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St. Augustine: On Desire to See God

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St. Augustine of Hippo (stained glass; location unknown)

1John 3

[1] Behold, what manner of love the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called the sons of God: therefore the world knoweth us not, because it knew him not.
[2] Beloved, now are we the sons of God, and it doth not yet appear what we shall be: but we know that, when he shall appear, we shall be like him; for we shall see him as he is.
[3] And every man that hath this hope in him purifieth himself, even as he is pure.

St. Augustine of Hippo, Homilies on the First Epistle of John 4.5−6

5. For us then, what are we? Already we are begotten of Him; but because we are such in hope, he says, Beloved, now are we sons of God. Now already? Then what is it we look for, if already we are sons of God? And not yet, says he, is it manifested what we shall be. But what else shall we be than sons of God? Hear what follows: We know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like Him, because we shall see Him as He is. Understand, my beloved. It is a great matter: We know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like Him; for we shall see Him as He is. In the first place mark, what is called Is. You know what it is that is so called. That which is called Is, [c.f. Exod 3:14] and not only is called but is so, is unchangeable: It ever remains, It cannot be changed, It is in no part corruptible: It has neither proficiency, for It is perfect; nor has deficiency, for It is eternal. … and the Lord Himself says, Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God. (Matt 5:8) Therefore, we are to see a certain vision, my brethren, which neither eye has seen, nor ear has heard, nor has entered into the heart of man: (1 Cor 2:9) a certain vision, a vision surpassing all earthly beauty, of gold, of silver, of groves and fields; the beauty of sea and air, the beauty of sun and moon, the beauty of the stars, the beauty of angels: surpassing all things: because from it are all things beautiful.

6. What then shall we be, when we shall see this? What is promised to us? We shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is. The tongue has done what it could, has sounded the words: let the rest be thought by the heart.

For what has even John himself said in comparison of That which Is, or what can be said by us men, who are so far from being equal to his merits? Return we therefore to that anointing of Him, return we to that anointing which inwardly teaches that which we cannot speak: and because ye cannot at present see, let your office be in desire.

The whole life of a good Christian is a holy desire. [Tota vita christiani boni, sanctum desiderium est.] Now what you long for, you do not yet see: howbeit by longing, you are made capable, so that when that has come which you may see, you shall be filled.

For just as, if you would fill a bag, and know how great the thing is that shall be given, you stretch the opening of the sack or the skin, or whatever else it be; you know how much you would put in, and see that the bag is narrow; by stretching you make it capable of holding more: so God, by deferring our hope, stretches our desire; by the desiring, stretches the mind; by stretching, makes it more capacious.

Let us desire therefore, my brethren, for we shall be filled. See Paul widening, as it were, his bosom, that it may be able to receive that which is to come. He says, namely, Not that I have already received, or am already perfect: brethren, I deem not myself to have apprehended. (Phil 3:12−13)

Then what are you doing in this life, if you have not yet apprehended? But this one thing [I do]; forgetting the things that are behind, reaching forth to the things that are before, upon the strain I follow on unto the prize of the high calling. (Phil 3:13-14) He says he reaches forth, or stretches himself, and says that he follows upon the strain. He felt himself too little to take in that which eye has not seen, nor ear heard, neither has entered into the heart of man. (1 Cor 2:9)

This is our life, that by desiring we should be exercised. But holy longing exercises us just so much as we prune off our longings from the love of the world. We have already said, Empty out that which is to be filled. With good you are to be filled: pour out the bad. Suppose that God would fill you with honey: if you are full of vinegar, where will you put the honey? That which the vessel bore in it must be poured out: the vessel itself must be cleansed; must be cleansed, albeit with labor, albeit with hard rubbing, that it may become fit for that thing, whatever it be.

Let us say honey, say gold, say wine; whatever we say it is, being that which cannot be said, whatever we would fain say, It is called — God. And when we say God, what have we said? Is that one syllable the whole of that we look for? So then, whatever we have had power to say is beneath Him: let us stretch ourselves unto Him, that when He shall come, He may fill us. For we shall be like Him; because we shall see Him as He is. [Source: Browne (slightly edited)]

Bibliography

Browne, Henry. (tr.). St. Augustine: Homilies on the First Epistle of John. In: Philip Schaff (ed.), Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 7, Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1888; online version: ed. Kevin Knight.

Ramsey, Boniface (tr.). St. Augustine: Homilies on the First Epistle of John. New City, 2008.

Roman Catholic Office of Readings. From a treatise by St Augustine on the first epistle of John. Our heart longs for God.

Latin: In Epistolam Joannis ad Parthos tractatus X. J. P. Migne, Patrologia Latina vol. 35 1977−2062. Paris, 1841.

Written by John Uebersax

February 18, 2023 at 4:53 pm

The Other Kind of Cupidity

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CUPIDITY (in Latin, cupiditas) is a word rarely used, and when misunderstood. Cupidity, along with its near cognate, concupiscence, is nowadays often understood to mean either undue interest in sensual pleasure (especially sexual) or avarice. Hence cupiditas is often translated as lust or covetousness. But this isn’t how it was understood by St. Augustine — in whose ethics and theology cupiditas plays a central role.

Ultimately, according to Augustine, one loves either the world or loves God. Love of God (and others for God’s sake) is the essence of caritas or charity. Love of the world is cupidity. Each of these loves becomes a seed around which an entire set of personality characteristics and mental patterns develop. Hence we tend to have within our psyche two competing personalities: one based on caritas, and one on cupiditas.

This is much the same as — if not identical to — St. Paul’s repeated emphasis on the struggle between carnal mindedness and spiritual mindedness (e.g., Romans 8).  Again, carnal mindedness we tend to associate with attraction to pleasures of the body, but it’s actually something much broader.  It could as easily be called worldly-mindedness.

Cupidity encompasses the love of anything worldly.  It isn’t just sexual lust, gluttony, avarice and the like. There is another form which we tend to overlook, but which is much worse.  That is our craving for things like acceptance and approval of others, social status, prestige, etc.

This is clearly linked to biological instincts we have as social animals.  Social and herd animals depend on the acceptance of others for survival.  These are very deep-seated instincts, which we, inasmuch as we are social mammals, have.   But, unlike other animals, we are also spiritual beings.  It’s imperative that we subordinate our biological instincts to our higher, spiritual nature.

To overcome sexual lust, avarice, and undue interest in food and drink are comparatively easy things.  Much more difficult is to overcome this basic desire for approval by others, social status, and prestige.

I myself am constantly aware when I write of having not only a sincere desire to help people (caritas), but to gain social approval by writing something noteworthy.  I crave acceptance, respect, honor. I have a wordly desire to be recognized by others as contributing something significant, or of being ‘learned.’  That is this second form of cupidity at work.

This cupidity is even more insidious because it tends not to be thought of as a moral failing.  Indeed, in our competitive society, it may even masquerade as a kind of virtue.

But it is not a virtue. It opposes our love of God, and anything that distracts us from love of God we must strive with all our might to eliminate.

This is explained very well by St. Augustine:

(1) Charity [Charitatem] denotes that whereby one loves [the eternal]. …

However, the poison of charity is the hope of getting and holding onto temporal things. The nourishment of charity is the lessening of cupidity [cupiditatis], the perfection of charity, the absence of cupidity. …

(3) But when the enticements of bodily pleasures [carnalium voluptatum] have been overcome, it is to be feared lest the cupidity for pleasing men, by way of either some wonderful deeds or an arduous self-control or patience or some act of generosity or through a reputation for knowledge or eloquence, creep in and take their place. Here is also to be found the cupidity for honor [cupiditas honoris]. Against this should be cited all those things that have been written in praise of charity and on the foolishness of boasting [inanitate iactantiae]. … If you wish to please men, however, so as to help them to love God, you have desire not for pleasing others or honor, but for something else.
(Source: St. Augustine of Hippo, On Diverse Questions 36, On nurturing charity; my translation, based on those of Mosher and Ramsey.)

Modern translators fail to capture the full scope of cupiditas by using such words as ‘lust’ and ‘greed’.  ‘Cupidity’ seems a better choice. The expression “to have your liking in the world” captures its essence.

Bibliography

Mosher, David L. (tr.). Saint Augustine: Eighty-three Different Questions. Fathers of the Church, Vol. 70. CUA Press, 1982 (repr. 2010); pp. 67−71.

Ramsey, Boniface (tr.). Saint Augustine (Bishop of Hippo): Miscellany of Eighty-three Questions. New City Press, 2008.

Latin text

De Diversis Quaestionibus 36 (Quaestio XXXVI. De nutrienda charitate). J. P. Migne, Patrologia Latina 40 cols. 11−100.

Written by John Uebersax

December 4, 2022 at 8:09 pm

How Good is Google’s Latin-to-English Translator?

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GOOGLE translation has gotten much better over the last 15 years, thanks to continued improvement in its algorithms.  How good is its Latin-to-English translation now?  Judge for yourself.  Here’s a famous passage from St. Augustine’s Confessions in Latin, a human English translation, and Google’s automatic translation.

Sero te amavi, pulchritudo tam antiqua et tam nova, sero te amavi! et ecce intus eras et ego foris, et ibi te quaerebam, et in ista formosa, quae fecisti, deformis inruebam. mecum eras, et tecum non eram. ea me tenebant longe a te, quae si in te non essent, non essent. vocasti et clamasti et rupisti surditatem meam: coruscasti, splenduisti et fugasti caecitatem meam: fragrasti, et duxi spiritum, et anhelo tibi, gustavi et esurio et sitio, tetigisti me, et exarsi in pacem tuam. (Augustine of Hippo, Confessions 10.27.38).

Too late did I love You, O Fairness, so ancient, and yet so new! Too late did I love You! For behold, You were within, and I without, and there did I seek You; I, unlovely, rushed heedlessly among the things of beauty You made. You were with me, but I was not with You. Those things kept me far from You, which, unless they were in You, were not. You called, and cried aloud, and forced open my deafness. You gleamed and shine, and chase away my blindness. You exhaled odours, and I drew in my breath and do pant after You. I tasted, and do hunger and thirst. You touched me, and I burned for Your peace. (Expert translation)

I loved You late, Beauty so old and so new, I loved You late! and behold, You were inside and I was outside, and I was looking for You there; and I, deformed, was rushing into those beautiful things that You made. You were with me, and I was not with You. They kept me far from You, which, if they were not in You, would not be. You called and cried and broke my deafness; You flashed, shone and drove away my blindness; You broke, and I drew breath, and I longed for You, I tasted and hungered and thirsted, You touched me, and I burned for Your peace. (Google translation)

I only needed to change one or two words in the Google translation. While it may lack the stylistic touches a human translators can supply, it does seem sufficient to convey the main ideas — and, besides, there’ s something to be said for literal translation.

Thus it appears that a huge volume of untranslated Latin works — which include over half the contents of Mignes Patrologia Latina — are can now be read and studied in English.

I’ll follow up this post with an actual example: to translate into English for the first time part of the interesting medieval treatise titled, De septem septenis (On the Seven Sevens).

 

Written by John Uebersax

November 17, 2022 at 7:38 pm

The Seven Vices and Fifty Subvices of Medieval Christianity

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Tree of Vices” from Speculum Virginum, Walters Art Museum Ms. W.72, fol. 25v

AS  a previous post on the Seven Virtues and Fifty Subvirtues of Medieval Christianity is one of the most oft-visited here, it seems fitting to supply a sequel on vices and subvices.  Joint diagrams of virtues and vices are found in many medieval manuscripts.  The closest we have to a text source is De fructus carnis et spirits, a work of the 11th century, today tentatively attributed to Conrad of Hirsau  (c. 1070 – c .1150) and previously to Hugh of St. Victor (c. 1096 –1141).

An important patristic source for the medieval diagrams is Gregory the Great’s Moralia in Job, 31.xlv.87−88. Spencer (2014, 177 f.; cf. Straw, 2005, 38 f.) lists the vices/subvices as found both in Gregory and Cassian. Medieval tree diagrams are fairly consistent concerning the vices, but variation exists in subvices (these vary in number from 48 to 52; again we’ll just say roughly 50).

Just as the virtues and subvirtues are rooted in Humility, the vices and subvirtues derive from a common parent, Pride (superbia).

We should not look at these vices and subvices as mere historical curiosities.  They have modern relevance at the level of practical cognitive psychology: each corresponds to a significant form of negative thinking common to us all,  which we need to overcome.  There is considerable interest in the application of ancient Stoic virtue ethics to modern life.  The patristic and medieval literature on the virtues and vices is an extension (and arguably more refined version) of Stoic moral psychology and ought to interest us at least as much.

I. VAINGLORY (vana gloria)

  1. Hipocrisy (hypocrisis)
  2. Disobedience (inobedientia)
  3. Boasting (lactantia)
  4. Presumption (praesumptionis)
  5. Arrogance (arrogantia)
  6. Talkativeness (loquacitas)
  7. Obstinacy (pertinacia)

II. ENVY (invidia)

  1. Hatred (odium)
  2. Envying others’ good fortune (afflictio in prosperis)
  3. Exulting in others’ adversity (exsultatio in adversis)
  4. Malice (malitia)
  5. Detraction (detractio)
  6. Bitterness (amaritudo)
  7. ‘Whispering’ (susurratio); “by which, either by a hiss of hateful flattery or contempt, one is roused to the hatred of the other.”

II. ANGER (ira)

  1. Accusation (clamor)
  2. Blasphemy (blasphemia)
  3. Insult (contumelia)
  4. Mourning or dwelling on an injury by another (luctus)
  5. Reckless outburst (temeritas)
  6. Fury (furor)
  7. Indignation (indignatio)

IV. SADNESS (tristitia)

  1. Despair (desperatio)
  2. Rancor (rancor)
  3. Mental torpor (torpor)
  4. Fear and anxiety (timor; menti fluctuans angustia)
  5. Acidie (acidia)
  6. Complaint (querela)
  7. Pessimism (pusillanimitas)

V. AVARICE (avaritia)

  1. Love of money (philargyria)
  2. Perjury (perjurium)
  3. Violence (violentia)
  4. Usury (usura)
  5. Fraud (fraus)
  6. Robbery (rapina)
  7. Deceit (fallacia)

VI. GLUTTONY (Ventris ingluvies)

  1. Drunkenness (ebrietas)
  2. Overeating (crapula)
  3. Dulness of sense and in understanding (mentis hebetatio)
  4. Laziness (languor)
  5. Delicacy of appetite; desire for delicious foods beyond one natural needs (delicatio)
  6. Disregard of health (oblivio)

VII. LUST (Luxuria)

  1. Voluptuous pleasure (voluptas)
  2. Lewdness (lascivia)
  3. Languid rejection of virtue (ignavia)
  4. Rash, consuming desire (petulantia)
  5. Weakness of spirit or body given over to indulgence (titubatio)
  6. Enticement (blanditiae)
  7. Excessive sensual delight (deliciae)

Bibliography

Bliss, James and anonymous (trs.). St. Gregory the Great: Morals on the Book of Job. Three vols. Library of the Fathers. Oxford, 1844−1850. Book 31.

Bloomfield, Morton. The Seven Deadly Sins: An Introduction to the History of a Religious Concept, with Special Reference to Medieval English Literature. East Lansing, 1952; repr. 1967.

Goggin, Cheryl Gohdes. Copying manuscript illuminations: The Trees of Vices and Virtues. Visual Resources, 2004, 20:2-3, 179−198. https://doi.org/10.1080/0197376042000207552

Hugo de S. Victore (attr.). De fructibus carnis et spiritus. J. P. Migne. Patrologia Latina, Paris, 1854; cols. 997−1010 (rough diagrams of the Tree of Vices and Tree of Virtues appear at the end of the work).  Latin text is online: http://mlat.uzh.ch/?c=2&w=HuDeSVi.DeFrCaE

Katzenellenbogen, Adolf. Allegories of the Virtues and Vices in Medieval Art from Christian Times to the Thirteenth Century. Alan J. P. Crick (tr.). London: Warburg Institute, 1939.

Kerns, Brian (tr.). Gregory the Great: Moral Reflections on the Book of Job. Six vols. Liturgical Press, 2014−2022. (English translation of Latin critical edition.)

Mews, Constant J. (ed.). Listen, Daughter: The “Speculum virginum” and the Formation of Religious Women in the Middle Ages. The New Middle Ages Series. Palgrave, 2001.

Newhauser, Richard G. In the Garden of Evil: The Vices and Culture in the Middle Ages. Toronto, 2005.

Robertson, D. W. The Doctrine of Charity in Mediaeval Literary Gardens: A Topical Approach through Symbolism and Allegory. Speculum, vol. 26, no. 1, 1951, pp. 24–49. Reprinted in: Robertson, Durant Waite. Essays in Medieval Culture. Princeton University Press, 1980 (repr. 2014); pp. 21−50.

Powell, Morgan. Gender, Reading, and Truth in the Twelfth Century: The Woman in the Mirror. Arc Humanities Press, 2020.

Straw, Carole E. Gregory and Cassian on the cardinal vices. In: Richard G. Newhauser (ed.), In the Garden of Evil: The Vices and Culture in the Middle Ages, Toronto, 2005, pp. 35−58.

Tucker, Shawn R. The Virtues and Vices in the Arts: A Sourcebook. Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2015.

Young, Spencer E. Scholarly Community at the Early University of Paris: Theologians, Education and Society, 1215–1248. Cambridge University Press, 2014; Ch. 5, Parisian theologians and the seven deadly sins. (pp. 168−207).

Watson, Arthur. The Speculum Virginum with special reference to the Tree of Jesse. Speculum, vol. 3, no. 4, 1928, pp. 445–69.

Wenzel, Siegfried. The Seven Deadly Sins. Speculum 43, 1968, 1−22.

Art: “Tree of Vices” from Speculum Virginum, Walters Art Museum Ms. W.72, fol. 25v; early 13th century manuscript from the Cistercian abbey of Himmerode, Germany.

Origen – Allegorical Meaning of the Parable of the Wise and Foolish Virgins

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John Melhuish Strudwick, The Ten Virgins (c.1884)

AS an earlier post on the allegorical meaning of Moses defending Jethro’s seven daughters at the well is one of the most-often visited here, I though I’d follow up with another on the parable of the wise and foolish virgins, which, as I mentioned before, seems similar.  We’re guided here by several patristic commentaries on the parables, but of course need not restrict ourselves to the meanings they find.

The parable would have a simple and straightforward interpretation if it concerned only one wise and one foolish virgin.  It would then affirm the ethical principle of ‘keeping ones lamp lit’ by remaining constantly vigilant and attentive to God.  The specific reference to five (and not merely several), however, suggests to several commentators a reference to the senses.

We can parse the parable (shown below) into its main structural elements and their general meanings as follows:

Virgins.  The patristic consensus is that these refer collectively a wise or foolish soul.  However, since all are virgins (including the foolish ones), there is a also tendency to see them more specifically as souls of those who are at least make the effort to follow a religious life.

Bridegroom. The obvious Christian meaning here is Jesus Christ.

Marriage. Spiritual marriage with Jesus, also understood (as implied by verse 1) as attainment of the kingdom of heaven.  Some commentators (e.g., Augustine) take the kingdom here in the most literal sense of attaining heaven in the afterlife, but that opposes meaning implied by Luke 17:21, the kingdom of God is within you. More likely then, the marriage symbolizes the soul’s union with God, a state of being constantly attuned and receptive to God’s Word as it directs and guides our minds.

Lamps. Conscious attention; vigilance.

Oil. That which keeps the lamps lit. Oil suggests grace or Spirit received from God.  However the whole point of the parable is to suggest that effort on our part is required to obtain the oil. What distinguishes the wise from the foolish virgins, according to several patristic commentators, is that the former pursue good works (which might be broadly defined to include not only acts of charity, but prayer, reading of Scripture, meditation, etc.).  Origen mentions sound doctrine as another form of oil that keeps the lamps lit.

Origen in his commentary on Matthew 1:1ff. understands the virgins as symbolizing “powers of perception,” which include for him both the physical senses and spiritual senses. (Origen is considered the father of the doctrine of spiritual senses.) Right use of sensation requires it being directed by the WORD of God. As with Augustine (Sermon 43 = Ben. 73), good works are needed to maintain this connection, i.e., to keep the lamps lit.

In the earlier post on Moses and Jethro’s daughters, I suggested that the story could be interpreted as either (1) describing a state of spiritualized physical perception — such that, quickened by grace and spirit, our physical senses may perceive material objects in a unitive, holy, and transfigured way, or (2) referring to purely spiritual senses, i.e., those which perceive immaterial things. Origen’s commentary of the parable of the virgins — which, it must be admitted, raises more questions than it answers — nevertheless does not seem inconsistent with either interpretation.

Hans Urs von Balthasar’s theological aesthetics (von Balthasar, 1982; McInroy, 2014) appears to affirm a link between Origen, spiritual senses, the virgins parable and transfigured physical perception. (McInroy, p. 159: “Balthasar calls for perception of a form that contains both sensory and ‘supersensory’ aspects (i.e. a material component and a ‘spiritual’ dimension).”

We add at the end a passage from Pseudo-Macarius’ Homily 4, which refers to the parable.  He briefly connects the virgins with the physical senses within a more general discussion of how the mind in its entirely must remain fixed on God and spiritual things, and not lapse into worldly concerns.

MATTHEW 25:1–13 (KJV)

[1] Then shall the kingdom of heaven be likened unto ten virgins, which took their lamps, and went forth to meet the bridegroom.
[2] And five of them were wise, and five were foolish.
[3] They that were foolish took their lamps, and took no oil with them:
[4] But the wise took oil in their vessels with their lamps.
[5] While the bridegroom tarried, they all slumbered and slept.
[6] And at midnight there was a cry made, Behold, the bridegroom cometh; go ye out to meet him.
[7] Then all those virgins arose, and trimmed their lamps.
[8] And the foolish said unto the wise, Give us of your oil; for our lamps are gone out.
[9] But the wise answered, saying, Not so; lest there be not enough for us and you: but go ye rather to them that sell, and buy for yourselves.
[10] And while they went to buy, the bridegroom came; and they that were ready went in with him to the marriage: and the door was shut.
[11] Afterward came also the other virgins, saying, Lord, Lord, open to us.
[12] But he answered and said, Verily I say unto you, I know you not.
[13] Watch therefore, for ye know neither the day nor the hour wherein the Son of man cometh.

Origen, Commentary on Matthew 25:1ff. (Latin translation = Klostermann Commentariorum Series 63−64)

Then the kingdom of heaven shall be compared to ten maidens who took their lamps and went to meet the bridegroom and the bride. Five of them were foolish, and five were wise” (Mt 25:1−2)….

Not without reason do we say that the powers of perception of all who have come to know divine things, no matter how they have received the WORD of God, “whether by chance or by truth” (cf. Phil 2:18), are “virgins” — made virgins by the WORD of God in which they have believed or wish to believe. For such is the WORD of God that it shares of its purity with all who through its teaching have withdrawn from the service of idols or from the service of the elements of God’s creation (cf. 1 Cor 10:14; Gal 4:3), and have come to the service of God through Jesus Christ even if they have not carried out good works nor prepared themselves for beatitude. But just as, according to the WORD of truth, the individual virtues — which are, in substance, Christ — go together, so that whoever has one has all (for Christ cannot be separated from himself), so too do all the powers of perception go together; and wherever one of these senses has too little of the right teaching of the WORD, there will all the other senses be deceived, as it were, and turned into fools. By powers of perception or senses I mean both those ordinarily understood as such: seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, and those which the Book of Proverbs calls divine with the words: “You will find the knowledge of God” (cf. Prov 2:5). But again, the WORD of God is the cause of the right use of the senses, and it is not possible that, . . . someone use certain activities of the senses and neglect others. Thus if the Word has made one of the senses wise, so as to constitute it a virgin, it is necessary for it to pour out its wisdom into the other senses as well. Thus it is not possible that, of the five senses one has, some should be foolish and others prudent; they must rather all be prudent or all wise.

All these senses now take their “lamps” . . . when they accept that the Word of God and the Son of God is the bridegroom of the church; “they go out” from the world and from the errors of many gods and come to meet the Savior who is always ready to come to these virgins so that, with the worthy among them, he might go in to his blessed bride, the church. And after the reception of the WORD, as long as the light of the faithful “shines before men, that they may see their good works and give glory to their Father who is in heaven” (Mt 5:16), they are prudent [maidens], the kind who take along the oil which nourishes the light which is always poured forth in good works, i.e., the WORD of doctrine. They fill the vessels of their souls from this WORD, buying it from the teachers and keepers of the tradition who sell it, as much as is needed, even if their end is late and the WORD coming to their fulfillment is delayed; for they hasten to him to be fulfilled and to be set outside the world. But those who, after becoming Christian, were concerned to receive only enough teaching to last them to the end, … these are “foolish.” They accepted their lamps, which of course were lit at first, but they did not take oil along for such a long journey to go meet the spouse.

As the bridegroom was delayed, all the maidens slumbered and slept” (Mt 25:5). When the bridegroom delays this way and the WORD does not come quickly to make perfect their life, the senses suffer somewhat while they remain and sleep, so to speak, in the night of the world. For they sleep in that they lose something of their alert vigilance; but those prudent maidens did not lose their lamps nor give up hope of saving their oil. . . .

But at midnight,” that is, at the high point of that remissness, and at the midpoint between the spent light of evening and the still-awaited light of day, “there was a cry” (Mt 25:6), the cry of angels, I think, wishing to awaken all the slumbering senses and call them to go to meet the bridegroom. Inside the senses of those sleeping they cry out: “Behold the bridegroom! Come out to meet him!” (Mt 25:6). . . . All indeed heard and got up, but not all dressed their lamps in the proper way … and at an inopportune time “the foolish said to the wise, ‘Give us some of your oil’” (Mt 25:8). For although they were foolish, they still understood that they needed to go meet the bridegroom with light, with all the lamps of their senses illuminated. And since this parable was spoken for everyone to hear, Christ added for his disciples the words: “Watch therefore, for you know neither the day nor the hour” (Mt 25:13).
Source: von Balthasar, p. 190f.

Pseudo-Macarius, Homilies 4.6f.

6. Take, for example, the five prudent and vigilant virgins (Mt 25:1 ff.). They enthusiastically had taken in the vessels of their heart the oil of the supernatural grace of the Spirit — a thing not conformable to their nature. For this reason they were able to enter together with the Bridegroom into the heavenly bridal chamber. The other foolish ones, however, content with their own nature, did not watch nor did they betake themselves to receive “the oil of gladness” (Ps 45:7) in their vessels. But still in the flesh, they fell into a deep sleep through negligence, inattentiveness, laziness, and ignorance or even through considering themselves justified. Because of this they were excluded from the bridal chamber of the kingdom because they were unable to please the heavenly Bridegroom. Bound by ties of the world and by earthly love, they did not offer all their love and devotion to the heavenly Spouse nor did they carry with them the oil. But the souls who seek the sanctification of the Spirit, which is a thing that lies beyond natural power, are completely bound with their whole love to the Lord. There they walk; there they pray; there they focus their thoughts, ignoring all other things. For this reason they are considered worthy to receive the oil of divine grace and without any failure they succeed in passing to life for they have been accepted by and found greatly pleasing to the spiritual Bridegroom. But other souls, who remain on the level of their own nature, crawl along the ground with their earthly thoughts. They think only in a human way. Their mind lives only on the earthly level. And still they are convinced in their own thought that they look to the Bridegroom and that they are adorned with the perfections of a carnal justification. But in reality they have not been born of the Spirit from above (Jn 3:3) and have not accepted the oil of gladness.

7. The five rational senses of the soul, if they have received grace from above and the sanctification of the Spirit, truly are the prudent virgins. They have received from above the wisdom of grace. But if they continue depending solely on their own nature, they class themselves with the foolish virgins and show themselves to be children of this world.

Just as the souls who have completely given themselves totally to the Lord have their thoughts there, their prayers directed there, walk there, and are bound there by the desire of the love of God, so, on the contrary, the souls who have given themselves to the love of the world and wish to live completely on this earth walk there, have their thoughts there, and it is there where their minds live (Lk 12:34).

For this reason they are unable to turn themselves over to the kind, prudential guidance of the Spirit. Something that is foreign to our basic nature, I mean, heavenly grace, necessarily demands being joined and drawn into our nature in order that we can enter into the heavenly hridal chamber of the kingdom and obtain eternal salvation.
Source: Maloney, p. 52f.

First draft: 9 Oct 2022

Bibliography

von Balthasar, Hans Urs. Origen, Spirit and Fire: A Thematic Anthology of His Writings. Tr. Robert J. Daly.  CUA Press, 2001.

von Balthasar, Hans Urs. Glory of the Lord Vol. 1: Seeing The Form. Tr. Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis. T&T Clark, 1982.

Gavrilyuk, Paul L.; Coakley, Sarah. The Spiritual Senses: Perceiving God in Western Christianity. Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Klostermann, Erich. Origenes Werke: Bd. Origenes Matthäuserklärung, II. Die lateinische Übersetzung der Commentariorum series. J. C. Hinrichs, 1933.

MacMullen, R. G. St. Augustine: Sermon 43. In: Ed. Philip Schaff, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 6.,  Buffalo, NY, Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1888. Online (New Advent) version by Kevin Knight.

Maloney, George A. Pseudo-Macarius: The Fifty Spiritual Homilies and the Great Letter. Classics of Western Spirituality. Paulist Press, 1992.

McInroy, Mark. Balthasar on the Spiritual Senses: Perceiving Splendour. OUP, 2014.  [dissertation]

Rahner, Karl. The doctrine of the ‘spiritual senses’ in Origen, Theological Investigations 16.81−103; originally published as Le début d’une doctrine des cinq sens spirituels chez Origene, Revue d’ascétique et de mystique 13, 1932, 113−45.

St. Gregory the Great on the Two Doors of Contemplation

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Peter Paul Rubens,The Ecstasy of St Gregory the Great (1608)

THE Homlies on Ezekiels is an important but little studied work by St. Gregory the Great. It contains twelve homilies on the vision of Ezekiel 1 and ten homilies on the temple vision of Ezekiel 40.  Contemplation is a main theme of the latter. The excerpt of Homilies below gives a anagogical interpretation of Ezekiel 40:13, He measured then the gate from the roof of one little chamber to the roof of another: the breadth was five and twenty cubits, door against door.

Cuthbert Butler writes: “[A] passage, extending over §§ 8−20 of the Homilies on Ezechiel, II. v., is the one piece in St Gregory’s writings that may claim to be in any way a scientific or psychological exposition of the process of contemplation. Striking passages of the kind have been adduced from St Augustine, wherein is described under the act of introversion the soul’s search to find God within itself, a search which for St Augustine appears to have been a process predominantly intellectual, but culminating in a fully religious experience. St Gregory’s passage on introversion, though of greatly inferior power, is of much interest, as being the only account he gives, known to me, of the intellectual side of contemplation. It is difficult in places to understand, and very difficult to translate, the doctrine of contemplation being couched in terms of an allegorical interpretation of the doors and windows of Ezcchiel’s Temple. An attempt will be made to reproduce the teaching positively, detached as far as may be from the references to the Temple, and in a contracted form. He starts from the words of Ezechiel xl. 13, A door against a door, that is, an inner door opposite to an outer one. He [St. Gregory] proceeds:”

8. In the cognition of the Almighty God our first door is faith, and our second-sight (species) to which, walking by faith, we arrive. For in this life we enter the door of faith, that afterwards we may be led to the other. And the door is opposite the door, because by the entrance of faith is opened the entrance of the vision of God. But if any one wishes to understand both these doors as of this life, this by no means runs counter to a sound meaning. For often we desire to contemplate (considerare) the invisible nature of Almighty God, but we are by no means able; the soul, wearied by these difficulties, returns to itself and uses itself as a ladder by which it may mount up, that first it may consider itself, if it is able, and then may explore, as far as it can, that Nature which is above it. But if our mind be distracted (sparsa) by earthly images, it can in no way consider either itself or the nature of the soul, because by how many thoughts it is led about, by so many obstacles is it blinded.

9. And so the first step is that it collect itself within itself (recollection); the second, that it consider what its nature is so collected (introversion); the third, that it rise above itself and yield itself to the intent contemplation of its invisible Maker (contemplation). But the mind cannot recollect itself unless it has first learned to repress all phantasmata of earthly and heavenly images, and to reject and spurn whatever sense impressions present themselves to its thoughts, in order that it may seek itself within as it is without these sensations. So they are all to be driven away from the mind’s eye, in order that the soul may see itself as it was made, beneath God and above the body, that receiving life from What is above, it may impart life to that which it governs, beneath. . . .

When the soul, stript of bodily images, is the object of its own thought, it has passed through the first door. But the way leads from this door to the other, that somewhat of the nature of the Almighty God may be contemplated. And so, the soul in the body is the life of the flesh ; but God, who gives life to all, is the life of souls. And if life that is communicated (vita vivificata) is of such greatness that it cannot be comprehended, who will be able to comprehend by his intellect of how great majesty is the Life that gives life (vita vivificans)? But to consider and to grasp this fact is already in some measure to enter the second door ; because the soul from its estimate of itself gathers what it should think concerning the unencompassed Spirit, who incomprehensibly governs what He has incomprehensibly created.

11. When the soul raised up to itself understands its own measure, and recognizes that it transcends all bodily things, and from the knowledge of itself passes to the knowledge of its Maker, what is this, except to see the door opposite the door ? However much it strive, the soul is not able fully to fathom itself; how much less the greatness of Him who was able to make the soul. But when, striving and straining, we desire to see somewhat of the invisible Nature, we are fatigued and beaten back and driven off: and if we are not able to penetrate to what is within, yet already from the outer door we see the inner one. For the very effort of the looking is the door, because it shows somewhat of that which is inside, although there be not yet the power of entering. (Butler, pp. 98−100)

Other important discussions of St. Gregory’s on contemplation are found in his Moralia on Job and Homilies on the Song of Songs.  Ancient editors also collected many passages from his other works that interpret the Song of Songs in a contemplative framework (DelCogliano, 2012).

Concerning St. Gregory’s influences, DelCogliano writes:

“It is notoriously difficult to pinpoint Gregory’s sources. His writings are so suffused with the thought of his patristic predecessors [JU: e.g., Origen, St. Ambrose, St. Augustine] that it is tough to demarcate where their doctrine ends and his begins. He has made the preceding patristic tradition his own. Gregory absorbed the teachings of his predecessors and reexpressed them in a way that reflected his concerns as well as those of his audience. He was no mere copyist; he digested the thoughts of others and ruminated on them in the light of his own experience as a pastor, ascetic, and contemplative. This would often transform the ideas of his sources in striking ways. Hence, we find in Gregory’s writings sentiments that are simultaneously very familiar and very novel.”

It is clear in any case that St. Gregory bases his writings on deep personal experience with contemplation, and they are full of practical knowledge.

References

Latin Text

Adriaen, Marc (ed.). Moralia in Job. Corpus Christianorum Series Latina, vols. 143, 143A & 143B. Latin critical edition. Brepols, 1979/2005.

Adriaen, Marc (ed.). S. Gregorii Magni Homiliae in Hiezechihelem Prophetam. Corpus Christianorum Series Latina, vol. 142. Latin critical edition. Brepols, 1971.

Gregorius I. Homiliae in Ezechielem. J. P. Migne, Patrologia Latina 76 0785A−1072C, 1849.

Gregorius I. Moralia. J. P. Migne, Patrologia Latina 75 509D−1162B. Paris, 1849.

English Translation

Bliss, James and anonymous (trs.). St. Gregory the Great: Morals on the Book of Job. Three vols. Library of the Fathers. Oxford, 1844−1850.

DelCogliano, Mark. Gregory the Great on the Song of Songs. Liturgical Press, 2012.

Kerns, Brian (tr.). Gregory the Great: Moral Reflections on the Book of Job. Six vols. Liturgical Press, 2014−2022. (English translation of Latin critical edition.)

O’Donnell, James J. (tr.). Saint Gregory the Great: Moralia or Commentary on the Book of Blessed Job. Online text (unpublished)

Tomkinson, Theodosia (tr.). Saint Gregory the Great: Homilies on the Book of the Prophet Ezekiel. Second Edition. Center for Traditionalist Orthodox Studies, 1990. English translation of Migne, Patrologia Latina, Vol. 76, 785A–1072C.

Secondary Literature

Butler, Cuthbert. Western Mysticism, Constable, 1922; St Gregory the Great, pp. 89−133.  Butler’s excerpts from St. Gregory’s works (but not the analytical discussion) are reproduced in: Egan, Harvey D. An Anthology of Christian Mysticism, Liturgical Press, 1991, pp. 105−113.

McGinn, Bernard. Contemplation in Gregory the Great. In: Ed. John C. Cavadini, Gregory the Great: A Symposium, University of Notre Dame Press,  1995/2015.

Psalm 45. The Mystical Marriage

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Monastery of St. John the Baptist, Megara

PSALM 45 (Ps. 44 LXX) is another hidden gem.  The Book of Psalms is a magnificent work — even by itself one of the greatest treatises on spiritual life we possess.  The weakening of spiritual life in the West today is proportional to the loss in fervor with which people study and pray Psalms, which in previous centuries was a mainstay of Christian spiritual life. It’s not enough to read or hear isolated verses of Psalms during masses and liturgies.  A thorough, attentive, and repeated reading of the whole work is needed. Only then may one recognize it as an organic unity with an express aim. That aim is to help effect a transformation of soul.  Psalms not only give us a conceptual framework for understanding that process of transformation, but, insofar as we pray individual psalms (or perhaps sing them) devoutly and meditate on their meanings, it becomes a means of effecting that transformation.

The subject is a marriage involving the soul. The resemblance to the Song of Songs is evident and striking. It would be interesting to know which was written earlier: does the first epitomize the second, or the second expand the first?

To begin there is one verse of introduction, a masterpiece of economy and eloquence, and immediately rivets our attention on what is to follow:

[1] My heart is inditing a good matter: I speak of the things which I have made touching the king: my tongue is the pen of a ready writer.

There is no doubt — on this virtually all commentators agree — but that this psalm does not describe any historical event, but its meaning is found in symbolism and allegorical interpretation. There are two principal figures in the psalm: the King, and the Bride.

The King

[2] Thou art fairer than the children of men: grace is poured into thy lips: therefore God hath blessed thee for ever.
[3] Gird thy sword upon thy thigh, O most mighty, with thy glory and thy majesty.
[4] And in thy majesty ride prosperously because of truth and meekness and righteousness; and thy right hand shall teach thee terrible things.
[5] Thine arrows are sharp in the heart of the king’s enemies; whereby the people fall under thee.
[6] Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever: the sceptre of thy kingdom is a right sceptre.
[7] Thou lovest righteousness, and hatest wickedness: therefore God, thy God, hath anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows.
[8] All thy garments smell of myrrh, and aloes, and cassia, out of the ivory palaces, whereby they have made thee glad.

The King here is almost universally understood to signify Christ.  However, it’s also possible to understand the figure as symbolic of an Inner Christ within the soul.  These two interpretations are not mutually exclusive, but to supply a satisfactory discussion of the relationship of Christ to the Inner Christ (however valuable that might be) is beyond the present scope. We may observe, though, that such a parallel is implied by the important Christian doctrine of theosis (becoming like God).  Most unfortunate it is that this doctrine receives so little attention today outside the Orthodox Churches. We come to see, know and love God only to the degree that we become like Him. Our spiritual life is one of gradual coming to be like God, as we proceed from glory to glory. (2 Cor.3:18)

Of what, then, does the beauty of the King consist? We are told that He has the qualities of truth, meekness and righteousness. As we read and reflect on the psalm, we rediscover a great truth of our own soul: that we find this figure of supreme righteousness innately and irresistibly attractive. We cannot help but love deeply and intensely these divine virtues, because these also constitute the deepest nature of our own soul. We love in others what we treasure — sometimes without realizing it — in ourselves.  Reading these verses and calling to our imagination a vision of this King, we are confronted with a great truth of our own soul: we love Righteousness and Moral Beauty — and  far more so than anything related to the material world.  This realization jolts us into a proper remembrance of our true nature.

Yet the King is not only great in moral beauty, but also awesome and sublime in a sense that is, we might say, terrifying.  The very perfection of truth and righteousness which we admire in the King makes falsehood and wickedness perfectly unacceptable to Him.  Hence He is also portrayed as taking an aggressive stance against evil. This creates a psychological paradox for us — one that, in a sense, is the same paradox inherent in that potent expression, fear of the LORD. The same pure King of Righteousness, whose beauty we find so irresistibly attractive, is also a source in like degree of great apprehensiveness.  For we do not believe we are pure and holy.  Even the best of us harbors a deep awareness of our carnal nature and selfish tendencies. As we are drawn toward the beautiful King, we recoil, as though feeling as St. Peter did when he said, Depart from me; for I am a sinful man, O Lord. (Luke 5:8)

Therefore, while Christ, loving and patient, continually beckons us forward, saying, “Fear not!  Come into your Father’s house, to the place that has been prepared for you,” we are divided.  We wish both to proceed and to draw back, lest, coming into the presence of the Father, our sinful side will be seen and incur rejection and wrath.

This is an elemental conflict which must be resolved within the psyche of the devoted reader.  The harder task, perhaps, is not so much the elimination of all sin, but to accept that God loves us completely despite our sins.  This is a matter of great import.  For insofar as guilt and shame dominates our mind, we will seek to by our own efforts to conquer sin — the polar opposite of what we need.  But if we focus our attention on God’s generosity, understanding and love, we will see that it is by grace we are saved. So far from human understanding is this great truth!

The Bride

[9] Kings’ daughters were among thy honourable women: upon thy right hand did stand the queen in gold of Ophir.
[10] Hearken, O daughter, and consider, and incline thine ear; forget also thine own people, and thy father’s house;
[11] So shall the king greatly desire thy beauty: for he is thy Lord; and worship thou him.
[12] And the daughter of Tyre shall be there with a gift; even the rich among the people shall intreat thy favour.
[13] The king’s daughter is all glorious within: her clothing is of wrought gold.
[14] She shall be brought unto the king in raiment of needlework: the virgins her companions that follow her shall be brought unto thee.
[15] With gladness and rejoicing shall they be brought: they shall enter into the king’s palace.
[16] Instead of thy fathers shall be thy children, whom thou mayest make princes in all the earth.
[17] I will make thy name to be remembered in all generations: therefore shall the people praise thee for ever and ever.

The bride here has traditionally been given three alternative meanings:  (1) the Church, (2) the soul, and (3) the Blessed Virgin Mary.  Examples of all three interpretations can be found throughout ancient and medieval commentaries on the Song of Songs. The meanings overlap and are interact, so we need not worry overmuch about making an exact distinction among them. The Church, after all, is a collection of individual souls, and what applies to one, generally applies to the other. Similarly, the Blessed Virgin is frequently taken as a kind of ideal for the individual soul.  This not withstanding, our focus of attention here is on the bride as an individual soul.

Why is the soul symbolized as a female figure, as it would seem to transcend distinctions of gender. Apparently what is symbolized is not the entire soul, but that part of it that is connected with such things as feeling, sensation, emotion and desiring.  This affective soul (anima) would be the counterpart of another part of our soul, the intellective (animus).  In that case, we might possibly interpret the King as a symbol of the animus, to which the anima soul is being united in some new and fundamentally improved way.  Such an inner marriage has many archetypal counterparts in mythology (e.g., Martinus Capella’s Marriage of Philology and Mercury and Apuleius’ Marriage of Eros and Psyche), and some alchemical literature. A Jungian would see this as a representation of a conjiunctio or marriage of the conscious and unconscious psyche.

It is not correct for Christians to summarily and completely dismiss secular psychological or esoteric writers merely because they depart from orthodox Christianity. Even if they are merely half-right, we must pay attention to the half that is right.  Just as St. Augustine in On Christian Doctrine reminds us to read Scripture charitably, so as to not miss important meanings, so the principle of charity applies to reading secular works and writings from other spiritual traditions.

That said, the orthodox Christian (or, for that matter Jewish) and the Jungian view produce two complementary psychological interpretations of the marriage. The former sees the mystical marriage as an ascent of human consciousness to God.  The latter sees it as an integration of psychic functions that produce an intensification and revitalization of waking consciousness in and of this world — that is, attainment of what Abraham Maslow called  Being-experience. Elsewhere I have suggested that Plato’s philosophy, as shown particularly in his myths, can be understood as helping to attain both: mystical ascent and Being-experience. These two meanings are not mutually exclusive, and there is much in the Gospel to suggest it is as much concerned with the latter as the former. The telos of Christian ethics must be complete and integral if it is to be satisfying and compelling.

To return to the psalm, the Queen has female attendants, which may symbolize particular powers or faculties of the soul.  For example, they could mean the senses, or perhaps higher-level creative powers such as are symbolized in Greek myth by the Muses. Her garment of finest gold and its fine embroidery suggest a radiant and beautiful assortment of virtues.

The bride is told to leave her father’s land.  Many commentators plausibly suggest that this refers to the soul leaving its natural homeland of attachment to sensory and worldly goods, and fixing its affection on spiritual things.  (See excerpt from St. Ambrose below.)

In verse 11 we see that it is precisely because the soul rejects the worldly and turns to heavenly things that the King finds her beautiful.  This is a key point, and a magnificent one. It addresses and solves the aforementioned paradox.  Despite our fears and misgivings about being acceptable to God, we here are taught that we already possess, at least in potential, something that God treasures dearly.  Our soul becomes not just good, but supremely beautiful — possessing the very kind of moral beauty that the King prizes — by making the moral choice to turn from flesh to spirit.  We need not recoil from God due to an our awareness of sinfulness, for God has endowed us with a nature He finds supremely beautiful.  We must constantly redirect our attention to that fact.

Attending the wedding as a guest is another female figure, the Queen of Tyre. Tyre is a Philistine (i.e., heathen) city — so this figure may indicate some ruling power or sub-personality (for clarification of these terms see my previous post on Philonic interpretation) concerned with worldly things.  Significantly, this woman bears a gift.  What that gift is we are not told, and it is up to us to learn experientially.  It might involve the ability to enjoy sensory goods and pleasures to a far greater degree than we could before.  That is, if we are attached to the senses, we cannot really enjoy their offerings, because we are divided: we are simultaneous aware of defection, of giving our allegiance to the wrong place, which degrades the integrity of consciousness and diminishes enjoyment.  But if our allegiance remains in heaven, then we my touch the world of sense delicately, savoring it as we would the delicate scent of a rose, rather than dulling our senses with cheap perfume.

Princely offspring of the bride are also promised. Perhaps these would be intellectual activities, projects, and works initiated by the redeemed, reformed and divinized mind.

Conclusion

These are some possible interpretations.  They are only tentative, approximate and suggestive — hints, hopefully to that fuller understanding attainable only by devout reading and meditation.

As said before, there is an important performative dimension to interpreting the psalms.  Understanding comes more from praying than analyzing them.  This is true generally of biblical exegesis, and perhaps especially the Wisdom Books. There is a self-referential or circular quality:  by spiritual mindedness we understand the deeper meanings, and a main purpose of the Bible is to help us gain spiritual mindedness.  Norris puts this well:

“[Gregory of Nyssa] says not only that the Song in some fashion narrates an exemplary soul’s progress in knowledge and love of God but also that readers of the Song may themselves, through their comprehension of it, be brought along as actual participants in the same progress. The text of the Song has a kind of symbolic or sacramental character, then, in that to understand it fully is to be involved with the reality it speaks of.” (p. xlv).

Similarly, Origen, in his Commentary on the Song of Songs, interprets the words behold, thou art fair; thou hast doves’ eyes (Song 1.15) to mean that the eyes of the exegete are illumined by the Holy Spirit and enabled to see spiritual meanings of Scripture. (Origen Comm. Cant. 3.1)

Thus it is not the purpose here or in other articles to replace the effort of each reader with formulaic interpretations.

Let us, then, simply close with a passage from St. Ambrose’s commentary on the Song (found in his work On Isaac, or the Soul) I encountered in preparing this article which seems very relevant:

(8.78) Let us then take up these wings, since like flames they aim for the higher regions. Let each man divest his soul of her baser coverings and approve her when she is cleansed of the mire just as he would approve gold cleansed by fire. For the soul is cleansed just like the finest gold. Moreover the beauty of the soul, her pure virtue and attractiveness, is her truer knowledge of the things that are above, so that she sees the good on which all things depend, but which itself depends on none. There she lives and receives her understanding. For that supreme good is the fountain of life; love and longing for it are enkindled in us, and it is our desire to approach and be joined to it, for it is desirable to him who does not see it and is present to him who sees it, and therefore he disregards all other things and takes pleasure and delight in this one only. …

Let us flee therefore to our real, true fatherland [cf. Plotinus, Enneads 1.6.5]. There is our fatherland and there is our Father, by whom we have been created, where there is the city of Jerusalem, which is the mother of all men. (8.79) … Let us flee with the spirit and the eyes and feet that are within. Let us accustom our eyes to see what is bright and clear, to look upon the face of continence and of moderation, and upon all the virtues, in which there is nothing scabrous, nothing obscure or involved. And let each one look upon himself and his own conscience; let him cleanse that inner eye, so that it may contain no dirt. For what is seen ought not to be at variance with him who sees, because God has wished that we be conformed to the image of His Son. … This is the eye that looks upon the true and great beauty. Only the strong and healthy eye can see the sun; only the good soul can see the good. Therefore let him become good who wishes to see the Lord and the nature of the good.

References

Astell, Ann W. The Song of Songs in the Middle Ages. Cornell University Press, 1990.

McHugh, Michael P. (tr.). Saint Ambrose: Isaac, or the Soul (De Isaac vel anima). In: Michael P. McHugh (ed.), Saint Ambrose: Seven Exegetical Works, Fathers of the Church 65, CUA Press, 1972 (repr. 2010); pp. 9−65.

Lawson, R. P. (tr.). Origen: The Song of Songs Commentary and Homilies. Ancient Christian Writers 26. Newman Press, 1957.

Norris Jr., Richard A. (tr.). Gregory of Nyssa: Homilies on the Song of Songs. Society of Biblical Literature, 2012.

Fragments of Cicero’s Hortensius in English

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AUGUSTINE relates in Confessions 3.4.7 that around the age of eighteen he was permanently converted to a passionate and lifelong love of Wisdom by reading Cicero’s dialogue, the Hortensius. In this dialogue, modeled after Aristotle’s work, Protrepticus, Cicero applies all his eloquence and rhetorical skills to exhort his fellow Romans to the study of Greek philosophy Unfortunately the Hortensius is also a lost work, but we have approximately 103 fragments.  These were collected by H. Mueller, and have been translated into Italian, French and German.  As far as I know, no similar translation in English exists.  However many of the fragments are found in well known works by Cicero, St. Augustine and Lactantius that are available in English.  These are supplied below.

Following these are lists of (1) fragments of Aristotle’s Protrepticus in Cicero’s other works (which might have found there way into Hortensius) and (2) related passages from Cicero’s other works.

Hortensius Fragments 

Mueller 1. Cicero. De divinitione 2 1.1

AFTER serious and long continued reflection as to how I might do good to as many people as possible and thereby prevent any interruption of my service to the State, no better plan occurred to me than to conduct my fellow-citizens in the ways of the noblest learning — and this, I believe, I have already accomplished through my numerous books. For example, in my work entitled Hortensius, I appealed as earnestly as I could for the study of philosophy. And in my Academics, in four volumes, I set forth the philosophic system which I thought least arrogant, and at the same time most consistent and refined. (Falconer, p. 371)

Mueller 2. Cicero, De finibus 1.1.2

To all of these objections I suppose I ought to make some brief reply. The indiscriminate censure of philosophy has indeed been sufficiently answered already in the book which I wrote in praise of that study, in order to defend it against a bitter attack that had been made upon it by Hortensius. The favorable reception which that volume appeared to obtain from yourself and from others whom I considered competent to sit in judgment encouraged me to embark upon further undertakings; for I did not wish to be thought incapable of sustaining the interest that I had aroused. (Rackham, p. 3)

Mueller 3. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 2 2.4

But I have answered the detractors of philosophy in general, in my Hortensius. (Yonge, p. 339)

Mueller 4. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 3.3.6

Philosophy is certainly the medicine of the soul, whose assistance we do not seek from abroad, as in bodily disorders, but we ourselves are bound to exert our utmost energy and power in order to effect our cure. But as to philosophy in general, I have, I think, in my Hortensius, sufficiently spoken of the credit and attention which it deserves, (Yonge, p. 365)

Mueller 5. Cicero, De officiis 2 2.6

Now, when I am advocating the study of philosophy, I usually discuss this subject at greater length, as I have done in another of my books. For the present I meant only to explain why, deprived of the tasks of public service, I have devoted myself to this particular pursuit. (Miller, p. 173)

Mueller 6. Cicero, Academica 2 2.6

In fact, if there is truth in the praise of philosophy that occupies a certain volume of mine, it is obvious that its pursuit is supremely worthy of all persons of the highest character and eminence, and the only precaution that need be observed by us whom the Roman nation has placed in this rank is to prevent our private studies from encroaching at all upon our pubhc interest. (Rackham, p. 471f)

Mueller 9. Augustine, De beata vita 4

From the age of nineteen, having read in the school of rhetoric that book of Cicero’s called Hortensius, I was inflamed by such a great love of philosophy that I considered devoting myself to it at once. (Schopp, p. 46)

Mueller 10. Augustine, Confessions 3.4.7f

In the ordinary course of study, I lighted upon a certain book of Cicero, whose language, though not his heart, almost all admire. This book of his contains an exhortation to philosophy, and is called Hortensius. This book, in truth, changed my affections, and turned my prayers to Yourself, O Lord, and made me have other hopes and desires. Worthless suddenly became every vain hope to me; and, with an incredible warmth of heart, I yearned for an immortality of wisdom, and began now to arise (Luke 15:18) that I might return to You. Not, then, to improve my language — which I appeared to be purchasing with my mother’s means, in that my nineteenth year, my father having died two years before — not to improve my language did I have recourse to that book; nor did it persuade me by its style, but its matter.

[8] How ardent was I then, my God, how ardent to fly from earthly things to You! Nor did I know how You would deal with me. For with You is wisdom. In Greek the love of wisdom is called philosophy, with which that book inflamed me. There be some who seduce through philosophy, under a great, and alluring, and honourable name coloring and adorning their own errors. And almost all who in that and former times were such, are in that book censured and pointed out. There is also disclosed that most salutary admonition of Your Spirit, by Your good and pious servant: Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ: for in Him dwells all the fullness of the Godhead bodily. Colossians 2:8-9 And since at that time (as Thou, O Light of my heart, know) the words of the apostle were unknown to me, I was delighted with that exhortation, in so far only as I was thereby stimulated, and enkindled, and inflamed to love, seek, obtain, hold, and embrace, not this or that sect, but wisdom itself, whatever it were; and this alone checked me thus ardent, that the name of Christ was not in it. (Pilkington)

Mueller 12. Lactantius, Divine Institutes 3.16.9

Hortensius in Cicero, contending against philosophy, is pressed by a clever argument; inasmuch as, when he said that men ought not to philosophize, he seemed nevertheless to philosophize, since it is the part of the philosophers to discuss what ought and what ought not to be done in life. (Fletcher)

Mueller 14. Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 6.2.15

In Cicero, Catulus in the Hortensius, while he prefers philosophy to all things, says that he would rather have one short treatise respecting duty, than a long speech in behalf of a seditious man Cornelius. And this is plainly to be regarded not as the opinion of Catulus, who perhaps did not utter this saying, but as that of Cicero, who wrote it. I believe that he wrote it for the purpose of recommending these books which he was about to write on Offices, in which very books he testifies that nothing in the whole range of philosophy is better and more profitable than to give precepts for living. (Fletcher)

Mueller 32. Lactantius, Divine Institutes 3.16.12

Moreover, the argument which the same Hortensius employed has great weight also against philosophy — namely, that it may be understood from this, that philosophy is not wisdom, since its beginning and origin are apparent. When, he says, did philosophers begin to exist? Thales, as I imagine, was the first, and his age was recent. Where, then, among the more ancient men did that love of investigating the truth lie hidden? (Fletcher)

Mueller 36. Augustine, De Trinitate 13.4.7

Shall we, then, hold that to be false of which the Academic Cicero himself did not doubt (although Academics doubt every thing), who, when he wanted in the dialogue Hortensius to find some certain thing, of which no one doubted, from which to start his argument, says, We certainly all will to be blessed? (Haddan)
Cf. Augustine, Against Julian 6.1.26.

Mueller 39. Augustine, De beata vita 2.10

I smiled at her and said cheerfully: ‘Mother, you have really gained the mastery of the very stronghold of philosophy. For, undoubtedly you were wanting the words to express yourself like Tullius, who also has dealt with this matter. In his Hortensius, a book written in the praise and defense of philosophy, he said: “Behold, not the philosophers, but only people who like to argue, state that all are happy who live according to their own will. This, of course, is not true, for, to wish what is not fitting is the worst of wretchedness. But it is not so deplorable to fail of attaining what we desire as it is to wish to attain what is not proper. For, greater evil is brought about through one’s wicked will than happiness through fortune.”’ (Schopp, p. 56)
Cf. Augustine, De Trinitate 13.5.8

Mueller 40. Lactantius, Divine Institutes 1.7.4

But perchance some one may ask of us the same question which Hortensius asks in Cicero: If God is one only, what solitude can be happy? As though we, in asserting that He is one, say that He is desolate and solitary. Undoubtedly He has ministers, whom we call messengers. And that is true, which I have before related, that Seneca said in his Exhortations that God produced ministers of His kingdom. (Fletcher)

Mueller 42. Lactantius, Divine Institutes 3.16.5

It is not therefore utility, but enjoyment, which they seek from philosophy. And this Cicero indeed testified. Truly, he says, all their disputation, although it contains most abundant fountains of virtue and knowledge, yet, when compared with their actions and accomplishments, I fear lest it should seem not to have brought so much advantage to the business of men as enjoyment to their times of relaxation. (Fletcher)

Mueller 50. Augustine, De Trinitate 14.9.12

Yet Tullius, the great author of eloquence, when arguing in the dialogue Hortensius, says of all four: If we were allowed, when we migrated from this life, to live forever in the islands of the blessed, as fables tell, what need were there of eloquence when there would be no trials, or what need, indeed, of the very virtues themselves? For we should not need fortitude when nothing of either toil or danger was proposed to us; nor justice, when there was nothing of anybody else’s to be coveted; nor temperance, to govern lasts that would not exist; nor, indeed, should we need prudence, when there was no choice offered between good and evil. We should be blessed, therefore, solely by learning and knowing nature, by which alone also the life of the gods is praiseworthy. And hence we may perceive that everything else is a matter of necessity, but this is one of free choice. This great orator, then, when proclaiming the excellence of philosophy, going over again all that he had learned from philosophers, and excellently and pleasantly explaining it, has affirmed all four virtues to be necessary. (Haddan)

Mueller 54. Augustine, City of God 3.15

In the dialogue Hortensius, too, while speaking of the regular eclipses of the sun, he says that they produce the same darkness as covered the death of Romulus, which happened during an eclipse of the sun. Here you see he does not at all shrink from speaking of his death, for Cicero was more of a reasoner than an eulogist. (Dods)

Mueller 76. Augustine, De beata vita 26

But, let us think of such a man as resembles Tullius’ description of Orata. Who could affirm offhand that Orata had been afflicted with want, since he was a man of great riches, luxuries, and delights, not lacking anything in regard to pleasure, influence, dignity, and having a healthy constitution? Immensely rich in estates, and exceptionally blessed with most charming friends, he had in abundance whatever his heart desired, and all these goods in the interest of his physical wellbeing. In a word, all his undertakings and his every wish were crowned with success. (Kavanagh, p. 74)
Note. Nonius has a longer version in Latin (see Mueller).

Mueller 81. Augustine, Against Julian 4.14.72

Consider Tully’s words in the dialogue Hortensius, which should delight you more than those of Balbus, who takes the part of the Stoics. What he says is true, but it concerns the inferior part of man, that is, his body, and it could not help you. See what he says about the quality of the mind over against the pleasure of the body. He says: ‘Should one seek the pleasures of the body, which, as Plato said truly and earnestly, are the enticements and baits of evil? What injury to health, what deformity of character and body, what wretched loss, what dishonor is not evoked and elicited by pleasure? Where its action is the most intense, it is the most inimical to philosophy. The pleasure of the body is not in accord with great thought. Who can pay attention or follow a reasoning or think anything at all when under the influence of intense pleasure? The whirlpool of this pleasure is so great that it strives day and night, without the slightest intermission, so to arouse our senses that they be drawn into the depths. What fine mind would not prefer that nature had given us no pleasures at all?’ (Schumacher, p. 229)
Cf. Ibid., 5.8.33. But if you would yield to true judgments, found in at least some of the philosophers’ writings, you would not fail to hear them say pleasures are the enticements and baits of evils, and that lust is a faulty part of the soul.
Cf. Ibid., 5.10.42. What can one think about when the very mind with which he thinks is so absorbed in this carnal pleasure? He whose words I quoted in the foregoing book spoke well when he said: ‘When its activity is most intense, it is most hostile to philosophy. Intense pleasure of the body is incompatible with great thought. What man, under the power of this the most intense of pleasures, can use his mind or carry on a process of reasoning, or think about anything at all?’

Mueller 82. Augustine, Against Julian 5.7.29

Let us enjoy present pleasures to the full, let us amuse ourselves in their absence with thoughts of them, as Epicurus advocated, and we shall be without sin and not deprive ourselves of any good. Let us not resist natural movements because of any doctrinal opinion, but, as Hortensius says: ‘Man would be obedient to nature, sensing without a teacher whatever nature desires.’ A nature which is good cannot desire what is evil, or we must deny good to the good; therefore, let whatever this good lust desires be done, lest he who resists the good himself be evil. (Schumacher, p. 274f)

Mueller 89. Augustine, De beata vita 14

To this remark he smilingly replied: ‘Such things will really cure me. For this dish you have placed before us, prickly somehow and elaborate, is sharp in its sweetness—as that well-known writer says of Hymettic honey—and docs not bloat my stomach. Therefore, after a taste of it, I gladly swallow it all. For I see no way in which this conclusion can be refuted.’ (Kavanagh, p. 61f)
Note: Nonius has a longer version in Latin (see Mueller).

Mueller 95. Augustine, Against Julian 4.15.78

How much better than you and nearer the truth in their opinions about the generation of man are those whom Cicero names in the last part of his dialogue Hortensius, who seemed to be drawn and compelled by the very evidence of things. After he had mentioned the many things we see and grieve over in human vanity and unhappiness, he said : ‘From those errors and hardships of human life it happened that at times there was vision by the ancients, whether they were seers or interpreters of the divine mind, as found in sacred things and origins; who said we are born to atone by punishment for crimes committed in a higher life. We find in Aristotle a statement to the effect that we have been afflicted by punishment similar to one once given a group of men who, fallen into the hands of Etruscan pirates, were slaughtered with deliberate cruelty, and their bodies, part corresponding to part, were very neatly piled up, the living with the dead; thus it seems our souls are united with our bodies as the living were joined with the dead.’ (tr. Schumacher, p. 234f)

Mueller 97. Augustine, De Trinitate 14.19.26

This contemplative wisdom, which I believe is properly called wisdom as distinct from knowledge in the sacred writings; but wisdom only of man, which yet man has not except from Him, by partaking of whom a rational and intellectual mind can be made truly wise — this contemplative wisdom, I say, it is that Cicero commends, in the end of the dialogue Hortensius, when he says: While, then, we consider these things night and day, and sharpen our understanding, which is the eye of the mind, taking care that it be not ever dulled, that is, while we live in philosophy; we, I say, in so doing, have great hope that, if, on the one hand, this sentiment and wisdom of ours is mortal and perishable, we shall still, when we have discharged our human offices, have a pleasant setting, and a not painful extinction, and as it were a rest from life: or if, on the other, as ancient philosophers thought — and those, too, the greatest and far the most celebrated — we have souls eternal and divine, then must we needs think, that the more these shall have always kept in their own proper course, i.e. in reason and in the desire of inquiry, and the less they shall have mixed and entangled themselves in the vices and errors of men, the more easy ascent and return they will have to heaven. And then he says, adding this short sentence, and finishing his discourse by repeating it: Wherefore, to end my discourse at last, if we wish either for a tranquil extinction, after living in the pursuit of these subjects, or if to migrate without delay from this present home to another in no little measure better, we must bestow all our labor and care upon these pursuits. And here I marvel, that a man of such great ability should promise to men living in philosophy, which makes man blessed by contemplation of truth, a pleasant setting after the discharge of human offices, if this our sentiment and wisdom is mortal and perishable; as if that which we did not love, or rather which we fiercely hated, were then to die and come to nothing, so that its setting would be pleasant to us! But indeed he had not learned this from the philosophers, whom he extols with great praise; but this sentiment is redolent of that New Academy, wherein it pleased him to doubt of even the plainest things. But from the philosophers that were greatest and far most celebrated, as he himself confesses, he had learned that souls are eternal. (Haddan)

Mueller 99. Augustine, On Dialectic 9.15.14

Thus, it is most correctly said by the dialecticians that any word is ambiguous. Do not let it dissuade that Hortensius sneers at them in Cicero: “They say that they dare explain the ambiguous clearly. They also say that any word is ambiguous. Then how were ambiguous things explained by ambiguous things? That is like bringing an unlit torch into the darkness.” (Marchand)

Mueller 100. Augustine, Contra academicos 3.14.31

Cicero admits that he himself is very much given to forming opinions, but he say’s that he is inquiring as to what a wise man does. [Cicero, Academica 2.20.66.] … you have at least read in his Hortensius: “Therefore, if there is no certainty, a wise man will not form opinions: he will never accept anything as true.” (Kavanagh, p. 205f.)

Mueller 101. Augustine, Contra academicos 1.3.7

‘Do you not think that Carneades was a wise man?’ asked Licentius.
‘I am not a Greek,’ replied Trygetius. ‘I do not know who that Carneades was.’
‘Well, what about our own Cicero?’ asked Licentius. ‘At any rate, what do you think of him?’
After a long pause, Trygetius said: ‘He was a wise man.’
‘Therefore,’ said Licentius, ‘his opinion on this matter has some weight with you?’
‘It has,’ replied Trygetius.
‘Then hear what it is, for I think it has escaped you. Our Cicero was of the opinion that a man who is searching for the truth, even though he be unable to attain to its discovery, is nevertheless happy.’
‘Where has Cicero said that?’ Trygetius asked.
Licentius rejoined: ‘Who does not know that he has forcefully asserted that nothing can be understood by man, that nothing remains for a wise man but a diligent search for the truth, and that, if he should give assent to doubtful things — and in a wise man this fault is the greatest of all—he could not be free from error, even if those things should happen to be true? Wherefore, if we must believe that a wise man Is necessarily happy, and, if a mere search for the truth is the whole function of wisdom, why should we hesitate to believe that a happy life can be attained by the mere search for the truth? ’ (Kavanagh, p. 113)
Cf. Cicero Academica 1.12.45, 2.20.60, 2.21.67.

Mueller 102. Augustine, Against Julian 4.15.76

You feared lest you be thwarted in our discussion about pleasure by those more sound philosophers whom Cicero called a kind of consular philosophers because of their soundness, as well as by the Stoics themselves, most inimical to pleasure, whose testimony you thought should be quoted from Cicero’s book, in the person of Balbus, but which was in no way helpful to you. (Schumacher, p. 233)

Fragments of Aristotle’s Protrepticus in Cicero’s Other Works

Cicero, Tusculan Disp. 3.28.69 (= Aristotle, Protrepticus, Ross fr. 8; p. 37)

Therefore Aristotle, criticizing the old philosophers who had thought philosophy completed by their intellectual labours, says they were either very stupid or very conceited, but that he sees that, since great progress has been made in a few years, philosophy will in a short time be brought to completion. (Ross)
Cf. Iamblichus, Comm. Math. 26 (83.6−22 Festa).

Cicero, Tusculan Disp. 1.39.94 (= Aristotle, Protrepticus, Ross fr. 10a p. 40)

But what age can truly be called old? What possession of man is lasting? . . . Because we have nothing more, we call this lasting; all these things are called long or short according to the proportion of each that is given to each of us. By the river Hypanis, which flows into the Pontus from the direction of Europe, Aristotle says there are born little creatures which live for but one day. One of these that has died at the eighth hour has died at an advanced age; one that has died at sunset is decrepit, especially if it is on a midsummer day. Compare our longest life with eternity; we shall be found as short-lived as these little creatures. (Ross)
cf. Iamblichus Protrepticus 8 (47.5-21 Pistelli), Boethius Consolation 3.8, Seneca Brev. Vit. 1.2.

Cicero, De finibus 2.13.39−40 (= Aristotle, Protrepticus, Ross fr. 10c p. 42)

I shall hold that we must first exclude the opinions of Aristippus and the whole Cyrenaic school, who were not afraid to place the supreme good in the pleasure which moves our senses most delightfully, and spurned the freedom from pain of which you speak. They did not see that as the horse is born to run, the ox to plough, the dog to follow a scent, so man (as Aristotle says) is born as a sort of mortal god to do two things — for understanding and for action. (Ross)
Cf. Iamblichus Protrepticus 8 (48.9–21 Pistelli); cf. Augustine, De Trinitate 14.19.26.

Cicero, Tusculan Disp. 5.35.101 (= Aristotle, Protrepticus, Ross fr. 16  p. 53)

How then can a life be pleasant from which prudence and moderation are absent? We see from this the error of Sardanapallus, the wealthy king of Syria, who ordered these words to be engraved on his tomb: ‘What I ate and what sated lust drained to the dregs, that I have; many a famous deed lies left behind.’ ‘What else’, Aristotle says, ‘would you have inscribed on the grave, not of a king but of an ox? He says he had in death the things which even in life he had no longer than for the moment of enjoyment.’ (Ross)
Cf. Strabo 14.5.9, p. C 672; Cicero, De finibus 2.32.106.

Cicero, Tusculan Disp. 5.30.85−31.87 (= Aristotle, Protrepticus, Ross fr. 18 p. 54f.)

The case of the Peripatetics has been unfolded — apart from the views of Theophrastus and those who, following him, show a weak dread of and shrinking from pain; the rest may do what they in fact practically do, to exaggerate the importance and dignity of virtue. When they have extolled it to the skies, which these eloquent men are wont to do at length … 31.87 according to the reasoning of these men the happy life will follow virtue even if it leads to torture, and will descend with it into the tyrant’s bull,[1] with Aristotle, Xenocrates, Speusippus, and Polemon, to encourage it; it will never, seduced by threats or blandishments, desert virtue. (Ross)
[1] Phalaris’ brazen bull.

Ibid. 5.10.30.

I do not, therefore, readily allow my friend Brutus, or our common masters, or the ancients, Aristotle, Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Polemon, when they count as evils the things I have enumerated above, at the same time to say that the ‘wise man’ is always happy. If this noble and beautiful title, most worthy of Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato, delights them, let them bring themselves to despise the things by whose splendour they are attracted—strength, health, beauty, riches, honours, power—and to count their opposites as nothing; then they will be able with a voice of crystal clearness to profess that they are terrified neither by the onslaught of fortune, by the opinion of the multitude, by pain, nor by poverty, that everything lies in themselves, that there is nothing outside their power which they should reckon as a good. (Ross)

Ibid. 5.13.39.

Cicero, De finibus 5.5.12−14

But since the happy life is sought for, and the one thing that philosophy ought to consider and pursue is the question whether happiness is entirely in the power of the wise man, or whether it can be weakened or snatched from him by adversity, on this point there seems to be sometimes variation and doubt among philosophers. This impression is produced most strongly by Theophrastus’ book on the happy life, in which a great deal is ascribed to fortune. If this were true, wisdom could not guarantee a happy life. This seems to me, so to speak, a softer and more timid line of thought than that demanded by the force and dignity of virtue. Let us, therefore, cling to Aristotle and his son Nicomachus . . . but let us follow Theophrastus in most things, only allowing virtue more firmness and strength than he did…. [14] Our own Antiochus seems to me to follow most faithfully the opinion of the ancients, which was (he maintains) common to Aristotle and to Polemon. (Ross)

Cicero De natura deorum 2.20.51−52 (= Aristotle, Protrepticus, Ross fr. 19 p. 55)  

Most admirable are the motions of the five stars which we wrongly call wandering stars…. It is on the basis of their diverse motions that mathematicians have given the name of ‘great year’ to that which is completed when the sun, the moon, and the five ‘wandering’ stars, the course of all of them completed, have returned to the same relative positions. How long this period is, is a great question, but it must be certain and definite. (Ross)
Cf. Cicero, Hortensius, fr. 35 Mueller; Tacitus Dialogus 16.7; Censor, c.18.11.

Other Related Passages in Cicero

Throughout his philosophical works Cicero’s has magnificent passages concerning the greatness and immortality of the human soul, divine Reason, and the ascent of the mind by contemplation of the order, beauty and goodness of the natural world.

Cicero, De natura deorum 2.37.95−96 (= Aristotle, On Philosophy, Ross fr. 13; p. 85ff)

Great was the saying of Aristotle: ‘Suppose there were men who had lived always underground, in good and well-lighted dwellings, adorned with statues and pictures, and furnished with everything in which those who are thought happy abound. Suppose, however, that they had never gone above ground, but had learned by report and hearsay that there is a divine authority and power. Suppose that then, at some time, the jaws of the earth opened, and they were able to escape and make their way from those hidden dwellings into these regions which we inhabit. When they suddenly saw earth and seas and sky, when they learned the grandeur of clouds and the power of winds, when they saw the sun and learned his grandeur and beauty and the power shown in his filling the sky with light and making day; when, again, night darkened the lands and they saw the whole sky picked out and adorned with stars, and the varying lights of the moon as it waxes and wanes, and the risings and settings of all these bodies, and their courses settled and immutable to all eternity; when they saw those things, most certainly they would have judged both that there are gods and that these great works are the works of gods.’ Thus far Aristotle. (Ross)
Cf. Philo, Allegorical Interpretation 3.32.97−99; On Rewards and Punishments 7.40−46; Special Laws 1.35.185−1.36.194; Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta 2. 1009−1020; Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.4.

Cicero, De divinatione 1.30.63f (= Aristotle, On Philosophy, Ross fr. 12a; p. 84f)
Cf. Sextus Empiricus, Phys. 1.20−23; Cicero, Tusculan Disp. 1.68ff.

Cicero, De natura deorum 1.13.33 (= Aristotle On Philosophy, Ross fr. 26; p. 97)

Cicero, De natura deorum 2.6.16−17

Cicero, De natura deorum 2.15.40 (= Aristotle On Philosophy, Ross fr. 21; p. 93f.)

Cicero, De natura deorum 2.16.42−17.47

Cicero, De natura deorum 2.61.153

Cicero, De natura deorum 3.10.26

Cicero, Pro Milone 83−84

Cicero, Academica 2.38.119 (= Aristotle On Philosophy, Ross fr. 20; p. 92f)

Cicero, Academica 1.7.26 (= Aristotle On Philosophy, Ross fr. 27; p. 98f.)
Cf. Cicero, Tuscculan Disp. 1.10.22; 1.17.41; 1.26.65−27.66.

❧❧

Bibliography

Hortensius

Grilli, Alberto (ed.). M. Tulli Ciceronis Hortensius. Milan, 1962. Crtical edition and Italian translation. 2nd edition, Bologna, 2010.

Mueller, C. F. W. (ed.). M. Tulli Ciceronis scripta quae manserunt omnia. Part 4, Vol. 3. Lipsiae Teubneri, 1890.

Ruch, Michel (ed.). L’Hortensius de Cicéron; histoire et reconstitution [The Hortensius of Cicero: A History and Reconstruction] (in French). Paris, France: Les Belles Lettres, 1958.

Straume-Zimmermann, Laila. (tr.). Cicero’s Hortensius. Bern: Peter Lang, 1976. German and Latin.

Straume-Zimmermann, Laila; Broemser, Ferdinand; Gigon, Olof (trs.). Marcus Tullius Cicero: Lucullus, Academici libri. Lateinisch – deutsch. Munich: Artemis Verlag, 1990 (repr. De Gruyter, 2014).

Cicero

Falconer, William Armistead (tr.). Cicero: On Old Age, On Friendship, On Divination. Loeb Classical Library. New York, 1923.

Miller, Walter (tr.). Cicero: On Duties (De Officiis. Loeb Classical Library. New York, 1913.

Rackham, H. Harris (tr.). Cicero: On Ends (De Fiunibus). Loeb Classical Library. 2nd. ed. Cambridge, MA: 1931.

Rackham, H. (tr.). Cicero: On the Nature of the Gods, Academica. Loeb Classical Library. Harvard University Press, 1917.

Yonge, Charles Duke (tr.). Cicero: The Academic Questions, De Finibus, and Tusculan Disputations. Bohn: London, 1853.

Augustine

Dods, Marcus (tr.). St. Augustine: The City of God. In: Philip Schaff (ed.), Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 2, Buffalo, 1887.

Haddan, Arthur West (tr.). St. Augustine: On the Trinity. In: Philip Schaff (ed.), Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 3, Buffalo, 1887.

Kavanagh, Denis J. (tr.). Answer to Skeptics (Contra academicos). In: Ludwig Schopp (ed.), St. Augustine: The Happy Life; Answer to Skeptics; Divine Providence and the Problem of Evil; Soliloquies. Fathers of the Church, Vol. 5, New York, 1948 (repr. 2010); pp. 87−228.

Marchand, James (tr.). Augustine: On Dialectic.  University of Illinois at Urbana. c. 1994.

Pilkington, J. G. (tr.). St. Augustine: Confessions. In: Philip Schaff (ed.), Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 1, Buffalo, 1887.

Schopp, Ludwig (tr.). The Happy Life (De beata vita). In: Ludwig Schopp (ed.), St. Augustine: The Happy Life; Answer to Skeptics; Divine Providence and the Problem of Evil; Soliloquies. Fathers of the Church, Vol. 5, New York, 1948 (repr. 2010); pp. 29−86.

Schumacher, Matthew A. (tr.). Saint Augustine: Against Julian. Fathers of the Church, Vol. 35. New York, 1957.

Other

Fletcher, William (tr.). Lactantius: The Divine Institutes. In: Alexander Roberts, James Donaldson, A. Cleveland Coxe (eds.), Ante-Nicene Fathers, Vol. 7, Buffalo, 1886.

Johnson, Thomas M. (tr.) Iamblichus’ Exhortation to the Study of Philosophy. Osceola, Missouri, U.S.A., 1907; repr. Phanes Press, 1988;

Pistelli, Ermenegildo (ed.), Iamblichi Protrepticus, Leipzig: Teubner, 1888,

Ross, David. The Works of Aristotle. Vol. XII. Select Fragments. Oxford, 1952.

von Arnim, Hans (ed.). Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta. Vol. 2. Teubner, 1903 (repr. 1964).

Written by John Uebersax

November 9, 2021 at 6:43 pm

St. Augustine: The Utility of Belief

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Fra Angelicao, The Conversion of St. Augustine (c. 14301435)

DEAR Philonous, 

I had promised to deliver to you this week an explanation of St. Augustine’s lesser-known but valuable work, De utilitate credendi.  I was prepared today to write my summary, but now find my mind agitated by a change in weather (an unseasonably warm, ‘Santa-Ana’ like wind). Rather than abandon my plan completely, though, I’ll attempt to accommodate Fate (a tactic which, when employed, sometimes reveals Fate to be Providence). Thus, while I am no fan of stream-of-consciousness style writing — but ,rather, tend to the oppose extreme of obsessive perfectionism — I will allow myself to experiment with the former this time.

Here, then, are a series of thoughts I had during today’s walk. I will write these directly, without adding substantially to them, however great the temptation may be to do so.  Hopefully posting these brief comments will help motivate a few people to read the work, so that Augustine can explain his points better than I can.

Augustine in this short book addresses those who are at point in their life where they genuinely seek wisdom and true religion.  He is not interested in those for whom these topics are mere curiosities or diversions.

Adapting his thesis to a modern audience, it is: That people — at least those in the West — should not avoid investigating Christianity.  This investigation may be done in an experimental way:  that is, one may test the waters, so to speak, without making any immediate and permanent commitment. However this initial experiment must be done in a sincere and ‘charitable’ way. By charitable, it is meant that a person should, in case of questionable teachings or, say, puzzling passages of the Bible, be inclined to give the ‘benefit of the doubt.’

Central to his argument is the premise that a person sincerely seeking wisdom and religion recognizes that they are subject to the delusions, follies and vanities of life, and that their own reasoning is subject to corruption by egoism, bias, self-love, and the like.  Not only does this make it difficult to understand true religion without help, but it means one has little ability to distinguish true from false teachers. Therefore it is both prudent and reasonable to seek first sources with good reputations.  Augustine speaks in terms of ‘authoritative sources’ here — but he does not mean by authority that of a policeman or dictator, but rather authority in the sense of having genuine expertise.

What are the signs of a such an authoritative source. He lists several that apply to the Christian Church (broadly defined):

  • It’s longevity.
  • It’s wide respect and admiration.
  • The benevolent actions and intentions of its saints and doctors.
  • The courage and determination of its martyrs.

He also lists as potentially relevant evidence miracles.  Modern readers may not accept that part of his argument, but it isn’t really necessary.

Augustine notes that the objection that most Christians themselves lack wisdom and virtue does not affect this argument. In any field of respectable endeavor, only a few gain mastery, yet all respect the field and admire those who do gain mastery. That the ideals of Christianity appeal to the masses, even if they are seldom achieved, is what matters here. It is evidence that Christianity genuinely responds to deep needs of the human condition and resonates with our highest innate ideals.

He also invites us to consider the parallels with authors like Virgil. All people respect these authors and those who study them.  Yet only a minority of people actually read them, and fewer still are able to grasp the fine points of their writings.

In this connection Augustine mentions another interesting and revealing point. If someone were to summarily dismiss Virgil or Homer, or read them with the specific intention of finding fault with them, we would consider that person worthy of blame.  That is, some instinct we have to honor trust sources of antiquity would be outraged.  Augustine does not pursue this point as far as he could, but it is anticipated at some length in the writings of Cicero (one of Augustine’s influences).  Ultimately this argument has roots before Cicero in Stoic philosophy. Human beings are social, communal creatures.  We are designed by nature, as it were, to honor valid traditions.  Those who do not do so — at least not without some good reason — are instinctively disapproved of; and, while perhaps not all instincts are trustworthy or constructive, this one may well be so.

Hence his argument might be succinctly framed as follows:

  1. If we are sincerely, urgently, fervently seeking wisdom and religion, we must know that our reasoning and judgment are prone to bias and error.
  2. Therefore we cannot attain wisdom and religion by our own reasoning alone.
  3. We cannot find a good teacher by relying only on our reasoning.
  4. We have little choice, then, but to experiment by investigating the teachings of a trusted, reputable source.
  5. To profit from this source, we must approach the teachings charitably — that is, in an experimental way that basically says, “Okay, I’ll go along for now and see where this leads. If insight soon follows, the experiment will be successful. If not, then I will withhold further belief.”
  6. That is what we might call experimental credence. It is very different from credulousness or gullibility, things Augustine in no way endorses or advocates.
  7. To approach things this way is eminently reasonable. This is what he meant by faith (credence) seeking understanding. This is, in fact, far more reasonable than insisting on radical rationalism at the outset — that is requiring that each article of religion be given a fully rational argument before it is taken seriously.

Augustine is in no way here suggesting that we should just bow down to authoritarian dogma.  That would be insincere and affected.  He does not ask us to be insincere.  Rather, this is about adopting a kind of provisional belief.  Just as when we cross a street, we do not know a car will not come from around a corner and hit us.  We proceed with the ‘faith’ that crossing will be safe.  However we do not commit ourselves to this fixed belief, but remain attentive and ready to change our belief if circumstances so dictate. What he is calling credence is, then, somewhat like a “working hypothesis.”

While he does not say so explicitly, the implication is that we have a natural impulse to believe Christianity (or comparable trusted sources.)  Hence here we are not imposing on ourselves an arbitrary and artificial belief, but rather are permitting ourselves to accede to a natural impulse to provisionally believe.

Finally, although it may be difficult to find a reliable contemporary person to teach Christianity, we have access to the Bible.  We should apply ourselves to its study in the aforementioned spirit of trust and charity, asking such questions as how might this passage apply to my life? or how might I interpret these words in a useful, meaningful and wise way?— and not how may I ridicule or find fault with it? Augustine took it as axiomatic that much of the Bible’s message (especially in the Old Testament) is conveyed by means of allegory.  Passages which seem morally objectionable if taken literally assist us by forcing us to look for symbolic meanings. Having sometimes to struggle to find deeper meanings is consistent with the role of religion in helping us to reform and improve our thinking.

Augustine also places great emphasis on the fact that Christian teaching is open, public, and available to all without charge.  This contrasts with the secrecy of esoteric texts and elite ‘schools’ which promise to deliver subtle wisdom for the right price. Why seek religion at all if we do not believe God is both generous and actively seeks to assist our endeavors?  What could be more evidence of such benevolence and wisdom than by entrusting the teaching of divine truths to an institution like the Christian Church?

Then what are the messages the seeker may hope to find from the Bible?  I would propose to classify these under three headings. (These are my view, that is, and not anything Augustine says directly in the work.)

The first is moral reformation and purification, and the gaining of intellectual and moral virtue.  (This is similar to Stoicism.)

The second is instruction in contemplative ascent of the mind (anagogy; this is similar to Platonism).

Third (this goes beyond Stoicism and Platonism) is achievement of loving union with God and the theological virtues of Faith, Hope, and, above all, Charity.

Of course nothing I’ve said here should be understood to dissuade the study of other traditional religions, including Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism and Islam — or, for that matter, ancient religious and philosophical traditions like Neoplatonism and Hermeticism. At least one source I’ve seen claimed that Augustine himself continued to read Plotinus all his life. Augustine’s main objection to the Manicheans was not so much their wrong doctrines, but that (1) they maligned Christianity and (2) they insisted that rationalism alone is sufficient in religion.

John

Bibliography

English translations

Burleigh, J. H. S. (tr.). St. Augustine: The Usefulness of Belief (De Utitlitate Credendi). In: J. H. S. Burleigh (ed.), Augustine: Earlier Writings, SCM Press, 1953 (repr. Knox, 2006); pp. 284−323.

Cornish, C. L. (tr). St. Augustine: On the Profit of Believing.  In: Philip Schaff (ed.), Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 3, Buffalo, 1887.

Kearney, Ray (tr.). Saint Augustine: The Advantage of Believing (De utilitate credendi). In: Boniface Ramsey (ed.), The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century, vol. I/8, (On Christian Belief), New City Press, 2005; pp. 116−150.

Meagher, Luanne (tr.). St.Augustine: The Advantage of Believing (De utilitate credendi). In: Ludwig Schopp (ed.), Fathers of the Church, Vol. 4 (Writings of St. Augustine, Vol. 2), New York, 1947; pp. 385−442.

Marriott, Charles (tr.). On the Profit of Believing. In: John Henry Parker (ed.), Seventeen Short Treatises of S. Augustine, Oxford, 1847/1869/1885; pp. 577−618.

Latin editions

Migne J. P. (ed.). Augustinus Hipponensis: De utilitate credendi. Patrologia Latina 42, 65−92. Paris, 1841

Pegon, J. (ed. & tr.). De utilitate credendi. In: Oeuvres de Saint Augustin, 1re série, Opuscules, volume VIII. Bibliothèque Augustinienne (BA) 17, Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1951.

Zycha, Joseph (ed.).  S. Aureli Augustini: De utilitate credendi. Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum (CSEL) 25.1. Vienna, 1866.

St. Augustine on the Esoteric Meaning of the Beatitudes

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Whosoever heareth these sayings of mine, and doeth them, I will liken him unto a wise man, which built his house upon a rock. (Mat 7:24)

THE THEME of Jesus’ teachings in the Gospels is the kingdom of heaven.  This kingdom is not of this world (John 18:36; cf. Luke 17:21), but is within.  Nowhere is the message of the kingdom, and its role in attaining to holy, happy and blesssed living, presented more directly than in the Sermon on the Mount, of which the Beatitudes (Matthew 5:3−10) are the essence.  The Beatitudes are one of the great prayers of the Christian tradition.  Unfortunately they are too often regarded as mere platitudes, or else as moral commands to change the exterior world by promoting social justice, peace and so on.    But while things like social justice are undeniably important, the Beatitudes seek something greater still:  the union of the individual soul with God, which is the essence of beatitude and the purpose of true religion.

St. Augustine — always mindful in his writings of the soul’s journey to God — supplies a beautiful and insightful commentary on the interior meaning of the Beatitudes in Book 1 of his Commentary on Matthew, shown belowThe translation here is that of Jepson (1948).

Matthew 5

[3] Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.
[4] Blessed are they that mourn: for they shall be comforted.
[5] Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth.
[6] Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after righteousness: for they shall be filled.
[7] Blessed are the merciful: for they shall obtain mercy.
[8] Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God.
[9] Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called the children of God.
[10] Blessed are they which are persecuted for righteousness’ sake: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.

CHAPTER 1

The Sermon on the Mount is the perfect pattern of the Christian life. The poor in spirit. [Note 1]

3. Now, what does He say? Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. We read in the Scriptures concerning the craving for temporal things: All is vanity and presumption of spirit. [Qoh 1:14; LXX]. Presumption of spirit means boldness and haughtiness. In common parlance, too, the haughty are said to have “high spirits”; and rightly, since spirit is also called “wind.” Whence it is written: Fire, hail, snow, ice, stormy wind. [Psa 148:8] And who has not heard the haughty spoken of as “inflated,” blown up, as it were, with wind? So, too, the expression of the Apostle: Knowledge puffeth up, but charity edifieth. [1 Cor 8.1] For this reason the poor in spirit are rightly understood here as the humble and those who fear God, that is, those who do not have an inflated spirit. And there could be no more felicitous beginning of blessedness, whose ultimate goal is perfect wisdom: The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom. [Pro 1:7; cf. Sir 1: 14; Psa 110:11] Whereas, on the contrary, we have the attribution: The beginning of all sin is pride. [Sir 10:13] Let, therefore, the haughty seek and love the kingdom of the earth; but Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.

CHAPTER 2

The other Beatitudes.

4. Blessed are the meek, for they shall possess the land by inheritance. [Notes 2, 3] The land I take in the sense of the Psalm: Thou art my hope, my portion in the land of the living. [Psa 142:5] It stands for something solid, the stability of an undying inheritance, where the soul in a state of well-being rests as in its natural environment, as the body does on earth; and thence draws its food, as the body from the earth. This is the life and rest of the Saints. The meek are those who yield before outbursts of wickedness and do not resist evil, but overcome evil with good. [Cf. Rom 12:21] Therefore let those who are not meek struggle and contend for earthly and temporal things; but blessed are the meek, for they shall possess the land by inheritance from which they cannot be expelled.

5. Blessed are the mourners, for they shall be comforted. Mourning is sadness for the loss of dear ones. But when people turn to God, they dismiss what they cherished as dear in this world; for they do not find joy in those things which before rejoiced them; and until there comes about in them the love for what is eternal, they feel the sting of sadness over a number of things. They, therefore, will be comforted by the Holy Spirit, who especially for this reason is named the Paraclete, that is, the Consoler, that disregarding the temporal they may enjoy eternal happiness.

6. Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice, for they shall have their fill. Here He means those who love the true and unshakable good. The food with which they will be filled is the food that the Lord Himself mentions: My meat is to do the will of my Father, [John 4:34] which is righteousness; and the water, of which whoso shall drink, as He Himself says, it shall become in him a fountain of water springing up into life everlasting. [John 4:14]

7. Blessed are the merciful, for mercy shall be shown them. He pronounces them blessed who come to the aid of the needy, since it is paid back to them so that they are freed from distress.

8. Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God. How senseless, therefore, are they who look for God with bodily eyes, since He is seen by the heart, as elsewhere it is written: And seek Him in simplicity of heart. [Wis 1.1] For this is a clean heart, one that is a simple heart; and as the light of this world cannot be seen save with sound eyes, so God cannot be seen unless that is sound by which He can be seen.

9. Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God. Perfection lies in peace, where nothing is at war; and the children of God are peaceful for the reason that no resistance to God is present, and surely children ought to bear a likeness to their father. And they are at peace with themselves who quell all the emotions of their soul and subject them to reason, that is, to the mind and spirit, and have their carnal passions well under control; these make up the kingdom of God. In this kingdom everything is in such perfect order that the noblest and most excellent elements in man control without opposition the other elements which are common to us and animals. Moreover, what is most distinguished in man—mind and reason—is subject to a higher being, which is Truth itself, the only-begotten Son of God; for it cannot control the lower unless it puts itself in subjection to its superior. And this is the peace which is given on earth to men of good will; [cf. Luke 2:14] this is the life of a man who is rounded out and perfect in wisdom. From a kingdom of this sort enjoying greatest peace and order has been cast out the Prince of this world who lords it over the perverse and disorderly. With this peace set up and established in the soul, whatever onslaughts he who has been cast out makes against it from without, he but increases the glory which is according to God. He weakens nothing in that structure but by the very ineffectiveness of his machinations reveals what strength has grown within. Hence it follows: Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice’ sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. [Mat 5:10]

CHAPTER 3

The Beatitudes mark the stages traversed towards perfection.

10.  … [Note 4]

For blessedness starts with humility: Blessed are the poor in spirit, that is, those who are not puffed up, whose soul is submissive to divine authority, who stand in dread of punishment after this life despite the seeming blessedness of their earthly life.

The soul next makes itself acquainted with Sacred Scripture according to which it must show itself meek through piety, so that it may not make bold to censure what appears a stumbling block to the uninstructed and become intractable by obstinate argumentation.

The soul now begins to realize what a hold the world has on it through the habits and sins of the flesh. In this third step, then, wherein is knowledge, there is grief for the loss of the highest good through clinging to the lowest.

In the fourth step there is hard work. The soul puts forth a tremendous effort to wrench itself from the pernicious delights which bind it. Here there must be hunger and thirst for righteousness, and there is great need for fortitude, for not without pain is the heart severed from its delights.

At the fifth step it is suggested to those who are continuing their energetic efforts how they may be helped to master their situation. For unless one is helped by a superior power, he is incapable of freeing himself by his own efforts from the bonds of misery which encompass him. The suggestion given is a just proposition: If one wishes to be helped by a more powerful person, let him help someone who is weaker in a field wherein he himself holds an advantage. Hence, Blessed are the merciful, for mercy will be shown them.

The sixth step is cleanness of heart from a good consciousness of works well done, enabling the soul to contemplate that supreme good which can be seen only by a mind that is pure and serene.

Finally, the seventh step is wisdom itself, that is, contemplation of the truth, bringing peace to the whole man and effecting a likeness to God; and of this the sum is, Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God.

The eighth maxim [Note 5] returns, as it were, to the beginning, because it shows and commends what is perfect and complete. Thus, in the first and the eighth the kingdom of heaven is mentioned: Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven; and, Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice’ sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven — when now it is said: Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? Shall tribulation? or distress? or persecution? or hunger? or nakedness? or danger? or the sword? [Rom 8:35]

Seven in number, therefore, are the things which lead to perfection. The eighth maxim throws light upon perfection and shows what it consists of, so that, with this maxim beginning again, so to speak, from the first, the two together may serve as steps toward the perfection of the others also.

Notes

1. In paragraphs 1 and 2, omitted here for brevity, Augustine gives a brief introduction.  He suggests that the Beatitudes supply a perfect perfect pattern of the Christian life and embrace all the directives we need.  Jesus states that those who hear and shape their lives according to his words spoken on the mount are like the man who built his house upon a rock. [Matt. 7:24-27].  Augustine proposes that the reference to Jesus “opening his mouth” [Matt.5:2] implies these are these are His words, i.e., the New Law, whereas previously in His ministry He was wont to open the mouth of the Prophets, i.e., the Old Law.

2. by inheritance.  These words appear in the Old Latin version of the Gospels that Augustine used at the time of writing this (ca. 394).  He didn’t routinely use the Vulgate until around 400.

3. He inverts the order of the 2nd and 3rd  Beatitudes.

4. We omit a paragraph wherein Augustine remarks on the grammatical difference between seven Beatitudes (Mat. 5: 3−9) and the two further maxims in Mat. 10−11.

5. That is, Mat. 5:10.  Again, he considers this verse relevant to the present theme, but not one of the seven Beatitudes themselves.

Bibliography

Augustine, Saint, Bishop of Hippo: De sermone Domini in monte. CCSL 35 (1967). J. P. Migne (Paris, 1845), Patrologia Latina (PL) 34:1229−1308 (Latin text).

Findlay, William (tr.). Saint Augustine: Our Lord’s Sermon on the Mount. In: Philip Schaff (ed.), A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, First Series 6. New York, 1903; repr. 1979.

Jepson, John J. (tr.). Saint Augustine: The Lord’s Sermon on the Mount. Ancient Christian Writers 5. Newman Press, 1948.

Kavanagh, Denis J. Saint Augustine: Commentary on the Lord’s Sermon on the Mount, with Seventeen Related Sermons. Fathers of the Church 11. New York 1951.

Paffenroth, Kim (tr.). The Sermon on the Mount (De sermone Domini in monte). In: Boniface Ramsey (ed.), Saint Augustine: New Testament I and II. New City Press, 2014.

Pryse, William. Praying the Beatitudes as a Spiritual Exercise. Satyagraha: Cultural Psychology.  2017.  Accessed 13 Oct 2020.

1st draft, 15 Oct 2020