Archive for the ‘Augustine’ Category
The Other Kind of Cupidity
CUPIDITY (in Latin, cupiditas) is a word rarely used, and when misunderstood. Cupidity, along with its near cognate, concupiscence, is nowadays often understood to mean either undue interest in sensual pleasure (especially sexual) or avarice. Hence cupiditas is often translated as lust or covetousness. But this isn’t how it was understood by St. Augustine — in whose ethics and theology cupiditas plays a central role.
Ultimately, according to Augustine, one loves either the world or loves God. Love of God (and others for God’s sake) is the essence of caritas or charity. Love of the world is cupidity. Each of these loves becomes a seed around which an entire set of personality characteristics and mental patterns develop. Hence we tend to have within our psyche two competing personalities: one based on caritas, and one on cupiditas.
This is much the same as — if not identical to — St. Paul’s repeated emphasis on the struggle between carnal mindedness and spiritual mindedness (e.g., Romans 8). Again, carnal mindedness we tend to associate with attraction to pleasures of the body, but it’s actually something much broader. It could as easily be called worldly-mindedness.
Cupidity encompasses the love of anything worldly. It isn’t just sexual lust, gluttony, avarice and the like. There is another form which we tend to overlook, but which is much worse. That is our craving for things like acceptance and approval of others, social status, prestige, etc.
This is clearly linked to biological instincts we have as social animals. Social and herd animals depend on the acceptance of others for survival. These are very deep-seated instincts, which we, inasmuch as we are social mammals, have. But, unlike other animals, we are also spiritual beings. It’s imperative that we subordinate our biological instincts to our higher, spiritual nature.
To overcome sexual lust, avarice, and undue interest in food and drink are comparatively easy things. Much more difficult is to overcome this basic desire for approval by others, social status, and prestige.
I myself am constantly aware when I write of having not only a sincere desire to help people (caritas), but to gain social approval by writing something noteworthy. I crave acceptance, respect, honor. I have a wordly desire to be recognized by others as contributing something significant, or of being ‘learned.’ That is this second form of cupidity at work.
This cupidity is even more insidious because it tends not to be thought of as a moral failing. Indeed, in our competitive society, it may even masquerade as a kind of virtue.
But it is not a virtue. It opposes our love of God, and anything that distracts us from love of God we must strive with all our might to eliminate.
This is explained very well by St. Augustine:
(1) Charity [Charitatem] denotes that whereby one loves [the eternal]. …
However, the poison of charity is the hope of getting and holding onto temporal things. The nourishment of charity is the lessening of cupidity [cupiditatis], the perfection of charity, the absence of cupidity. …
(3) But when the enticements of bodily pleasures [carnalium voluptatum] have been overcome, it is to be feared lest the cupidity for pleasing men, by way of either some wonderful deeds or an arduous self-control or patience or some act of generosity or through a reputation for knowledge or eloquence, creep in and take their place. Here is also to be found the cupidity for honor [cupiditas honoris]. Against this should be cited all those things that have been written in praise of charity and on the foolishness of boasting [inanitate iactantiae]. … If you wish to please men, however, so as to help them to love God, you have desire not for pleasing others or honor, but for something else.
(Source: St. Augustine of Hippo, On Diverse Questions 36, On nurturing charity; my translation, based on those of Mosher and Ramsey.)
Modern translators fail to capture the full scope of cupiditas by using such words as ‘lust’ and ‘greed’. ‘Cupidity’ seems a better choice. The expression “to have your liking in the world” captures its essence.
❧
Bibliography
Mosher, David L. (tr.). Saint Augustine: Eighty-three Different Questions. Fathers of the Church, Vol. 70. CUA Press, 1982 (repr. 2010); pp. 67−71.
Ramsey, Boniface (tr.). Saint Augustine (Bishop of Hippo): Miscellany of Eighty-three Questions. New City Press, 2008.
Latin text
De Diversis Quaestionibus 36 (Quaestio XXXVI. De nutrienda charitate). J. P. Migne, Patrologia Latina 40 cols. 11−100.
❧ ❧
Origen – Allegorical Meaning of the Parable of the Wise and Foolish Virgins
John Melhuish Strudwick, The Ten Virgins (c.1884)
AS an earlier post on the allegorical meaning of Moses defending Jethro’s seven daughters at the well is one of the most-often visited here, I though I’d follow up with another on the parable of the wise and foolish virgins, which, as I mentioned before, seems similar. We’re guided here by several patristic commentaries on the parables, but of course need not restrict ourselves to the meanings they find.
The parable would have a simple and straightforward interpretation if it concerned only one wise and one foolish virgin. It would then affirm the ethical principle of ‘keeping ones lamp lit’ by remaining constantly vigilant and attentive to God. The specific reference to five (and not merely several), however, suggests to several commentators a reference to the senses.
We can parse the parable (shown below) into its main structural elements and their general meanings as follows:
Virgins. The patristic consensus is that these refer collectively a wise or foolish soul. However, since all are virgins (including the foolish ones), there is a also tendency to see them more specifically as souls of those who are at least make the effort to follow a religious life.
Bridegroom. The obvious Christian meaning here is Jesus Christ.
Marriage. Spiritual marriage with Jesus, also understood (as implied by verse 1) as attainment of the kingdom of heaven. Some commentators (e.g., Augustine) take the kingdom here in the most literal sense of attaining heaven in the afterlife, but that opposes meaning implied by Luke 17:21, the kingdom of God is within you. More likely then, the marriage symbolizes the soul’s union with God, a state of being constantly attuned and receptive to God’s Word as it directs and guides our minds.
Lamps. Conscious attention; vigilance.
Oil. That which keeps the lamps lit. Oil suggests grace or Spirit received from God. However the whole point of the parable is to suggest that effort on our part is required to obtain the oil. What distinguishes the wise from the foolish virgins, according to several patristic commentators, is that the former pursue good works (which might be broadly defined to include not only acts of charity, but prayer, reading of Scripture, meditation, etc.). Origen mentions sound doctrine as another form of oil that keeps the lamps lit.
Origen in his commentary on Matthew 1:1ff. understands the virgins as symbolizing “powers of perception,” which include for him both the physical senses and spiritual senses. (Origen is considered the father of the doctrine of spiritual senses.) Right use of sensation requires it being directed by the WORD of God. As with Augustine (Sermon 43 = Ben. 73), good works are needed to maintain this connection, i.e., to keep the lamps lit.
In the earlier post on Moses and Jethro’s daughters, I suggested that the story could be interpreted as either (1) describing a state of spiritualized physical perception — such that, quickened by grace and spirit, our physical senses may perceive material objects in a unitive, holy, and transfigured way, or (2) referring to purely spiritual senses, i.e., those which perceive immaterial things. Origen’s commentary of the parable of the virgins — which, it must be admitted, raises more questions than it answers — nevertheless does not seem inconsistent with either interpretation.
Hans Urs von Balthasar’s theological aesthetics (von Balthasar, 1982; McInroy, 2014) appears to affirm a link between Origen, spiritual senses, the virgins parable and transfigured physical perception. (McInroy, p. 159: “Balthasar calls for perception of a form that contains both sensory and ‘supersensory’ aspects (i.e. a material component and a ‘spiritual’ dimension).”
We add at the end a passage from Pseudo-Macarius’ Homily 4, which refers to the parable. He briefly connects the virgins with the physical senses within a more general discussion of how the mind in its entirely must remain fixed on God and spiritual things, and not lapse into worldly concerns.
❧
MATTHEW 25:1–13 (KJV)
[1] Then shall the kingdom of heaven be likened unto ten virgins, which took their lamps, and went forth to meet the bridegroom.
[2] And five of them were wise, and five were foolish.
[3] They that were foolish took their lamps, and took no oil with them:
[4] But the wise took oil in their vessels with their lamps.
[5] While the bridegroom tarried, they all slumbered and slept.
[6] And at midnight there was a cry made, Behold, the bridegroom cometh; go ye out to meet him.
[7] Then all those virgins arose, and trimmed their lamps.
[8] And the foolish said unto the wise, Give us of your oil; for our lamps are gone out.
[9] But the wise answered, saying, Not so; lest there be not enough for us and you: but go ye rather to them that sell, and buy for yourselves.
[10] And while they went to buy, the bridegroom came; and they that were ready went in with him to the marriage: and the door was shut.
[11] Afterward came also the other virgins, saying, Lord, Lord, open to us.
[12] But he answered and said, Verily I say unto you, I know you not.
[13] Watch therefore, for ye know neither the day nor the hour wherein the Son of man cometh.
Origen, Commentary on Matthew 25:1ff. (Latin translation = Klostermann Commentariorum Series 63−64)
“Then the kingdom of heaven shall be compared to ten maidens who took their lamps and went to meet the bridegroom and the bride. Five of them were foolish, and five were wise” (Mt 25:1−2)….
Not without reason do we say that the powers of perception of all who have come to know divine things, no matter how they have received the WORD of God, “whether by chance or by truth” (cf. Phil 2:18), are “virgins” — made virgins by the WORD of God in which they have believed or wish to believe. For such is the WORD of God that it shares of its purity with all who through its teaching have withdrawn from the service of idols or from the service of the elements of God’s creation (cf. 1 Cor 10:14; Gal 4:3), and have come to the service of God through Jesus Christ even if they have not carried out good works nor prepared themselves for beatitude. But just as, according to the WORD of truth, the individual virtues — which are, in substance, Christ — go together, so that whoever has one has all (for Christ cannot be separated from himself), so too do all the powers of perception go together; and wherever one of these senses has too little of the right teaching of the WORD, there will all the other senses be deceived, as it were, and turned into fools. By powers of perception or senses I mean both those ordinarily understood as such: seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, and those which the Book of Proverbs calls divine with the words: “You will find the knowledge of God” (cf. Prov 2:5). But again, the WORD of God is the cause of the right use of the senses, and it is not possible that, . . . someone use certain activities of the senses and neglect others. Thus if the Word has made one of the senses wise, so as to constitute it a virgin, it is necessary for it to pour out its wisdom into the other senses as well. Thus it is not possible that, of the five senses one has, some should be foolish and others prudent; they must rather all be prudent or all wise.
All these senses now take their “lamps” . . . when they accept that the Word of God and the Son of God is the bridegroom of the church; “they go out” from the world and from the errors of many gods and come to meet the Savior who is always ready to come to these virgins so that, with the worthy among them, he might go in to his blessed bride, the church. And after the reception of the WORD, as long as the light of the faithful “shines before men, that they may see their good works and give glory to their Father who is in heaven” (Mt 5:16), they are prudent [maidens], the kind who take along the oil which nourishes the light which is always poured forth in good works, i.e., the WORD of doctrine. They fill the vessels of their souls from this WORD, buying it from the teachers and keepers of the tradition who sell it, as much as is needed, even if their end is late and the WORD coming to their fulfillment is delayed; for they hasten to him to be fulfilled and to be set outside the world. But those who, after becoming Christian, were concerned to receive only enough teaching to last them to the end, … these are “foolish.” They accepted their lamps, which of course were lit at first, but they did not take oil along for such a long journey to go meet the spouse.
“As the bridegroom was delayed, all the maidens slumbered and slept” (Mt 25:5). When the bridegroom delays this way and the WORD does not come quickly to make perfect their life, the senses suffer somewhat while they remain and sleep, so to speak, in the night of the world. For they sleep in that they lose something of their alert vigilance; but those prudent maidens did not lose their lamps nor give up hope of saving their oil. . . .
“But at midnight,” that is, at the high point of that remissness, and at the midpoint between the spent light of evening and the still-awaited light of day, “there was a cry” (Mt 25:6), the cry of angels, I think, wishing to awaken all the slumbering senses and call them to go to meet the bridegroom. Inside the senses of those sleeping they cry out: “Behold the bridegroom! Come out to meet him!” (Mt 25:6). . . . All indeed heard and got up, but not all dressed their lamps in the proper way … and at an inopportune time “the foolish said to the wise, ‘Give us some of your oil’” (Mt 25:8). For although they were foolish, they still understood that they needed to go meet the bridegroom with light, with all the lamps of their senses illuminated. And since this parable was spoken for everyone to hear, Christ added for his disciples the words: “Watch therefore, for you know neither the day nor the hour” (Mt 25:13).
Source: von Balthasar, p. 190f.
Pseudo-Macarius, Homilies 4.6f.
6. Take, for example, the five prudent and vigilant virgins (Mt 25:1 ff.). They enthusiastically had taken in the vessels of their heart the oil of the supernatural grace of the Spirit — a thing not conformable to their nature. For this reason they were able to enter together with the Bridegroom into the heavenly bridal chamber. The other foolish ones, however, content with their own nature, did not watch nor did they betake themselves to receive “the oil of gladness” (Ps 45:7) in their vessels. But still in the flesh, they fell into a deep sleep through negligence, inattentiveness, laziness, and ignorance or even through considering themselves justified. Because of this they were excluded from the bridal chamber of the kingdom because they were unable to please the heavenly Bridegroom. Bound by ties of the world and by earthly love, they did not offer all their love and devotion to the heavenly Spouse nor did they carry with them the oil. But the souls who seek the sanctification of the Spirit, which is a thing that lies beyond natural power, are completely bound with their whole love to the Lord. There they walk; there they pray; there they focus their thoughts, ignoring all other things. For this reason they are considered worthy to receive the oil of divine grace and without any failure they succeed in passing to life for they have been accepted by and found greatly pleasing to the spiritual Bridegroom. But other souls, who remain on the level of their own nature, crawl along the ground with their earthly thoughts. They think only in a human way. Their mind lives only on the earthly level. And still they are convinced in their own thought that they look to the Bridegroom and that they are adorned with the perfections of a carnal justification. But in reality they have not been born of the Spirit from above (Jn 3:3) and have not accepted the oil of gladness.
7. The five rational senses of the soul, if they have received grace from above and the sanctification of the Spirit, truly are the prudent virgins. They have received from above the wisdom of grace. But if they continue depending solely on their own nature, they class themselves with the foolish virgins and show themselves to be children of this world.
Just as the souls who have completely given themselves totally to the Lord have their thoughts there, their prayers directed there, walk there, and are bound there by the desire of the love of God, so, on the contrary, the souls who have given themselves to the love of the world and wish to live completely on this earth walk there, have their thoughts there, and it is there where their minds live (Lk 12:34).
For this reason they are unable to turn themselves over to the kind, prudential guidance of the Spirit. Something that is foreign to our basic nature, I mean, heavenly grace, necessarily demands being joined and drawn into our nature in order that we can enter into the heavenly hridal chamber of the kingdom and obtain eternal salvation.
Source: Maloney, p. 52f.
First draft: 9 Oct 2022
❧
Bibliography
von Balthasar, Hans Urs. Origen, Spirit and Fire: A Thematic Anthology of His Writings. Tr. Robert J. Daly. CUA Press, 2001.
von Balthasar, Hans Urs. Glory of the Lord Vol. 1: Seeing The Form. Tr. Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis. T&T Clark, 1982.
Gavrilyuk, Paul L.; Coakley, Sarah. The Spiritual Senses: Perceiving God in Western Christianity. Cambridge University Press, 2011.
Klostermann, Erich. Origenes Werke: Bd. Origenes Matthäuserklärung, II. Die lateinische Übersetzung der Commentariorum series. J. C. Hinrichs, 1933.
MacMullen, R. G. St. Augustine: Sermon 43. In: Ed. Philip Schaff, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 6., Buffalo, NY, Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1888. Online (New Advent) version by Kevin Knight.
Maloney, George A. Pseudo-Macarius: The Fifty Spiritual Homilies and the Great Letter. Classics of Western Spirituality. Paulist Press, 1992.
McInroy, Mark. Balthasar on the Spiritual Senses: Perceiving Splendour. OUP, 2014. [dissertation]
Rahner, Karl. The doctrine of the ‘spiritual senses’ in Origen, Theological Investigations 16.81−103; originally published as Le début d’une doctrine des cinq sens spirituels chez Origene, Revue d’ascétique et de mystique 13, 1932, 113−45.
❧
Fragments of Cicero’s Hortensius in English
AUGUSTINE relates in Confessions 3.4.7 that around the age of eighteen he was permanently converted to a passionate and lifelong love of Wisdom by reading Cicero’s dialogue, the Hortensius. In this dialogue, modeled after Aristotle’s work, Protrepticus, Cicero applies all his eloquence and rhetorical skills to exhort his fellow Romans to the study of Greek philosophy. Unfortunately the Hortensius is also a lost work, but we have approximately 103 fragments. These were collected by H. Mueller, and have been translated into Italian, French and German. As far as I know, no similar translation in English exists. However many of the fragments are found in well known works by Cicero, St. Augustine and Lactantius that are available in English. These are supplied below.
Following these are lists of (1) fragments of Aristotle’s Protrepticus in Cicero’s other works (which might have found there way into Hortensius) and (2) related passages from Cicero’s other works.
Hortensius Fragments
Mueller 1. Cicero. De divinitione 2 1.1
AFTER serious and long continued reflection as to how I might do good to as many people as possible and thereby prevent any interruption of my service to the State, no better plan occurred to me than to conduct my fellow-citizens in the ways of the noblest learning — and this, I believe, I have already accomplished through my numerous books. For example, in my work entitled Hortensius, I appealed as earnestly as I could for the study of philosophy. And in my Academics, in four volumes, I set forth the philosophic system which I thought least arrogant, and at the same time most consistent and refined. (Falconer, p. 371)
Mueller 2. Cicero, De finibus 1.1.2
To all of these objections I suppose I ought to make some brief reply. The indiscriminate censure of philosophy has indeed been sufficiently answered already in the book which I wrote in praise of that study, in order to defend it against a bitter attack that had been made upon it by Hortensius. The favorable reception which that volume appeared to obtain from yourself and from others whom I considered competent to sit in judgment encouraged me to embark upon further undertakings; for I did not wish to be thought incapable of sustaining the interest that I had aroused. (Rackham, p. 3)
Mueller 3. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 2 2.4
But I have answered the detractors of philosophy in general, in my Hortensius. (Yonge, p. 339)
Mueller 4. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 3.3.6
Philosophy is certainly the medicine of the soul, whose assistance we do not seek from abroad, as in bodily disorders, but we ourselves are bound to exert our utmost energy and power in order to effect our cure. But as to philosophy in general, I have, I think, in my Hortensius, sufficiently spoken of the credit and attention which it deserves, (Yonge, p. 365)
Mueller 5. Cicero, De officiis 2 2.6
Now, when I am advocating the study of philosophy, I usually discuss this subject at greater length, as I have done in another of my books. For the present I meant only to explain why, deprived of the tasks of public service, I have devoted myself to this particular pursuit. (Miller, p. 173)
Mueller 6. Cicero, Academica 2 2.6
In fact, if there is truth in the praise of philosophy that occupies a certain volume of mine, it is obvious that its pursuit is supremely worthy of all persons of the highest character and eminence, and the only precaution that need be observed by us whom the Roman nation has placed in this rank is to prevent our private studies from encroaching at all upon our pubhc interest. (Rackham, p. 471f)
Mueller 9. Augustine, De beata vita 4
From the age of nineteen, having read in the school of rhetoric that book of Cicero’s called Hortensius, I was inflamed by such a great love of philosophy that I considered devoting myself to it at once. (Schopp, p. 46)
Mueller 10. Augustine, Confessions 3.4.7f
In the ordinary course of study, I lighted upon a certain book of Cicero, whose language, though not his heart, almost all admire. This book of his contains an exhortation to philosophy, and is called Hortensius. This book, in truth, changed my affections, and turned my prayers to Yourself, O Lord, and made me have other hopes and desires. Worthless suddenly became every vain hope to me; and, with an incredible warmth of heart, I yearned for an immortality of wisdom, and began now to arise (Luke 15:18) that I might return to You. Not, then, to improve my language — which I appeared to be purchasing with my mother’s means, in that my nineteenth year, my father having died two years before — not to improve my language did I have recourse to that book; nor did it persuade me by its style, but its matter.
[8] How ardent was I then, my God, how ardent to fly from earthly things to You! Nor did I know how You would deal with me. For with You is wisdom. In Greek the love of wisdom is called philosophy, with which that book inflamed me. There be some who seduce through philosophy, under a great, and alluring, and honourable name coloring and adorning their own errors. And almost all who in that and former times were such, are in that book censured and pointed out. There is also disclosed that most salutary admonition of Your Spirit, by Your good and pious servant: Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ: for in Him dwells all the fullness of the Godhead bodily. Colossians 2:8-9 And since at that time (as Thou, O Light of my heart, know) the words of the apostle were unknown to me, I was delighted with that exhortation, in so far only as I was thereby stimulated, and enkindled, and inflamed to love, seek, obtain, hold, and embrace, not this or that sect, but wisdom itself, whatever it were; and this alone checked me thus ardent, that the name of Christ was not in it. (Pilkington)
Mueller 12. Lactantius, Divine Institutes 3.16.9
Hortensius in Cicero, contending against philosophy, is pressed by a clever argument; inasmuch as, when he said that men ought not to philosophize, he seemed nevertheless to philosophize, since it is the part of the philosophers to discuss what ought and what ought not to be done in life. (Fletcher)
Mueller 14. Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 6.2.15
In Cicero, Catulus in the Hortensius, while he prefers philosophy to all things, says that he would rather have one short treatise respecting duty, than a long speech in behalf of a seditious man Cornelius. And this is plainly to be regarded not as the opinion of Catulus, who perhaps did not utter this saying, but as that of Cicero, who wrote it. I believe that he wrote it for the purpose of recommending these books which he was about to write on Offices, in which very books he testifies that nothing in the whole range of philosophy is better and more profitable than to give precepts for living. (Fletcher)
Mueller 32. Lactantius, Divine Institutes 3.16.12
Moreover, the argument which the same Hortensius employed has great weight also against philosophy — namely, that it may be understood from this, that philosophy is not wisdom, since its beginning and origin are apparent. When, he says, did philosophers begin to exist? Thales, as I imagine, was the first, and his age was recent. Where, then, among the more ancient men did that love of investigating the truth lie hidden? (Fletcher)
Mueller 36. Augustine, De Trinitate 13.4.7
Shall we, then, hold that to be false of which the Academic Cicero himself did not doubt (although Academics doubt every thing), who, when he wanted in the dialogue Hortensius to find some certain thing, of which no one doubted, from which to start his argument, says, We certainly all will to be blessed? (Haddan)
Cf. Augustine, Against Julian 6.1.26.
Mueller 39. Augustine, De beata vita 2.10
I smiled at her and said cheerfully: ‘Mother, you have really gained the mastery of the very stronghold of philosophy. For, undoubtedly you were wanting the words to express yourself like Tullius, who also has dealt with this matter. In his Hortensius, a book written in the praise and defense of philosophy, he said: “Behold, not the philosophers, but only people who like to argue, state that all are happy who live according to their own will. This, of course, is not true, for, to wish what is not fitting is the worst of wretchedness. But it is not so deplorable to fail of attaining what we desire as it is to wish to attain what is not proper. For, greater evil is brought about through one’s wicked will than happiness through fortune.”’ (Schopp, p. 56)
Cf. Augustine, De Trinitate 13.5.8
Mueller 40. Lactantius, Divine Institutes 1.7.4
But perchance some one may ask of us the same question which Hortensius asks in Cicero: If God is one only, what solitude can be happy? As though we, in asserting that He is one, say that He is desolate and solitary. Undoubtedly He has ministers, whom we call messengers. And that is true, which I have before related, that Seneca said in his Exhortations that God produced ministers of His kingdom. (Fletcher)
Mueller 42. Lactantius, Divine Institutes 3.16.5
It is not therefore utility, but enjoyment, which they seek from philosophy. And this Cicero indeed testified. Truly, he says, all their disputation, although it contains most abundant fountains of virtue and knowledge, yet, when compared with their actions and accomplishments, I fear lest it should seem not to have brought so much advantage to the business of men as enjoyment to their times of relaxation. (Fletcher)
Mueller 50. Augustine, De Trinitate 14.9.12
Yet Tullius, the great author of eloquence, when arguing in the dialogue Hortensius, says of all four: If we were allowed, when we migrated from this life, to live forever in the islands of the blessed, as fables tell, what need were there of eloquence when there would be no trials, or what need, indeed, of the very virtues themselves? For we should not need fortitude when nothing of either toil or danger was proposed to us; nor justice, when there was nothing of anybody else’s to be coveted; nor temperance, to govern lasts that would not exist; nor, indeed, should we need prudence, when there was no choice offered between good and evil. We should be blessed, therefore, solely by learning and knowing nature, by which alone also the life of the gods is praiseworthy. And hence we may perceive that everything else is a matter of necessity, but this is one of free choice. This great orator, then, when proclaiming the excellence of philosophy, going over again all that he had learned from philosophers, and excellently and pleasantly explaining it, has affirmed all four virtues to be necessary. (Haddan)
Mueller 54. Augustine, City of God 3.15
In the dialogue Hortensius, too, while speaking of the regular eclipses of the sun, he says that they produce the same darkness as covered the death of Romulus, which happened during an eclipse of the sun. Here you see he does not at all shrink from speaking of his death, for Cicero was more of a reasoner than an eulogist. (Dods)
Mueller 76. Augustine, De beata vita 26
But, let us think of such a man as resembles Tullius’ description of Orata. Who could affirm offhand that Orata had been afflicted with want, since he was a man of great riches, luxuries, and delights, not lacking anything in regard to pleasure, influence, dignity, and having a healthy constitution? Immensely rich in estates, and exceptionally blessed with most charming friends, he had in abundance whatever his heart desired, and all these goods in the interest of his physical wellbeing. In a word, all his undertakings and his every wish were crowned with success. (Kavanagh, p. 74)
Note. Nonius has a longer version in Latin (see Mueller).
Mueller 81. Augustine, Against Julian 4.14.72
Consider Tully’s words in the dialogue Hortensius, which should delight you more than those of Balbus, who takes the part of the Stoics. What he says is true, but it concerns the inferior part of man, that is, his body, and it could not help you. See what he says about the quality of the mind over against the pleasure of the body. He says: ‘Should one seek the pleasures of the body, which, as Plato said truly and earnestly, are the enticements and baits of evil? What injury to health, what deformity of character and body, what wretched loss, what dishonor is not evoked and elicited by pleasure? Where its action is the most intense, it is the most inimical to philosophy. The pleasure of the body is not in accord with great thought. Who can pay attention or follow a reasoning or think anything at all when under the influence of intense pleasure? The whirlpool of this pleasure is so great that it strives day and night, without the slightest intermission, so to arouse our senses that they be drawn into the depths. What fine mind would not prefer that nature had given us no pleasures at all?’ (Schumacher, p. 229)
Cf. Ibid., 5.8.33. But if you would yield to true judgments, found in at least some of the philosophers’ writings, you would not fail to hear them say pleasures are the enticements and baits of evils, and that lust is a faulty part of the soul.
Cf. Ibid., 5.10.42. What can one think about when the very mind with which he thinks is so absorbed in this carnal pleasure? He whose words I quoted in the foregoing book spoke well when he said: ‘When its activity is most intense, it is most hostile to philosophy. Intense pleasure of the body is incompatible with great thought. What man, under the power of this the most intense of pleasures, can use his mind or carry on a process of reasoning, or think about anything at all?’
Mueller 82. Augustine, Against Julian 5.7.29
Let us enjoy present pleasures to the full, let us amuse ourselves in their absence with thoughts of them, as Epicurus advocated, and we shall be without sin and not deprive ourselves of any good. Let us not resist natural movements because of any doctrinal opinion, but, as Hortensius says: ‘Man would be obedient to nature, sensing without a teacher whatever nature desires.’ A nature which is good cannot desire what is evil, or we must deny good to the good; therefore, let whatever this good lust desires be done, lest he who resists the good himself be evil. (Schumacher, p. 274f)
Mueller 89. Augustine, De beata vita 14
To this remark he smilingly replied: ‘Such things will really cure me. For this dish you have placed before us, prickly somehow and elaborate, is sharp in its sweetness—as that well-known writer says of Hymettic honey—and docs not bloat my stomach. Therefore, after a taste of it, I gladly swallow it all. For I see no way in which this conclusion can be refuted.’ (Kavanagh, p. 61f)
Note: Nonius has a longer version in Latin (see Mueller).
Mueller 95. Augustine, Against Julian 4.15.78
How much better than you and nearer the truth in their opinions about the generation of man are those whom Cicero names in the last part of his dialogue Hortensius, who seemed to be drawn and compelled by the very evidence of things. After he had mentioned the many things we see and grieve over in human vanity and unhappiness, he said : ‘From those errors and hardships of human life it happened that at times there was vision by the ancients, whether they were seers or interpreters of the divine mind, as found in sacred things and origins; who said we are born to atone by punishment for crimes committed in a higher life. We find in Aristotle a statement to the effect that we have been afflicted by punishment similar to one once given a group of men who, fallen into the hands of Etruscan pirates, were slaughtered with deliberate cruelty, and their bodies, part corresponding to part, were very neatly piled up, the living with the dead; thus it seems our souls are united with our bodies as the living were joined with the dead.’ (tr. Schumacher, p. 234f)
Mueller 97. Augustine, De Trinitate 14.19.26
This contemplative wisdom, which I believe is properly called wisdom as distinct from knowledge in the sacred writings; but wisdom only of man, which yet man has not except from Him, by partaking of whom a rational and intellectual mind can be made truly wise — this contemplative wisdom, I say, it is that Cicero commends, in the end of the dialogue Hortensius, when he says: While, then, we consider these things night and day, and sharpen our understanding, which is the eye of the mind, taking care that it be not ever dulled, that is, while we live in philosophy; we, I say, in so doing, have great hope that, if, on the one hand, this sentiment and wisdom of ours is mortal and perishable, we shall still, when we have discharged our human offices, have a pleasant setting, and a not painful extinction, and as it were a rest from life: or if, on the other, as ancient philosophers thought — and those, too, the greatest and far the most celebrated — we have souls eternal and divine, then must we needs think, that the more these shall have always kept in their own proper course, i.e. in reason and in the desire of inquiry, and the less they shall have mixed and entangled themselves in the vices and errors of men, the more easy ascent and return they will have to heaven. And then he says, adding this short sentence, and finishing his discourse by repeating it: Wherefore, to end my discourse at last, if we wish either for a tranquil extinction, after living in the pursuit of these subjects, or if to migrate without delay from this present home to another in no little measure better, we must bestow all our labor and care upon these pursuits. And here I marvel, that a man of such great ability should promise to men living in philosophy, which makes man blessed by contemplation of truth, a pleasant setting after the discharge of human offices, if this our sentiment and wisdom is mortal and perishable; as if that which we did not love, or rather which we fiercely hated, were then to die and come to nothing, so that its setting would be pleasant to us! But indeed he had not learned this from the philosophers, whom he extols with great praise; but this sentiment is redolent of that New Academy, wherein it pleased him to doubt of even the plainest things. But from the philosophers that were greatest and far most celebrated, as he himself confesses, he had learned that souls are eternal. (Haddan)
Mueller 99. Augustine, On Dialectic 9.15.14
Thus, it is most correctly said by the dialecticians that any word is ambiguous. Do not let it dissuade that Hortensius sneers at them in Cicero: “They say that they dare explain the ambiguous clearly. They also say that any word is ambiguous. Then how were ambiguous things explained by ambiguous things? That is like bringing an unlit torch into the darkness.” (Marchand)
Mueller 100. Augustine, Contra academicos 3.14.31
Cicero admits that he himself is very much given to forming opinions, but he say’s that he is inquiring as to what a wise man does. [Cicero, Academica 2.20.66.] … you have at least read in his Hortensius: “Therefore, if there is no certainty, a wise man will not form opinions: he will never accept anything as true.” (Kavanagh, p. 205f.)
Mueller 101. Augustine, Contra academicos 1.3.7
‘Do you not think that Carneades was a wise man?’ asked Licentius.
‘I am not a Greek,’ replied Trygetius. ‘I do not know who that Carneades was.’
‘Well, what about our own Cicero?’ asked Licentius. ‘At any rate, what do you think of him?’
After a long pause, Trygetius said: ‘He was a wise man.’
‘Therefore,’ said Licentius, ‘his opinion on this matter has some weight with you?’
‘It has,’ replied Trygetius.
‘Then hear what it is, for I think it has escaped you. Our Cicero was of the opinion that a man who is searching for the truth, even though he be unable to attain to its discovery, is nevertheless happy.’
‘Where has Cicero said that?’ Trygetius asked.
Licentius rejoined: ‘Who does not know that he has forcefully asserted that nothing can be understood by man, that nothing remains for a wise man but a diligent search for the truth, and that, if he should give assent to doubtful things — and in a wise man this fault is the greatest of all—he could not be free from error, even if those things should happen to be true? Wherefore, if we must believe that a wise man Is necessarily happy, and, if a mere search for the truth is the whole function of wisdom, why should we hesitate to believe that a happy life can be attained by the mere search for the truth? ’ (Kavanagh, p. 113)
Cf. Cicero Academica 1.12.45, 2.20.60, 2.21.67.
Mueller 102. Augustine, Against Julian 4.15.76
You feared lest you be thwarted in our discussion about pleasure by those more sound philosophers whom Cicero called a kind of consular philosophers because of their soundness, as well as by the Stoics themselves, most inimical to pleasure, whose testimony you thought should be quoted from Cicero’s book, in the person of Balbus, but which was in no way helpful to you. (Schumacher, p. 233)
❧
Fragments of Aristotle’s Protrepticus in Cicero’s Other Works
Cicero, Tusculan Disp. 3.28.69 (= Aristotle, Protrepticus, Ross fr. 8; p. 37)
Therefore Aristotle, criticizing the old philosophers who had thought philosophy completed by their intellectual labours, says they were either very stupid or very conceited, but that he sees that, since great progress has been made in a few years, philosophy will in a short time be brought to completion. (Ross)
Cf. Iamblichus, Comm. Math. 26 (83.6−22 Festa).
Cicero, Tusculan Disp. 1.39.94 (= Aristotle, Protrepticus, Ross fr. 10a p. 40)
But what age can truly be called old? What possession of man is lasting? . . . Because we have nothing more, we call this lasting; all these things are called long or short according to the proportion of each that is given to each of us. By the river Hypanis, which flows into the Pontus from the direction of Europe, Aristotle says there are born little creatures which live for but one day. One of these that has died at the eighth hour has died at an advanced age; one that has died at sunset is decrepit, especially if it is on a midsummer day. Compare our longest life with eternity; we shall be found as short-lived as these little creatures. (Ross)
cf. Iamblichus Protrepticus 8 (47.5-21 Pistelli), Boethius Consolation 3.8, Seneca Brev. Vit. 1.2.
Cicero, De finibus 2.13.39−40 (= Aristotle, Protrepticus, Ross fr. 10c p. 42)
I shall hold that we must first exclude the opinions of Aristippus and the whole Cyrenaic school, who were not afraid to place the supreme good in the pleasure which moves our senses most delightfully, and spurned the freedom from pain of which you speak. They did not see that as the horse is born to run, the ox to plough, the dog to follow a scent, so man (as Aristotle says) is born as a sort of mortal god to do two things — for understanding and for action. (Ross)
Cf. Iamblichus Protrepticus 8 (48.9–21 Pistelli); cf. Augustine, De Trinitate 14.19.26.
Cicero, Tusculan Disp. 5.35.101 (= Aristotle, Protrepticus, Ross fr. 16 p. 53)
How then can a life be pleasant from which prudence and moderation are absent? We see from this the error of Sardanapallus, the wealthy king of Syria, who ordered these words to be engraved on his tomb: ‘What I ate and what sated lust drained to the dregs, that I have; many a famous deed lies left behind.’ ‘What else’, Aristotle says, ‘would you have inscribed on the grave, not of a king but of an ox? He says he had in death the things which even in life he had no longer than for the moment of enjoyment.’ (Ross)
Cf. Strabo 14.5.9, p. C 672; Cicero, De finibus 2.32.106.
Cicero, Tusculan Disp. 5.30.85−31.87 (= Aristotle, Protrepticus, Ross fr. 18 p. 54f.)
The case of the Peripatetics has been unfolded — apart from the views of Theophrastus and those who, following him, show a weak dread of and shrinking from pain; the rest may do what they in fact practically do, to exaggerate the importance and dignity of virtue. When they have extolled it to the skies, which these eloquent men are wont to do at length … 31.87 according to the reasoning of these men the happy life will follow virtue even if it leads to torture, and will descend with it into the tyrant’s bull,[1] with Aristotle, Xenocrates, Speusippus, and Polemon, to encourage it; it will never, seduced by threats or blandishments, desert virtue. (Ross)
[1] Phalaris’ brazen bull.
Ibid. 5.10.30.
I do not, therefore, readily allow my friend Brutus, or our common masters, or the ancients, Aristotle, Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Polemon, when they count as evils the things I have enumerated above, at the same time to say that the ‘wise man’ is always happy. If this noble and beautiful title, most worthy of Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato, delights them, let them bring themselves to despise the things by whose splendour they are attracted—strength, health, beauty, riches, honours, power—and to count their opposites as nothing; then they will be able with a voice of crystal clearness to profess that they are terrified neither by the onslaught of fortune, by the opinion of the multitude, by pain, nor by poverty, that everything lies in themselves, that there is nothing outside their power which they should reckon as a good. (Ross)
Ibid. 5.13.39.
Cicero, De finibus 5.5.12−14
But since the happy life is sought for, and the one thing that philosophy ought to consider and pursue is the question whether happiness is entirely in the power of the wise man, or whether it can be weakened or snatched from him by adversity, on this point there seems to be sometimes variation and doubt among philosophers. This impression is produced most strongly by Theophrastus’ book on the happy life, in which a great deal is ascribed to fortune. If this were true, wisdom could not guarantee a happy life. This seems to me, so to speak, a softer and more timid line of thought than that demanded by the force and dignity of virtue. Let us, therefore, cling to Aristotle and his son Nicomachus . . . but let us follow Theophrastus in most things, only allowing virtue more firmness and strength than he did…. [14] Our own Antiochus seems to me to follow most faithfully the opinion of the ancients, which was (he maintains) common to Aristotle and to Polemon. (Ross)
Cicero De natura deorum 2.20.51−52 (= Aristotle, Protrepticus, Ross fr. 19 p. 55)
Most admirable are the motions of the five stars which we wrongly call wandering stars…. It is on the basis of their diverse motions that mathematicians have given the name of ‘great year’ to that which is completed when the sun, the moon, and the five ‘wandering’ stars, the course of all of them completed, have returned to the same relative positions. How long this period is, is a great question, but it must be certain and definite. (Ross)
Cf. Cicero, Hortensius, fr. 35 Mueller; Tacitus Dialogus 16.7; Censor, c.18.11.
❧
Other Related Passages in Cicero
Throughout his philosophical works Cicero’s has magnificent passages concerning the greatness and immortality of the human soul, divine Reason, and the ascent of the mind by contemplation of the order, beauty and goodness of the natural world.
Cicero, De natura deorum 2.37.95−96 (= Aristotle, On Philosophy, Ross fr. 13; p. 85ff)
Great was the saying of Aristotle: ‘Suppose there were men who had lived always underground, in good and well-lighted dwellings, adorned with statues and pictures, and furnished with everything in which those who are thought happy abound. Suppose, however, that they had never gone above ground, but had learned by report and hearsay that there is a divine authority and power. Suppose that then, at some time, the jaws of the earth opened, and they were able to escape and make their way from those hidden dwellings into these regions which we inhabit. When they suddenly saw earth and seas and sky, when they learned the grandeur of clouds and the power of winds, when they saw the sun and learned his grandeur and beauty and the power shown in his filling the sky with light and making day; when, again, night darkened the lands and they saw the whole sky picked out and adorned with stars, and the varying lights of the moon as it waxes and wanes, and the risings and settings of all these bodies, and their courses settled and immutable to all eternity; when they saw those things, most certainly they would have judged both that there are gods and that these great works are the works of gods.’ Thus far Aristotle. (Ross)
Cf. Philo, Allegorical Interpretation 3.32.97−99; On Rewards and Punishments 7.40−46; Special Laws 1.35.185−1.36.194; Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta 2. 1009−1020; Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.4.
Cicero, De divinatione 1.30.63f (= Aristotle, On Philosophy, Ross fr. 12a; p. 84f)
Cf. Sextus Empiricus, Phys. 1.20−23; Cicero, Tusculan Disp. 1.68ff.
Cicero, De natura deorum 1.13.33 (= Aristotle On Philosophy, Ross fr. 26; p. 97)
Cicero, De natura deorum 2.6.16−17
Cicero, De natura deorum 2.15.40 (= Aristotle On Philosophy, Ross fr. 21; p. 93f.)
Cicero, De natura deorum 2.16.42−17.47
Cicero, De natura deorum 2.61.153
Cicero, De natura deorum 3.10.26
Cicero, Pro Milone 83−84
Cicero, Academica 2.38.119 (= Aristotle On Philosophy, Ross fr. 20; p. 92f)
Cicero, Academica 1.7.26 (= Aristotle On Philosophy, Ross fr. 27; p. 98f.)
Cf. Cicero, Tuscculan Disp. 1.10.22; 1.17.41; 1.26.65−27.66.
❧❧
Bibliography
Hortensius
Grilli, Alberto (ed.). M. Tulli Ciceronis Hortensius. Milan, 1962. Crtical edition and Italian translation. 2nd edition, Bologna, 2010.
Mueller, C. F. W. (ed.). M. Tulli Ciceronis scripta quae manserunt omnia. Part 4, Vol. 3. Lipsiae Teubneri, 1890.
Ruch, Michel (ed.). L’Hortensius de Cicéron; histoire et reconstitution [The Hortensius of Cicero: A History and Reconstruction] (in French). Paris, France: Les Belles Lettres, 1958.
Straume-Zimmermann, Laila. (tr.). Cicero’s Hortensius. Bern: Peter Lang, 1976. German and Latin.
Straume-Zimmermann, Laila; Broemser, Ferdinand; Gigon, Olof (trs.). Marcus Tullius Cicero: Lucullus, Academici libri. Lateinisch – deutsch. Munich: Artemis Verlag, 1990 (repr. De Gruyter, 2014).
Cicero
Falconer, William Armistead (tr.). Cicero: On Old Age, On Friendship, On Divination. Loeb Classical Library. New York, 1923.
Miller, Walter (tr.). Cicero: On Duties (De Officiis. Loeb Classical Library. New York, 1913.
Rackham, H. Harris (tr.). Cicero: On Ends (De Fiunibus). Loeb Classical Library. 2nd. ed. Cambridge, MA: 1931.
Rackham, H. (tr.). Cicero: On the Nature of the Gods, Academica. Loeb Classical Library. Harvard University Press, 1917.
Yonge, Charles Duke (tr.). Cicero: The Academic Questions, De Finibus, and Tusculan Disputations. Bohn: London, 1853.
Augustine
Dods, Marcus (tr.). St. Augustine: The City of God. In: Philip Schaff (ed.), Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 2, Buffalo, 1887.
Haddan, Arthur West (tr.). St. Augustine: On the Trinity. In: Philip Schaff (ed.), Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 3, Buffalo, 1887.
Kavanagh, Denis J. (tr.). Answer to Skeptics (Contra academicos). In: Ludwig Schopp (ed.), St. Augustine: The Happy Life; Answer to Skeptics; Divine Providence and the Problem of Evil; Soliloquies. Fathers of the Church, Vol. 5, New York, 1948 (repr. 2010); pp. 87−228.
Marchand, James (tr.). Augustine: On Dialectic. University of Illinois at Urbana. c. 1994.
Pilkington, J. G. (tr.). St. Augustine: Confessions. In: Philip Schaff (ed.), Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 1, Buffalo, 1887.
Schopp, Ludwig (tr.). The Happy Life (De beata vita). In: Ludwig Schopp (ed.), St. Augustine: The Happy Life; Answer to Skeptics; Divine Providence and the Problem of Evil; Soliloquies. Fathers of the Church, Vol. 5, New York, 1948 (repr. 2010); pp. 29−86.
Schumacher, Matthew A. (tr.). Saint Augustine: Against Julian. Fathers of the Church, Vol. 35. New York, 1957.
Other
Fletcher, William (tr.). Lactantius: The Divine Institutes. In: Alexander Roberts, James Donaldson, A. Cleveland Coxe (eds.), Ante-Nicene Fathers, Vol. 7, Buffalo, 1886.
Johnson, Thomas M. (tr.) Iamblichus’ Exhortation to the Study of Philosophy. Osceola, Missouri, U.S.A., 1907; repr. Phanes Press, 1988;
Pistelli, Ermenegildo (ed.), Iamblichi Protrepticus, Leipzig: Teubner, 1888,
Ross, David. The Works of Aristotle. Vol. XII. Select Fragments. Oxford, 1952.
von Arnim, Hans (ed.). Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta. Vol. 2. Teubner, 1903 (repr. 1964).
❧
St. Augustine: The Utility of Belief
Fra Angelicao, The Conversion of St. Augustine (c. 1430−1435)
DEAR Philonous,
I had promised to deliver to you this week an explanation of St. Augustine’s lesser-known but valuable work, De utilitate credendi. I was prepared today to write my summary, but now find my mind agitated by a change in weather (an unseasonably warm, ‘Santa-Ana’ like wind). Rather than abandon my plan completely, though, I’ll attempt to accommodate Fate (a tactic which, when employed, sometimes reveals Fate to be Providence). Thus, while I am no fan of stream-of-consciousness style writing — but ,rather, tend to the oppose extreme of obsessive perfectionism — I will allow myself to experiment with the former this time.
Here, then, are a series of thoughts I had during today’s walk. I will write these directly, without adding substantially to them, however great the temptation may be to do so. Hopefully posting these brief comments will help motivate a few people to read the work, so that Augustine can explain his points better than I can.
Augustine in this short book addresses those who are at point in their life where they genuinely seek wisdom and true religion. He is not interested in those for whom these topics are mere curiosities or diversions.
Adapting his thesis to a modern audience, it is: That people — at least those in the West — should not avoid investigating Christianity. This investigation may be done in an experimental way: that is, one may test the waters, so to speak, without making any immediate and permanent commitment. However this initial experiment must be done in a sincere and ‘charitable’ way. By charitable, it is meant that a person should, in case of questionable teachings or, say, puzzling passages of the Bible, be inclined to give the ‘benefit of the doubt.’
Central to his argument is the premise that a person sincerely seeking wisdom and religion recognizes that they are subject to the delusions, follies and vanities of life, and that their own reasoning is subject to corruption by egoism, bias, self-love, and the like. Not only does this make it difficult to understand true religion without help, but it means one has little ability to distinguish true from false teachers. Therefore it is both prudent and reasonable to seek first sources with good reputations. Augustine speaks in terms of ‘authoritative sources’ here — but he does not mean by authority that of a policeman or dictator, but rather authority in the sense of having genuine expertise.
What are the signs of a such an authoritative source. He lists several that apply to the Christian Church (broadly defined):
- It’s longevity.
- It’s wide respect and admiration.
- The benevolent actions and intentions of its saints and doctors.
- The courage and determination of its martyrs.
He also lists as potentially relevant evidence miracles. Modern readers may not accept that part of his argument, but it isn’t really necessary.
Augustine notes that the objection that most Christians themselves lack wisdom and virtue does not affect this argument. In any field of respectable endeavor, only a few gain mastery, yet all respect the field and admire those who do gain mastery. That the ideals of Christianity appeal to the masses, even if they are seldom achieved, is what matters here. It is evidence that Christianity genuinely responds to deep needs of the human condition and resonates with our highest innate ideals.
He also invites us to consider the parallels with authors like Virgil. All people respect these authors and those who study them. Yet only a minority of people actually read them, and fewer still are able to grasp the fine points of their writings.
In this connection Augustine mentions another interesting and revealing point. If someone were to summarily dismiss Virgil or Homer, or read them with the specific intention of finding fault with them, we would consider that person worthy of blame. That is, some instinct we have to honor trust sources of antiquity would be outraged. Augustine does not pursue this point as far as he could, but it is anticipated at some length in the writings of Cicero (one of Augustine’s influences). Ultimately this argument has roots before Cicero in Stoic philosophy. Human beings are social, communal creatures. We are designed by nature, as it were, to honor valid traditions. Those who do not do so — at least not without some good reason — are instinctively disapproved of; and, while perhaps not all instincts are trustworthy or constructive, this one may well be so.
Hence his argument might be succinctly framed as follows:
- If we are sincerely, urgently, fervently seeking wisdom and religion, we must know that our reasoning and judgment are prone to bias and error.
- Therefore we cannot attain wisdom and religion by our own reasoning alone.
- We cannot find a good teacher by relying only on our reasoning.
- We have little choice, then, but to experiment by investigating the teachings of a trusted, reputable source.
- To profit from this source, we must approach the teachings charitably — that is, in an experimental way that basically says, “Okay, I’ll go along for now and see where this leads. If insight soon follows, the experiment will be successful. If not, then I will withhold further belief.”
- That is what we might call experimental credence. It is very different from credulousness or gullibility, things Augustine in no way endorses or advocates.
- To approach things this way is eminently reasonable. This is what he meant by faith (credence) seeking understanding. This is, in fact, far more reasonable than insisting on radical rationalism at the outset — that is requiring that each article of religion be given a fully rational argument before it is taken seriously.
Augustine is in no way here suggesting that we should just bow down to authoritarian dogma. That would be insincere and affected. He does not ask us to be insincere. Rather, this is about adopting a kind of provisional belief. Just as when we cross a street, we do not know a car will not come from around a corner and hit us. We proceed with the ‘faith’ that crossing will be safe. However we do not commit ourselves to this fixed belief, but remain attentive and ready to change our belief if circumstances so dictate. What he is calling credence is, then, somewhat like a “working hypothesis.”
While he does not say so explicitly, the implication is that we have a natural impulse to believe Christianity (or comparable trusted sources.) Hence here we are not imposing on ourselves an arbitrary and artificial belief, but rather are permitting ourselves to accede to a natural impulse to provisionally believe.
Finally, although it may be difficult to find a reliable contemporary person to teach Christianity, we have access to the Bible. We should apply ourselves to its study in the aforementioned spirit of trust and charity, asking such questions as how might this passage apply to my life? or how might I interpret these words in a useful, meaningful and wise way?— and not how may I ridicule or find fault with it? Augustine took it as axiomatic that much of the Bible’s message (especially in the Old Testament) is conveyed by means of allegory. Passages which seem morally objectionable if taken literally assist us by forcing us to look for symbolic meanings. Having sometimes to struggle to find deeper meanings is consistent with the role of religion in helping us to reform and improve our thinking.
Augustine also places great emphasis on the fact that Christian teaching is open, public, and available to all without charge. This contrasts with the secrecy of esoteric texts and elite ‘schools’ which promise to deliver subtle wisdom for the right price. Why seek religion at all if we do not believe God is both generous and actively seeks to assist our endeavors? What could be more evidence of such benevolence and wisdom than by entrusting the teaching of divine truths to an institution like the Christian Church?
Then what are the messages the seeker may hope to find from the Bible? I would propose to classify these under three headings. (These are my view, that is, and not anything Augustine says directly in the work.)
The first is moral reformation and purification, and the gaining of intellectual and moral virtue. (This is similar to Stoicism.)
The second is instruction in contemplative ascent of the mind (anagogy; this is similar to Platonism).
Third (this goes beyond Stoicism and Platonism) is achievement of loving union with God and the theological virtues of Faith, Hope, and, above all, Charity.
Of course nothing I’ve said here should be understood to dissuade the study of other traditional religions, including Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism and Islam — or, for that matter, ancient religious and philosophical traditions like Neoplatonism and Hermeticism. At least one source I’ve seen claimed that Augustine himself continued to read Plotinus all his life. Augustine’s main objection to the Manicheans was not so much their wrong doctrines, but that (1) they maligned Christianity and (2) they insisted that rationalism alone is sufficient in religion.
John
❧
Bibliography
English translations
Burleigh, J. H. S. (tr.). St. Augustine: The Usefulness of Belief (De Utitlitate Credendi). In: J. H. S. Burleigh (ed.), Augustine: Earlier Writings, SCM Press, 1953 (repr. Knox, 2006); pp. 284−323.
Cornish, C. L. (tr). St. Augustine: On the Profit of Believing. In: Philip Schaff (ed.), Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 3, Buffalo, 1887.
Kearney, Ray (tr.). Saint Augustine: The Advantage of Believing (De utilitate credendi). In: Boniface Ramsey (ed.), The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century, vol. I/8, (On Christian Belief), New City Press, 2005; pp. 116−150.
Meagher, Luanne (tr.). St.Augustine: The Advantage of Believing (De utilitate credendi). In: Ludwig Schopp (ed.), Fathers of the Church, Vol. 4 (Writings of St. Augustine, Vol. 2), New York, 1947; pp. 385−442.
Marriott, Charles (tr.). On the Profit of Believing. In: John Henry Parker (ed.), Seventeen Short Treatises of S. Augustine, Oxford, 1847/1869/1885; pp. 577−618.
Latin editions
Migne J. P. (ed.). Augustinus Hipponensis: De utilitate credendi. Patrologia Latina 42, 65−92. Paris, 1841
Pegon, J. (ed. & tr.). De utilitate credendi. In: Oeuvres de Saint Augustin, 1re série, Opuscules, volume VIII. Bibliothèque Augustinienne (BA) 17, Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1951.
Zycha, Joseph (ed.). S. Aureli Augustini: De utilitate credendi. Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum (CSEL) 25.1. Vienna, 1866.
❧
St. Augustine on the Esoteric Meaning of the Beatitudes
Whosoever heareth these sayings of mine, and doeth them, I will liken him unto a wise man, which built his house upon a rock. (Mat 7:24)
THE THEME of Jesus’ teachings in the Gospels is the kingdom of heaven. This kingdom is not of this world (John 18:36; cf. Luke 17:21), but is within. Nowhere is the message of the kingdom, and its role in attaining to holy, happy and blesssed living, presented more directly than in the Sermon on the Mount, of which the Beatitudes (Matthew 5:3−10) are the essence. The Beatitudes are one of the great prayers of the Christian tradition. Unfortunately they are too often regarded as mere platitudes, or else as moral commands to change the exterior world by promoting social justice, peace and so on. But while things like social justice are undeniably important, the Beatitudes seek something greater still: the union of the individual soul with God, which is the essence of beatitude and the purpose of true religion.
St. Augustine — always mindful in his writings of the soul’s journey to God — supplies a beautiful and insightful commentary on the interior meaning of the Beatitudes in Book 1 of his Commentary on Matthew, shown below. The translation here is that of Jepson (1948).
Matthew 5
[3] Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.
[4] Blessed are they that mourn: for they shall be comforted.
[5] Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth.
[6] Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after righteousness: for they shall be filled.
[7] Blessed are the merciful: for they shall obtain mercy.
[8] Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God.
[9] Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called the children of God.
[10] Blessed are they which are persecuted for righteousness’ sake: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.
CHAPTER 1
The Sermon on the Mount is the perfect pattern of the Christian life. The poor in spirit. [Note 1]
3. Now, what does He say? Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. We read in the Scriptures concerning the craving for temporal things: All is vanity and presumption of spirit. [Qoh 1:14; LXX]. Presumption of spirit means boldness and haughtiness. In common parlance, too, the haughty are said to have “high spirits”; and rightly, since spirit is also called “wind.” Whence it is written: Fire, hail, snow, ice, stormy wind. [Psa 148:8] And who has not heard the haughty spoken of as “inflated,” blown up, as it were, with wind? So, too, the expression of the Apostle: Knowledge puffeth up, but charity edifieth. [1 Cor 8.1] For this reason the poor in spirit are rightly understood here as the humble and those who fear God, that is, those who do not have an inflated spirit. And there could be no more felicitous beginning of blessedness, whose ultimate goal is perfect wisdom: The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom. [Pro 1:7; cf. Sir 1: 14; Psa 110:11] Whereas, on the contrary, we have the attribution: The beginning of all sin is pride. [Sir 10:13] Let, therefore, the haughty seek and love the kingdom of the earth; but Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.
CHAPTER 2
The other Beatitudes.
4. Blessed are the meek, for they shall possess the land by inheritance. [Notes 2, 3] The land I take in the sense of the Psalm: Thou art my hope, my portion in the land of the living. [Psa 142:5] It stands for something solid, the stability of an undying inheritance, where the soul in a state of well-being rests as in its natural environment, as the body does on earth; and thence draws its food, as the body from the earth. This is the life and rest of the Saints. The meek are those who yield before outbursts of wickedness and do not resist evil, but overcome evil with good. [Cf. Rom 12:21] Therefore let those who are not meek struggle and contend for earthly and temporal things; but blessed are the meek, for they shall possess the land by inheritance from which they cannot be expelled.
5. Blessed are the mourners, for they shall be comforted. Mourning is sadness for the loss of dear ones. But when people turn to God, they dismiss what they cherished as dear in this world; for they do not find joy in those things which before rejoiced them; and until there comes about in them the love for what is eternal, they feel the sting of sadness over a number of things. They, therefore, will be comforted by the Holy Spirit, who especially for this reason is named the Paraclete, that is, the Consoler, that disregarding the temporal they may enjoy eternal happiness.
6. Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice, for they shall have their fill. Here He means those who love the true and unshakable good. The food with which they will be filled is the food that the Lord Himself mentions: My meat is to do the will of my Father, [John 4:34] which is righteousness; and the water, of which whoso shall drink, as He Himself says, it shall become in him a fountain of water springing up into life everlasting. [John 4:14]
7. Blessed are the merciful, for mercy shall be shown them. He pronounces them blessed who come to the aid of the needy, since it is paid back to them so that they are freed from distress.
8. Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God. How senseless, therefore, are they who look for God with bodily eyes, since He is seen by the heart, as elsewhere it is written: And seek Him in simplicity of heart. [Wis 1.1] For this is a clean heart, one that is a simple heart; and as the light of this world cannot be seen save with sound eyes, so God cannot be seen unless that is sound by which He can be seen.
9. Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God. Perfection lies in peace, where nothing is at war; and the children of God are peaceful for the reason that no resistance to God is present, and surely children ought to bear a likeness to their father. And they are at peace with themselves who quell all the emotions of their soul and subject them to reason, that is, to the mind and spirit, and have their carnal passions well under control; these make up the kingdom of God. In this kingdom everything is in such perfect order that the noblest and most excellent elements in man control without opposition the other elements which are common to us and animals. Moreover, what is most distinguished in man—mind and reason—is subject to a higher being, which is Truth itself, the only-begotten Son of God; for it cannot control the lower unless it puts itself in subjection to its superior. And this is the peace which is given on earth to men of good will; [cf. Luke 2:14] this is the life of a man who is rounded out and perfect in wisdom. From a kingdom of this sort enjoying greatest peace and order has been cast out the Prince of this world who lords it over the perverse and disorderly. With this peace set up and established in the soul, whatever onslaughts he who has been cast out makes against it from without, he but increases the glory which is according to God. He weakens nothing in that structure but by the very ineffectiveness of his machinations reveals what strength has grown within. Hence it follows: Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice’ sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. [Mat 5:10]
CHAPTER 3
The Beatitudes mark the stages traversed towards perfection.
10. … [Note 4]
For blessedness starts with humility: Blessed are the poor in spirit, that is, those who are not puffed up, whose soul is submissive to divine authority, who stand in dread of punishment after this life despite the seeming blessedness of their earthly life.
The soul next makes itself acquainted with Sacred Scripture according to which it must show itself meek through piety, so that it may not make bold to censure what appears a stumbling block to the uninstructed and become intractable by obstinate argumentation.
The soul now begins to realize what a hold the world has on it through the habits and sins of the flesh. In this third step, then, wherein is knowledge, there is grief for the loss of the highest good through clinging to the lowest.
In the fourth step there is hard work. The soul puts forth a tremendous effort to wrench itself from the pernicious delights which bind it. Here there must be hunger and thirst for righteousness, and there is great need for fortitude, for not without pain is the heart severed from its delights.
At the fifth step it is suggested to those who are continuing their energetic efforts how they may be helped to master their situation. For unless one is helped by a superior power, he is incapable of freeing himself by his own efforts from the bonds of misery which encompass him. The suggestion given is a just proposition: If one wishes to be helped by a more powerful person, let him help someone who is weaker in a field wherein he himself holds an advantage. Hence, Blessed are the merciful, for mercy will be shown them.
The sixth step is cleanness of heart from a good consciousness of works well done, enabling the soul to contemplate that supreme good which can be seen only by a mind that is pure and serene.
Finally, the seventh step is wisdom itself, that is, contemplation of the truth, bringing peace to the whole man and effecting a likeness to God; and of this the sum is, Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God.
The eighth maxim [Note 5] returns, as it were, to the beginning, because it shows and commends what is perfect and complete. Thus, in the first and the eighth the kingdom of heaven is mentioned: Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven; and, Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice’ sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven — when now it is said: Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? Shall tribulation? or distress? or persecution? or hunger? or nakedness? or danger? or the sword? [Rom 8:35]
Seven in number, therefore, are the things which lead to perfection. The eighth maxim throws light upon perfection and shows what it consists of, so that, with this maxim beginning again, so to speak, from the first, the two together may serve as steps toward the perfection of the others also.
Notes
1. In paragraphs 1 and 2, omitted here for brevity, Augustine gives a brief introduction. He suggests that the Beatitudes supply a perfect perfect pattern of the Christian life and embrace all the directives we need. Jesus states that those who hear and shape their lives according to his words spoken on the mount are like the man who built his house upon a rock. [Matt. 7:24-27]. Augustine proposes that the reference to Jesus “opening his mouth” [Matt.5:2] implies these are these are His words, i.e., the New Law, whereas previously in His ministry He was wont to open the mouth of the Prophets, i.e., the Old Law.
2. by inheritance. These words appear in the Old Latin version of the Gospels that Augustine used at the time of writing this (ca. 394). He didn’t routinely use the Vulgate until around 400.
3. He inverts the order of the 2nd and 3rd Beatitudes.
4. We omit a paragraph wherein Augustine remarks on the grammatical difference between seven Beatitudes (Mat. 5: 3−9) and the two further maxims in Mat. 10−11.
5. That is, Mat. 5:10. Again, he considers this verse relevant to the present theme, but not one of the seven Beatitudes themselves.
Bibliography
Augustine, Saint, Bishop of Hippo: De sermone Domini in monte. CCSL 35 (1967). J. P. Migne (Paris, 1845), Patrologia Latina (PL) 34:1229−1308 (Latin text).
Findlay, William (tr.). Saint Augustine: Our Lord’s Sermon on the Mount. In: Philip Schaff (ed.), A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, First Series 6. New York, 1903; repr. 1979.
Jepson, John J. (tr.). Saint Augustine: The Lord’s Sermon on the Mount. Ancient Christian Writers 5. Newman Press, 1948.
Kavanagh, Denis J. Saint Augustine: Commentary on the Lord’s Sermon on the Mount, with Seventeen Related Sermons. Fathers of the Church 11. New York 1951.
Paffenroth, Kim (tr.). The Sermon on the Mount (De sermone Domini in monte). In: Boniface Ramsey (ed.), Saint Augustine: New Testament I and II. New City Press, 2014.
Pryse, William. Praying the Beatitudes as a Spiritual Exercise. Satyagraha: Cultural Psychology. 2017. Accessed 13 Oct 2020.
1st draft, 15 Oct 2020
Mental Ascent in St. Augustine’s De quantitate animae
THROUGHOUT his works St. Augustine presents descriptions of the ascent of the mind through fixed levels or stages (Van Fleteren, 2009). These are of interest not only because of their influence on later Christian contemplative thought, especially in the Middle Ages (for example, in the Victorines and St. Bonaventure), but also for their possible practical relevance today as aids for mindfulness and contemplation.
His earlier writings especially show the influence of Plotinus’ Enneads and possibly a lost of work of Porphyry, De regressu animae (On the Return of the Soul). An important example is Chapter 33 of De quantitate animae (On the Greatness of the Soul). In this work, purporting to describe a dialogue Augustine had with his friend, Evodius, several questions about the ‘magnitude’ of the soul are considered. Magnitude is understood in two senses: (1) in regard to extension in space and time, and (2) concerning the soul’s power and capacity. Chapter 33 — the work’s centerpiece — proposes a seven-fold categorization of the soul’s powers, which can also be interpreted as a scheme for ascent to contemplation, the highest activity of the mind.
The first level, animatio (animation) corresponds to simple vegetative and regulatory processes — which plants also possess. Next are sensus (sensation) and ars (arts); ars is construed very broadly and encompasses directed thought, planning, and constructive activity. Animals also, Augustine notes, possess these two powers. It is the last four levels, however, that are of most interest.
In the fourth stage, virtus (moral virtue), the soul turns its interest away from vain and empty worldly concerns, realizing that its true treasure and source of happiness is itself. It therefore sets out with a fervent desire for self-purification.
As a result, the soul reaches the fifth level, tranquillitas (tranquility). Tranquility is indispensable for the mind of the eye to see clearly, so that the soul may advance further.
Once tranquility is attained, the soul must now exert itself to advance towards higher cognitions. That is, an act of will is required. This is the stage of ingressio, or approach.
Finally, the seventh level, contemplatio (contemplation) is reached.
Relative to the traditional three stages of Western mysticism — as, for example, found in the writings of St. John Cassian — virtus and tranquillitas roughly correspond to purification, ingressio to illumination, and contemplatio to union.
Augustine allows that contemplation has varying degrees. The pinnacle is an ultimate mystical experience of union with God, such as “great and peerless souls” reach; for example, Porphyry reports that Plotinus attained this four times. At this point in his life, young Augustine was very intent on achieving this ultimate experience. However I believe his system might be applied to daily experience as we continually struggle to rise from our usual vain preoccupations with transient, delusory, worldly concerns to spiritual mindedness. In a more secular sense, we can interpret this as an ascent from what the humanistic psychologist Abraham Maslow called ‘deficiency cognition’ to ‘Being cognition’, from distraction to mindfulness, or from various forms of folly to right cognition.
Note: The translation here is that of Colleran (1950).
CHAPTER 33. The seven levels of the soul’s greatness.
The Fourth Level of the Soul (virtus)*
73. Take hold now and swing yourself onto the fourth level, which goodness and all true worth call their home. Here it is that the soul ventures to take precedence not only over its own body, acting some part in the universe, but even over the whole body of the universe itself. The goods of the world it does not account its own, and comparing them with its own power and beauty, it keeps aloof from them and despises them. Hence, the more the soul turns to itself for its own pleasure, the more does it withdraw from sordid things and cleanse itself and make itself immaculately clean through and through. It steels itself against every effort to lure it away from its purpose and resolve. It shows high consideration for human society and desires nothing to happen to another which it does not wish to happen to itself. It submits to the authority and the bidding of wise men and is convinced that through them God speaks to itself. Yet, this performance of the soul, noble as it is, still requires strenuous effort and the annoyances and allurements of this world engage it in a mighty struggle, bitterly contested. […]**
Yet, so great is the soul that it can do even this, by the help, of course, of the goodness of the supreme and true God — that goodness which sustains and rules the universe, that goodness by which it has been brought about not only that all things exist, but that they exist in such a way that they cannot be any better than they are. It is to this divine goodness that the soul most dutifully and confidently commits itself for help and success in the difficult task of self-purification.
The Fifth Level of the Soul (tranquillitas)
74. When this has been accomplished, that is, when the soul will be free from all corruption and purified of all its stains, then at last it possesses itself in utter joy and has no fears whatever for itself nor any anxiety for any reason. This, then, is the fifth level. For it is one thing to achieve purity, another to be in possession of it; and the activity by which the soul restores its sullied state to purity and that by which it does not suffer itself to be defiled again are two entirely different things. On this level it conceives in every way how great it is in every respect; and when it has understood that, then with unbounded and wondrous confidence it advances toward God, that is, to the immediate contemplation of truth; and it attains that supreme and transcendent reward for which it has worked so hard.
The Sixth Level of the Soul (ingressio)
75. Now, this activity, namely, the ardent desire to understand truth and perfection, is the soul’s highest vision: it possesses none more perfect, none more noble, none more proper. This, therefore, will be the sixth level of activity. For it is one thing to clear the eye of the soul so that it will not look without purpose and without reason and see what is wrong; it is something else to protect and strengthen the health of the eye; and it is something else again, to direct your gaze calmly and squarely to what is to be seen. Those who wish to do this before they are cleansed and healed recoil so in the presence of that light of truth or that they may think there is in it not only no goodness, but even great evil; indeed, they may decide it does not deserve the name of truth, and with an amount of zest and enthusiasm that is to be pitied, they curse the remedy offered and run back into the darkness engulfing them and which alone their diseased condition suffers them to face. Hence, the divinely inspired prophet says most appositely: Create a clean heart in me, O God, and renew a right spirit within my bowels. [Psalms 51: 10] The spirit is “right,” I believe, if it sees to it that the soul cannot lose its way and go astray in its quest for truth. This spirit is not really “renewed” in anyone unless his heart is first made clean, that is to say, unless he first controls his thoughts and drains off from them all the dregs of attachment to corruptible things.
The Seventh Level of the Soul (contemplatio)
76. Now at last we are in the very vision and contemplation of truth, which is the seventh and last level of the soul; and here we no longer have a level but in reality a home at which one arrives via those levels. What shall I say are the delights, what the enjoyment, of the supreme and true Goodness, what the everlasting peace it breathes upon us? Great and peerless souls — and we believe that they have actually seen and are still seeing these things, have told us this so far as they deemed it should be spoken of. This would I tell you now: if we hold most faithfully to the course which God enjoins on us and which we have undertaken to follow, we shall come by God’s power and wisdom to that supreme Cause or that supreme Author or supreme Principle of all things, or whatever other more appropriate appellative there may be for so great a reality.
And when we understand that, we shall see truly how all things under the sun are the vanity of the vain. For “vanity” is deceit; and “the vain ” are to be understood as persons who are deceived, or persons who deceive, or both. Further, one may discern how great a difference there is between these and the things that truly exist; and yet, since all the other things have also been created and have God as their Maker, they are wonderful and beautiful when considered by themselves, although in comparison with the things that truly exist, they are as nothing. […] Furthermore, in the contemplation of truth, no matter what degree of contemplation you reach, the delight is so great, there is such purity, such innocence, a conviction in all things that is so absolute, that one could think he really knew nothing when aforetime he fancied he had knowledge. And that the soul may not be impeded from giving full allegiance to the fullness of truth, death — meaning complete escape and acquittal from this body — which previously was feared, is now desired as the greatest boon.
* We omit here his discussion of animatio, sensus and ars, which are not directly related to contemplation.
** In the omitted material St. Augustine describes how at this stage an exaggerated fear of death may arise as a person, increasingly aware of faults, fears condemnation by God. This concern seems rather foreign to the thought of Plotinus and Porphyry.
Bibliography
Augustine, Saint, Bishop of Hippo: De quantitate animae. J. P. Migne (Paris, 1841), Patrologia Latina (PL) 32:1035−1080 (Latin text). CSEL 89 (1986), pp. 129−231.
Colleran, Joseph M. (tr.). St. Augustine: The Greatness of the Soul, The Teacher. Ancient Christian Writers 9. Newman Press, 1950; 1−112.
Fokin, Alexey. St. Augustine’s paradigm: ab exterioribus ad interiora, ab inferioribus ad superiora in Western and Eastern Christian mysticism. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7.2 (2015): 81−107.
Garvey, Mary Patricia. Saint Augustine: Christian or Neo-platonist? Marquette University Press, 1939. (See pp. 146−160.)
Maslow, Abraham H. (1971). The farther reaches of human nature. New York: Viking (republished: Arkana, 1993). Ch. 9. Notes on Being-Psychology. pp. 121−142.
McMahon, John J. The Magnitude of the Soul. Fathers of the Church: Writings of Saint Augustine 2. New York, 1947; 51−149.
Tourscher, Francis Edward. De Quantitate Animae: The Measure of the Soul; Latin Text, with English Translation and Notes. Peter Reilly Company, 1933.
Van Fleteren, Frederick. Ascent of the Soul. In: Allan D. Fitzgerald (ed.), Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, Eerdmans, 2009; pp. 63−67.
1st draft, 13 Oct 2020
Preface to Traherne
Art: Thomas Denny, Thomas Traherne windows (Hereford Cathedral, 2007)
SINCE the rediscovery of Thomas Traherne’s work around the turn of 20th century, there has been wide consensus that he is a significant writer. There has been less agreement, however, on why he is significant — i.e., what his main contributions, especially for present times, consist of.
Somewhat unfortunately, many early commentators focused attention on his poetry, classifying him narrowly as an English metaphysical poet. However, while his poetry is excellent, it is arguably,not quite as technically sophisticated as that of George Herbert or Henry Vaughan. Traherne’s best work is not his verse, but his Centuries of Meditations, which we might classify as prose-poetry.
Other writers sought to interpret Traherne as a critic of the newly emerging rationalism, especially of Hobbes. More recently (e.g., Inge, 2009) attention has been drawn to his significance for Christian doctrinal theology.
Somewhat less attention, however, has been paid to simply understanding Traherne’s writings at face value: as devotional works intended to stimulate and deepen the religious experience of readers. What if we simply allow that Traherne is authentically inspired? In that case, perhaps we ought to be more interested in how he describes his work and mission than in historical or technical criticism.
Traherne’s two most sublime and famous works — the poems of the Dobell folio (Dobell, 1906) and Centuries of Meditations (Dobell, 1908) have been transmitted in manuscript form only and lack author prefaces. However Traherne did prepare another work, Christian Ethicks, for publication (it reached print a year after his death) and this is prefaced with a ‘Note to the Reader.’ Here Traherne carefully and concisely explains his purpose. Christian Ethicks is a systematic work, but it treats the same subjects as his poems and Centuries of Meditations. Therefore his ‘To the Reader’ gives us insight into his intentions for these other works as well.
To the Reader, copied from the 1675 edition of Christian Ethicks is supplied below. Original spelling is retained. Page numbers have been added in braces ({}) and paragraphs numbered in brackets ([]). Some key points are as follows:
In the first paragraph he announces his aim to elevate the soul and inflame the heart. He is interested in ethics not as a dry academic exercise or as theories developed by force of rational argument. Rather he seeks to excite the intelligence and arouse the will, enabling people to seek and directly experience the religious and moral truths contained. Here he follows the tradition of Plato — to achieve moral transformation by an ascent of the mind and heart and by recollection (anamnesis) of already known truths — and not the rationalism of Aristotle or scholasticism.
In [2−3] he contrasts his method with discussions that approach ethics either (1) dogmatically, as ‘things we must do because God so ordains’, or (2) based on practical expedience. Indeed, a hallmark feature of Traherne’s philosophy is that ethics is what produces our greatest good, which he calls Felicity. Felicity includes happiness, but is something more. It also carries the sense of joy, illumination and holiness. For Traherne, Felicity is the telos of human beings, our ethical summum bonum. It unites in a single principle our greatest happiness, our duty, expedience, God’s will, love of God and charity to others.
Traherne has sometimes been criticized as being an impractical optimist, with no significant theory of evil. He addresses this point in paragraph [4], taking the position that virtues are so good, beautiful and attractive in themselves that, if we can see them truly, they will by their own force overcome any attraction to baseness or sin. Hence explicit discussion of vice is a digression and a distraction from topics that matter more.
Traherne is clearly promoting what we would today call virtue ethics. In the subsequent paragraphs he alludes to a number of specific virtues, including the traditional cardinal and theological virtues. Again in a characteristically Platonic way, he recognizes a fundamental unity amongst virtues. At the center of them all is Goodness, the source of which is God.
The final paragraph emphasizes two things. First, the essence of his entire system is to exhort us to God’s praise and glory. God’s glory, for Traherne, is the essential fact of the universe. This fact is not only virtually a logical necessity, but something Traherne claims to have experienced himself many times. Further, we cannot doubt that it is his personal, passionate aim to convey this message to us so that we may achieve the Felicity of which he speaks. Traherne presents his writings as a charitable outreaching to his readers, seeking to further God’s glory by making us want to further God’s glory, achieving, in the process, our own Felicity. This kind of self-reinforcing circularity is recurring theme in his writings.
Finally and tellingly, he is careful to emphasize that we must not only understand these high truths intellectually, but “sense” them.
TO THE READER.
[1] THE design of this Treatise is, not to stroak and tickle the Fancy, but to elevate the Soul, and refine its Apprehensions, to inform the Judgment, and polish it for Conversation, to purifie and enflame the Heart, to enrich the Mind, and guide Men {ii} (that stand in need of help) in the way of Vertue; to excite their Desire, to encourage them to Travel, to comfort them in the Journey, and so at last to lead them to true Felicity, both here and hereafter.
[2] need not treat of Vertues in the ordinary way, as they are Duties enjoyned by the Law of GOD; that the Author of The whole Duty of Man *hath excellently done: nor as they are Prudential Expedients and Means for a mans Peace and Honour on Earth; that is in some measure done by the French Charon {iii} of Wisdom**. My purpose is to satisfie the Curious and Unbelieving Soul, concerning the reality, force, and efficacy of Vertue; and having some advantages from the knowledge I gained in the nature of Felicity (by many years earnest and diligent study) my business is to make as visible, as it is possible for me, the lustre of its Beauty, Dignity, and Glory: By shewing what a necessary Means Vertue is, how sweet, how full of Reason, how desirable in it self, how just and amiable, how delightful, and how powerfully conducive also {iv} to Glory: how naturally Vertue carries us to the Temple of Bliss, and how immeasurably transcendent it is in all kinds of Excellency.
[3] And (if I may speak freely) my Office is, to carry and enhance Vertue to its utmost height, to open the Beauty of all the Prospect, and to make the Glory of GOD appear, in the Blessedness of Man, by setting forth its infinite Excellency: Taking out of the Treasuries of Humanity those Arguments that will discover the great perfection of the End of Man, which he may atchieve {v} by the capacity of his Nature: As also by opening the Nature of Vertue it self, thereby to display the marvellous Beauty of Religion, and light the Soul to the sight of its Perfection.
[4] I do not speak much of Vice, which is far the more easie Theme, because I am intirely taken up with the abundance of Worth and Beauty in Vertue, and have so much to say of the positive and intrinsick Goodness of its Nature. But besides, since a strait Line is the measure both of it self, and of a crooked one, I conclude, That the very Glory of {vi} Vertue well understood, will make all Vice appear like dirt before Jewel, when they are compared together. Nay, Vice as soon as it is named in the presence of these Vertues, will look like Poyson and a Contagion, or if you will, as black as Malice and Ingratitude: so that there will need no other Exposition of its Nature, to dehort Men from the love of it, than the Illustration of its Contrary.
[5] Vertues are listed in the rank of Invisible things; of which kind, some are so blind as to deny there are any existent {vii} in Nature: But yet it may, and will be made easily apparent, that all the Peace and Beauty in the World proceedeth from them, all Honour and Security is founded in them, all Glory and Esteem is acquired by them. For the Prosperity of all Kingdoms is laid in the Goodness of GOD and of Men. Were there nothing in the World but the Works of Amity, which proceed from the highest Vertue, they alone would testifie of its Excellency. For there can be no Safety where there is any Treachery: But were all {viii} Truth and Courtesie exercis’d with Fidelity and Love, there could be no Injustice or Complaint in the World; no Strife, nor Violence: but all Bounty, Joy and Complacency. Were there no Blindness, every Soul would be full of Light, and the face of Felicity be seen, and the Earth be turned into Heaven.
[6] The things we treat of are great and mighty; they touch the Essence of every Soul, and are of infinite Concernment, because the Felicity is eternal that is acquired by them: I do not mean Immortal only but worthy to be Eternal: and it is {ix} impossible to be happy without them. We treat of Mans great and soveraign End, of the Nature of Blessedness, of the Means to attain it: Of Knowledge and Love, of Wisdom and Goodness, of Righteousness and Holiness, of Justice and Mercy, of Prudence and Courage, of Temperance and Patience, of Meekness and Humility, of Contentment, of Magnanimity and Modesty, of Liberality and Magnificence, of the waies by which Love is begotten in the Soul, of Gratitude, of Faith, Hope, and Charity, of Repentance, Devotion, {x} Fidelity, and Godliness. In all which we shew what sublime and mysterious Creatures they are, which depend upon the Operations of Mans Soul; their great extent, their use and value, their Original and their End, their Objects and their Times: What Vertues belong to the Estate of Innocency, what to the Estate of Misery and Grace, and what to the Estate of Glory. Which are the food of the Soul, and the works of Nature; which were occasioned by Sin, as Medicines and Expedients only: which are {xi} Essential to Felicity, and which Accidental; which Temporal, and which Eternal: with the true Reason of their Imposition; why they all are commanded, and how wise and gracious GOD is in enjoyning them. By which means all Atheism is put to flight, and all Infidelity: The Soul is reconciled to the Lawgiver of the World, and taught to delight in his Commandements: All Enmity and Discontentment must vanish as Clouds and Darkness before the Sun, when the Beauty of Vertue appeareth in its {xii} brightness and glory. It is impossible that the splendour of its Nature should be seen, but all Religion and Felicity will be manifest.
[7] Perhaps you will meet some New Notions: but yet when they are examined, he hopes it will appear to the Reader, that it was the actual knowledge of true Felicity that taught him to speak of Vertue; and moreover, that there is not the least tittle pertaining to the Catholick Faith contradicted or altered in his Papers. For he firmly retains all that was established in the {xiii} Ancient Councels, nay and sees Cause to do so, even in the highest and most transcendent Mysteries: only he enriches all, by farther opening the grandeur and glory of Religion, with the interiour depths and Beauties of Faith. Yet indeed it is not he, but GOD that hath enriched the Nature of it: he only brings the Wealth of Vertue to light, which the infinite Wisdom, and Goodness, and Power of GOD have seated there. Which though Learned Men know perhaps far better than he, yet he humbly craves pardon for casting in {xiv} his Mite to the vulgar Exchequer. He hath nothing more to say, but that the Glory of GOD, and the sublime Perfection of Humane Nature are united in Vertue. By Vertue the Creation is made useful, and the Universe delightful. All the Works of GOD are crowned with their End, by the Glory of Vertue. For whatsoever is good and profitable for Men is made Sacred; because it is delightful and well-pleasing to GOD: Who being LOVE by Nature, delighteth in his Creatures welfare.{xv}
[8] There are two sorts of concurrent Actions necessary to Bliss. Actions in GOD, and Actions in Men; nay and Actions too in all the Creatures. The Sun must warm, but it must not burn; the Earth must bring forth, but not swallow up; the Air must cool without starving, and the Sea moisten without drowning: Meats must feed but not poyson: Rain must fall, but not oppress: Thus in the inferiour Creatures you see Actions are of several kinds. But these may be reduced to the Actions of GOD, from whom they {xvi} spring; for he prepares all these Creatures for us. And it is necessary to the felicity of his Sons, that he should make all things healing and amiable, not odious and destructive: that he should Love, and not Hate: And the Actions of Men must concur aright with these of GOD, and his Creatures. They must not despise Blessings because they are given, but esteem them; not trample them under feet, because they have the benefit of them, but magnifie and extol them: They too must Love, and not Hate: They must not kill and murther, {xvii} but serve and pleasure one another: they must not scorn great and inestimable Gifts, because they are common, for so the Angels would lose all the happiness of Heaven. If GOD should do the most great and glorious things that infinite Wisdom could devise; if Men will resolve to be blind, and perverse, and sensless, all will be in vain: the most High and Sacred things will increase their Misery. This may give you some little glimpse of the excellency of Vertue.{xviii}
[9] You may easily discern that my Design is to reconcile Men to GOD, and make them fit to delight in him: and that my last End is to celebrate his Praises, in communion with the Angels. Wherein I beg the Concurrence of the Reader, for we can never praise him enough; nor be fit enough to praise him: No other man (at least) can make us so, without our own willingness, and endeavour to do it. Above all, pray to be sensible of the Excellency of the Creation for upon the due sense of its Excellency the life of {xix} Felicity wholly dependeth. Pray to be sensible of the Excellency of Divine Laws, and of all the Goodness which your Soul comprehendeth. Covet a lively sense of all you know, of the Excellency of GOD, and of Eternal Love; of your own Excellency, and of the worth and value of all Objects whatsoever. For to feel is as necessary, as to see their Glory.
* Anonymous, The Whole Duty of Man. London: Henry Hammond, 1658. A popular 17th century Anglican devotional work.
** Pierre Charron, De la sagesse (translated into English as Of Wisdome, 1612). Charron, a disciple of Montaigne, defended virtue on the basis of practical expedience.
Bibliography
Balakier, James, J. Thomas Traherne and the Felicities of the Mind. Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, 2010.
Dobell, Bertram (ed.). The Poetical Works of Thomas Traherne. London, 1903; 2nd ed. 1906.
Dobell, Bertram (ed.). Thomas Traherne: Centuries of Meditations. London, 1908.
Hunter, Stuart Charles. Prophet of Felicity: A Study of the Intellectual Background of Thomas Traherne. Diss. McMaster University, 1965.
Inge, Denise. Wanting Like a God: Desire and Freedom in Thomas Traherne. London: SCM Press, 2009.
Margoliouth, H. M. (ed.). Centuries, Poems, and Thanksgivings. 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958.
Marks, Carol L. Thomas Traherne and Hermes Trismegistus. Renaissance News, vol. 19, no. 2, 1966, 118–131.
Martz, Louis. The Paradise Within: Studies in Vaughan, Traherne, and Milton. New Haven and London, 1964.
Traherne, Thomas. Christian ethicks, or, Divine morality opening the way to blessedness, by the rules of vertue and reason. London, Jonathan Edwin, 1675. [Orig. edition]
1st draft: 1 Sep 2020
St. Anselm: A rousing of the mind to the contemplation of God
Photo: source unknown
ST ANSELM OF CANTERBURY is for many best known as the originator of the ontological argument for God’s existence, and on that basis is sometimes dismissed as sort of a precursor to scholasticism. But this is quite unfair to the legacy of the venerable archbishop, who shines as an example of inspired integration of Faith and Reason. The ontological ‘argument’ is found in Chapters 2 and 3 of Anselm’s Prosologion. However Chapter 1 (below) reveals Anselm’s true intentions: not to supply a logical proof, but rather to draw up the mind into a mystical contemplation of God’s being and nature. Anselm, like Augustine and Plato before him, is a rational mystic. He demonstrates for us the religious mental power of inspired dialectic, a form of meditation. Dialectic is an exercise which seeks to focus the mind, opening the ‘eye of the intellect’ for divine contemplation (theoria), and not a dry excursion into rationalism.
In reading this chapter it struck me that it worked better as poetry than prose, and I’ve so parsed it here. (It turns out that in her translation Benedicta Ward had the same notion, based partly on punctuation in old manuscripts.) The strong influence of St. Augustine (e.g., his Confessions and Soliloquies) may be seen.
COME now, thou poor child of man,
turn awhile from thy business,
hide thyself for a little time from restless thoughts,
cast away thy troublesome cares,
put aside thy wearisome distractions.
Give thyself a little leisure to converse with God,
and take thy rest awhile in Him.
Enter into the secret chamber of thy heart:
leave everything without but God
and what may help thee to seek after Him,
and when thou hast shut the door,
then do thou seek Him.
Say now, O my whole heart, say now to God,
I seek Thy face; Thy face, Lord, do I seek.
*
COME now then, O Lord my God,
teach Thou my heart when and how I may seek Thee,
where and how I may find Thee?
O Lord, if Thou art not here, where else shall I seek Thee?
but if Thou art everywhere, why do I not behold Thee,
since Thou art here present?
Surely indeed Thou dwellest in the light which no man can approach unto.
But where is that light unapproachable?
or how may I approach unto it since it is unapproachable?
or who shall lead me and bring me into it
that I may see Thee therein?
Again, by what tokens shall I know Thee,
in what form shall I look for Thee?
I have never seen Thee, O Lord my God; I know not Thy form.
What shall I do then, O Lord most high,
what shall I do, banished as I am so far from Thee?
What shall Thy servant do that is sick for love of Thee,
and yet is cast away from Thy presence?
He panteth to behold Thee, and yet Thy presence is very far from him.
He longeth to approach unto Thee, and yet Thy dwelling-place is unapproachable.
He desireth to find Thee, yet he knoweth not Thy habitation.
He would fain seek Thee, yet he knoweth not Thy face.
O Lord, Thou art my God, Thou art my Lord; and I have never beheld Thee.
Thou hast created me and created me anew,
and all good things that I have, hast Thou bestowed upon me,
and yet I have never known Thee.
Nay, I was created to behold Thee, and yet have I never unto this day
done that for the sake whereof I was created.
*
O MISERABLE lot of man, to have lost that whereunto he was created!
O hard and terrible condition!
Alas, what hath he lost? what hath he found?
what hath departed from him? what hath continued with him?
He hath lost the blessedness whereunto he was created,
and he hath found the misery whereunto he was not created;
that without which nothing is happy, hath departed from him,
and that hath continued with him which by itself cannot but be miserable.
Once man did eat angels’ food, after which he now hungereth;
now he eateth the bread of affliction, which then he knew not.
Alas for the common woe of man, the universal sorrow of the children of Adam!
Our first father was filled with abundance, we sigh with hunger;
he was rich, we are beggars.
He miserably threw away that in the possession whereof he was happy, and in the lack whereof we are miserable;
after which we lamentably long and alas! abide unsatisfied.
Why did he not keep for us, when he might easily have kept it, that the loss whereof so grievously afflicts us?
Wherefore did he so overcloud our day, and plunge us into darkness?
Why did he take from us our life, and bring upon us the pains of death?
Wretches that we are, whence have we been driven out and whither?
From our native country into banishment,
from the vision of God into blindness,
from the joy of immortality into the bitterness and horror of death.
How sad the change from so great good to so great evil!
Grievous is the loss, grievous the pain, grievous every thing.
*
BUT alas for me, one of the miserable children of Eve, cast far away from God!
What did I begin? and what have I accomplished?
At what did I aim? and unto what have I attained?
To what did I aspire? and where am I now sighing?
I sought good, and behold, trouble.
I aimed at God, and have stumbled upon myself.
I sought rest in my secret chamber, and I have found tribulation and grief in the inmost parts.
I desired to laugh for gladness of spirit and am constrained to roar for the disquietness of my heart.
I hoped for joy and behold increase of sorrow.
*
HOW long, O Lord, how long? How long, O Lord, wilt Thou forget us,
how long wilt Thou hide Thy face from us?
When wilt Thou turn and hearken unto us?
When wilt thou enlighten our eyes and show us Thy face?
When wilt Thou restore Thy presence to us?
Turn and took upon us, O Lord:
hearken unto us, enlighten us, show us Thyself.
Restore to us Thy presence that it may be well with us;
for without Thee it goeth very ill with us.
Have pity upon our labours and strivings after Thee, for without Thee we can do nothing.
Thou callest us; help us to obey the call.
I beseech Thee, O Lord, that 1 may not despair in my sighing,
but may draw full breath again in hope.
My heart is embittered by its desolation;
with Thy consolation, I beseech Thee, O Lord, make it sweet again.
I beseech Thee, O Lord, for in my hunger I have begun to seek Thee,
suffer me not to depart from Thee fasting.
I have come to Thee fainting for lack of food;
let me not go empty away.
I have come to Thee, as the poor man to the rich, as the miserable to the merciful,
let me not return unsatisfied and despised:
and if before I be fed, I sigh,
grant me that, though after I have sighed, I may be fed.
O Lord, I am bent downwards, I cannot look up:
raise me up, that I may lift mine eyes to heaven.
My iniquities are gone over my head, they overwhelm me;
they are like a sore burden too heavy for me to bear.
Deliver me, take away my burden,
lest the pit of my wickedness shut its mouth upon me:
grant unto me that I may look upon Thy light,
though from afar off, though out of the deep.
Let me seek Thee in desiring Thee;
let me desire Thee in seeking Thee;
let me find Thee in loving Thee;
let me love Thee in finding Thee.
I confess to Thee, O Lord, and I give thanks unto Thee,
because Thou hast created in me this Thine image,
that I may remember Thee, think upon Thee, love Thee:
but so darkened is Thine image in me by the smoke of my sins
that it cannot do that whereunto it was created,
unless Thou renew it and create it again.
I seek not, O Lord, to search out Thy depth,
but I desire in some measure to understand Thy truth,
which my heart believeth and loveth.
Nor do I seek to understand that I may believe,
but I believe that I may understand.
For this too I believe, that unless I first believe, I shall not understand.
Source: St. Anselm of Canterbury, Proslogin 1 (tr. Webb, pp. 5−11; slightly edited)
Bibliography
St. Anselm, Opera Omnia. Patrologia Latina 158, 223–248 (ch. 1: 225−228). Paris: Migne, 1854. [Online Latin text]
Barth, Karl. Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum. Trans. Ian Robertson. John Knox Press, 1960.
Davies, Brian; Evans, G. R. Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works. Oxford University Press, 1998.
Sansom, Dennis. The virtue of contemplation and St. Anselm’s Proslogion II and III. Saint Anselm Journal 9.2, 2014.
Schmitt, Franciscus Salesius. S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia. Friedrich Fromann Verlag, 1968.
Southern, R.W. Saint Anselm: A Portrait In Landscape. Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Stolz, Anselm. Anselm’s Theology in the Proslogion. In: John Hick & Arthur C. McGill (eds.), The Many Faced Argument, New York: Macmillan, 1967 (repr. Wipf and Stock, 2009); pp. 183−206.
Ward, Benedicta (tr.). The Prayers and Meditations of Saint Anselm. Penguin, 1973.
Webb, Clement Charles Julian (tr.). The Devotions of Saint Anselm. Methuen, 1903.
Williams, Thomas. Anselm: Basic Writings. Hackett, 2007.
1st draft: 4 May 2020
St. Augustine and Intellectual Vision
Gerard Seghers (attr). The Four Doctors of the Western Church, Saint Augustine of Hippo
ST. AUGUSTINE, in several works, but most famously in Book 12 of On the Literal Meaning of Genesis (De Gen ad lit), developed a typology of ‘vision’ that became very influential throughout the Middle Ages, and which still merits our interest today. His main concern is not vision per se, but rather to use vision as a metaphor for knowing or cognition, and especially mental insight and knowledge of divine things. His basic scheme is a tripartite division:
Corporeal vision. The lowest form of vision is ordinary seeing by means of the eye, or bodily vision (visio corporalis). By this vision we see objects in the material world.
Spiritual vision. Above this is the mental vision by which we see images in the mind, either as memories of past sense experience, or products of the imagination. This he calls spiritual vision (visio spiritualis) — but this term requires an explanation. This vision is not spiritual in the sense that we understand that word today. Rather, the connection with ‘spirit’ derives from ancient theories of perception, wherein it was believed that sense experience involved stimulation of a semi-material fluid (pneuma) that permeated the body. Therefore a more apt term might be imaginative vision.
Intellectual vision. This all leads up to what really interests Augustine: the highest level of vision, which he calls intellectual vision (visio intellectualis). Unlike the other two forms of vision, intellectual vision sees things that have no connection with physical objects or their images. It includes what a Platonist or Neoplatonist might call the ‘intellection of Forms’ (noesis): for example, by intellectual vision we can ‘see’ that bisecting a triangle always produces two triangles, and that 5 is greater than 4. But for Augustine, intellectual vision is much more than Platonic or Plotinian noesis, and includes a wider range of cognitive activity, including what today we would call insight or (some kinds of) intuition.
Intellectual vision is, in fact, a pivotal concept in Augustine’s philosophy. It plays an important role for him in contemplative ascent to God, in the relationship of Jesus Christ to the individual soul, and in understanding what faith means. Hence he takes care to supply examples so readers can understand intellectual vision and observe it at work in their own minds. It probably wouldn’t be an exaggeration to suggest that Augustine’s notion of intellectual vision is critical to understanding his important role not only in Christian philosophy, but in the history of human consciousness.
In De Gen ad lit 12 Augustine supplies many examples of intellectual vision. These include the ability to see and understand virtues (12.24.50; 12.31.59), truth (12.26.54), love and (within limits) God (12.28.56; 12.31.59). He also suggests that it’s by means of intellectual vision that we can recognize allegorical meanings of Scripture, and distinguish valid from spurious spiritual visions and understand the meanings of the latter.
De videndo Deo
We also learn more about intellectual vision in a book-length letter Augustine wrote to Paulina, known as On seeing God (De videndo Deo). He is trying to help Paulina understand what it means to ‘see God,’ with particular reference to certain verses of Scripture, such as Matthew 5:8 (Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God.) More specifically, he wishes to help her see God herself.
The letter reveals in a most remarkable way his humanism and pastoral concern. Having ‘seen’ God himself, he has an intense, earnest desire to help others do the same. (This humanistic and personal view of Augustine stands in contrast with the common modern perception of him shaped by later appropriation and narrow interpretation of his teachings by later Scholastic and academic theologians.)
His concern is to show that God is seen by intellectual, not bodily vision. But first he must help Paulina understand what intellectual vision is, or, rather, to witness its operation in her own mind. For this purpose in chapters 38 to 41 he employs a novel and effective device: he has her reflect on her inner response to the various arguments and propositions advanced in his letter up to this point. He asks her to review his preceding discussion, noting which points ones she’s found credible and which she’s doubted; and then to notice the inner ‘vision’ by which the recognizes her varying degrees of belief:
But examine in this whole discussion of ours what you have seen, what you have believed, what you still do not know, either because I have not spoken of it, or you have not understood, or you have not judged it credible. Among the points which you have seen to be true, distinguish further how you saw them: whether it was by recalling that you had seen them through the body, such as heavenly or earthly bodies, or whether you never perceived them by corporeal sight, but, by looking upon them with your mind only, observed that they are true and certain, such as your own will, about which I believe you when you speak, for it is true I cannot see it myself as it is seen by you. And when you have distinguished between these two, notice, too, how you make your distinction. (De videndo Deo 38; italics added)
Whether we believe or doubt, we see that we do so. We also see that we we find some sources more credible than others. Paulina does not place equal credence in the opinions of Augustine and Ambrose. And she instinctively believes Scripture even more:
Note this, therefore, after you have carefully and faithfully examined and distinguished what you see; in making your distinction assess the actual weight of evidence on what you believe in this whole speech which I have been making to you, since I began to speak to you in this letter, and in it note to what extent you lend your faith to what you do not see. You do not put the same faith in me as you do in Ambrose … ; or if you do think that we are both to be weighed in the same balance, of course you will not compare us in any way with the Gospel, or put our writings on the same footing with the canonical Scriptures. …
Therefore, you yield faith to these words [of Ambrose and myself] in one way, but to the divine words in quite a different way. Perhaps some little doubt has crept into your mind about us; that we may be somewhat less than clear about some of the divine words, and that they are interpreted by us, not as they were said, but as we imagine them. … About the divine Scriptures, however, even when they are not clearly understood, you have no doubt that they are to be believed. But you surely observe and see this weighing of belief or non-belief, and the difficulty of knowing, and the storms of doubt, and the devout faith which is owed to the divine utterances; all these you see in your mind as they are, and you do not doubt in the least that they are in your mind in this way, either as I said them, or, preferably, as you knew them yourself. Therefore, you see your faith, you see your doubt, you see your desire and will to learn, and when you are led by divine authority to believe what you do not see, you see at once that you believe these things; you analyze and distinguish all this. (Ibid. 39f.; italics added)
Importantly, he is not equating intellectual vision with her actual beliefs or doubts, but rather with her ability to perceive differences in her degrees of belief. He then has her note the difference between this faculty and corporeal vision.
Of course, you will not make any sort of comparison between your bodily eyes and these eyes of your heart, with which you perceive that all this is true and certain, with which you observe and distinguish what is invisibly present to you. (Ibid. 41)
Augustine is turning what might otherwise be an abstruse and sterile technical discussion about ‘seeing’ God into a spiritual exercise and practical demonstration. He is helping Paulina integrate her intellectual vision more fully into her rational consciousness. Before, she, like all of us, engaged in intellectual vision, but somewhat subliminally, as something not fully in awareness. But by drawing her attention to it, the faculty now becomes more consciously accessible and more acute, even enlarged. By this means she will be able to eventually exercise it in subtle perceptions of God’s presence and activity in her mind.
As we investigate the meaning of intellectual vision — and especially by observing our own mental operations — it gradually becomes clear that this is no mere abstract epistemological category, but an entire dimension or plane of psychological experience. We begin to appreciate the reality, vastness and importance of an entire inner reality, a realm perhaps as as vast as the entire universe of sense experience.
Yet despite its importance, intellectual vision operates for most people only subliminally, in the sub- or pre-conscious mind. We constantly apply these subtle mental operations of inner vision, discernment and judgment and could not adaptively function otherwise. But by becoming more conscious of them, we may better integrate this dimension of our being into our rational mental life and social activity, so that both our outer and inner life becomes more holy, virtuous and spiritually authentic
Richard of Saint-Victor
Augustine’s concept of intellectual vision became a staple of medieval Latin Christina thought, and is especially prominent in the writings of Hugh and Richard of Saint-Victor, 12th century writers. To give but one example, Richard’s Adnotationes mysticae in Psalmos 143 distinguishes several distinct aspects of discretion [discretio]:
(1) diiudicatio is the right judgment that directs virtues toward their ends; it is the light that leads us to truth (lucerna cordis iudicium discretionis);
(2) deliberatio makes the distinction between what should and should not be done in a specific situation, taking into account the particular circumstances;
(3) dispositio considers the proper ordering of means for attaining an end;
(4) dispensatio distinguishes what’s appropriate and inappropriate, and reexamines a first judgment when required;
(5) moderatio determines the right measure of the action.
Considering that discretion is only one part of intellectual vision, we can begin to get an idea of the complexity and richness of our subtle mental life.
By the end of the 12th century, the Augustinian tradition had achieved a remarkable synthesis of rationalism and mysticism (and also, though we have not discussed this aspect here, charity as an organizing principle of social life). This progress halted as Scholasticism and rationalistic dogmatism became a dominating force in the 13th century and beyond, even to present times. As the rational separated itself from the mystical element of Christianity, so the mystical separated itself from the rational: Pseudo-Dionysian and ‘apophatic’ mysticism submerged the intellectual mystical tradition of Augustine. This split between rationalism and mysticism remains today. Augustinian intellectual mysticism may potentially supply a more integral form of Christianity for present times.
Bibliography
Augustine of Hippo. Epistolae 147. De videndo deo. Patrologia Latina 33:596−622. J. P. Migne. Paris, 1841.
Augustine of Hippo. De Genesi ad litteram. Patrologia Latina 34:245−486. J. P. Migne. Paris, 1841.
Cary, Phillip. Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self: The Legacy of a Christian Platonist. Oxford University Press, 2000.
Clark, Mary T. (tr.). On Seeing God (De videndo Deo; Letter 147. In: Augustine of Hippo, Selected Writings. Classics of Western Spirituality. Paulist Press, 1984; pp. 361−402.
Fraeters, Veerle. Visio/Vision. In: Amy Hollywood & Patricia Z. Beckman (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Christian Mysticism, Cambridge University Press 2012; pp. 178−188.
Hill, Edmund (tr.). The Literal Meaning of Genesis. In: Augustine, On Genesis, New City Press, 2002; ch. 12, pp. 464–475.
Meagher, Robert E. Augustine: On the Inner Life of the Mind. Hackett, 1998.
Parsons, Wilfrid (tr.). Letter 147: Augustine to Paulina (De videndo Deo). Saint Augustine: Letters Vol. 3. Fathers of the Church 20. New York, 1953; pp. 170−224.
Ragazzi, Grazia Mangano. Obeying the Truth: Discretion in the Spiritual Writings of Saint Catherine of Siena. Oxford University Press, 2013; p. 126.
Richard of Saint-Victor. Adnotationes mysticae in Psalmos. Patrologia Latina 196:265−402. J. P. Migne. Paris, 1855. (196:381d−382a)
Schlapbach, Karin. Intellectual vision in Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 12, or: seeing the hidden meaning of images. Studia Patristica 43, 2006, 239−244.
Taylor, John H. (tr.). Saint Augustine: The Literal Meaning of Genesis. Ancient Christian Writers 41 and 42. Paulist Press, 1982.
Zycha, Joseph (ed.). De Genesi ad Litteram libri duodecimo. Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum (CSEL) 28.1. Critical text. Vienna, 1894.
1st draft, 23 Feb 2020
My new book
Christian Platonism 
St. Augustine: On Desire to See God
leave a comment »
St. Augustine of Hippo (stained glass; location unknown)
1John 3
[1] Behold, what manner of love the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called the sons of God: therefore the world knoweth us not, because it knew him not.
[2] Beloved, now are we the sons of God, and it doth not yet appear what we shall be: but we know that, when he shall appear, we shall be like him; for we shall see him as he is.
[3] And every man that hath this hope in him purifieth himself, even as he is pure.
St. Augustine of Hippo, Homilies on the First Epistle of John 4.5−6
5. For us then, what are we? Already we are begotten of Him; but because we are such in hope, he says, Beloved, now are we sons of God. Now already? Then what is it we look for, if already we are sons of God? And not yet, says he, is it manifested what we shall be. But what else shall we be than sons of God? Hear what follows: We know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like Him, because we shall see Him as He is. Understand, my beloved. It is a great matter: We know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like Him; for we shall see Him as He is. In the first place mark, what is called Is. You know what it is that is so called. That which is called Is, [c.f. Exod 3:14] and not only is called but is so, is unchangeable: It ever remains, It cannot be changed, It is in no part corruptible: It has neither proficiency, for It is perfect; nor has deficiency, for It is eternal. … and the Lord Himself says, Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God. (Matt 5:8) Therefore, we are to see a certain vision, my brethren, which neither eye has seen, nor ear has heard, nor has entered into the heart of man: (1 Cor 2:9) a certain vision, a vision surpassing all earthly beauty, of gold, of silver, of groves and fields; the beauty of sea and air, the beauty of sun and moon, the beauty of the stars, the beauty of angels: surpassing all things: because from it are all things beautiful.
6. What then shall we be, when we shall see this? What is promised to us? We shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is. The tongue has done what it could, has sounded the words: let the rest be thought by the heart.
For what has even John himself said in comparison of That which Is, or what can be said by us men, who are so far from being equal to his merits? Return we therefore to that anointing of Him, return we to that anointing which inwardly teaches that which we cannot speak: and because ye cannot at present see, let your office be in desire.
The whole life of a good Christian is a holy desire. [Tota vita christiani boni, sanctum desiderium est.] Now what you long for, you do not yet see: howbeit by longing, you are made capable, so that when that has come which you may see, you shall be filled.
For just as, if you would fill a bag, and know how great the thing is that shall be given, you stretch the opening of the sack or the skin, or whatever else it be; you know how much you would put in, and see that the bag is narrow; by stretching you make it capable of holding more: so God, by deferring our hope, stretches our desire; by the desiring, stretches the mind; by stretching, makes it more capacious.
Let us desire therefore, my brethren, for we shall be filled. See Paul widening, as it were, his bosom, that it may be able to receive that which is to come. He says, namely, Not that I have already received, or am already perfect: brethren, I deem not myself to have apprehended. (Phil 3:12−13)
Then what are you doing in this life, if you have not yet apprehended? But this one thing [I do]; forgetting the things that are behind, reaching forth to the things that are before, upon the strain I follow on unto the prize of the high calling. (Phil 3:13-14) He says he reaches forth, or stretches himself, and says that he follows upon the strain. He felt himself too little to take in that which eye has not seen, nor ear heard, neither has entered into the heart of man. (1 Cor 2:9)
This is our life, that by desiring we should be exercised. But holy longing exercises us just so much as we prune off our longings from the love of the world. We have already said, Empty out that which is to be filled. With good you are to be filled: pour out the bad. Suppose that God would fill you with honey: if you are full of vinegar, where will you put the honey? That which the vessel bore in it must be poured out: the vessel itself must be cleansed; must be cleansed, albeit with labor, albeit with hard rubbing, that it may become fit for that thing, whatever it be.
Let us say honey, say gold, say wine; whatever we say it is, being that which cannot be said, whatever we would fain say, It is called — God. And when we say God, what have we said? Is that one syllable the whole of that we look for? So then, whatever we have had power to say is beneath Him: let us stretch ourselves unto Him, that when He shall come, He may fill us. For we shall be like Him; because we shall see Him as He is. [Source: Browne (slightly edited)]
❧
Bibliography
Browne, Henry. (tr.). St. Augustine: Homilies on the First Epistle of John. In: Philip Schaff (ed.), Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 7, Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1888; online version: ed. Kevin Knight.
Ramsey, Boniface (tr.). St. Augustine: Homilies on the First Epistle of John. New City, 2008.
Roman Catholic Office of Readings. From a treatise by St Augustine on the first epistle of John. Our heart longs for God.
Latin: In Epistolam Joannis ad Parthos tractatus X. J. P. Migne, Patrologia Latina vol. 35 1977−2062. Paris, 1841.
❧ ❧
Written by John Uebersax
February 18, 2023 at 4:53 pm
Posted in ascetical psychology, Augustine, Beauty, Bible, Commentary, Contemplation, Mysticism, New Testament, Theosis
Tagged with seeing God, vision of God