Christian Platonism

Rediscovering Ancient Wisdom

St. Macrina’s Exegesis of the Parable of the Sower

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Vincent Van Gogh, The Sower, 1888

The following allegorical interpretation of the Parable of the Sower (Matt.13: 24 -30) comes from St. Gregory of Nyssa’s treatise, On the Soul and the Resurrection, which describes a conversation St. Gregory had with his sister, St. Macrina, shortly before her death. Platonic philosophy is discussed throughtout the work. It has been called Phaedo Christianus due to its similarities in theme and setting to Plato’s Phaedo, which records discussions of Socrates on the soul before he drank the hemlock.

“To Macrina, the good seeds are the impulses of our soul which are capable, when directed towards the good (i. e., God), of producing virtue. The bad seed is sin, which is construed as a confusion of our judgment of what is, in fact, good.” (Matz, p. 278).

Matt.13
[24] Another parable put he forth unto them, saying, The kingdom of heaven is likened unto a man which sowed good seed in his field:
[25] But while men slept, his enemy came and sowed tares among the wheat, and went his way.
[26] But when the blade was sprung up, and brought forth fruit, then appeared the tares also.
[27] So the servants of the householder came and said unto him, Sir, didst not thou sow good seed in thy field? from whence then hath it tares?
[28] He said unto them, An enemy hath done this. The servants said unto him, Wilt thou then that we go and gather them up?
[29] But he said, Nay; lest while ye gather up the tares, ye root up also the wheat with them.
[30] Let both grow together until the harvest: and in the time of harvest I will say to the reapers, Gather ye together first the tares, and bind them in bundles to burn them: but gather the wheat into my barn.

AND who, she replied, could deny that truth is to be found only in that upon which the seal of Scriptural testimony is set? So, if it is necessary that something from the Gospels should be adduced in support of our view, a study of the Parable of the Wheat and Tares will not be here out of place. The Householder there sowed good seed. …  But the “enemy,” having watched for the time when men slept, sowed that which was useless in that which was good for food, setting the tares in the very middle of the wheat. The two kinds of seed grew up together; for it was not possible that seed put into the very middle of the wheat should fail to grow up with it. But the Superintendent of the field forbids the servants to gather up the useless crop, on account of their growing at the very root of the contrary sort; so as not to root up the nutritious along with that foreign growth.

Now we think that Scripture means by the good seed the corresponding impulses of the soul, each one of which, if only they are cultured for good, necessarily puts forth the fruit of virtue within us. But since there has been scattered amongst these the bad seed of the error of judgment as to the true Beauty which is alone in its intrinsic nature such, and since this last has been thrown into the shade by the growth of delusion which springs up along with it (for the active principle of desire does not germinate and increase in the direction of that natural Beauty which was the object of its being sown in us, but it has changed its growth so as to move towards a bestial and unthinking state, this very error as to Beauty carrying its impulse towards this result;

and in the same way the seed of anger does not steel us to be brave, but only arms us to fight with our own people; and the power of loving deserts its intellectual objects and becomes completely mad for the immoderate enjoyment of pleasures of sense; and so in like manner our other affections put forth the worse instead of the better growths),— on account of this the wise Husbandman leaves this growth that has been introduced amongst his seed to remain there, so as to secure our not being altogether stripped of better hopes by desire having been rooted out along with that good-for-nothing growth.

If our nature suffered such a mutilation, what will there be to lift us up to grasp the heavenly delights? If love is taken from us, how shall we be united to God? If anger is to be extinguished, what arms shall we possess against the adversary?

Therefore the Husbandman leaves those bastard seeds within us, not for them always to overwhelm the more precious crop, but in order that the land itself (for so, in his allegory, he calls the heart) by its native inherent power, which is that of reasoning, may wither up the one growth and may render the other fruitful and abundant: but if that is not done, then he commissions the fire to mark the distinction in the crops. If, then, a man indulges these affections in a due proportion and holds them in his own power instead of being held in theirs, employing them for an instrument as a king does his subjects’ many hands, then efforts towards excellence more easily succeed for him. But should he become theirs, and, as when any slaves mutiny against their master, get enslaved by those slavish thoughts and ignominiously bow before them; a prey to his natural inferiors, he will be forced to turn to those employments which his imperious masters command. This being so, we shall not pronounce these emotions of the soul, which lie in the power of their possessors for good or ill, to be either virtue or vice. But, whenever their impulse is towards what is noble, then they become matter for praise, as his desire did to Daniel, and his anger to Phineas, and their grief to those who nobly mourn. But if they incline to baseness, then these are, and they are called, bad passions.

Bibliography

Callahan, Virginia Woods (Trans.). On the Soul and the Resurrection. In: Virginia Woods Callahan, Saint Gregory of Nyssa: Ascetical Works. (The Fathers of the Church, Volume 58). Washington DC: CUA Press, 1967.

Matz, Brian J.  Ascetic Readings of the Agricultural Parables in Matt 13:1-48 in the Cappadocians. In: Ed. Hans-Ulrich Weidemann, Asceticism and Exegesis in Early Christianity, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013. pp. 268−283.

St. Gregory of Nyssa. On the Soul and the Resurrection (De anima et resurrectione).  Migne Patrologia Graeca vol. 46, cols. 11−160. Paris: 1863. [Greek text]

St. Gregory of Nyssa. On the Soul and the Resurrection. Trans. William Moore, Henry Austin Wilson. In: Eds. Philip Schaff & Henry Wace, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series 2, Vol. 5: Gregory of Nyssa (NPNF2-5‎). New York: Scribner, 1917 (orig. ed. 1893).

Gregory of Nyssa’s Allegorical Interpretation of the Parable of the Lost Coin

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Luke 15:8−10
[8] Either what woman having ten pieces of silver, if she lose one piece, doth not light a candle, and sweep the house, and seek diligently till she find it?
[9] And when she hath found it, she calleth her friends and her neighbours together, saying, Rejoice with me; for I have found the piece which I had lost.
[10] Likewise, I say unto you, there is joy in the presence of the angels of God over one sinner that repenteth.

Source: Gregory of Nyssa.  On Virginity 12.3−4. In: Virginia Woods Callahan  (Trans.), Gregory of Nyssa: Ascetical Works, The Fathers of the Church, Vol. 58, Washington, DC: CUA Press, 1967. (pp. 44−45).

THE human effort extends only to this: the removal of the filth which has accumulated through evil and the bringing to light again the beauty in the soul which we had covered over. It is such a dogma that I think the Lord is teaching in the Gospel to those who are able to hear wisdom when it is mysteriously spoken: ‘The kingdom of God is within you.’ [Luke 17:21] This saying shows, I believe, that the goodness of God is not separated from our nature, or far away from those who choose to seek it, but it is ever present in each individual, unknown and forgotten when one is choked by the cares and pleasures of life, but discovered again when we tum our attention back to it.

If there is need for further support of the argument, I think this is what the Lord was suggesting in the search for the lost drachma [Luke 15:8−10]. The rest of the virtues [areton; ἀρετῶν] which the Lord refers to as drachmas are of no use, even if they all be present in the soul, if the soul is bereft of the one that is lost. Consequently, He bids us, first of all, to light a lamp, and by this He means perhaps the word which brings to light that which is hidden. Then, He tells us to look for the lost drachma in our own house, i.e., in ourselves.

Through this parable, He suggests that the image of the King is not entirely lost, but that it is hidden under the dirt. We must, I think, interpret the word ‘dirt’ as the filth of the flesh. Once this is swept away and cleaned off by our caring for our life [JU: that is, our spiritual life], that which is being looked for becomes visible, and then the soul can rejoice and bring together the neighbors to share her joy. For in reality, all the faculties of the soul [psuches dunameis; ψυχῆς δυνάμεις], which is what the Lord means by neighbors, do live together, and when the great image of the King which the Creator implanted in our hearts from the beginning is uncovered and brought to light, then, these faculties turn towards that divine joy and merriment, gazing upon the unspeakable beauty of what has been recovered. For it says: ‘Rejoice with me, for I have found the drachma that I had lost.‘ [Luke 15:9]

The neighbors, i.e., the faculties of the soul which dwell together, rejoice at the finding of the divine drachma. Reason and desire [logistike te kai epithumetike; λογιστική τε καὶ ἐπιθυμητικὴ]and the faculty aroused by grief and anger, and whatever other faculties there are, are looked upon as being connected with the soul, and they are logically considered as friends who rightly rejoice in the Lord when they all look to the beautiful and the good and do everything for the glory of God, for now they are no longer the instruments of sin.

This concern, then, for the finding of what is lost is the restoration to the original state of the divine image which is now covered by the filth of the flesh. Let us become what the first being was during the first period of his existence.

Thomas Taylor’s Panegyric to Floyer Sydenham

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BEFORE Thomas Taylor there was Floyer Sydenham.

Sydenham (1710−1787) was the preeminent British translator of Plato in the 18th century, but suffered from obscurity and poverty — even more so than Thomas Taylor, whose own tragic and difficult life was at least compensated for by posthumous fame and influence.

Sydenham was an excellent Greek scholar and devoted himself to the task of translating the works of Plato.  Between 1759 and 1780, he translated and published 9 of Plato’s dialogues, including the Banquet (Symposium), Philebus, Meno, and the First and Second Alcibiades; these translations were included in Thomas Taylor’s famous 1804 edition of the Works of Plato — the first English version of Plato’s complete works (properly called the Taylor & Sydenham edition, with contributions by Harry Spens).

Sydenham’s essay, A Synopsis or General View of the Works of Plato (1759), remains valuable and merits modern study.

Despite his skill as a translator (he was better educated and, by most estimates, a more able translator than Taylor), so many of his subscribers, victims of a chaotic British economy, defaulted payment that he was sentenced to debtors prison in 1787 and subsequently died.   In consequence of his unfortunate treatment and tragic death, the Royal Literary Fund (1790) was founded for the relief of authors in distress.

Taylor paid posthumous tribute to Sydenham with the following memorial, which he published in 1790, and again, in revised form, in 1805.

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A Panegyric on Floyer Sydenham

by Thomas Taylor

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HILE vulgar souls the public notice claim,
And dare to stand as candidates for fame;
While Sydenham’s worth in shameful silence lies,
Who liv’d unnotic’d and neglected dies;
My Muse indignant wakes her dormant fire,
And, rous’d by Friendship, boldly strikes the lyre.
Ye liberal few, who in his footsteps tread,
Rise, and assert the honours of the dead;
Genius sublime; who from barbaric night,
Led Wisdom forth, far beaming heav’nly light;
Whose skill great Plato’s elegance commands,
His graces copies and his fire expands.
For this shall future Bards his worth prolong,
Example bright and theme of lib’ral song!
O! hadst thou liv’d in those exalted days,
When Monarchs crown’d Philosophers with bays;
When Alexandria’s god-like sons appear’d,
And Truth restor’d, her head majestic rear’d;
Who rose unveil’d perspicuous to the wise,
Though by the vulgar seen in dark disguise:
Then had thy mind with native worth elate,
Shone through the ruins of a falling state;
And far extended Wisdom’s endless reign,
O’er Rome’s wide-spreading, tottering domain;
Then had thy genius met its just reward,
Awe from the vulgar, and from kings regard;
Then had thy days with plenteous ease been crown’d,
Thy pupils noble, and thy name renown’d;
Thy death lamented through immortal Rome,
And the fair column planted o’er thy tomb.
But doom’d to live where Truth’s refulgent light
Yet scarcely glimmers through Oblivion’s night;
Where genuine Science scarcely lifts her head,
For ages buried with the mighty dead;
Where Wealth, not Virtue, is the road to Fame;
And ancient Wisdom is an empty name;
Where Plato’s sacred page neglected lies,
And words, not things, are studied to be wise.
Here shone thy Wisdom o’er this sea of life,
Rous’d with perpetual storms of grief and strife;
Like some fair lamp whose solitary light,
Streams from a watch-tower through the gloom of night,
And shines secure, though raging waves surround,
Its splendours beaming o’er the dark profound.
Here, while alive, thy genius was alone;
Thy worth neglected, and almost unknown:
Here thy disciples, and thy friends were few;
Nor these all just, magnanimous, and true:
For some whom Heav’n had blest with wealth and pow’r,
Turn’d mean deserters in the needful hour;
While others prais’d thy genius and admir’d,
But ne’er to ease thy wretched state desir’d,
Basely contended Wisdom to receive;
Without a wish its author to relieve.
Such was thy fate, while matters drowsy ties
Held thee an exile from thy native skies.
But now emerg’d from sense, and error’s night,
Thy soul has gain’d its ancient orb of light;
Refulgent shines in Truth’s immortal plain,
And scorns dull body, and her dark domain.
No gloomy clouds those happy realms assail;
And the calm aether knows no stormy gale;
No vain pretenders there, no faithless friends;
No selfish motives, no ignoble ends.
O! may some spark of Truth’s celestial fire,
My breast, like thine, with sacred warmth inspire.
Teach me like thee, with vigour unconfin’d,
To soar from body to the realms of mind;
To scorn like thee, wealth’s despicable race,
The vain—the sordid—impudent, and base.

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Source: Thomas Taylor, Miscellanies, in Prose and Verse, London: C. Whittingham, 1805 (pp. 37−40).

These verses first appeared in the General Advertiser in 1787, and were thence copied into “most of the evening papers.” Taylor made some minor alterations when he republished them in 1805.

References

Demetriou, Kyriakos N. Asking for Plato’s Forgiveness. Floyer Sydenham: A Platonic Visionary of 18th-century Britain. Quaderni di Storia, vol. 78, 2013, pp. 55-86.

Sydenham, Floyer.  A Synopsis or General View of the Works of Plato. London, 1759.

Taylor, Thomas; Sydenham, Floyer. The Works of Plato, 5 vols.  With Harry Spens (trans.). London: T. Taylor, 1804.

Uebersax, John.  Harry Spens and the First English Translation of Plato’s Republic.  Online article.  https://satyagraha.wordpress.com/2015/01/13/harry-spens/ .  Last updated: January 13, 2016.

Written by John Uebersax

January 31, 2017 at 3:50 am

The Oxford Movement’s Critique of Modern Rationalism

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The Oxford Movement was a 19th century movement within the Church of England that eventually developed into Anglo-Catholicism. The movement’s manifesto was set forth in explicit terms in the Tracts for the Times, published from 1833 to 1841.  However a parallel expression of principles took poetic form — in the Lyra Apostolica (1836), an anthology whose principal author was John Henry Newman, and with contributions by several others, including John Keble.

Newman, Keble and the others sought a return to a more authentic and full-blooded Christianity as found in the writings of Church Fathers.  Their critique of rationalism is relevant for our times.

The Introduction to the 1901 edition of the Lyra, written by Henry C. Beeching, excerpted below, explains with admirable clarity and eloquence the Oxford Movement’s critique of modern rationalism and Lockean Liberalism.

* * *

WE must remember what the Liberalism of the Thirties was, if we would understand the indignation with which these men set themselves to repudiate it. It was the Liberalism of rational enlightenment. It believed that the evils and sorrows of humanity would fade away before the instructed intelligence. It was hard, confident, aggressive. It had the easy air of superiority which belongs to those who have never faced the deep underlying issues of life.

It omitted these from its calculation. Everything, for it, was on the surface; was plain; was uncomplicated. The cool reason, the average commonsense, the ordinary experience of the man in the street, were its sufficing standards. It abhorred mystery. It had no touch of reverence, awe, mysticism. It was frankly utilitarian. It was at the mercy of a bland and shallow {xxvii} optimism. Not that it was not doing an immense deal of practical good. It was opening doors of freedom. It was breaking down barriers. It was spreading knowledge. It was extending the range of social happiness. It was widening the old horizons of philanthropic effort. It was relieving men from the burdens and terrors of ignorant bigotry. It was insisting that institutions should do the work for which they were intended. It was bent on applying the test of real use for the public welfare to all the resources of Civilisation, which were locked up, too often, by the selfishness of prejudice, and the idleness of indifference.

But, in spite of all this beneficial activity, Liberalism was felt, by those ardent young men at Oxford, to be their enemy. And it was this, because it left out that which to them was the one fact of supreme importance—the soul.

Liberalism, as it was understood in the days of Lord Brougham, and of Benthamism, knew nothing of the soul’s enthralling drama—its tragic heights and depths, its absorbing wonder, its momentous agonies, its infinite pathos, its tempestuous struggle, its mysterious sin, its passion, its penitence, and its tears. All this Liberalism passed over, as of no account. It was for it a veiled world, into which it possessed no way of entry. It came not into its secret, and moreover, it was content to be excluded. It was inclined to sweep it all aside, as the rubbish of superstition. It was unaware of its own blind-{xxviii} ness. It was confident in its own adequacy to set human life straight, without regard to this disturbing matter.

It was this shallow self-sufficiency which stung the strong soul of Carlyle into fierce revolt. In him, the elements which rational enlightenment fancied it had disposed of, re-asserted their volcanic intensity. Through his voice, humanity defied the comfortable bribes of utilitarianism, and revealed itself once again as the passionate Pilgrim of Time, for ever seeking an unknown and eternal Goal. And this recoil of Carlyle, prophetic in its force, yet empty of any Gospel message, had its parallel at Oxford. . . .  Every fibre of Keble’s soul revolted against any temper that would smoothe over the dark realities of sin, or would cheapen the tremendous issues of human character and human choice, or would rob earth of its imaginative mystery, or would {xxix}trifle with the awful significance of word or deed in the light of Doom. Truth was, for him, no thin logical consistency, but a Vision of Eternal Reality, which smote in upon the conscience of man with the solemnity of a moral challenge.

Liberalism embodied, according to Newman’s analysis, the spirit of rationalism, and the claim of the human reason to sit in judgment upon dogmatic revelation. And, against this, Keble recalled to men the teaching of Bishop Butler on the moral nature of the evidence by which spiritual convictions were reached. To the mere reason, this evidence could not get beyond suggestive probabilities; but these probabilities were used, by the living spirit of man, as an indication of the personal Will of God, which could be read by the soul that was in tune with that Will. So probabilities became certitudes. “ I will guide thee with mine Eye,” was Keble’s favourite example of the mode in which Divine truth touched the soul. By deep glimpses, by rare flashes, by a momentary glance, the Eye of God could make us aware of Truths far beyond the understanding of reason. Such Truths possessed authority, which we could not dissect or critically examine. They were revelations of the mind of Him with Whom we had to deal. So Authority was the key-note of Keble’s thinking, in antithesis to the Reason of Liberal enlightenment. And Authority was shown, as Mr. Balfour has again shown us in our own day, to rest on profound instincts of human nature, which had their roots far down out of sight, and defied rational analysis. Emotion, Imagination, {xxx} Association, Tradition, Conscience, all played their part in the creation of that temper which found its joyful freedom in surrendering to Authority.

{xxxvi} . . . .Newman, who has denounced the attack of Liberalism so vigorously, finds the weak and worldly defence of the traditional Conservatism as repulsive and as dangerous.

Italics added. Source: John Henry Newman, John Keble, et al. Lyra Apostolica. (Introduction by Henry C. Beeching.) London, 1901.

Written by John Uebersax

December 12, 2016 at 10:57 pm

Arthur Golding on the Psalms

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golding-psalms-1571

ARTHUR GOLDING (c. 1536 – 1606) is today known chiefly from his remarkable translation of Ovid’s Metamorphoses, still admired today and which Ezra Pound once called the most beautiful book in the English language.  Golding, ablest translator of his age, produced other works as well.  One was a translation of John Calvin’s Commentaries on the Psalms, to which Golding attached his own “dedicatory epistle” from which the following excerpt is taken taken. (Note: spelling has been modernized.):

To The Right Honorable And Very Good Lord, Edward de Vere, Earl of Oxford, Lord Great Chamberlain Of England, Vicount Bulbecke, Etc.

I beseech your good Lordship to peruse this present book, which doubtless, for the excellency thereof, not only deserveth more singular commendation than man’s wit is able to yield, but also is worthy too be had continually in all mens hands, or rather too be printed in their hearts. For if you have an eye to the Authors, it was written by Prophets, Priests, and Kings, inspired with the Holy Ghost, the fountain of all understanding, wisdom, and truth, and avouched unto us by Christ, the Son of the everlasting God. Or if you have an eye to the matter, it containeth a treatise of the Doctrine of life and everlasting Salvation, the particulars whereof are as many as are the points of true Religion and holiness to Godward, or the points of faithful meaning and honest dealing to manward. And these things are common to it with the residue of holy Scripture.

The thing that is peculiar to it, is the manner of the handling of the matters whereof it treateth. For whereas other parts of holy writ (whether they be historical, moral, judicial, ceremonial, or prophetical) do commonly set down their treatises in open and plain declarations; this part consisting of them all, wrappeth up things in types and figures, describing them under borrowed personages, and oftentimes winding in matters by prevention, speaking of things to come as if they were past or present, and of things past as if they were in doing, and every man is made a bewrayer of the secrets of his own heart. And forasmuch as it consisteth chiefly of prayer and thanksgiving, or (which comprehendeth them both) of invocation, which is a communication with God, and requireth rather an earnest and devout lifting up of the mind, than a loud or curious utterance of the voice: there be many unperfect sentences, many broken speeches, and many displaced words, according as the voice of the party that prayed was either prevented with the swiftness of his thoughts, or interrupted with vehemency of joy or grief, or forced to surcease through infirmity, that he might recover new strength and cheerfulness, by interminding God’s former promises and benefits.

Notwithstanding, the obscurity of those places is not so great but that it may be easily overcome, by such as, when they pray, doo utterly sequester their minds from all earthly imaginations and fleshly conceits, and after a sort forsaking their bodies for the time, do mount up above the world by faith, and present themselves before the heavenly throne of grace, to seek the unspeakable and inestimable comfort of their souls.

I haven’t yet located a scanned version of thje original 1571 version.  The above comes from an 1845 translation of Calvin’s Psalms commentary by Rev. James Anderson that included Golding’s dedication.

Sources

Calvin, John (author); Anderson, James (translator). Commentary on the Book of Psalms. Vol 1. Edinburgh, 1845. (pp. xxiv-xxxiv)

Calvin, John (author); Golding, Arthur (translator).  The Psalmes of Dauid and others. With M. John Caluins Commentaries. London, 1571.

 

Written by John Uebersax

September 30, 2016 at 10:26 pm

A Beautiful Mind: Joseph Addison’s Religious Essays

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EADERS of this blog may download a free copy of my new book, a collection of religious and metaphysical essays by Joseph Addison which appeared in the The Spectator in 1711 and 1712. These are certain to delight and edify.  Addison is well known as one of the most skilled prose stylists in the English language; but few today are aware of the sublime quality of his religious essays.

Addison’s influence on both the English and American minds is considerable, yet largely unacknowledged today.

Download the ebook in pdf format here.

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Plato’s 19 Proofs of the Immortality of the Human Soul

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William Blake, The Spirit of Plato Unfolds His Worlds to Milton in Contemplation

Is man immortal, or is he not? If he is not, all our disputes are mere amusements, or trials of skill. In this case, truth, reason, religion, which give our discourses such pomp and solemnity, are … mere empty sound, without any meaning in them. But if man is immortal, it will behove him to be very serious about eternal consequences; or, in other words, to be truly religious.
~ Edward Young, Night Thoughts

Art: William Blake, The Spirit of Plato unfolds his Worlds to Milton in Contemplation.

A SpectatorN earlier article proposed the cataloging of Plato’s various proofs for the immortality of the human soul. A fair effort to survey earlier literature has failed to uncover previous systematic attempts; the relative scarcity of studies on this topic generally is unfortunate (and not a little puzzling) given how central the soul’s immortality is for Plato’s philosophy.

As Plato’s proofs are many and subtle we shall proceed incrementally, adding little by little to the present article, until something like a thorough survey is accomplished.

To begin with, some general points.

First, we may in this context distinguish between two kinds of proofs: (1) logical arguments and (2) experiential demonstrations. By an argument we mean a set of propositions or premises, which, by formal rules of logic, imply a definite conclusion; or a set of propositions that together increase the probability that a conclusion is true (i.e., a probabilistic argument.)

By a demonstration we mean an attempt by Plato to bring to our conscious awareness an insight by means other than logical argument. In many cases with Plato this amounts to eliciting an anamnesis (an un-forgetting or recollection) of some previously known or latent knowledge. For example, we previously considered how Plato’s contemplation of the Form of the Good in Symposium 211–212 can be seen as a demonstrative proof of the existence of God. Similarly, some passages of Plato seem intended to evoke in the reader an experiential awareness of the soul’s immortality.

Second, some of Plato’s proofs are more distinct and easy to identify and characterize than others. What may at first seem a single proof may have several variations or senses that merit separate consideration. Here, inasmuch as we are approaching the topic at a data-gathering stage, we will incline more towards separating than aggregating potentially distinct proofs.

Third, some proofs appear in more than one dialogue. Initially we shall be content to, mostly, associate each proof with the dialogue in which it occurs most prominently.

A Bibliography, also to be developed over time, is added. In general the 20th century literature on immortality of the human soul is meager — an indication of the radical materialism that has lately dominated.

One motivation for pursuing the present project is to inform investigation of a related question, namely: have later philosophers introduced many new and original proofs for the immortality of the human soul, or have they, in this area as in many others, more or less only added ‘footnotes’ to Plato? To anticipate somewhat, it is tentatively proposed that one productive way to address this question is to consider three relevant works from different time periods: (1) Book 1 of Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations (which makes frequent reference to Plato’s main work on the soul, Phaedo), (2) Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology (prominently subtitled, On the Immortality of the Soul), and (3) Edward Young’s Night Thoughts (Nights 6 and 7; “Containing The Nature, Proof, and Importance of Immortality.”)

Plato’s Proofs of Immortality

1. Cyclicity argument.

Source: Phaedo 70c–72e.

Summary: All things proceed from their opposites. Just as death proceeds from life, life must proceed from death. Therefore the soul cannot permanently perish.

2. Recollection (or innate knowledge) argument.

Source: Phaedo 72e–77d; cf. e.g., Meno.

Summary: It appears that we know things that we have not learned in this lifetime — as shown by the fact that when they are made salient, we grasp them immediately and they seem already familiar. This suggests to Plato that we have lived before in a pre-existence; and if our souls existed before this life, they will exist after this life.

3. Affinity argument.

Source: Phaedo 78b–84b.

Summary: There are two levels of reality — the temporal and changing, and the Eternal and immutable; the soul has an innate affinity for eternal things (e.g., Platonic Forms; Truth, Beauty and Moral Goodness; mathematical and religious truths); therefore its own nature must be eternal.

4. Form of Life argument.

Source: Phaedo 102b–107b.

Summary: The soul is not only alive itself, but gives life to the body. Therefore it is intimately connected with the essence or Form of Life. Hence it would be illogical or inconsistent for the soul itself to perish.

5. Vitiating principle argument.

Source: Republic 10.608e–611a.

Summary: Every thing has its own principle of destruction, unique to it and innate (e.g., for a body, disease); if a thing is destroyed, it is only by this unique, endogenous principle. The soul has a unique destructive principle, namely vice; yet even the worst vice is not sufficient to completely kill the soul; and since nothing else besides a thing’s internal destructive principle can make it totally perish, the soul must be immortal.

6. Justice argument.

Source: Republic, Book 10 (e.g., 10.612−4, and the Myth of Er that follows).

Unless there are rewards or punishments after this life, it would violate our innate sense of justice. For example, an evil man could avoid punishment for misdeeds by dying. In short, an afterlife of the soul is required to reconcile our strong and innate sense of fairness with the seeming disregard of Fate to moral justice in this life.

7. Simplicity argument.

Source: Republic 611b, Phaedo 78b-d; cf. Plotinus, Enneads 1.1.2, 1.1.9, 1.1.12.

Summary: A thing composed of many elements is susceptible to decomposition; but the soul is a single substance, uncompounded and hence incorruptible.

8. Self-moved mover.

Source: Phaedrus 245c–246a.

Summary: While the soul moves the body, and it moves itself, it is itself not moved by anything external to it. Since being destroyed would imply movement of some sort, the soul, not moved by anything extrinsic, cannot be destroyed and must be imperishable.

9. Universal interest and yearning.

Source: Symposium 201–212.

Diotima’s speeches in Symposium revolve around the subject of immortality. Several senses of immortality are pursued, such as the begetting of children and the imparting of ideas or virtue to other people, leading up to the addressing of immortality in the religious sense. The overall drift is that human beings seem exceptionally interested in immortality and orient much of their lives to striving for it. This would not be logical unless immortality is possible.

10. Proof via purification.

Source: Republic 10.611b–612a; cf. Plotinus Enneads 1.1.12 and especially 4.7.10.

A proof by demonstration. One who is suitably purified, intellectually and morally, may obtain immediate awareness of the soul’s true nature and its immortality.

11. Replenishment argument.

Source: Phaedo 72a-e; cf. Republic 10.611b-d
Summary: Unless the world were not replenished with living souls, eventually all things would be dead; rather, the world is continually replenished with living souls, who must exist somewhere outside of this world before entering. As Socrates puts it, ” if all things that have life should die, and, when they had died, the dead should remain in that condition, is it not inevitable that at last all things would be dead.” (Phaedo 72c). Whether this is merely another statement of, or implicit in, the cyclicity argument is a topic for further consideration.

12. Afterlife testimonies.

Source: Republic Book 10 (Myth of Er).

If we take the Myth of Er literally, then it purports to be an eye-witness account of someone who has personally observed the extra-mundane life of souls. It seems fairly clear that Plato intend us to take the Er myth more than literally; nevertheless, it does serve more or less as an implicit reference by Plato to the genre of survival testimony, of which numerous examples, ancient and modern, exist.

13. Trusted authority.

Source: Meno 81a-b.

Among the Plato’s lesser arguments for the soul’s immortality is an appeal to authority: honored and trustworthy figures of the past have taught it.  The wisest and best of men are the most confident of survival of soul.

14. Tradition and custom.

Source: ?

Widespread or universal tradition implies that belief in immortality is in our common human nature.   This is conceptually different from the proof by trusted authority, though the two clearly go together. (E.g., one function of trusted authority is precisely to articulate most clearly the common knowledge or tradition.) I do not have a definite source for this in the dialogues, but include it here, tentatively, because another source mentioned it in connection with Plato. (Both the tradition and the trusted authority proofs, however, are taken up by Cicero.)

15. Limitless capacity.

Source: ?

Human beings seem to have a limitless capacity for knowledge, which would serve no purpose if the soul did not outlive the body. Here again, I have no definite source for this yet, but the idea is implicit in Plato’s general view of Man’s innate divinity and noetic and moral capabilities; and the Neoplatonist view (derived from Plato) that each human soul contains a copy of all Forms.

16. Example of Socrates.

Source: Apology, Phaedo, Crito.

Socrates’ absolute and unfeigned confidence in the face of death, his nonchalance, and what even approaches an eagerness to shuffle off the mortal coil constitute a demonstrative proof. His actions, that is, testify at least as eloquently as his words to the soul’s immortality.

17. Socrates’ desire to convince others.

Source: Phaedo

Beyond his own confidence in immortality, Socrates is intensely concerned to convince others of it. Such benevolent zeal is indicative of well-founded sincerity and possession of an important truth.

18. Socrates’ sign.

Source: Apology.

One reason Socrates gives for his confidence is that his habitual sign or daemon, which customarily warns him in case of danger, did not oppose him in attending his trial. This, Socrates, fully expecting a death sentence, took as strong evidence that his execution posed no harm. Insofar as Socrates believed his sign, and Socrates is a trusted source, this constitutes evidence for the immortality of the soul. Moreover, insofar as, from the testimony of others, we are persuaded of the sign’s trustworthiness independently of Socrates’ own evaluation of it, that is additional positive evidence for immortality.

19. Conviction of Plato.

Plato also seems intensely concerned with convincing readers of the soul’s immortality. His arguments are clearly presented in a spirit of something more than detached speculation. Cicero puts it well.

Even if Plato gave no reasons for his belief — see how much confidence I have in the man — he would break down my opposition by his authority alone; but he brings forward so many reasons as to make it perfectly obvious that he is not only fully persuaded himself, but desirous of convincing others.
~ Cicero, Tusc. Disp. 1.21.49

Thus Cicero alludes here to two different proofs:  Plato’s authority, and his desire to convince others; and the sheer number or proofs Plato produces is seen as evidence of the latter.

Bibliography

Suggestions are welcome. The goal, however, is not to produce a comprehensive bibliography, but mainly to include works that attempt to consider Plato’s arguments in their totality.

Apolloni, David. Plato’s Affinity Argument for the Immortality of the Soul. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 34(1), 1996, 5–32. (Study of the argument in Phaedo 78b-80d.)
https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_the_history_of_philosophy/v034/34.1apolloni.pdf

Bett, Richard. Immortality and the Nature of the Soul in the PhaedrusPhronesis, 31(1), 1986, 1–26.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182241

Chase, Thomas. Cicero on the Immortality of the Soul. Cambridge, MA 1851 (repr. 1872).
https://books.google.com/books?id=T8INAAAAYAAJ

Connolly, Tim. Plato: Phaedo. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Web, 13 June 2015. (See also References therein.)
http://www.iep.utm.edu/phaedo/

Cornford, Stephen (Ed.). Edward Young: Night Thoughts. Cambridge, 1989 (repr. 2008). https://books.google.com/books?id=-2Q2MgAACAAJ

DeGraff, Thelma B. Plato in Cicero. Classical Philology, 35(2), 1940, 143–153.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/264959

Elton, Matthew. The Role of the Affinity Argument in the Phaedo. Phronesis, 42(3), 1997, 313–316.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182565

Ficino, Marsilio. Platonic Theology, On the Immortality of the Soul. Michael J. B. Allen (Trans.), James Hankins (Ed.). 6 vols. Cambridge, MA, 2001–2006.
https://books.google.com/books?id=cQZrkQEACAAJ

Frede, Dorothea. The Final Proof of the Immortality of the Soul in Plato’s Phaedo 102a–107a. Phronesis, 23(1), 1978, 27–41.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182027

Gallop, David. Plato’s ‘Cyclical Argument’ Recycled. Phronesis, 27, 1982, 207–222.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182153

Gaye, Russell K. The Platonic Conception of Immortality and its Connexion with the Theory of Ideas. Cambridge, 1904 (repr. 2014).
http://books.google.com/books?id=XwWuAgAAQBAJ

Gertz, Sebastian Ramon Philipp. Death and Immortality in Late Neoplatonism: Studies on the Ancient Commentaries on Plato’s Phaedo. Leiden, 2011.
http://books.google.com/books?id=Kzgca5UpTFwC

Geddes, W(illiam) D(uguid). Platonis Phaedo. 2nd ed. London: MacMillan, 1885.
https://archive.org/details/phaedopla00plat

Gilfillan, George (Ed.) Young’s Night Thoughts. Edinburgh, 1853.
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/33156/33156-h/33156-h.htm

Gould, Richard. Cicero’s Indebtedness to the Platonic Dialogues in Tusculan Disputations I. Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1968.

Hackforth, R. Immortality in Plato’s Symposium. Classical Review, 64(2), 1950, 43–45.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/703569

King , J. E. (Trans.) Cicero: Tusculan Disputations. Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, MA, 1927 (rev. 1945).
http://www.amazon.com/dp/0674991567

MacKenna, Stephen (Trans.), Plotinus: The Enneads. 1st edition. London, 1917. Internet Sacred Text Archive. Web, 16 June 2015.
http://sacred-texts.com/cla/plotenn/index.htm

MacKenna, Stephen (Trans.); Page, B. S. (Ed.), Plotinus: The Enneads. 2nd edition. London, 1956.

O’Brien, Michael J. Becoming Immortal in Plato’s Symposium. In: Douglas E. Gerber (Ed.), Greek Poetry and Philosophy: Studies in Honour of Leonard Woodbury. Chicago, 1984, pp. 185–205.
http://commonweb.unifr.ch/artsdean/pub/gestens/f/as/files/4610/26399_133233.pdf

Patterson, Robert Leet. Plato on Immortality. University Park, PA, 1965.
http://books.google.com/books?id=GRtDAAAAIAAJ

Peabody, Andrew P. (tr.) Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations. Boston, 1886.
https://archive.org/details/cicerostusculand00ciceiala

Shorey, Paul. Review of The Platonic Conception of Immortality, and its Connexion with the Theory of Ideas, by R. K. Gaye. Philosophical Review, 14(5), 1905, 590–595.
http://books.google.com/books?id=MJZJAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA590

Shorey, Paul (Tr.). Plato’s Republic. 2 vols. (Loeb Classical Library: Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6). Cambridge, MA, 1935 (repr. 1969).
http://data.perseus.org/citations/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg030.perseus-eng1:1.327a

Smith, John. A Discourse Demonstrating the Immortality of the Soul. In: John Smith, Select Discourses, London J. Flesher, 1660; repr. in E. T. Campagnac (ed.), The Cambridge Platonists, Oxford, 1901, pp. 99-157.
https://books.google.com/books?id=CC8qAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA99

Snyder, James G. Marsilio Ficino. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Web, 22 June 2015.
http://www.iep.utm.edu/ficino/

Spring, Charles. On the Essence and Immortality of the Soul. London, 1865. http://books.google.com/books?id=xnwXAAAAYAAJ

Stanford, Charles S. A Catalogue of Books Treating on the Immortality of the Soul. New York, 1853. (Also appended to: Charles S. Stanford, Phaedo: Or, The Immortality of the Soul, New York, 1854.)
http://books.google.com/books?id=n4k0JOmmsJYC&pg=PA231

Stuart, Moses. Cicero on the Immortality of the Soul (Questionum Tusculanaram, Liber 1). With Notes and Appendix. Andover, MA, 1833.
https://books.google.com/books?id=VQeTJX8ARXoC

Stull, William. Reading the Phaedo in Tusculan Disputations 1. Classical Philology, Vol. 107, No. 1 (January 2012), pp. 38-52.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/663216

Uebersax, John S. Plato Divinus: Is Plato a Religious Figure? Web, 15 June 2015.
http://www.john-uebersax.com/books/Uebersax-Divinus-Plato-draft-June-2015.pdf

Westerink, Leendert. G. (Trans.). The Greek Commentaries on Plato’s Phaedo. Vol. 1 (Olympiodorus) & Vol 2 (Damascius). Prometheus Trust, 2009.
https://books.google.com/books?id=68ZOAQAAIAAJ

Written by John Uebersax

September 8, 2015 at 1:00 am