they are in your mind in this way, either as I said them, or, preferably, as you knew them yourself. Therefore, you see your faith, you see your doubt, you see your desire and will to learn, and when you are led by divine authority to believe what you do not see, you see at once that you believe these things; you analyze and distinguish all this. (Ibid. 39f.; italics added)

Importantly, he is not equating intellectual vision with her actual beliefs or doubts, but rather with her ability to perceive differences in her degrees of belief.  He then has her note the difference between this faculty and corporeal vision.

Of course, you will not make any sort of comparison between your bodily eyes and these eyes of your heart, with which you perceive that all this is true and certain, with which you observe and distinguish what is invisibly present to you. (Ibid. 41)

Augustine is turning what might otherwise be an abstruse and sterile technical discussion about ‘seeing’ God into a spiritual exercise and practical demonstration. He is helping Paulina integrate her intellectual vision more fully into her rational consciousness. Before, she, like all of us, engaged in intellectual vision, but somewhat subliminally, as something not fully in awareness.  But by drawing her attention to it, the faculty now becomes more consciously accessible and more acute, even enlarged.  By this means she will be able to eventually exercise it in subtle perceptions of God’s presence and activity in her mind.

As we investigate the meaning of intellectual vision — and especially by observing our own mental operations — it gradually becomes clear that this is no mere abstract epistemological category, but an entire dimension or plane of psychological experience.  We begin to appreciate the reality, vastness and importance of an entire inner reality, a realm perhaps as as vast as the entire universe of sense experience.

Yet despite its importance, intellectual vision operates for most people only subliminally, in the sub- or pre-conscious mind. We constantly apply these subtle mental operations of inner vision, discernment and judgment and could not adaptively function otherwise. But by becoming more conscious of them, we may better integrate this dimension of our being into our rational mental life and social activity, so that both our outer and inner life becomes more holy, virtuous and spiritually authentic

Richard of Saint-Victor

Augustine’s concept of intellectual vision became a staple of medieval Latin Christina thought, and is especially prominent in the writings of Hugh and Richard of Saint-Victor, 12th century writers. To give but one example, Richard’s Adnotationes mysticae in Psalmos 143 distinguishes several distinct aspects of discretion [discretio]:

(1) diiudicatio is the right judgment that directs virtues toward their ends; it is the light that leads us to truth (lucerna cordis iudicium discretionis);

(2) deliberatio makes the distinction between what should and should not be done in a specific situation, taking into account the particular circumstances;

(3) dispositio considers the proper ordering of means for attaining an end;

(4) dispensatio distinguishes what’s appropriate and inappropriate, and reexamines a first judgment when required;

(5) moderatio determines the right measure of the action.

Considering that discretion is only one part of intellectual vision, we can begin to get an idea of the complexity and richness of our subtle mental life.

By the end of the 12th century, the Augustinian tradition had achieved a remarkable synthesis of rationalism and mysticism (and also, though we have not discussed this aspect here, charity as an organizing principle of social life).  This progress halted as Scholasticism and rationalistic dogmatism became a dominating force in the 13th century and beyond, even to present times.  As the rational separated itself from the mystical element of Christianity, so the mystical separated itself from the rational: Pseudo-Dionysian and ‘apophatic’ mysticism submerged the intellectual mystical tradition of Augustine.  This split between rationalism and mysticism remains today.  Augustinian intellectual mysticism may potentially supply a more integral form of Christianity for present times.

Bibliography

Augustine of Hippo. Epistolae 147. De videndo deo. Patrologia Latina 33:596−622. J. P. Migne. Paris, 1841.

Augustine of Hippo. De Genesi ad litteram. Patrologia Latina 34:245−486. J. P. Migne. Paris, 1841.

Cary, Phillip. Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self: The Legacy of a Christian Platonist. Oxford University Press, 2000.

Clark, Mary T. (tr.).  On Seeing God (De videndo Deo; Letter 147. In: Augustine of Hippo, Selected Writings. Classics of Western Spirituality. Paulist Press, 1984; pp. 361−402.

Fraeters, Veerle. Visio/Vision. In: Amy Hollywood & Patricia Z. Beckman (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Christian Mysticism, Cambridge University Press 2012; pp. 178−188.

Hill, Edmund (tr.). The Literal Meaning of Genesis. In: Augustine, On Genesis, New City Press, 2002; ch. 12, pp. 464–475.

Meagher, Robert E. Augustine: On the Inner Life of the Mind. Hackett, 1998.

Parsons, Wilfrid (tr.). Letter 147: Augustine to Paulina (De videndo Deo). Saint Augustine: Letters Vol. 3. Fathers of the Church 20. New York, 1953; pp. 170−224.

Ragazzi, Grazia Mangano. Obeying the Truth: Discretion in the Spiritual Writings of Saint Catherine of Siena. Oxford University Press, 2013; p. 126.

Richard of Saint-Victor. Adnotationes mysticae in Psalmos. Patrologia Latina 196:265−402. J. P. Migne. Paris, 1855. (196:381d−382a)

Schlapbach, Karin. Intellectual vision in Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 12, or: seeing the hidden meaning of images. Studia Patristica 43, 2006, 239−244.

Taylor, John H. (tr.). Saint Augustine: The Literal Meaning of Genesis. Ancient Christian Writers 41 and 42. Paulist Press, 1982.

Zycha, Joseph (ed.). De Genesi ad Litteram libri duodecimo. Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum (CSEL) 28.1. Critical text. Vienna, 1894.

1st draft, 23 Feb 2020

Philo, On Greater and Lesser Vision of God

PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA, in On Rewards and Punishments (De praemiis et poenis), distinguishes two modes by which the devout soul may see God.  One is by the familiar ‘ladder’ of ascending from contemplation of God’s goodness, wisdom and providence as manifest in Creation (cf. Plato, Symposium 201–212).  The second, more exalted kind, is associated with a direct union of God granted by grace.  This contrast is prominent in the history of Christian mysticism, and it’s interesting to see how earlier it appears in Philo (who, of course, is also writing two centuries before Plotinus). Leading up to this passage Philo has reiterated his often-made distinction between three types of holy souls:  the Taught (symbolized by Abraham, one who seeks to learn wisdom from created things, science, and human culture); the Self-taught (symbolized by Isaac, one who acquires wisdom and virtue by following the adage, know thyself); and greatest of all, the Practicer (symbolized by Jacob, the ascetic who uses all available means and discipline in a dedicated quest for holiness).  To Jacob alone is granted the highest ‘vision’ of God — and for this reason he is also called Israel, which, according to Philo, means ‘seeing God.’

[36]
VI. After the self-taught, the man enriched by his natural gifts, the third to reach perfection is the Man of Practice who receives for his special reward the vision of God. …

[37]
In his former years the eyes of his soul had been closed, but by means of continuous striving he began though slowly to open them and to break up and throw off the mist which overshadowed him. For a beam purer than ether and incorporeal suddenly shone upon him and revealed the conceptual world ruled by its charioteer. [see Plato, Phaedrus 246a− 257b]

[38]
That charioteer, ringed as he was with beams of undiluted light, was beyond his sight or conjecture, for the eye was darkened by the dazzling beams. Yet in spite of the fiery stream which flooded it, his sight held its own in its unutterable longing to behold the vision.

[39]
The Father and Saviour perceiving the sincerity of his yearning in pity gave power to the penetration of his eyesight and did not grudge to grant him the vision of Himself in so far as it was possible for mortal and created nature to contain it. Yet the vision only showed that He is, not what He is.

[40]
For this … cannot be discerned by anyone else; to God alone is it permitted to apprehend God.

VII. Now the fact that He is, which can be apprehended under the name of His subsistence, is not apprehended by all or at any rate not in the best way. Some distinctly deny that there is such a thing as the Godhead. Others hesitate and fluctuate as though unable to state whether there is or not. Others whose notions about the subsistence of God are derived through habit rather than thinking from those who brought them up, believe themselves to have successfully attained to religion yet have left on it the imprint of superstition.

[41]
Others again who have had the strength through knowledge to envisage the Maker and Ruler of all have in the common phrase advanced from down to up. Entering the world as into a well-ordered city they have beheld the earth standing fast, highland and lowland full of sown crops and trees and fruits and all kinds of living creatures to boot; also spread over its surface, seas and lakes and rivers both spring fed and winter torrents. They have seen too the air and breezes so happily tempered, the yearly seasons changing in harmonious order, and over all the sun and moon, planets and fixed stars, the whole heaven and heaven’s host, line upon line, a true universe in itself revolving within the universe.

[42]
Struck with admiration and astonishment they arrived at a conception according with what they beheld, that surely all these beauties and this transcendent order has not come into being automatically but by the handiwork of an architect and world maker; also that there must be a providence, for it is a law of nature that a maker should take care of what has been made.

[43]
These no doubt are truly admirable persons and superior to the other classes. They have as I said advanced from down to up by a sort of heavenly ladder and by reason and reflection happily inferred the Creator from His works. But those, if such there be, who have had the power to apprehend Him through Himself without the co-operation of any reasoning process to lead them to the sight, must be recorded as holy and genuine worshippers and friends of God in very truth.

[44]
In their company is he [Jacob] who in the Hebrew is called Israel but in our tongue the God-seer who sees not His real nature, for that, as I said, is impossible— but that He is. And this knowledge he has gained not from any other source, not from things on earth or things in Heaven, not from the elements or combinations of elements mortal or immortal, but at the summons a of Him alone who has willed to reveal His existence as a person to the suppliant.

[45]
How this access has been obtained may be well seen through an illustration. Do we behold the sun which sense perceives by any other thing than the sun, or the stars by any others than the stars, and in general is not light seen by light? In the same way God too is His own brightness and is discerned through Himself alone, without anything co-operating or being able to co-operate in giving a perfect apprehension of His existence.

[46]
They then do but make a happy guess, who are at pains to discern the Uncreated, and Creator of all from His creation …. The seekers for truth are those who envisage God through God, light through light.

Source: Philo, On Rewards and Punishments (De praemiis et poenis) VI.36−VII.46 (tr. Colson)

Bibliography

Colson, F. H. Philo in Ten Volumes, Vol. 8. Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, MA, 1939.

Louth, Andrew. The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition: From Plato to Denys. Oxford, 1983 (repr. 2003); Chapter 2, Philo.

Ryu, Bobby Jang Sun. Knowledge of God in Philo of Alexandria. Mohr Siebeck, 2015. (Dissertation).

Winston, David. Philo of Alexandria: The Contemplative Life, The Giants and Selections. Classics of Western Spirituality. New York: Paulist Press, 1981. (pp. 124−153 collects Philonic excerpts on knowledge of God.)

Philo, On Jacob’s Dream

Jacob’s Dream (detail), St. Paul’s Cathedral, Pittsburgh

WHETHER they exist as metaphysical entities or not, angels are certainly psychologically real — that is, as certain inspirations, communications, subtle insights and promptings and high contemplative experiences that we consider ‘angelic.’ Angels, therefore, are, in terms of Jungian psychology, archetypally real; this is also evident from the proliferation of the angel motif in art, folklore, myth, etc.

The classic treatment of angels in the Bible is the story of Jacob’s Ladder in Genesis, which Philo addressed in his work, On Dreams.. Philo — the great allegorical exegete of the Pentateuch — didn’t write a great many words about this, but what he did write great words!

Note a certain asymmetry with regard to ascending and descending angels in Philo’s discussion. The ascending ones involve the drawing up of our minds to thoughts and ‘spectacles,’ whereas the descending angels heal and quicken the soul. Philo associates angels with the logoi of God, which we may understand as God’s ‘words’, i.e., discrete units of God’s will which direct the world (or, in this case, our mind.)

[146]
XXIII. Such then is that which in the universe is figuratively called stairway. If we consider that which is so called in human beings we shall find it to be soul. Its foot is sense-perception, which is as it were the earthly element in it, and its head, the mind which is wholly unalloyed, the heavenly element, as it may be called.

[147]
Up and down throughout its whole extent are moving incessantly the “words” [λόγοι] of God, drawing it up with them when they ascend and disconnecting it with what is mortal, and exhibiting to it the spectacle of the only objects worthy of our gaze; and when they descend not casting it down, for neither does God nor does a divine Word cause harm, but condescending out of love for man and compassion for our race, to be helpers and comrades, that with the healing of their breath they may quicken into new life the soul which is still borne along in the body as in a river.

[148]
In the understandings of those who have been purified to the utmost the Ruler of the universe walks noiselessly, alone, invisibly, for verily there is an oracle once vouchsafed to the Sage, in which it is said: “I will walk in you, and will be your God” (Lev. 26:12): but in the understandings of those who are still undergoing cleansing and have not yet fully washed their life defiled and stained by the body’s weight there walk angels, divine words, making them bright and clean with the doctrines* of all that is good and beautiful.  Source: Philo, On Dreams (De somniis) 1.146ff, tr. Colson & Whitaker, p. 375.

* this word is uncertain in manuscripts.

Bibliography

Colson, F.H.; Whitaker, G. H.  On Dreams.  In: Philo in Ten Volumes, Vol. 5. Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, MA, 1938.

The Great Prayer of St. Augustine

Art: Unknown.

BETWEEN the time of his conversion and his baptism, St. Augustine retired with his family and friends to a villa in Casciago in the beautiful lake region north of Milan. There he wrote several dialogues in the manner of Cicero, including the Soliloquies. Years later Augustine described his conversion in the Confessions, but here we have, as it were, a direct window into his mind at this important period of his life. The Soliloquies opens with an inspired and impassioned prayer — full of phrases from the Neoplatonist Plotinus and the Bible.

While I was turning over in my mind many and divers matters, searching ceaselessly and intently through many a day for my very own self and my good, and what evil should be avoided, all at once a voice spoke to me— whether it was myself or another inside or outside of me I do not know, for that is the very thing I am endeavoring to find out. Reason thereupon spoke to me as follows:

Reason. Now then, suppose you had discovered something, to what would you consign it, in order that you might proceed to other matters?

Augustine. To memory, of course.

R. Is memory of such virtue that it well preserves all that has been thought out?

A. That is difficult; in fact, it is impossible.

R. It must be written down, then. But, what are you going to do now that your poor health shirks the task of writing? These matters ought not to be dictated, for they demand real solitude.

A. You speak the truth. Wherefore, I really do not know what I am to do.

2.
O God, the Founder of the Universe, grant me first of all that I may fittingly supplicate Thee; next, that I may so act that I may be worthy of a hearing from Thee; finally, I beg Thee to set me free.
O God, through whom all those things, which of themselves would not exist, strive to be.
O God, who dost not permit to perish even that which is self-destructive.
O God, who from nothing hast created this world which every eye sees to be most beautiful.
O God, who dost not cause evil, and who dost cause that it become not most evil.
O God, who, to those few who have their refuge in that which truly is, dost show that evil is nothing.
O God, through whom the universe, even with its sinister side, is perfect.
O God, by whose ordinance the uttermost discord is as naught, since the less perfect things are in harmony with the more perfect.’
O God, whom everything loves which is capable of loving whether knowingly or unknowingly.
O God, in whom are all things—and yet the shamefulness of every creature does not shame Thee, their wickedness does not harm Thee, nor docs their error deceive Thee.
O God, who hast not willed that any save the pure should know the True.
O God, the Father of Truth, the Father of Wisdom, Father of True and Supreme Life, Father of Happiness, Father of the Good and the Beautiful, Father of Intelligible Light, Father of our watching and our enlightenment, Father of the covenant by which we are admonished to return to Thee.

3.
I call upon Thee, O God the Truth, in whom and by whom and through whom all those things are true which are true.
O God, Wisdom, in whom and by whom and through whom all those are wise who are wise.
O God, True and Supreme Life, in whom and by whom and through whom all those things live which truly and perfectly live.
O God, Happiness, in whom and by whom and through whom all those things are happy which are happy.
O God, the Good and the Beautiful, in whom and by whom and through whom all those things are good and beautiful which are good and beautiful.
O God, Intelligible Light, in whom and by whom and through whom all those things which have intelligible light have their intelligible light.
O God, whose domain is the whole world unknown to sense.
O God, from whose realm law is promulgated even in these regions.
O God, from whom to turn away is to fall, to whom to turn is to rise again, in whom to abide is to stand firm.
O God, from whom to depart is to die, to whom to return is to be revived, in whom to dwell is to live.
O God, whom no one loses unless deceived, whom no one seeks unless admonished, whom no one finds unless he is purified.
O God, whom to abandon is to perish, whom to heed is to love, whom to see is to possess.
O God, to whom Faith moves us, Hope raises us, Charity unites us.
O God, through whom we overcome the enemy, Thee do I pray.
O God, through whom we obtain that we do not altogether perish.
O God, by whom we are admonished to be ever watchful.
O God, through whom we discern the good from the evil.
O God, through whom we flee evil and follow after good.
O God, through whom we are not overcome by afflictions.
O God, through whom we fittingly serve and fittingly rule.
O God, through whom we learn that that is alien to us which once we thought was meet for us, and that is meet which we used to think was alien.
O God, through whom we cling not to the charms and lures of evil.
O God, through whom deprivations do not abase us.
O God, through whom what is better in us is not under the dominion of our lower self.
O God, through whom death is swallowed up in victory.
O God, who dost convert us, stripping us of that which is not and clothing us with that which Is.
O God, who makest us worthy to be heard.
O God, who strengthenest us; who leadest us into all truth.
O God, who speakest to us of all good things; who dost not drive us out of our mind, nor permittest that anyone else do so.
O God, who callest us back to the way; who leadest us to the gate; who grantest that it is opened to those who knock.
O God, who givest us the bread of life.
O God, through whom we thirst for the cup, which when it is drunk we shall thirst no more.
O God, who dost convince the world of sin, of justice, and of judgment.
O God, through whom we are not shaken by those who have no faith.
O God, through whom we denounce the error of those who think that the merits of souls are naught before Thee.
O God, through whom we do not serve weak and beggarly elements.
O God, who dost cleanse us, who dost make us ready for divine rewards, graciously come to me.

4.
Whatever I have said, come to my aid, Thou, the one God, the one, eternal, true substance in whom there is no strife, no disorder, no change, no need, no death; where there is supreme harmony, supreme clarity, supreme permanence, supreme fullness, supreme life; where there is no deficiency and no excess; where the One begetting and the One begotten is One.
O God, who art served by all things which serve, who art obeyed by every good soul.
O God, by whose laws the poles revolve, the stars follow their courses, the sun rules the day, and the moon presides over the night; and all the world maintains, as far as this world of sense allows, the wondrous stability of things by means of the orders and recurrences of seasons: through the days by the changing of light and darkness, through the months by the moon’s progressions and declines, through the years by the successions of spring, summer, autumn, and winter, through the cycles by the completion of the sun’s course, through the great eras of time by the return of the stars to their starting points.
O God, by whose ever-enduring laws the varying movement of movable things is not suffered to be disturbed, and is always restored to a relative stability by the controls of the encompassing ages.
O God, by whose laws the choice of the soul is free, and rewards to the good and chastisements to the wicked are meted out in accord with inexorable and universal destiny.
O God, from whom all good things flow even unto us, and by whom all evil things are kept away from us.
O God, above whom, beyond whom, and without whom nothing exists.
O God, under whom everything is, in whom everything is, with whom everything is.
O God, who hast made man to Thine image and likeness, a fact which he acknowledges who knows himself.
Hear, hear, O hear me, my God, my Lord, my King, my Father, my Cause, my Hope, my Wealth, my Honor, my Home, my Native Land, my Salvation, my Light, my Life.
Hear, hear, O hear me, in that way of Thine well known to a select few.

5.
Thee alone do I love; Thee alone do I follow; Thee alone do I seek; Thee alone am I ready to serve, for Thou alone hast just dominion; under Thy sway do I long to be.
Order, I beg Thee, and command what Thou wilt, but heal and open my ears, so that with them I may hear Thy words.
Heal and open my eyes so that with them I may perceive Thy wishes.
Banish from me my senselessness, so that I may know Thee.
Tell me where I should turn that I may behold Thee; and I hope I shall do all Thou hast commanded me.
Look, I beseech Thee, upon Thy prodigal, O Lord, kindest Father; already have I been punished enough; long enough have I served Thine enemies whom Thou hast beneath Thy feet; long enough have I been the plaything of deceits. Receive me Thy servant as I flee from them, for they took me in a stranger when I was fleeing from Thee.
I realize I must return to Thee. Let Thy door be open to my knocking. Teach me how to come to Thee. Nothing else do I have but willingness. Naught else do I know save that fleeting and perishable things are to be spurned, certain and eternal things to be sought after. This I do, O Father, because this is all I know, but how I am to reach Thee I know not.
Do Thou inspire me, show me, give me what I need for my journey.
If it is by faith that they find Thee who have recourse to Thee, give me faith; if it is through virtue, give me virtue; if it is by knowledge, give knowledge to me. Grant me increase of faith, of hope, and of charity. O how marvelous and extraordinary is Thy goodness.

6.
To Thee do I appeal, and once more I beg of Thee the very means by which appeal is made to Thee. For, if Thou shouldst abandon us, we are lost; but Thou dost not abandon us, because Thou art the Supreme Good whom no one ever rightly sought and entirely failed to find. And, indeed, every one hast rightly sought Thee whom Thou hast enabled to seek Thee aright. Grant that I may seek Thee, my Father; save me from error. When I seek Thee, let me not find aught else but Thee, I beseech Thee, Father. But, if there is in me any vain desire, do Thou Thyself cleanse me and make me fit to look upon Thee.

With regard to the health of this my mortal body, so long as I am ignorant of its usefulness to me or to those whom I love, I entrust it to Thee, O wisest and best of Fathers, and I shall pray for it as Thou shalt in good time advise me. This only I shall ask of Thine extreme kindness, that Thou convertest me wholly to Thee, and that Thou allowest nothing to prevent me when I wend my way to Thee. I beg Thee to command, while I move and bear this my body, that I may be pure, generous, just, and prudent; that I may be a perfect lover and knower of Thy Wisdom; that I may be worthy of Thy dwelling place, and that I may in fact dwell in Thy most blessed kingdom. Amen. Amen.  (Source: Soliloquies 1.1−6; Migne PL 32 cols 869−872; tr. Gilligan pp. 343−350).

Bibliography

Augustini Hipponensis. Soliloquia (Soliloquiorum libri II). Migne Patrologia Latina vol. 32, cols. 869−904, Paris, 1841. Latin text.

Gilligan, Thomas F. St. Augustine: Soliloquies. In: Schopp, Ludwig (ed), Writings of St. Augustine, Vol. 1.  (Fathers of the Church, Vol. 5). CUA Press, 1947 (repr. 2008); pp. 333−426. English translation.

The Seven Virtues and Fifty Subvirtues of Medieval Christianity

Tree of Virtues from Speculum Virginum, Walters Art Museum Ms. W.72, fol. 26r.

BEGINNING in the 11th century we find in Western medieval manuscripts frequent portrayal of virtues and vices as tree diagrams.  These vary in details, but always include the four cardinal virtues of the Greek ethical tradition (Fortitude, Temperance,  Prudence and Justice) and the three theological virtues (Faith, Hope and Charity) of Christianity.  Each virtue is shown as a branch of the tree accompanied by seven sub-virtues (Charity may have up to ten sub-virtues, so we’ll say roughly fifty subvirtues in total) as leaves.  Often a parallel tree of the seven deadly vices and their sub-vices accompanies the Tree of Virtues.  Pride (superbia) is considered the common root of all vices, and Humility (humilitas) of all virtues.

The best-known of these figures appear in a 12th century work called the Speculum virginum (Mirror of Virgins), a devotional work intended for the spiritual formation of nuns and attributed to Conrad of Hirsau. (Mews, 2001 supplies a wealth of information on the Speculum virginum.)

The Speculum virginum shows the Tree of Virtue and Tree of Vices side by side on facing pages, as below:

Tree of Vices (left) and Tree of Virtues (right), Walters MS W.72, fols. 25v-26r

The trees in the Speculum virginum are based on an earlier work, De fructibus carnis et spiritus (On the Fruits of the Flesh and Spirit), sometimes attributed to Hugh of St. Victor, but possibly written by Conrad of Hirsau.  The Prologue of De fructibus introduces the two trees as follows:

SINCE every word of Divine Scripture aims to convince one of the good of humility, and to advise more attentively to decline the evil of pride, especially since on the one hand it is the beginning of salvation and life, and on the other of ruin, it seems necessary that the fruit and efficacy of humility and pride itself should be seen as a form visible to the devotee of virtues, to show … in so far one is the imitator of either species, of pride, or of humility, the quality of the fruits, and what reward one obtains from the execution of either. Therefore, we present two trees, different in fruit and growth, both rough and young, to each of the opposites, with vices or virtues attached to them; with a few definitions, from whose root the fruits proceed, and which tree is to be chosen from the two, attracted by the fruit, one can discern. Indeed pride is the root of the fruit of the flesh, humility the fruit of the spirit. This diversity, looking at the roots, shows the appetite of those who seek their fruits in moderation. Old Adam places himself in the castle of the wicked tree. The new Adam obtains the guidance of the spiritual results. If, therefore, the more excellent is the worse, that is, you have joined the good to the evil from the other side, which stands out in these, and which you have strongly understood to predominate. For when the qualities of the opposites are compared, a better estimation will soon be evident. Therefore, having looked at our roots, branches, and fruits, it is up to you to choose what you will.
(Source: De fructibus carnis et spiritus; Prologue; my translation)

At issue is a fundamental distinction between a soul organized by (in St. Paul’s terms; e.g., Romans 8) carnal mindedness or by spiritual mindedness.  St. Augustine’s elaboration of the distinction — love of the world and love of God — respectively came to virtually define ethical psychology in the Middle Ages. 

The evil tree on the left appears under the rubric Vetus Adam (Old Adam), or man unredeemed. Rooted in superbia (Pride),  its crowning fruit is luxuria (Sensory Pleasure) and it is prominently labeled Babylonia, or a city of confusion.

The good tree on the right appears under the rubric Novus Adam (New Adam), or a regenerated person in a state of grace. Rooted in Humilitas (Humility), its crowning fruit is Caritas (Charity) and it is labeled Hierosolyma (Jerusalem; city of peace). For more discussion on the significance of these trees, and especially how they relate to medieval Christianity’s central empahsis on Charity, see Robertson (1951).

Humility, we should note, is meant in the Christian sense as (1) an accurate recognition of one’s own sinfulness, frailty, ignorance and utter dependence on God, and (2) a subordination of one’s own will to God’s. Pride does not mean arrogance, conceit, or self-aggrandizement so much as self-will.

More than a simple device to assist in the memorization of ethical doctrine, these and the several other figures in the Speculum are conceptual tools.  They supply an interiorly retained image, with which one may visualize internal psychological processes and form productive associational structures, promoting integration of spiritual mindendess into ones personality.

The seven Virtues and their sub-virtues are listed below.  The selection of sub-virtues and their definitions appears influenced by a variety of patristic and biblical sources. The vices and subvices are described in a separate post here.

Update:  Since posting this I’ve added a related article, The Thirty Seraphic Virtues of the Middle Ages.

❧

PRUDENCE (prudentia)

• Fear of God (timor Domini)
• Promptness (alacritas)
• Counsel (consilium)
• Memory (memoria)
• Intelligence (intelligentia)
• Foresight (providentia)
• Deliberation (deliberatio)

JUSTICE (justitia )

• Law (lex)
• Strictness (severitas)
• Equity (aequitas)
• Correction (correctio; Correctio est erroris innati vel consuetudine introducti freno rationis inhibitio.)
• Honoring a pledge (jurisjurandi observatio; Jurisjurandi observatio est quae, plebescito civibus promulgato, transgressionem ejus temerariam arcet praestito juramento de conservatione illius perpetua.)
• Judgment (judicium)
• Truth (veritas)

COURAGE (fortitudo)

• Magnanimity (magnanimitas)
• Fidelity (fiducia)
• Tolerance (tolerantia)
• Rest (requies)
• Stability (stabilitas)
• Constancy (constantia)
• Perseverance (perseverantia)

TEMPERANCE (temperantia)

• Discernment (discretio)
• Obedience; acquiescence (morigeratio)
• Silence (taciturnitas)
• Fasting (jejunium)
• Sobriety (sobrietas)
• Physical penance; mortification of flesh (afflictio carnis; Afflictio carnis est per quem lascivae mentis seminaria castigatione discreta comprimuntur.)
• Contempt of the world (contemptus saeculi)

FAITH (fides)

• Pratice of religion (religio)
• Decorum (munditia; Munditia est consummata integritas utriusque hominis intuitu divini vel amoris vel timoris.)
• Obedience (obedientia)
• Chastity (castitas)
• Reverence (reverentia)
• Continence (continentia)
• Good desire (affectus)

HOPE (spes)

• Heavenly contemplation (contemplatio supernorum; Contemplatio supernorum est per sublevatae mentis jubilum mors carnalium affectuum).
• Joy (gaudium)
• Modesty (modestia)
• Confession (confessio)
• Patience (patientia)
• Sorrow for faults (compunctio)
• Longsuffering (longanimitas)

CHARITY (caritas)

• Forgiveness (gratia)
• Peace (pax)
• Piety (pietas)
• Mildness; leniency(mansuetudo)
• Liberality (liberalitas)
• Mercy (misericordia)
• Indulgence (indulgentia)
• Compassion (compassio)
• Benignity (benignitas)
• Concord (concordia)

❧

Bibliography

Goggin, Cheryl Gohdes. Copying manuscript illuminations: The Trees of Vices and Virtues. Visual Resources, 2004, 20:2-3, 179−198. https://doi.org/10.1080/0197376042000207552

Hugo de S. Victore (attr.). De fructibus carnis et spiritus. J. P. Migne. Patrologia Latina, Paris, 1854; cols. 997−1010 (rough diagrams of the Tree of Vices and Tree of Virtues appear at the end of the work).  Latin text is online: http://mlat.uzh.ch/?c=2&w=HuDeSVi.DeFrCaE

Katzenellenbogen, Adolf. Allegories of the Virtues and Vices in Medieval Art from Christian Times to the Thirteenth Century. Alan J. P. Crick (tr.). London: Warburg Institute, 1939.

Mews, Constant J. (ed.). Listen, Daughter: The “Speculum virginum” and the Formation of Religious Women in the Middle Ages. The New Middle Ages Series. Palgrave, 2001.  Pages 15−40.

Powell, Morgan. Gender, Reading, and Truth in the Twelfth Century: The Woman in the Mirror. Arc Humanities Press, 2020.

Robertson, D. W. The Doctrine of Charity in Mediaeval Literary Gardens: A Topical Approach through Symbolism and Allegory. Speculum, vol. 26, no. 1, 1951, pp. 24–49. Reprinted in: Robertson, Durant Waite. Essays in Medieval Culture. Princeton University Press, 1980 (repr. 2014); pp. 21−50.

Tucker, Shawn R. The Virtues and Vices in the Arts: A Sourcebook. Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2015.

Watson, Arthur. The Speculum Virginum with special reference to the Tree of Jesse. Speculum, vol. 3, no. 4, 1928, pp. 445–69.

Art: “Tree of Virtues” from Speculum Virginum, Walters Art Museum Ms. W.72, fol. 26r; early 13th century manuscript from the Cistercian abbey of Himmerode, Germany. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Virtues_Speculum_Virginum_W72_26r.jpg

 

Contemplative Christianity in the 13th and 14th Centuries: Latin West

(click image to view in high resolution)

HERE we extend the previous timeline forward to the 13th and 14th centuries.
Legend: Olive = Benedictine; Light green: Cistercian; Purple: Dominican; Orange = Carthusian; Dark blue = Augustinian; Light blue = Other.

Recommended Reading

Egan, Harvey D. An Anthology of Christian Mysticism. Liturgical Press, 1991.

McGinn, Bernard. The Flowering of Mysticism: Men and Women in the New Mysticism (1200−1350). (Vol. 3 of B. McGinn, The Presence of God: A History of Western Christian Mysticism.) New York: Crossroad, 1998.