Cicero’s 28 Proofs of the Immortality of the Human Soul

MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO (109−43 BC) was a great Roman statesman and philosopher, a contemporary of Julius Caesar. As a young man he studied in Athens and Rhodes with many of the greatest Greek philosophers of his times, including Platonists, Aristotelians and Stoics.  In addition to his political, legal and rhetorical accomplishments (he served, for example as consul, the highest political office of the Roman Republic) he had an abiding interest in religious matters.

In 45 BC, during an intensive phase of writing, he produced in rapid succession four major works on religion:  (1) the Consolatio (a lost work, except for fragments), Tusculan Disputations (Book 1, the main focus of our discussion here, deals with immortality of the soul and Books 2−5 with Stoic philosophy), On the Nature of the Gods, and On Divination.  This final phase of his multifaceted career dedicated to writing was prompted by three factors. First was the untimely death of his beloved daughter, Tullia, during childbirth — an event which put Cicero in a profound depression. Second, during the tumultuous events and civil wars in the final years of the Republic (before Julius Caesar inaugurated the Roman Empire), Cicero — whose idealism was no match for the armies of Caesar and Pompey or the vast wealth of Crassus — fled into retirement and seclusion.  Third, as he tells us, fearful of Rome’s future, he wished to preserve and transmit the treasures of Greek philosophy to future generations of Romans.

The Consolatio was his most immediate ad direct attempt to console himself at the loss of Tullia.  Modeled on similar works that had been written at least since the time of Aristotle, it touched on a number of themes, including evidence of the soul’s immortality, the pains and problems of this life which death releases us from, and bearing loss of a loved one without undue pain or suffering.  A few months later Cicero produced a more concentrated and systematic study of the soul’s immortality, Book 1 of Tusculan Disputations.  In this dialogue Cicero follows two lines of thought, both aimed to relieve the fear of death: (1) the human soul is immortal; and (2) even if not, death is no harm (e.g., if we are no longer conscious, we cannot experience any pain).  Our main interest here is the many arguments Cicero invokes in Book 1 for the soul’s immortality.

As was his practice generally, in writing this Cicero had at hand a range of books by earlier philosophers, including handbooks summarizing the theories of many authors.  The views of Plato (especially his arguments for the soul’s immortality found in the dialogues Phaedo and Phaedrus), Aristotle, and certain Stoics (e.g., Posidonius, one of Cicero’s teachers, and Panaetius) are in the forefront.  Therefore we can learn a great deal about ancient views of immortality from this work.  Additional, related material can be found in On the Nature of the Gods, On Divination, and On Old Age. Although Tusculan Disputations 1 is our main concern here, arguments in these other sources will be noted when appropriate.

As he wrote in dialogue form, it’s sometimes not especially easy to identify Cicero’s own views on a particular topic.  Concerning immortality of the soul and on religion generally, the most typical persona he presents is that of an Academic (i.e., Platonist) skeptic.  Like more radical Pyrrhonists, Academic skeptics claimed that absolute certainty on any philosophical question was impossible; however, unlike Pyrrhonists, the allowed for probabilistic conclusions to be drawn based on a preponderance of evidence.  Nevertheless, it’s hard to read Cicero’s religious works without suspecting his personal belief in the gods and the immortality of the human soul.  On the latter point, we also know that he seriously considered building a shrine dedicated to Tullia after her death, expressing the belief that this might help to achieve her deification.

As in the case of Plato’s discussions of the soul’s immortality, none of the many arguments Cicero presents are fully logically compelling. However, also like Plato, Cicero aims for something potentially more important than logical proof: to elevate our mind and raise our consciousness such that we may gain an intuitive insight into the soul’s immortality.  This is done by (1) focusing our attention and interest on what the soul is, and (2) sharpening the critical discernment (what the Greeks called diakrisis) of our higher intelligence.  As we do this, we’re simultaneously forced to withdraw our attention from worldly concerns, which drag down, distract and confuse the Intelligence.

Cicero — like Plato — is a great artist.  Indeed, he is one of the greatest rhetoricians in human history. Reading his works is itself meant to be a transformative experience.  Reading and reflecting on the lofty themes he presents, we regain our true condition as contemplative beings with exalted souls.  Not only may this enable us to glimpse our soul and see its immortality, but also, as long as we are doing this, we become that very part of our soul which is immortal.

For convenience, arguments below are presented in the order in which they appear in Tusculan Disputations 1.  Here the effort has been made to identify as many separate arguments as possible, rather than to (as most commentators have done) aggregate them.  Among other things, this more atomistic approach (see Uebersax, 2015) will facilitate tracing the history of individual proofs through later centuries.

A helpful online edition of Tusculan Disputations 1 can be found here.

Notation: References to Tusculan Disputations 1 are given as paragraph numbers, preceded by the symbol §; these should not be confused with chapter divisions. References to other works of Cicero are given as book.chapter.paragraph, or (for works comprised of a single book) chapter.paragraph.  The following abbreviations/titles are used:

Amic. = De amicitia (On Friendship)

Fin. = De finibus (On Ends)

Leg. = De legibus (On Laws)

N.D. = De natura deorum (On the Nature of the Gods)

Off. = De officiis (On Moral Duties)

Rep. = De republica (On the Republic)

Sen. = De senectute (On Old Age)

Arguments from Tradition and Consensus

1. Argument from antiquity
§ 26 f.; cf. Amic. 4.13

Our ancestors — wiser than us — instituted rites and memorials for the dead, motivated by a belief in the soul’s immortality.

2. Deified humans
§ 28 f.; cf. N.D. 2.24.62

Many traditional immortal gods (e.g., Hercules) are deified human beings, whose existence is verified by appearances in visions and intervention in human affairs. See Hesiod, Works and Days 121−126, 252–255, where souls of the righteous may return to earth as guardian spirits (daimones hagnoi; δαίμονες ἁγνοὶ). Cf. cures, miracles, visions, etc.  attributed to Christian saints.

3. Argument from general consensus
§ 30, § 35 f.; cf. N.D. 2.2.4; Div. 1.1.2

All nations perform funeral rites, memorialize the dead, and believe in survival of the soul. The agreement of all peoples implies a natural instinct and is to be viewed as ‘the voice of Nature’ (omnium consensus naturae vox est). According to Stoic philosophy, all Nature is providentially and purposefully directed; a tacit minor premise here, therefore, is that Nature would not implant a false instinctive belief. Stoics used this argument to prove the existence of the gods, and Cicero adapts it to immortality of the soul.  Although Cicero does not state this, implicit in the argument is that each person can verify by introspection that they possess this instinctive belief.

Interestingly, Cicero states that the reason people wail and prostrate themselves at funerals is not to express anguish at their personal loss, but in grief for the deceased soul which must now survive without the accustomed comforts of earthly existence and is sensible of this loss.

4. Interest in future
§ 31

All people are deeply and instinctively concerned about what will happen in the world after their death: they beget children, write wills, compose epitaphs, design monuments, etc.  This would make no sense if our consciousness simply ceased; rather, it implies some form of ongoing awareness of events, of others’ welfare, etc.

5. A ‘bodhisattva instinct’
§ 32

The most virtuous and wise people regard themselves as having come into the world to protect and serve humanity. We revere such individuals as the finest members of our species.  This argument is subtly different from 7 below. There, noble self-sacrifice is itself evidence of an immortal soul. Here the proof is psychological: that we instinctively regard this as the ideal of human nature — that is, our reverence for such people and their actions is a separate proof.

6. Military heroism
§ 32

Especially revealing are the actions of those who heroically sacrifice their lives in battle or even voluntarily undergo torture (Off. 3.26.99) for the sake of their country.  “No one would ever have exposed himself to death for his country without good hope of immortality.”

7. Other great personal sacrifices 
§ 34 ff.

Again, but for expectation of future reward and glory, nobody would pass their life in toil and peril to accomplish great things. “Even philosophers who teach contempt for fame place their names on their books.” Unlike the modern view — i.e., that such actions are motivated by pure altruism and love of others — Cicero asserts that such sacrifices are made at least partly with the aim of attaining eternal life and glory. Neither is the goal merely to be remembered and honored by future generations, but for the soul to survive and enjoy the benefits of its glory.  Earthly fame will in any case eventually fade and is negligible in comparison to eternal favor of the gods and immortality earned as a reward for great virtue, heroism and self-sacrifice.

8. Argument from authority
§ 38 f.; cf. Sen 21.77, 21.83; Amic. 4.13

The wisest and most virtuous (Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato are mentioned by name) assert the immortality of the soul.

Miscellaneous Arguments

9. Physical arguments
§§ 40−43

Cicero begins with a fairly diffuse set of observations which, while by no means comprise a syllogistic argument, do converge on the notion that the soul’s ultimate destiny is celestial. He begins by positing as uncontested facts of (ancient) science that (1) the earth is in the center of the universe, located between a subterranean realm and the sky regions; and (2) all things consist of four elements: earth, water, air and fire. The rapidity of the soul’s operations rules out its consisting of earth or water, so it must consist of air and/or fire (or Aristotle’s hypothetical fifth element).  As air and fire naturally rise, so must the soul after death.  To facilitate this ascent and to penetrate any barriers between regions, the soul (Cicero states) must remain intact. Hence it remains after death.

10. Celestial order and splendor
§ 47, § 62, §§ 68−70; cf. N.D. 2.2.4 f.; N.D. 2.15.40−17.44; N. D. 2.56.140; Rep. 3.2.3; Rep. 6.15.15; Leg. 1.9.26; cf. Scipio’s Dream = Rep. 6.9.9−6.26.29

The spectacle of the night sky and orderly movements of stars and planets plainly reveal the wisdom, goodness and power of God. An all-powerful, all beneficent God would not deny human beings an immortal soul. While Cicero doesn’t make this argument in so many words, it runs just below the surface of his religious works so consistently that we should include it.

Throughout his works Cicero notes our intense interest in beholding the celestial vault and in astronomical science — suggesting some basic affinity between our souls and stars. A revealing discussion of the doctrine of sidereal immortality in Greco-Roman religion, including Cicero’s treatment of it in Tusculan Disputations 1, is found in Cumont (1912; 92−110).  In his late teens Cicero translated the Phaenomena of Aratus (315−240 BC), a poem on the constellations, from Latin into Greek — with sufficient skill that the translation was known to Lucretius.

11. Consciousness in soul, not senses
§ 46

Loss of conscious sensation during intense absorbed thought or sickness, despite functioning sense organs, shows that perception occurs in the soul.

12. Common sensory pathway
§ 46

Similarly, using the same mind/soul we have conscious perception of things as diverse as sights, sounds, smells, etc.

13. Know Thyself a divine mandate
§ 52; more fully developed in Leg. 1.22.59

“Know Thyself” would not have been given to us by the gods themselves unless the human soul were divine: “For he who knows himself will realize, in the first place, that he has a divine element within him, and will think of his own inner nature as a kind of consecrated image of God; and so he will always act and think in a way worthy of so great a gift of the gods, and, when he has examined and thoroughly tested himself, he will understand how nobly equipped by Nature he entered life, and what manifold means he possesses for the attainment and acquisition of wisdom.” (Leg. 1.22.59)

Platonic Arguments

We now move to more distinctively Platonic proofs — viz. proofs Plato explicitly presents in Phaedo (which relates Socrates’ conversations immediately before his death) and other dialogues, or which are otherwise directly implied by Platonic doctrines.

14. Self-moving
§§ 53−55, § 66; cf. Sen. 21.78; N. D. 2.12.32; Plato Phaedrus 245

The soul moves the body, but is itself not moved by anything else. Therefore nothing external could have first initiated its motion, nor can anything external cause its activity to cease.

15. Indivisibility
§ 56, § 71; cf. Sen. 21.78; Plato Phaedo 78b-d; Plato Republic 611b

The soul is uncompounded, unitary and indivisible.  Therefore it is not subject to decay or dissolution.

16. Recollection argument
§57 f.; Sen. 21.78; Plato Phaedo 72e–77d

Plato asserts that the most important kinds of human knowledge (e.g., principles of mathematics, logic and morality) are not taught, but are innate and merely remembered or recollected (anamnesis = unforgetting).  Plato famously illustrates this in his dialogue, Meno (83−85), where an uneducated slave boy is able to prove a sophisticated theorem of geometry by merely giving common sense answers to a series of prompting questions. This suggests to Plato a pre-existence; and if our souls existed before this life, they will exist after this life.

17. Soul a Form
§41; cf. Plato’s affinity argument in Phaedo 78b–84b

Cicero briefly mentions the Pythagorean notion that the soul is a “number” — by which is meant a unique, ideal and perfect pattern or set of relationships (which could, in theory, all be expressed mathematically).  As such it would be a Platonic Form, eternal and existing in the realm of pure Being, outside space and time.  Cicero does not develop the argument, however.

18. Scale of Existence
§ 56, § 65 ff.; N.D. 2.12.33−14.39; Leg. 1.7.22−8.25; see Dougan 242 f.

There is a scale according to which all existing things (inanimate objects, plants, animals, man, gods) are ordered.  Man and gods are kindred by virtue of their shared capacity for Reason. Cicero presents the argument more clearly in De legibus.

19. Infinite yearning for knowledge
§§ 44−47; cf. Plato Phaedrus 247c

Nature has planted in our minds an insatiable longing to see truth.” This can be satisfied only after the soul escapes the confinement and inherent limitations of the body.  This applies not only to new intellectual and spiritual knowledge, but, also, Cicero suggests, in an actual physical sense: “What, pray, do we think the panorama will be like when [from a celestial vantage point] we shall be free to embrace the whole earth in our survey.”

Divine Powers of  Soul

Cicero next discusses various powers of the human mind which suggest a divine — and, by extension, an immortal — nature.

20. Capacity of memory
§ 59 ff.; cf. Sen. 21.78

Besides its possible connection with pre-existence, the sheer capacity of our memory supplies, Cicero suggests, evidence of our soul’s divinity.  What material substance, Cicero asks, could store such a large, virtually infinite amount of information, instantly retrievable.  Given what we now know of brain physiology, this argument is less persuasive for us than it might have been in antiquity.

21. Rapidity of thought
§ 70; cf. Sen. 21.78

The speed of thought processes seems inconsistent with a physical basis.  Again, this argument is less persuasive to modern readers.

22. Human genius
§ 61 ff.; cf. Sen. 21.78

Human beings have a vast and incredible capacity to invent (inventio) and discover in fields as diverse as literature, science, art, music and government.  Indeed, our creative imagination appears limitless. His litany of humankind’s accomplishments is supremely eloquent, itself an example of genius: “In order to persuade us of the divinity of the soul, Cicero extols the splendour of the universe and raises the tone of his language to match the lofty topic” (Kennedy, p. 95).

23. Astronomy
(see 10 above)

Especially because of its prevalence throughout his religious works, we may single out astronomy for special consideration.  Nature, Cicero tells us, providentially supplied the heavenly bodies and their orderly movements.  It also designed the human body with an upright posture, our heads raised, to make the sky more visible.  We first charted the movements of stars of necessity, to mark seasons and time agriculture.  From this came mathematics, and from that all further sciences and technology that rely on mathematics.

24. Inspired philosophy, religion, poetry
§§ 64−67; cf. Leg. 1.22.58; Amic. 57; Sen. 40; Off. 2.5

Poetry, philosophy, and especially religion are divine activities, things worthy of gods.

25. Divination
§ 66; cf. Div. 1; Sen. 21.78; Sextus Empiricus Phys. 1.20−23. = Aristotle On Philosophy Ross fr. 12a

Cicero had considerable interest in divination.  His views on the topic, as inferred from his discussion in many writings, are subject to some debate.  In On Divination he distinguishes two varieties of divination:  natural (e.g., dreams and prophecies uttered in ecstatic trances) and technical (e.g., ceremonial interpretation of animal entrails or flights of birds).  A reasonable hypothesis that might accommodate his various statements is that he accepted the validity of natural divination, but was more skeptical of the technical kind.

In Div. 1.5.9, he argues that if divination exists, it means the gods exist (since they use this means to communicate knowledge of future events to us).  While he does not state it explicitly, it seems straightforward to extend this reasoning by adding “and if the gods exist and communicate with us, it means we are divine — and if divine, then immortal.”

By divination Cicero chiefly means supernatural prediction of future events.  However other forms of extrasensory perception, like telepathy and clairvoyance, might equally be taken as evidence of the soul’s divinity and immortality.

26. Affinity with God’s nature
§ 66 f.; cf. N.D. 2.15.40−42; Fin. 4.5.11; Rep. 6.15.15

“And indeed God Himself, who is comprehended by us, can be comprehended in no other way save as a mind unfettered and free, severed from all perishable matter, conscious of all and moving all and self-endowed with perpetual motion.. Of such sort and of the same nature is the human mind.” Cicero also alludes to the possibility than both gods and human souls are composed of Aristotle’s hypothetical fifth element.

27. Unseen Governor analogy
§ 68 ff.; cf. N.D. 2.32.81–35.90

While we cannot see God, we infer God’s existence from what we can see: the order, beauty and wonder of the universe.  Analogously, while we do not see our own divine nature, we may infer it from the vast, orderly and wonderful extent and coordination of its activities.  More of Cicero’s eloquence is on display here.

Direct Awareness

28. Introspection and existential experience
§ 55; cf. § 52

In § 55 Cicero writes, “The soul then is conscious that it is in motion, and when so conscious it is at the same time conscious of this, that it is self-moved by its own power and not an outside power, and that it cannot ever be abandoned by itself; and this is proof of eternity.”  This and similar statements might be interpreted to mean that, by means of introspection, one may gain some form of experiential proof of the soul’s divinity and immortality.  Concerning this passage Wynne (2020) quotes Carlos Lévy as writing, “Ainsi s’effectue le passage entre l’immédiateté de la sensation intérieure et l’éternité,” although Wynne does not agree.

Brittain (2012) suggests that virtually the entire point of the work is to stimulate introspection, leading to intuitive insight into ones immortality, setting the stage for St. Augustine’s introspective proofs of the souls immortality. (Augustine, of course, was a dedicated reader of Cicero). Nevertheless, Cicero is no  mystic.  He doesn’t describe a experiential revelation of the soul’s divinity such as found in the Hermetic literature, or a startling and profound I AM experience.that settles the question of the soul’s immortality once and for all.

Conclusion

As with Plato, none of Cicero’s arguments individually constitute a logically irrefutable proof of the soul’s immortality, although considered collectively we might allow they supply probabilistic scientific support (cf. N.D. 2.65.163).  The real power of Tusculan Disputations 1, however, lay in its performative aspects: as a work of art, a product of genius, inspired by sources deeper than rationalistic thought, it awakens instinctive conviction, stimulates introspection, and directs our attention to subjective intuitive and experiential evidences of divinity and immortality.  Our summary here is insufficient to fully convey this.  Rather, it’s best appreciated by reading the work itself.

So much, then for Cicero. The next proposed steps will be to consider arguments for the soul’s immortality presented by St. Augustine in De Immortalitate Animae and De Trinitate, and in the Hermetic literature.  After that we will jump ahead many centuries to Marsilio Ficino’s Theologia Platonica de immortalitate animorum (1482), and then to John Davies’ Nosce Teipsum (1599) and Edward Young’s Night Thoughts (1742−1745).  Since Young’s time, pervasive skepticism, materialism and atheism have so much dominated academic thinking that serious discussions of immortality are hard to come by.

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First draft: 3 December 2020

St. Augustine on the Esoteric Meaning of the Beatitudes

Whosoever heareth these sayings of mine, and doeth them, I will liken him unto a wise man, which built his house upon a rock. (Mat 7:24)

THE THEME of Jesus’ teachings in the Gospels is the kingdom of heaven.  This kingdom is not of this world (John 18:36; cf. Luke 17:21), but is within.  Nowhere is the message of the kingdom, and its role in attaining to holy, happy and blesssed living, presented more directly than in the Sermon on the Mount, of which the Beatitudes (Matthew 5:3−10) are the essence.  The Beatitudes are one of the great prayers of the Christian tradition.  Unfortunately they are too often regarded as mere platitudes, or else as moral commands to change the exterior world by promoting social justice, peace and so on.    But while things like social justice are undeniably important, the Beatitudes seek something greater still:  the union of the individual soul with God, which is the essence of beatitude and the purpose of true religion.

St. Augustine — always mindful in his writings of the soul’s journey to God — supplies a beautiful and insightful commentary on the interior meaning of the Beatitudes in Book 1 of his Commentary on Matthew, shown below.  The translation here is that of Jepson (1948).

Matthew 5

[3] Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.
[4] Blessed are they that mourn: for they shall be comforted.
[5] Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth.
[6] Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after righteousness: for they shall be filled.
[7] Blessed are the merciful: for they shall obtain mercy.
[8] Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God.
[9] Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called the children of God.
[10] Blessed are they which are persecuted for righteousness’ sake: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.

CHAPTER 1

The Sermon on the Mount is the perfect pattern of the Christian life. The poor in spirit. [Note 1]

3. Now, what does He say? Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. We read in the Scriptures concerning the craving for temporal things: All is vanity and presumption of spirit. [Qoh 1:14; LXX]. Presumption of spirit means boldness and haughtiness. In common parlance, too, the haughty are said to have “high spirits”; and rightly, since spirit is also called “wind.” Whence it is written: Fire, hail, snow, ice, stormy wind. [Psa 148:8] And who has not heard the haughty spoken of as “inflated,” blown up, as it were, with wind? So, too, the expression of the Apostle: Knowledge puffeth up, but charity edifieth. [1 Cor 8.1] For this reason the poor in spirit are rightly understood here as the humble and those who fear God, that is, those who do not have an inflated spirit. And there could be no more felicitous beginning of blessedness, whose ultimate goal is perfect wisdom: The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom. [Pro 1:7; cf. Sir 1: 14; Psa 110:11] Whereas, on the contrary, we have the attribution: The beginning of all sin is pride. [Sir 10:13] Let, therefore, the haughty seek and love the kingdom of the earth; but Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.

CHAPTER 2

The other Beatitudes.

4. Blessed are the meek, for they shall possess the land by inheritance. [Notes 2, 3] The land I take in the sense of the Psalm: Thou art my hope, my portion in the land of the living. [Psa 142:5] It stands for something solid, the stability of an undying inheritance, where the soul in a state of well-being rests as in its natural environment, as the body does on earth; and thence draws its food, as the body from the earth. This is the life and rest of the Saints. The meek are those who yield before outbursts of wickedness and do not resist evil, but overcome evil with good. [Cf. Rom 12:21] Therefore let those who are not meek struggle and contend for earthly and temporal things; but blessed are the meek, for they shall possess the land by inheritance from which they cannot be expelled.

5. Blessed are the mourners, for they shall be comforted. Mourning is sadness for the loss of dear ones. But when people turn to God, they dismiss what they cherished as dear in this world; for they do not find joy in those things which before rejoiced them; and until there comes about in them the love for what is eternal, they feel the sting of sadness over a number of things. They, therefore, will be comforted by the Holy Spirit, who especially for this reason is named the Paraclete, that is, the Consoler, that disregarding the temporal they may enjoy eternal happiness.

6. Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice, for they shall have their fill. Here He means those who love the true and unshakable good. The food with which they will be filled is the food that the Lord Himself mentions: My meat is to do the will of my Father, [John 4:34] which is righteousness; and the water, of which whoso shall drink, as He Himself says, it shall become in him a fountain of water springing up into life everlasting. [John 4:14]

7. Blessed are the merciful, for mercy shall be shown them. He pronounces them blessed who come to the aid of the needy, since it is paid back to them so that they are freed from distress.

8. Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God. How senseless, therefore, are they who look for God with bodily eyes, since He is seen by the heart, as elsewhere it is written: And seek Him in simplicity of heart. [Wis 1.1] For this is a clean heart, one that is a simple heart; and as the light of this world cannot be seen save with sound eyes, so God cannot be seen unless that is sound by which He can be seen.

9. Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God. Perfection lies in peace, where nothing is at war; and the children of God are peaceful for the reason that no resistance to God is present, and surely children ought to bear a likeness to their father. And they are at peace with themselves who quell all the emotions of their soul and subject them to reason, that is, to the mind and spirit, and have their carnal passions well under control; these make up the kingdom of God. In this kingdom everything is in such perfect order that the noblest and most excellent elements in man control without opposition the other elements which are common to us and animals. Moreover, what is most distinguished in man—mind and reason—is subject to a higher being, which is Truth itself, the only-begotten Son of God; for it cannot control the lower unless it puts itself in subjection to its superior. And this is the peace which is given on earth to men of good will; [cf. Luke 2:14] this is the life of a man who is rounded out and perfect in wisdom. From a kingdom of this sort enjoying greatest peace and order has been cast out the Prince of this world who lords it over the perverse and disorderly. With this peace set up and established in the soul, whatever onslaughts he who has been cast out makes against it from without, he but increases the glory which is according to God. He weakens nothing in that structure but by the very ineffectiveness of his machinations reveals what strength has grown within. Hence it follows: Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice’ sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. [Mat 5:10]

CHAPTER 3

The Beatitudes mark the stages traversed towards perfection.

10.  … [Note 4]

For blessedness starts with humility: Blessed are the poor in spirit, that is, those who are not puffed up, whose soul is submissive to divine authority, who stand in dread of punishment after this life despite the seeming blessedness of their earthly life.

The soul next makes itself acquainted with Sacred Scripture according to which it must show itself meek through piety, so that it may not make bold to censure what appears a stumbling block to the uninstructed and become intractable by obstinate argumentation.

The soul now begins to realize what a hold the world has on it through the habits and sins of the flesh. In this third step, then, wherein is knowledge, there is grief for the loss of the highest good through clinging to the lowest.

In the fourth step there is hard work. The soul puts forth a tremendous effort to wrench itself from the pernicious delights which bind it. Here there must be hunger and thirst for righteousness, and there is great need for fortitude, for not without pain is the heart severed from its delights.

At the fifth step it is suggested to those who are continuing their energetic efforts how they may be helped to master their situation. For unless one is helped by a superior power, he is incapable of freeing himself by his own efforts from the bonds of misery which encompass him. The suggestion given is a just proposition: If one wishes to be helped by a more powerful person, let him help someone who is weaker in a field wherein he himself holds an advantage. Hence, Blessed are the merciful, for mercy will be shown them.

The sixth step is cleanness of heart from a good consciousness of works well done, enabling the soul to contemplate that supreme good which can be seen only by a mind that is pure and serene.

Finally, the seventh step is wisdom itself, that is, contemplation of the truth, bringing peace to the whole man and effecting a likeness to God; and of this the sum is, Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God.

The eighth maxim [Note 5] returns, as it were, to the beginning, because it shows and commends what is perfect and complete. Thus, in the first and the eighth the kingdom of heaven is mentioned: Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven; and, Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice’ sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven — when now it is said: Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? Shall tribulation? or distress? or persecution? or hunger? or nakedness? or danger? or the sword? [Rom 8:35]

Seven in number, therefore, are the things which lead to perfection. The eighth maxim throws light upon perfection and shows what it consists of, so that, with this maxim beginning again, so to speak, from the first, the two together may serve as steps toward the perfection of the others also.

Notes

1. In paragraphs 1 and 2, omitted here for brevity, Augustine gives a brief introduction.  He suggests that the Beatitudes supply a perfect perfect pattern of the Christian life and embrace all the directives we need.  Jesus states that those who hear and shape their lives according to his words spoken on the mount are like the man who built his house upon a rock. [Matt. 7:24-27].  Augustine proposes that the reference to Jesus “opening his mouth” [Matt.5:2] implies these are these are His words, i.e., the New Law, whereas previously in His ministry He was wont to open the mouth of the Prophets, i.e., the Old Law.

2. by inheritance.  These words appear in the Old Latin version of the Gospels that Augustine used at the time of writing this (ca. 394).  He didn’t routinely use the Vulgate until around 400.

3. He inverts the order of the 2nd and 3rd  Beatitudes.

4. We omit a paragraph wherein Augustine remarks on the grammatical difference between seven Beatitudes (Mat. 5: 3−9) and the two further maxims in Mat. 10−11.

5. That is, Mat. 5:10.  Again, he considers this verse relevant to the present theme, but not one of the seven Beatitudes themselves.

Bibliography

Augustine, Saint, Bishop of Hippo: De sermone Domini in monte. CCSL 35 (1967). J. P. Migne (Paris, 1845), Patrologia Latina (PL) 34:1229−1308 (Latin text).

Findlay, William (tr.). Saint Augustine: Our Lord’s Sermon on the Mount. In: Philip Schaff (ed.), A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, First Series 6. New York, 1903; repr. 1979.

Jepson, John J. (tr.). Saint Augustine: The Lord’s Sermon on the Mount. Ancient Christian Writers 5. Newman Press, 1948.

Kavanagh, Denis J. Saint Augustine: Commentary on the Lord’s Sermon on the Mount, with Seventeen Related Sermons. Fathers of the Church 11. New York 1951.

Paffenroth, Kim (tr.). The Sermon on the Mount (De sermone Domini in monte). In: Boniface Ramsey (ed.), Saint Augustine: New Testament I and II. New City Press, 2014.

Pryse, William. Praying the Beatitudes as a Spiritual Exercise. Satyagraha: Cultural Psychology.  2017.  Accessed 13 Oct 2020.

1st draft, 15 Oct 2020

Mental Ascent in St. Augustine’s De quantitate animae

THROUGHOUT his works St. Augustine presents descriptions of the ascent of the mind through fixed levels or stages (Van Fleteren, 2009).  These are of interest not only because of their influence on later Christian contemplative thought, especially in the Middle Ages (for example, in the Victorines and St. Bonaventure), but also for their possible practical relevance today as aids for mindfulness and contemplation.

His earlier writings especially show the influence of Plotinus’ Enneads and possibly a lost of work of Porphyry, De regressu animae (On the Return of the Soul).  An important example is Chapter 33 of De quantitate animae (On the Greatness of the Soul).  In this work, purporting to describe a dialogue Augustine had with his friend, Evodius, several questions about the ‘magnitude’ of the soul are considered.  Magnitude is understood in two senses: (1) in regard to extension in space and time, and (2) concerning the soul’s power and capacity.  Chapter 33 — the work’s centerpiece — proposes a seven-fold categorization of the soul’s powers, which can also be interpreted as a scheme for ascent to contemplation, the highest activity of the mind.

The first level, animatio (animation) corresponds to simple vegetative and regulatory processes — which plants also possess.  Next are sensus (sensation) and ars (arts); ars is construed very broadly and encompasses directed thought, planning, and constructive activity.  Animals also, Augustine notes, possess these two powers.  It is the last four levels, however, that are of most interest.

In the fourth stage, virtus (moral virtue), the soul turns its interest away from vain and empty worldly concerns, realizing that its true treasure and source of happiness is itself.  It therefore sets out with a fervent desire for self-purification.

As a result, the soul reaches the fifth level, tranquillitas (tranquility).  Tranquility is indispensable for the mind of the eye to see clearly, so that the soul may advance further.

Once tranquility is attained, the soul must now exert itself to advance towards higher cognitions.  That is, an act of will is required.  This is the stage of ingressio, or approach.

Finally, the seventh level, contemplatio (contemplation) is reached.

Relative to the traditional three stages of Western mysticism — as, for example, found in the writings of St. John Cassian — virtus and tranquillitas roughly correspond to purification, ingressio to illumination, and contemplatio to union.

Augustine allows that contemplation has varying degrees.  The pinnacle is an ultimate mystical experience of union with God, such as “great and peerless souls” reach; for example, Porphyry reports that Plotinus attained this four times.  At this point in his life, young Augustine was very intent on achieving this ultimate experience.  However I believe his system might be applied to daily experience as we continually struggle to rise from our usual vain preoccupations with transient, delusory, worldly concerns to spiritual mindedness.  In a more secular sense, we can interpret this as an ascent from what the humanistic psychologist Abraham Maslow called ‘deficiency cognition’ to ‘Being cognition’, from distraction to mindfulness, or from various forms of folly to right cognition.

Note:  The translation here is that of Colleran (1950).

CHAPTER 33. The seven levels of the soul’s greatness.

The Fourth Level of the Soul (virtus)*

73. Take hold now and swing yourself onto the fourth level, which goodness and all true worth call their home. Here it is that the soul ventures to take precedence not only over its own body, acting some part in the universe, but even over the whole body of the universe itself. The goods of the world it does not account its own, and comparing them with its own power and beauty, it keeps aloof from them and despises them. Hence, the more the soul turns to itself for its own pleasure, the more does it withdraw from sordid things and cleanse itself and make itself immaculately clean through and through. It steels itself against every effort to lure it away from its purpose and resolve. It shows high consideration for human society and desires nothing to happen to another which it does not wish to happen to itself. It submits to the authority and the bidding of wise men and is convinced that through them God speaks to itself. Yet, this performance of the soul, noble as it is, still requires strenuous effort and the annoyances and allurements of this world engage it in a mighty struggle, bitterly contested. […]**

Yet, so great is the soul that it can do even this, by the help, of course, of the goodness of the supreme and true God — that goodness which sustains and rules the universe, that goodness by which it has been brought about not only that all things exist, but that they exist in such a way that they cannot be any better than they are. It is to this divine goodness that the soul most dutifully and confidently commits itself for help and success in the difficult task of self-purification.

The Fifth Level of the Soul (tranquillitas)

74. When this has been accomplished, that is, when the soul will be free from all corruption and purified of all its stains, then at last it possesses itself in utter joy and has no fears whatever for itself nor any anxiety for any reason. This, then, is the fifth level. For it is one thing to achieve purity, another to be in possession of it; and the activity by which the soul restores its sullied state to purity and that by which it does not suffer itself to be defiled again are two entirely different things. On this level it conceives in every way how great it is in every respect; and when it has understood that, then with unbounded and wondrous confidence it advances toward God, that is, to the immediate contemplation of truth; and it attains that supreme and transcendent reward for which it has worked so hard.

The Sixth Level of the Soul (ingressio)

75. Now, this activity, namely, the ardent desire to understand truth and perfection, is the soul’s highest vision: it possesses none more perfect, none more noble, none more proper. This, therefore, will be the sixth level of activity. For it is one thing to clear the eye of the soul so that it will not look without purpose and without reason and see what is wrong; it is something else to protect and strengthen the health of the eye; and it is something else again, to direct your gaze calmly and squarely to what is to be seen. Those who wish to do this before they are cleansed and healed recoil so in the presence of that light of truth or that they may think there is in it not only no goodness, but even great evil; indeed, they may decide it does not deserve the name of truth, and with an amount of zest and enthusiasm that is to be pitied, they curse the remedy offered and run back into the darkness engulfing them and which alone their diseased condition suffers them to face. Hence, the divinely inspired prophet says most appositely: Create a clean heart in me, O God, and renew a right spirit within my bowels. [Psalms 51: 10] The spirit is “right,” I believe, if it sees to it that the soul cannot lose its way and go astray in its quest for truth. This spirit is not really “renewed” in anyone unless his heart is first made clean, that is to say, unless he first controls his thoughts and drains off from them all the dregs of attachment to corruptible things.

The Seventh Level of the Soul (contemplatio)

76. Now at last we are in the very vision and contemplation of truth, which is the seventh and last level of the soul; and here we no longer have a level but in reality a home at which one arrives via those levels. What shall I say are the delights, what the enjoyment, of the supreme and true Goodness, what the everlasting peace it breathes upon us? Great and peerless souls — and we believe that they have actually seen and are still seeing these things, have told us this so far as they deemed it should be spoken of. This would I tell you now: if we hold most faithfully to the course which God enjoins on us and which we have undertaken to follow, we shall come by God’s power and wisdom to that supreme Cause or that supreme Author or supreme Principle of all things, or whatever other more appropriate appellative there may be for so great a reality.

And when we understand that, we shall see truly how all things under the sun are the vanity of the vain. For “vanity” is deceit; and “the vain ” are to be understood as persons who are deceived, or persons who deceive, or both. Further, one may discern how great a difference there is between these and the things that truly exist; and yet, since all the other things have also been created and have God as their Maker, they are wonderful and beautiful when considered by themselves, although in comparison with the things that truly exist, they are as nothing. […] Furthermore, in the contemplation of truth, no matter what degree of contemplation you reach, the delight is so great, there is such purity, such innocence, a conviction in all things that is so absolute, that one could think he really knew nothing when aforetime he fancied he had knowledge. And that the soul may not be impeded from giving full allegiance to the fullness of truth, death — meaning complete escape and acquittal from this body — which previously was feared, is now desired as the greatest boon.

* We omit here his discussion of animatio, sensus and ars, which are not directly related to contemplation.
** In the omitted material St. Augustine describes how at this stage an exaggerated fear of death may arise as a person, increasingly aware of faults, fears condemnation by God.  This concern seems rather foreign to the thought of Plotinus and Porphyry.

Bibliography

Augustine, Saint, Bishop of Hippo: De quantitate animae. J. P. Migne (Paris, 1841), Patrologia Latina (PL) 32:1035−1080 (Latin text). CSEL 89 (1986), pp. 129−231.

Colleran, Joseph M. (tr.). St. Augustine: The Greatness of the Soul, The Teacher. Ancient Christian Writers 9. Newman Press, 1950; 1−112.

Fokin, Alexey. St. Augustine’s paradigm: ab exterioribus ad interiora, ab inferioribus ad superiora in Western and Eastern Christian mysticism. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7.2 (2015): 81−107.

Garvey, Mary Patricia. Saint Augustine: Christian or Neo-platonist? Marquette University Press, 1939. (See pp. 146−160.)

Maslow, Abraham H. (1971). The farther reaches of human nature. New York: Viking (republished: Arkana, 1993). Ch. 9. Notes on Being-Psychology. pp. 121−142.

McMahon, John J. The Magnitude of the Soul. Fathers of the Church: Writings of Saint Augustine 2. New York, 1947; 51−149.

Tourscher, Francis Edward. De Quantitate Animae: The Measure of the Soul; Latin Text, with English Translation and Notes. Peter Reilly Company, 1933.

Van Fleteren, Frederick. Ascent of the Soul. In: Allan D. Fitzgerald (ed.), Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, Eerdmans, 2009; pp. 63−67.

1st draft, 13 Oct 2020

The Archetypal Meaning of Hercules at the Crossroads

Annibale Carracci, The Choice of Hercules (1596)

THE ATHENIAN philosopher and rhetorician, Prodicus, a contemporary of Socrates, wrote an essay commonly known as Hercules at the Crossroads, which he often delivered orally to appreciative crowds. A moral allegory of deep psychological significance, it describes a young Hercules at a crossroads confronted by two women who personify Vice and Virtue.  Each appeals to him to take a different route: Lady Vice claims the easy path will lead to pleasure and happiness; Lady Virtue reminds him that the road to true and lasting satisfaction is the harder and more toilsome route.

Our best source of the story is Xenophon’s dialogue Memorabilia (2.1.21–34), wherein Socrates is presented as relating Prodicus’ story to a young protege named Aristippus (evidently not the eponymous founder of the Cyrenaic philosophical sect).

Thanks to Xenophon, the story was well known and often alluded to throughout antiquity and beyond. Philo of Alexandria (fl. ca. 20 AD), the Jewish Middle Platonist philosopher (and, as it happens, the virtual father of Christian allegorical interpretation of the Bible), expanded on Prodicus’ theme in a discussion of the ‘two wives of the soul’ (On the Sacrifices of Cain and Abel 1.5.21−34).  Philo’s treatment is quite interesting in its own right, in part because of his remarkable list (section 1.5.31) of over 150 negative adjectives to describe a votary of Pleasure.  Readers of Philo will recognize the connection of the story with his allegorical interpretation of the Garden of Eden myth.

Centuries later, St. Ambrose of Milan (fl. 390 AD), in Cain and Abel 4.13−5.15, paraphrased Philo’s discussion and connected it with the ‘strange woman‘ (Uebersax, 2009) in the Book of Proverbs (Prv 2:16−19; 5:3−8; 5:15−19; 5:20; 6:24−26; 7:5−27; 9:13−18; 20:16; 22:14; 23:27−35; 27:13, 15), a personification of pleasure and/or folly, and opponent of the virtuous ‘wife of thy youth.’ (Prv 5:15−19).

Cicero, in On Moral Duties (1.32.118; 3.5.25), a work addressed to his son, mentions Prodicus’ tale in the context of choosing ones career.  Others, too, have understood the tale as referring choosing one’s long term course in life.  However we have good reason to believe the story has a deeper psychological and more existential meaning. One clue to the deeper meaning is the strong appeal of the story throughout the centuries to the artistic imagination.  As Erwin Panovsky (1930) in a seminal work on art history describes, Prodicus story elicited scores of paintings and drawings beginning in the Renaissance.

Another clue to a deeper meaning is to see how this same theme is expressed in many variations throughout antiquity.  The earliest and best known example in the Greek tradition is Hesiod’s Works and Days 1.287−294.

Wickedness (κακότητα; kakotes) can be had in abundance easily: smooth is the road and very nigh she dwells. But in front of virtue (ἀρετῆς; arete) the gods immortal have put sweat: long and steep is the path to her and rough at first; but when you reach the top, then at length the road is easy, hard though it was.
Source: Hesiod, Works and Days 1.287−294 (tr. Evelyn-White)

This passage serves as a virtual epitome of book 1 of Works and Days, which also contains the Pandora and Ages of Man myths, both allegories of the moral fall.

The Judgment of Paris

Sandro Botticelli, Judgment of Paris (c. 1488)

In Greek mythology, a similar trope is found in the Judgment of Paris, where Paris (prince of Troy and brother of Hector) must choose which goddess is more beautiful: Athena, Hera or Aphrodite — allegorically symbolizing Wisdom, domestic virtue, and sensory pleasure, respectively.  His choice of Aphrodite over Athena and Hera led to the Trojan War.  If we understand the Trojan War as allegorically symbolizing the principle of psychomachia, or conflict between virtuous and unvirtuous elements of the human psyche, then the Judgment of Paris may be understood as symbolizing a depth-psychological dynamic that precipitates a fundamental form of  inner conflict.

Plato cites the above passage of Hesiod in two of his works (Republic 2.364d  and Laws 4.718e−719a). Moreover, in two underworld myths presented in his dialogues (Republic 10.614c−d and Gorgias 524a−527a), he describes a parting of two paths — one associated virtue and leading to the Isles of the Blest, and one associated with vice and leading to punishment in Tartarus. If we understand the underworld as symbolizing depth-psychological processes, it suggests that Plato is saying that orienting our mind wrongly leads to internal self-inflicted punishments, the ultimate aim of which is to educated and reform us (Gorgias 525b−c).

The Pythagorean Y

The same trope of a parting of the ways in an underworld journey is found in Book 6 of Virgil’s Aeneid (Smith, 2000).  Further, an epigram attributed (probably incorrectly, but perhaps written within a century of Virgil’s death) describes what is commonly called the Pythagorean Y (so-named because of the resemblance of ‘Y’ to a forking path):

This letter of Pythagoras, that bears
This fork’d distinction, to conceit prefers
The form man’s life bears. Virtue’s hard way takes
Upon the right hand path, which entry makes
(To sensual eyes) with difficult affair ;
But when ye once have climb’d the highest stair,
The beauty and the sweetness it contains,
Give rest and comfort, far past all your pains.’
The broadway in a bravery paints ye forth,
(In th’ entry) softness, and much shade of worth;
But when ye reach the top, the taken ones
It headlong hurls down, torn at sharpest stones.
He then, whom virtues love, shall victor crown
Of hardest fortunes, praise wins and renown:
But he that sloth and fruitless luxury
Pursues, and doth with foolish wariness fly
Opposed pains (that all best acts befall).
Lives poor and vile, and dies despised of all.
(tr. George Chapman)

Like Hercules at the Crossroads, the Pythagorean Y inspired many Renaissance works of art.

The theme of two paths associated with a choice or judgment concerning virtue vs. wickedness occurs throughout the Old and New Testament.  Perhaps best known is Psalm 1 (traditionally called The Two Paths).

When we find the same theme like this so prominently expressed across many times and traditions, it implies some universal, archetypal psychological dynamic of fundamental significance. That, I believe, is the case here. This is not a simple, prosaic morality tale such that “one must choose good and not evil.” Rather it confronts us with the existential fact — readily verifiable by introspection and close attention to thoughts — that we are always, every moment at our lives, faced with the two paths:  we can direct the immediate energies of our mind towards seeking physical pleasure, or to virtue, spirituality and higher cognitive activity.  When we choose the latter, all is well. Our mind is a harmony.  This is the path of life. But the moment we stop actively choosing virtue, our mind lapses into its immature state dominated by the pleasure principle; we are no longer true to our genuine nature, and a cascading sequence of negative mental events ensues.

This is not unlike the Freudian distinction between the pleasure principle and the reality principle, which, according to him, it is the principal task of the ego to broker.  However in this case, the reality principle is replaced by what we might call the virtue principle:  that our psyche is, in its core, fundamentally aligned with virtue.  In a sense this is still a reality principle — but, here the reality is that our nature seeks virtue.

To choose the path of virtue, wisdom and righteousness on an ongoing basis is not easy. It is, rather, as Plato calls it, the contest of contests (Gorgias 526e) and requires a degree of resolve and effort we may perhaps rightly call Herculean.

❧

Bibliography

Colson, F. H.; Whitaker, G. H. (trs.). Philo: On the Sacrifices of Abel and Cain. In: Philo, Volume 2. Loeb Classical Library L227. Harvard University Press, 1929.

Evelyn-White, Hugh G. (tr.). Hesiod: Works and Days. In: Hesiod, Homeric Hymns and Homerica. Loeb Classical Library L057. Harvard University Press, 1943.

Marchant, E. C. Xenophon: Memorabilia and Oeconomicus. Harvard University Press, 1923. http://data.perseus.org/texts/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0032.tlg002.perseus-eng1

Miller, Walter (tr.). Cicero: De Officiis. Loeb Classical Library L030. Harvard University Press, 1913. https://archive.org/details/deofficiiswithen00ciceuoft

Panofsky, Erwin. Hercules am Scheidewege und andere antike Bildstoffi in der neueren Kunst, Studien der Bibliothek Warburg 18, Leipzig, 1930.

Rochette, Bruno. Héraclès à la croissé des chemins: un topos dans la literature grécolatine. Études Classiques 66, 1998, 105−113.

Savage, John J. (tr.). Saint Ambrose: Hexameron, Paradise, and Cain And Abel. Fathers of the Church 42. Catholic University of America, 1961.

Smith, Richard Upsher. The Pythagorean letter and Virgil’s golden bough. Dionysius 18, 2000, pp. 7−24. https://dialnet.unirioja.es/revista/10126/A/2000

Uebersax, John S.  The strange woman of Proverbs. 2009. https://catholicgnosis.wordpress.com/2009/05/19/the-strange-woman-of-proverbs/

1st draft, 1 Mar 2020

St. Augustine and Intellectual Vision

Gerard Seghers (attr). The Four Doctors of the Western Church, Saint Augustine of Hippo

ST. AUGUSTINE, in several works, but most famously in Book 12 of On the Literal Meaning of Genesis (De Gen ad lit), developed a typology of ‘vision’ that became very influential throughout the Middle Ages, and which still merits our interest today. His main concern is not vision per se, but rather to use vision as a metaphor for knowing or cognition, and especially mental insight and knowledge of divine things.  His basic scheme is a tripartite division:

Corporeal vision.  The lowest form of vision is ordinary seeing by means of the eye, or bodily vision (visio corporalis). By this vision we see objects in the material world.

Spiritual vision. Above this is the mental vision by which we see images in the mind, either as memories of past sense experience, or products of the imagination. This he calls spiritual vision (visio spiritualis) — but this term requires an explanation. This vision is not spiritual in the sense that we understand that word today.  Rather, the connection with ‘spirit’ derives from ancient theories of perception, wherein it was believed that sense experience involved stimulation of a semi-material fluid (pneuma) that permeated the body.  Therefore a more apt term might be imaginative vision.

Intellectual vision. This all leads up to what really interests Augustine: the highest level of vision, which he calls intellectual vision (visio intellectualis). Unlike the other two forms of vision, intellectual vision sees things that have no connection with physical objects or their images.  It includes what a Platonist or Neoplatonist might call the ‘intellection of Forms’ (noesis): for example, by intellectual vision we can ‘see’ that bisecting a triangle always produces two triangles, and that 5 is greater than 4.  But for Augustine, intellectual vision is much more than Platonic or Plotinian noesis, and includes a wider range of cognitive activity, including what today we would call insight or (some kinds of) intuition.

Intellectual vision is, in fact, a pivotal concept in Augustine’s philosophy.  It plays an important role for him in contemplative ascent to God, in the relationship of Jesus Christ to the individual soul, and in understanding what faith means.  Hence he takes care to supply examples so readers can understand intellectual vision and observe it at work in their own minds.  It probably wouldn’t be an exaggeration to suggest that Augustine’s notion of intellectual vision is critical to understanding his important role not only in Christian philosophy, but in the history of human consciousness.

In De Gen ad lit 12 Augustine supplies many examples of intellectual vision.  These include the ability to see and understand virtues (12.24.50; 12.31.59), truth (12.26.54), love and (within limits) God (12.28.56; 12.31.59).  He also suggests that it’s by means of intellectual vision that we can recognize allegorical meanings of Scripture, and distinguish valid from spurious spiritual visions and understand the meanings of the latter.

De videndo Deo

We also learn more about intellectual vision in a book-length letter Augustine wrote to Paulina, known as On seeing God (De videndo Deo). He is trying to help Paulina understand what it means to ‘see God,’ with particular reference to certain verses of Scripture, such as Matthew 5:8 (Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God.)  More specifically, he wishes to help her see God herself.

The letter reveals in a most remarkable way his humanism and pastoral concern.  Having ‘seen’ God himself, he has an intense, earnest desire to help others do the same. (This humanistic and personal view of Augustine stands in contrast with the common modern perception of him shaped by later appropriation and narrow interpretation of his teachings by later Scholastic and academic theologians.)

His concern is to show that God is seen by intellectual, not bodily vision. But first he must help Paulina understand what intellectual vision is, or, rather, to witness its operation in her own mind. For this purpose in chapters 38 to 41 he employs a novel and effective device: he has her reflect on her inner response to the various arguments and propositions advanced in his letter up to this point. He asks her to review his preceding discussion, noting which points ones she’s found credible and which she’s doubted; and then to notice the inner ‘vision’ by which the recognizes her varying degrees of belief:

But examine in this whole discussion of ours what you have seen, what you have believed, what you still do not know, either because I have not spoken of it, or you have not understood, or you have not judged it credible. Among the points which you have seen to be true, distinguish further how you saw them: whether it was by recalling that you had seen them through the body, such as heavenly or earthly bodies, or whether you never perceived them by corporeal sight, but, by looking upon them with your mind only, observed that they are true and certain, such as your own will, about which I believe you when you speak, for it is true I cannot see it myself as it is seen by you. And when you have distinguished between these two, notice, too, how you make your distinction. (De videndo Deo 38; italics added)

Whether we believe or doubt, we see that we do so.  We also see that we we find some sources more credible than others.  Paulina does not place equal credence in the opinions of Augustine and Ambrose.  And she instinctively believes Scripture even more:

Note this, therefore, after you have carefully and faithfully examined and distinguished what you see; in making your distinction assess the actual weight of evidence on what you believe in this whole speech which I have been making to you, since I began to speak to you in this letter, and in it note to what extent you lend your faith to what you do not see. You do not put the same faith in me as you do in Ambrose … ; or if you do think that we are both to be weighed in the same balance, of course you will not compare us in any way with the Gospel, or put our writings on the same footing with the canonical Scriptures. …

Therefore, you yield faith to these words [of Ambrose and myself] in one way, but to the divine words in quite a different way. Perhaps some little doubt has crept into your mind about us; that we may be somewhat less than clear about some of the divine words, and that they are interpreted by us, not as they were said, but as we imagine them. … About the divine Scriptures, however, even when they are not clearly understood, you have no doubt that they are to be believed. But you surely observe and see this weighing of belief or non-belief, and the difficulty of knowing, and the storms of doubt, and the devout faith which is owed to the divine utterances; all these you see in your mind as they are, and you do not doubt in the least that they are in your mind in this way, either as I said them, or, preferably, as you knew them yourself. Therefore, you see your faith, you see your doubt, you see your desire and will to learn, and when you are led by divine authority to believe what you do not see, you see at once that you believe these things; you analyze and distinguish all this. (Ibid. 39f.; italics added)

Importantly, he is not equating intellectual vision with her actual beliefs or doubts, but rather with her ability to perceive differences in her degrees of belief.  He then has her note the difference between this faculty and corporeal vision.

Of course, you will not make any sort of comparison between your bodily eyes and these eyes of your heart, with which you perceive that all this is true and certain, with which you observe and distinguish what is invisibly present to you. (Ibid. 41)

Augustine is turning what might otherwise be an abstruse and sterile technical discussion about ‘seeing’ God into a spiritual exercise and practical demonstration. He is helping Paulina integrate her intellectual vision more fully into her rational consciousness. Before, she, like all of us, engaged in intellectual vision, but somewhat subliminally, as something not fully in awareness.  But by drawing her attention to it, the faculty now becomes more consciously accessible and more acute, even enlarged.  By this means she will be able to eventually exercise it in subtle perceptions of God’s presence and activity in her mind.

As we investigate the meaning of intellectual vision — and especially by observing our own mental operations — it gradually becomes clear that this is no mere abstract epistemological category, but an entire dimension or plane of psychological experience.  We begin to appreciate the reality, vastness and importance of an entire inner reality, a realm perhaps as as vast as the entire universe of sense experience.

Yet despite its importance, intellectual vision operates for most people only subliminally, in the sub- or pre-conscious mind. We constantly apply these subtle mental operations of inner vision, discernment and judgment and could not adaptively function otherwise. But by becoming more conscious of them, we may better integrate this dimension of our being into our rational mental life and social activity, so that both our outer and inner life becomes more holy, virtuous and spiritually authentic

Richard of Saint-Victor

Augustine’s concept of intellectual vision became a staple of medieval Latin Christina thought, and is especially prominent in the writings of Hugh and Richard of Saint-Victor, 12th century writers. To give but one example, Richard’s Adnotationes mysticae in Psalmos 143 distinguishes several distinct aspects of discretion [discretio]:

(1) diiudicatio is the right judgment that directs virtues toward their ends; it is the light that leads us to truth (lucerna cordis iudicium discretionis);

(2) deliberatio makes the distinction between what should and should not be done in a specific situation, taking into account the particular circumstances;

(3) dispositio considers the proper ordering of means for attaining an end;

(4) dispensatio distinguishes what’s appropriate and inappropriate, and reexamines a first judgment when required;

(5) moderatio determines the right measure of the action.

Considering that discretion is only one part of intellectual vision, we can begin to get an idea of the complexity and richness of our subtle mental life.

By the end of the 12th century, the Augustinian tradition had achieved a remarkable synthesis of rationalism and mysticism (and also, though we have not discussed this aspect here, charity as an organizing principle of social life).  This progress halted as Scholasticism and rationalistic dogmatism became a dominating force in the 13th century and beyond, even to present times.  As the rational separated itself from the mystical element of Christianity, so the mystical separated itself from the rational: Pseudo-Dionysian and ‘apophatic’ mysticism submerged the intellectual mystical tradition of Augustine.  This split between rationalism and mysticism remains today.  Augustinian intellectual mysticism may potentially supply a more integral form of Christianity for present times.

Bibliography

Augustine of Hippo. Epistolae 147. De videndo deo. Patrologia Latina 33:596−622. J. P. Migne. Paris, 1841.

Augustine of Hippo. De Genesi ad litteram. Patrologia Latina 34:245−486. J. P. Migne. Paris, 1841.

Cary, Phillip. Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self: The Legacy of a Christian Platonist. Oxford University Press, 2000.

Clark, Mary T. (tr.).  On Seeing God (De videndo Deo; Letter 147. In: Augustine of Hippo, Selected Writings. Classics of Western Spirituality. Paulist Press, 1984; pp. 361−402.

Fraeters, Veerle. Visio/Vision. In: Amy Hollywood & Patricia Z. Beckman (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Christian Mysticism, Cambridge University Press 2012; pp. 178−188.

Hill, Edmund (tr.). The Literal Meaning of Genesis. In: Augustine, On Genesis, New City Press, 2002; ch. 12, pp. 464–475.

Meagher, Robert E. Augustine: On the Inner Life of the Mind. Hackett, 1998.

Parsons, Wilfrid (tr.). Letter 147: Augustine to Paulina (De videndo Deo). Saint Augustine: Letters Vol. 3. Fathers of the Church 20. New York, 1953; pp. 170−224.

Ragazzi, Grazia Mangano. Obeying the Truth: Discretion in the Spiritual Writings of Saint Catherine of Siena. Oxford University Press, 2013; p. 126.

Richard of Saint-Victor. Adnotationes mysticae in Psalmos. Patrologia Latina 196:265−402. J. P. Migne. Paris, 1855. (196:381d−382a)

Schlapbach, Karin. Intellectual vision in Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 12, or: seeing the hidden meaning of images. Studia Patristica 43, 2006, 239−244.

Taylor, John H. (tr.). Saint Augustine: The Literal Meaning of Genesis. Ancient Christian Writers 41 and 42. Paulist Press, 1982.

Zycha, Joseph (ed.). De Genesi ad Litteram libri duodecimo. Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum (CSEL) 28.1. Critical text. Vienna, 1894.

1st draft, 23 Feb 2020