Christian Platonism

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Richard of St. Victor’s Psychological Interpretation of Nebuchadnezzar’s Dream

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Ernest Wallcousins, Nebuchadnezzar in the Hanging Gardens (1915)

AS previously noted, Richard of St. Victor (1110−1173) is a master of psychological-allegorical interpretation of the Old Testament.  His important exegetical works include Benjamin Minor, Benjamin Major and On the Extermination of Bad and the Promotion of Good.

Another superb example is his On the Education of the Interior Man (De eruditione hominis interiori). This considers an important practical matter in contemplative life: after one attains a state of divine contemplation, inevitably, whether through inattention or fatigue, one will eventually (sometimes rapidly) lapse into an inferior mental state. Returning to a higher state can be difficult. Hence the contemplative has a threefold problem: (1) how to avoid lapsing from divine states of mind; and, if one does fall (2) how to return quickly and (3) how to avoid falling to an even lower state.

Note that Plato considers the same problem of falling from contemplative states in his Chariot Allegory, and there are parallels between his discussion and Richard’s.

Richard addresses the topic by an exegesis of Nebuchadnezzar’s dream of the composite statue in Daniel 2. Like Philo of Alexandria, Richard’s Old Testament interpretations are insightful, relevant and compelling.  Also like Philo, Richard applies a form of personification which sees each Old Testament figure as symbolizing some feature, component or disposition of the individual psyche.

Briefly, his interpretation is as follows. Nebuchadnezzar represents the ego operating in its proper and higher capacity: as the king of ones soul. His dream is an example of divine revelation — that is, the ego experiences through contemplation or attainment of spiritual mindedness some special knowledge. His forgetting the dream and not understanding the meaning symbolizes the once-enlightened ego in its lapsed state.

The king, frustrated and unhappy at having fallen and lost divine vision, calls his wise men to describe and interpret his forgotten dream. For Richard, the wise men are higher intellectual abilities and activities — including reading Scripture, study, meditation and orderly speculation, which assist us in rising to contemplation.

As the wise men are unable to help, Nebuchadnezzar becomes furious and vows to kill them. Analogously, when the ‘studious’ actions which aid our mental elevation cannot return us to a contemplative state, we — already distraught that we have lost contemplation’s sweetness and delights — become further agitated.  In this condition we are prone to reject studies as not only burdensome (which, in a sense, they always are), but fruitless, and to instead dissipate ourselves in worldly affairs, vanities, or concupiscence.

The true remedy, Richard teaches, lay in the entrance of Daniel, who symbolizes devotion. Our first (and only truly effective) response to falling must be devotion and prayer. We should not only pray for the grace to return to contemplation (and, Richard emphasizes, contemplation is a grace), but pray for the grace of such prayer.

Daniels companions, Ananias, Mishael, and Azariah, symbolize three supporting cognitive activities which help us reach a devout state of mind: circumspection, discretion, and deliberation. Richard associates these with attentive consideration of the past, present and future, respectively. Circumspection examines past sins, admitting faults and learning from mistakes. Discretion mindfully considers present choices, exercising discrimination to determine what is bad and what is good. Deliberation applies sound judgment to choose actions that will minimize cause for future regret and unhappiness.

Richard treats these functions many times throughout his works, and their meanings are not always consistent.  All three are forms, we might say, of practical wisdom or prudence.  So, speaking more generally, Richard’s point is that while devotion per se is a grace, we should not simply wait passively for it.  Rather we are called to labor with self-examination and active steps to organize our mental and physical life. Richard is emphatic on about this: we must at all costs avoid the temptation to cease our studies and disciplines in times of desolation, when the grace of contemplation is withheld.  However he is even more emphatic that our attitude must remain one of devotion and humility. All studies and disciplines must be performed with utmost recognition of the constant need for God’s guidance and assistance.

As to Nebuchadnezzar’s dream itself, that too symbolize the progressive lapse of the soul. The statue is of a man, composed of (in descending order) gold, silver, brass, iron and clay — i.e., from precious to base metals, and finally (describing complete fall into sensuality), mud. All of these are common mythological tropes.  Gold, for example, is a usual symbol for higher consciousness, and mud sensuality. The dream is very close in details and meaning to Hesiod’s Ages of Man myth, which similarly mentions phases of Gold, Silver, Bronze, Iron and complete degradation.

Without loss of meaning we may easily substitute for “contemplative states” mindfulness and mental integrity, and for “fallen condition” various forms of negative thinking and intrusive thoughts.  Hence Richard’s discussion also interests us at the level of the psychology of healthy-mindedness and optimal functioning (or, conversely, handling the psychopathology of everyday thought.)

Richard outlines the above in just the first 12 chapters of the three-book work.  Doubtless there is much more of interest.  The Latin text from Migne’s Patrologia Latina (1855) is available online (see Bibliography below). Unfortunately there is no critical edition or published English translation of the work. However I’ve placed online an automated English translation.

Victorine ascetico-mystical cognitive psychology deserves far more attention than it receives. Hugh, Richard and the others of the St. Victor school occupy an important position between patristic writers and the soon-to-arrive era of scholasticism. Drawing on writers like Cassian, Augustine, and Gregory, they begin to develop a complex set of psychological terms, and attempt to identify functional relationship among various intellectual and moral virtues.  Yet, unlike later scholastics, systematization and organization is not done for its own sake.  They are not writing for university students.  Rather, their concern always remains practical and pastoral.

Bibliography

Palmén, Ritva. Richard of St. Victor’s Theory of Imagination. Brill, 2014.

Richard of St. Victor, De eruditione hominis interioris (On the Education of the Inner Man), J. P. Migne, Patrologia Latina vol. 196 1229D−1366A.  Paris, 1855.  [Latin text]

Uebersax, John.  Myths of the Fall.  Christian Platonism website. 2021.

Zinn, Grover A. (tr.). Richard of St. Victor: The Twelve Patriarchs (Benjamin Minor), The Mystical Ark (Benjamin Major) and Book Three of The Trinity. Paulist Press, 1979.

De septem septenis

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De septem septinis, London British Library MS Harley 3969, fol. 206v

THE mystagogical work De septem septenis (On the Seven Sevens) is a curious medieval treatise. It was written in the early 12th century — but probably not by the scholastic philosopher, John of Salisbury, to whom it’s attributed.  The overall orientation is Christian, yet it includes references to Hermetic, Platonic and Chaldean teachings. Its title refers to seven groups of seven things each:

  1. Seven steps to learning;
  2. Seven liberal arts;
  3. Seven windows of the soul (two eyes, two ears, two nostrils and mouth);
  4. Seven faculties of the mind (animus, mens, imaginatio, opinio, ratio, intellectus, memoria);
  5. Seven cardinal and theological virtues;
  6. Seven types of contemplation (meditatio, soliloquium, circumspectio, ascensio, revelatio, emissio, inspiratio); and
  7. Seven principles of Nature.

It is not to be confused with De quinque septenis (On the Five Sevens), a more traditionally themed work by Hugh of St. Victor that relates the seven petitions of the Lord’s Prayer, the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, the seven Beatitudes, the seven virtues, and the seven deadly sins. That work became the source of many medieval illustrations of the so-called Wheel of Sevens.

The background of Septem septenis — what little we can surmise from the internal evidence — is most interesting.  According to Németh (2013), a single sentence in Martianus Capella’s 5th century Latin work, De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii (On the Marriage of Philology and Mercury) — a popular work in the Middle Ages and principle source on the divisions of education known as the Trivium and the Quadrivium — made an ambiguous reference to what was understood to be an ancient work on “divinization,” called the egerimion. The Septem septimis, Németh suggests, is an attempt of an anonymous medieval Christian writer to either reconstruct or imitate the fabled egerimion, which it explicitly mentions.

The seven sections of Septem septimis appear somewhat cobbled together from various sources. Section 6 is an abridged version of De contemplatione et ejus speciebus (On Contemplation and its Species), a work possibly by Richard of St. Victor. Section 7 may have some connection with the School of Chartres, which studied and commented on the cosmological theories of Plato’s Timaeus.

Is this just a mishmash — some student forgery or prank?  Or is there an internal consistency and coherent message, which the author wishes to communicate in a very creative and non-traditional way?  As there has been no modern interest in the work (it’s never been translated) it’s perhaps too early to say.

As discussed in the last post, Google Latin-to-English translation has reached now reached a respectable level of accuracy.  Below are lightly edited Google translations of the Section 1 and part of Section 6.  The former sets the stage by claiming the authority of ancient Greek and Chaldean writings — which, the author claims, unlike the Latin tradition, are not limited by a narrow focus on rationalism.  The latter passage discusses a kind of contemplation which the author calls ascension.

Sect. 1. Prima septena de septem modis eruditiomis

Section 1.  The First Seven are the Seven Modes of Learning

CHALDAEI et Græci sapientiam quærunt: Latine veritatem inquirunt: illi quærunt et inveniunt, quia mores cum scientia componunt; isti inquirunt et non inveniunt, quia disputationis potius cavillationi quam veritatis inquisitioni insistunt.

The Chaldaeans and Greeks seek wisdom, Latins inquire after truth. The former seek and find, because they combine morals with knowledge; the latter search and do not find, because they dispute and cavil rather than only search for truth.

Cavillosa vero disputatio ingenium exercendo excitat, in qua si moram fecerit obtundit et fascinat: quod quidem in invio et non in via veritatis hebes et palpans errat; veritatis autem inquisitio cotis vice clarum ingenium et subtile reddit: in viam regiam mentem dirigit, mentis oculos ad ardua erigit.

A caviling discussion may exercise and awaken the intellect, but, if prolonged, it stuns and fascinates: which, indeed, errs dull and groping and not in the path of truth. But a genuine search for truth on the other hand makes the intellect clear and subtle: it directs the mind in the royal road, it raises the eyes of the mind to the heights.

Et licet hisce oculis quandoque quædam aperiantur quæ latuerunt, adhuc tamen multa latent, quæ comprehendi non possunt, vel subtilitate, quia sensum effugiunt, vel obscuritate, quia nec studium nec ingenium admittunt, vel immensitate, quia rationem et intellectum excedunt. Hinc est igitur quod divina quædam sunt quæ in manifestationem veniunt et ad cognitionem se exponunt. Sed quoniam subtilia, difficilia et ardua sunt, tanquam inscrutabilia fere omnes prætermittunt. Hæc prima rerum principia, id est rerum causæ latentes et cognitiones dicuntur. De quibus præclara Chaldæorum tantum scripta ad majorem veritatis evidentiam scrutantur.

And though these eyes may sometimes reveal some things which were hidden, yet many things are still hidden which cannot be comprehended, either by subtlety, because they escape the senses, or by obscurity, because they admit neither study nor genius, or by immensity, because they exceed reason and Intellect. Hence it is that there are divine things which come into manifestation and expose themselves to knowledge. But since they are subtle, difficult, and arduous, almost everyone dismisses them as inscrutable. These are called the first principles of things, that is, the latent causes of things and knowledge. Of which only the famous writings of the Chaldeans are carefully searched for the greater evidence of the truth.

Alia vero quædam divina tam profunda, tam occulta, tam intima et omnino impenetrabilia sunt, ut nulla ratione scrutari, nullo intellectu percipi, nulla sapientia investigari possint. Unde Apostolus Quod notum Dei et manifestum est in illis. Quum dicit quod notum Dei est, id est noscibile de Deo, ostendit plane ex his quæ Dei sunt et in Deo aliquid esse manifestum, aliquid occultum. Sed quod manifestum est, per scientias posse contingi.

Things are so deep, so hidden, so intimate, and completely impenetrable, that they cannot be rationally studied, perceived by any understanding, or investigated by any wisdom. Wherefore the Apostle says, What is known of God and is manifest in them. When he says that what is known of God, that is, that is knowable of God, he clearly shows that from the things that are of God and in God there is something manifest, something hidden. But what is clear is that it can be reached through science.

Quod prorsus absconditum est, nulla ratione posse penetrari. Et haec sunt secreta illa, quæ non licet homini loqui. Proinde, ut in Apostolo scribitur, Sapientiam inter perfectos loquimur. Sapientia namque Pallas, id est nova dicitur, quia scandens ad eam minoratur. Minerva vel Athena, id est immortalis, vocatur, quia verbo et opere eam sequens ad immortalitatem rapitur. Hæc igitur Tritonia, id est trina notio, nuncupatur, quia humano animo sapientia illustrato engerimion, id est surrationis liber aperitur, in quo ab humanis ad divina surgere septem septenis eruditur, et ad trinam, humanæ scilicet naturæ, angelicæ et divinæ, notionem ascendere perfectius instruitur.

What is completely hidden cannot be penetrated by rationality. And these are those secrets which it is not lawful for a man to speak. Therefore, as it is written in the Apostle, we speak wisdom among the perfect. For wisdom is Pallas, that is, it is said to be new, because when one ascends to it, it diminishes. Minerva or Athena, that is, immortal [JU: apparently from athanatos, undying], is called because following her in word and deed he is carried away to immortality. Therefore this Tritonia, that is, the triple concept, is called, because in the human mind, enlightened wisdom engerimion, that is, the book of resurrection is opened, in which it is learned to rise from the human to the divine seven sevens, and to ascend more perfectly to the triple concept, that is, the human nature, the angelic and the divine is instructed.

Septem sunt modi primæ septenæ, quibus humanus animus in perfectam eruditionem introducitur. Primus modus est, omnium artium doctrinam velle, secundus est delectari quod velis: tertius instare ad id quod delectat: quartus, concipere quod instat: quintus, memorare quod concipit, sextus invenire aliquid simile: septimus ex his omnibus extorquere quod est utile.

There are seven ways, the first seven, by which the human mind is introduced into perfect learning. The first way is to desire the learning of all arts, the second is to delight in what you want, the third to insist on what delights, the fourth to conceive what is urgent, the fifth to remember what one conceives, the sixth to discover similitudes, the seventh to wring from all these things that are useful.

Sect. 6. Sexta septema de septem generibus contemplationis

Section 6.  The Sixth Seven are the Seven Kinds of Contemplation

SEXTA septena de septem generibus contemplationis sequitur, in quibus anima requiescens jucundus immoratur. Septem sunt contemplationis genera, meditatio, soliloquium, circumspectio, ascensio, revelatio, emissio, inspiratio. […]

The sixth seven are the seven kinds of contemplation that follow, in which the soul rests and dwells in delightf. There are seven kinds of contemplation: meditation, soliloquy, survey [or scrutiny], ascension, revelation, release, and inspiration. […]

Quarta species. Ascensio.

Ascensio est ad immortalia in excelsis animi digressio; unde Propheta: “Beatus vir, cujus est auxilium abs te ascensiones in corde suo disposuit” [cf. Vulgate Psa 83:6, beatus homo cuius fortitudo est in te semitae in corde eius]. Tres sunt ascensiones in corde suo dispositae.

The ascent to immortality is the highest going of the soul; whence the Prophet: Blessed is the man whose strength is in You, whose heart is set on pilgrimage. [Psa 84:5; NKJV] There are three ascents arranged in his heart.

Tres sunt ascensiones Christi: tres quoque nostri. Prius enim Christus ascendit in montem, deinde in crucem, tandem ad patrem.

There are three ascents of Christ: ours are also three. For first Christ ascended the mountain, then the cross, and finally to the Father.

In monte docuit discipulos; in cruce redemit captivos; in coelo glorificavit electos.
In monte doctrinam protulit humilitatis; in cruce formam expressit caritatis; in coelo coronam præbuit felicitatis.
In primo præbuit lumen scientiæ; in secundo culmen justitiæ; in tertio numen gloriæ.

He taught the disciples on the mountain; He redeemed the captives on the cross; He glorified the elect in heaven.
On the mountain he brought forth the doctrine of humility; on the cross he expressed the form of charity; He gave a crown of happiness in heaven.
In the first place He provided the light of knowledge; in the second summit of justice; in the third divine glory.

Tres sunt nostri ascensiones; prima in actu; secunda in affectu; tertia in intellectu.

Three are our ascents: first in action; second in affect; third in understanding.

[JU: So in addition to the traditional distinction between the affective and intellective divisions of the human soul, the author introduces a third aspect of our nature, action or activity.  Ascent occurs on all three.]

Ascensio vero actualiter triplex; prima in confessione culparum; secundain largitione eleemosynarum; tertia in contemptu divitiarum, prima in operibus poenitentiæ; secunda in operibus misericordiæ; tertia in operibus consummatæ justitiae; prima meretur veniam; secunda gratiam; tertia gloriam.

Ascension in action is threefold: first in confession of faults; second, giving of alms; third in contempt of riches: the first in works of penitence, the second in works of mercy, the third in works of consummate righteousness; the first merits forgiveness, the second grace, the third glory.

[JU: The author is weaving together in a plausible way Hermetic and Platonic themes of divinisation with traditional Christian virtues of self-examination, compunction, humility, and charity.]

Ascensio affectualis triplex: prima est ad perfectam humilitatem; secunda ad consummatam caritatem; tertia ad contemplationis puritatem.

Affective ascent is threefold: first to perfect humility; second to consummate charity; third to purity of contemplation.

Ascensio vero intellectuali illuminat et imperat; actus illuminatur et obtemperat; affectus illuminat, et illuminatur, et intellectui obtemperat et actui imperat.

Intellectual ascent illuminates and commands; action is enlightened and obeyed; affect enlightens and is enlightened, and obeys the understanding and commands action.

[JU: This paragraph seems to dense for Google to reliably translate.  The main idea is that there is dynamic interplay between the ascents of action, affect and understanding: mutual illumination and directing.]

Bibliography

Baron, Roger (ed.). De contemplatione et ejus speciebus (La Contemplation et Ses Espèces). Desclée, 1955.

Giles, J. A. (ed.). De septem septenis. In: Joannis Saresberiensis postea episcopi camotensis opera omnia, vol. V: Opuscula.  Oxford, 1848; 209−238. Reprinted in Jacques-Paul Migne, Patrologia Latina, vol. 199, cols. 945−965. Paris, 1855. [Latin text] [Latin text]

Hugh of St. Victor. De quinque septenis. Jacques-Paul Migne, Patrologia Latina, vol. 175, cols. 405B−414A. Paris, 1854.

Németh, Csaba. Fabricating philosophical authority in the Twelfth Century: The Liber Egerimion and the De septem septenis. Authorities in the Middle Ages. De Gruyter, 2013; 69−87.

Manuscripts

Cambridge Corpus Christi College MS 459 fol. 99r-107v.

London British Library Harley MS 3969 fol. 206v−215v.

first draft: 19 Nov 2022; please excuse typos

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Philo and the Liber Mundi

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(Not Philo, but maybe he looked like this!)

LAST week I felt inspired to look at Philo’s On Dreams again.  The Introduction in Colson & Whitaker’s translation didn’t turn up much of new interest, until I got to their summary of Philo’s interpretation of Jacob’s ladder dream.

Philo pays particular attention to Jacob’s statement, “this is a gate of heaven” (Gen. 28:17).  Here Philo sees a reference to how the sensory world is a ‘gate’ to the Ideal world — every material thing being an image or shadow of a corresponding eternal Idea.  To me it seems Philo isn’t making so much a technical metaphysical point as a practical, psychological and experiential one: in the proper frame of mine, we can ascend from material things to catch sight of Eternal Beauty, or of objects belonging to that realm.

There are obviously Platonic overtones here — implicit references to the ascent to God from contemplation of beautiful things in Symposium 201–212, parts of the Timaeus, and the ‘pure world’ myth of Phaedo 107c–115a.  But in another sense it comes across (at least to me) as reminiscent of Neoplatonism — not just Plotinus, but of the characteristically Renaissance Neoplatonism idea that the world is a Book of God, a mirror or gateway into a corresponding universe of eternal, perfect Forms. One proceeds, say, from seeing an actual beautiful flower to somehow intuiting or contemplating a truth that the object not only instantiates, but one which the object is intended to convey to us for some didactic purpose.

IF that corresponds to Philo’s intentions it seems worth mentioning, because then it means that Philo is expressing this typically Neoplatonist idea two centuries before Plotinus.

Or perhaps I’m reading too much into the passage.  This general subject has been on my mind lately as I’ve recently collected and placed online quotations from American Transcendentalists and others about the transcendent beauty and meaning of flowers, illustrated with my photos  (Visit the new website Florigelium here).

Genesis 28

[10] And Jacob went out from Beer-sheba, and went toward Haran.

[11] And he lighted upon a certain place, and tarried there all night, because the sun was set; and he took of the stones of that place, and put them for his pillows, and lay down in that place to sleep.

[12] And he dreamed, and behold a ladder set up on the earth, and the top of it reached to heaven: and behold the angels of God ascending and descending on it.

[13] And, behold, the LORD stood above it, and said, I am the LORD God of Abraham thy father, and the God of Isaac: the land whereon thou liest, to thee will I give it, and to thy seed;?

[14] And thy seed shall be as the dust of the earth, and thou shalt spread abroad to the west, and to the east, and to the north, and to the south: and in thee and in thy seed shall all the families of the earth be blessed.

[15] And, behold, I am with thee, and will keep thee in all places whither thou goest, and will bring thee again into this land; for I will not leave thee, until I have done that which I have spoken to thee of.

[16] And Jacob awaked out of his sleep, and he said, Surely the LORD is in this place; and I knew it not.

[17] And he was afraid, and said, How dreadful is this place! this is none other but the house of God, and this is the gate of heaven.

Philo, On Dreams 1 (De Somniis 1)

XXXII. [184]
Rightly, therefore, was he afraid and said in an awestruck tone, “How dreadful is this place” (Gen. 28:17). For indeed most difficult of the “places” in the study of nature’s verities is that in which men inquire as to where, and whether at all in any thing the Existent Being is. Some say that everything that subsists occupies some space, and of these one allots to the Existent One this space, another that, whether inside the world or a space outside it in the interval between worlds. Others maintain that the Unoriginate resembles nothing among created things, but so completely transcends them, that even the swiftest understanding falls far short of apprehending Him and acknowledges its failure.

[185]
Wherefore he straightway cried aloud “This is not” (ibid. 17); this that I supposed, “that the Lord is in some place” (ibid. 16), is not so; for according to the true reckoning He contains, but is not contained. But this that we can point out and see, this world discerned by sense, is, as I now know, nothing but a house of “God,” that is, of one of the Potencies of the Existent, that is, the Potency which expresses His goodness.

[Note:  Yonge translates this paragraph in a somewhat less difficult way as: “wherefore (Jacob) speedily cries out, This is not what I expected, because the Lord is in the place”; for he surrounds everything, but in truth and reason he is not surrounded by anything. And this thing which is demonstrated and visible, this world perceptible by the outward senses, is nothing else but the house of God, the abode of one of the powers of the true God, in accordance with which he is good;”]

[186]
The world which he named a “house,” he also described as “gate of” the real “heaven” (ibid. 17). Now what is this? The world which only intellect can perceive, framed from the eternal forms in Him [Note: Perhaps meaning the Logos] Who was appointed in accordance with Divine bounties, cannot be apprehended otherwise than by passing on to it from this world which we see and perceive by our senses.

[187]
For neither indeed is it possible to get an idea of any other incorporeal thing among existences except by making material objects our starting-point. The conception of place was gained when they were at rest: that of time from their motion, and points and lines and superficies, in a word extremities from the robe-like exterior which covers them.

[188]
Correspondingly, then, the conception of the intelligible world was gained from the one which our senses perceive: it is therefore a kind of gate into the former. For as those who desire to see our cities go in through gates, so all who wish to apprehend the unseen world are introduced to it by receiving the impression of the visible world. The world whose substance is discernible only by intellect apart from any sight whatever of shapes or figures, but only by means of the archetypal eternal form present in the world which was fashioned in accordance with the image beheld by him with no intervening shadow, — that world shall change its title, when all its walls and every gate has been removed and men may not catch sight of it from some outside point, but behold the unchanging beauty, as it actually is, and that sight no words can tell or express.

p.s. This passage connects with an earlier one in On Dreams about which I wrote previously.

Reference

Colson, F.H.; Whitaker, G. H.  On Dreams.  In: Philo in Ten Volumes, Vol. 5. Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, MA, 1938.

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Cicero’s 28 Proofs of the Immortality of the Human Soul

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MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO (109−43 BC) was a great Roman statesman and philosopher, a contemporary of Julius Caesar. As a young man he studied in Athens and Rhodes with many of the greatest Greek philosophers of his times, including Platonists, Aristotelians and Stoics.  In addition to his political, legal and rhetorical accomplishments (he served, for example as consul, the highest political office of the Roman Republic) he had an abiding interest in religious matters.

In 45 BC, during an intensive phase of writing, he produced in rapid succession four major works on religion:  (1) the Consolatio (a lost work, except for fragments), Tusculan Disputations (Book 1, the main focus of our discussion here, deals with immortality of the soul and Books 2−5 with Stoic philosophy), On the Nature of the Gods, and On Divination.  This final phase of his multifaceted career dedicated to writing was prompted by three factors. First was the untimely death of his beloved daughter, Tullia, during childbirth — an event which put Cicero in a profound depression. Second, during the tumultuous events and civil wars in the final years of the Republic (before Julius Caesar inaugurated the Roman Empire), Cicero — whose idealism was no match for the armies of Caesar and Pompey or the vast wealth of Crassus — fled into retirement and seclusion.  Third, as he tells us, fearful of Rome’s future, he wished to preserve and transmit the treasures of Greek philosophy to future generations of Romans.

The Consolatio was his most immediate ad direct attempt to console himself at the loss of Tullia.  Modeled on similar works that had been written at least since the time of Aristotle, it touched on a number of themes, including evidence of the soul’s immortality, the pains and problems of this life which death releases us from, and bearing loss of a loved one without undue pain or suffering.  A few months later Cicero produced a more concentrated and systematic study of the soul’s immortality, Book 1 of Tusculan Disputations.  In this dialogue Cicero follows two lines of thought, both aimed to relieve the fear of death: (1) the human soul is immortal; and (2) even if not, death is no harm (e.g., if we are no longer conscious, we cannot experience any pain).  Our main interest here is the many arguments Cicero invokes in Book 1 for the soul’s immortality.

As was his practice generally, in writing this Cicero had at hand a range of books by earlier philosophers, including handbooks summarizing the theories of many authors.  The views of Plato (especially his arguments for the soul’s immortality found in the dialogues Phaedo and Phaedrus), Aristotle, and certain Stoics (e.g., Posidonius, one of Cicero’s teachers, and Panaetius) are in the forefront.  Therefore we can learn a great deal about ancient views of immortality from this work.  Additional, related material can be found in On the Nature of the Gods, On Divination, and On Old Age. Although Tusculan Disputations 1 is our main concern here, arguments in these other sources will be noted when appropriate.

As he wrote in dialogue form, it’s sometimes not especially easy to identify Cicero’s own views on a particular topic.  Concerning immortality of the soul and on religion generally, the most typical persona he presents is that of an Academic (i.e., Platonist) skeptic.  Like more radical Pyrrhonists, Academic skeptics claimed that absolute certainty on any philosophical question was impossible; however, unlike Pyrrhonists, the allowed for probabilistic conclusions to be drawn based on a preponderance of evidence.  Nevertheless, it’s hard to read Cicero’s religious works without suspecting his personal belief in the gods and the immortality of the human soul.  On the latter point, we also know that he seriously considered building a shrine dedicated to Tullia after her death, expressing the belief that this might help to achieve her deification.

As in the case of Plato’s discussions of the soul’s immortality, none of the many arguments Cicero presents are fully logically compelling. However, also like Plato, Cicero aims for something potentially more important than logical proof: to elevate our mind and raise our consciousness such that we may gain an intuitive insight into the soul’s immortality.  This is done by (1) focusing our attention and interest on what the soul is, and (2) sharpening the critical discernment (what the Greeks called diakrisis) of our higher intelligence.  As we do this, we’re simultaneously forced to withdraw our attention from worldly concerns, which drag down, distract and confuse the Intelligence.

Cicero — like Plato — is a great artist.  Indeed, he is one of the greatest rhetoricians in human history. Reading his works is itself meant to be a transformative experience.  Reading and reflecting on the lofty themes he presents, we regain our true condition as contemplative beings with exalted souls.  Not only may this enable us to glimpse our soul and see its immortality, but also, as long as we are doing this, we become that very part of our soul which is immortal.

For convenience, arguments below are presented in the order in which they appear in Tusculan Disputations 1.  Here the effort has been made to identify as many separate arguments as possible, rather than to (as most commentators have done) aggregate them.  Among other things, this more atomistic approach (see Uebersax, 2015) will facilitate tracing the history of individual proofs through later centuries.

A helpful online edition of Tusculan Disputations 1 can be found here.

Notation: References to Tusculan Disputations 1 are given as paragraph numbers, preceded by the symbol §; these should not be confused with chapter divisions. References to other works of Cicero are given as book.chapter.paragraph, or (for works comprised of a single book) chapter.paragraph.  The following abbreviations/titles are used:

Amic. = De amicitia (On Friendship)

Fin. = De finibus (On Ends)

Leg. = De legibus (On Laws)

N.D. = De natura deorum (On the Nature of the Gods)

Off. = De officiis (On Moral Duties)

Rep. = De republica (On the Republic)

Sen. = De senectute (On Old Age)

Arguments from Tradition and Consensus

1. Argument from antiquity
§ 26 f.; cf. Amic. 4.13

Our ancestors — wiser than us — instituted rites and memorials for the dead, motivated by a belief in the soul’s immortality.

2. Deified humans
§ 28 f.; cf. N.D. 2.24.62

Many traditional immortal gods (e.g., Hercules) are deified human beings, whose existence is verified by appearances in visions and intervention in human affairs. See Hesiod, Works and Days 121−126, 252–255, where souls of the righteous may return to earth as guardian spirits (daimones hagnoi; δαίμονες ἁγνοὶ). Cf. cures, miracles, visions, etc.  attributed to Christian saints.

3. Argument from general consensus
§ 30, § 35 f.; cf. N.D. 2.2.4; Div. 1.1.2

All nations perform funeral rites, memorialize the dead, and believe in survival of the soul. The agreement of all peoples implies a natural instinct and is to be viewed as ‘the voice of Nature’ (omnium consensus naturae vox est). According to Stoic philosophy, all Nature is providentially and purposefully directed; a tacit minor premise here, therefore, is that Nature would not implant a false instinctive belief. Stoics used this argument to prove the existence of the gods, and Cicero adapts it to immortality of the soul.  Although Cicero does not state this, implicit in the argument is that each person can verify by introspection that they possess this instinctive belief.

Interestingly, Cicero states that the reason people wail and prostrate themselves at funerals is not to express anguish at their personal loss, but in grief for the deceased soul which must now survive without the accustomed comforts of earthly existence and is sensible of this loss.

4. Interest in future
§ 31

All people are deeply and instinctively concerned about what will happen in the world after their death: they beget children, write wills, compose epitaphs, design monuments, etc.  This would make no sense if our consciousness simply ceased; rather, it implies some form of ongoing awareness of events, of others’ welfare, etc.

5. A ‘bodhisattva instinct’
§ 32

The most virtuous and wise people regard themselves as having come into the world to protect and serve humanity. We revere such individuals as the finest members of our species.  This argument is subtly different from 7 below. There, noble self-sacrifice is itself evidence of an immortal soul. Here the proof is psychological: that we instinctively regard this as the ideal of human nature — that is, our reverence for such people and their actions is a separate proof.

6. Military heroism
§ 32

Especially revealing are the actions of those who heroically sacrifice their lives in battle or even voluntarily undergo torture (Off. 3.26.99) for the sake of their country.  “No one would ever have exposed himself to death for his country without good hope of immortality.”

7. Other great personal sacrifices 
§ 34 ff.

Again, but for expectation of future reward and glory, nobody would pass their life in toil and peril to accomplish great things. “Even philosophers who teach contempt for fame place their names on their books.” Unlike the modern view — i.e., that such actions are motivated by pure altruism and love of others — Cicero asserts that such sacrifices are made at least partly with the aim of attaining eternal life and glory. Neither is the goal merely to be remembered and honored by future generations, but for the soul to survive and enjoy the benefits of its glory.  Earthly fame will in any case eventually fade and is negligible in comparison to eternal favor of the gods and immortality earned as a reward for great virtue, heroism and self-sacrifice.

8. Argument from authority
§ 38 f.; cf. Sen 21.77, 21.83; Amic. 4.13

The wisest and most virtuous (Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato are mentioned by name) assert the immortality of the soul.

Miscellaneous Arguments

9. Physical arguments
§§ 40−43

Cicero begins with a fairly diffuse set of observations which, while by no means comprise a syllogistic argument, do converge on the notion that the soul’s ultimate destiny is celestial. He begins by positing as uncontested facts of (ancient) science that (1) the earth is in the center of the universe, located between a subterranean realm and the sky regions; and (2) all things consist of four elements: earth, water, air and fire. The rapidity of the soul’s operations rules out its consisting of earth or water, so it must consist of air and/or fire (or Aristotle’s hypothetical fifth element).  As air and fire naturally rise, so must the soul after death.  To facilitate this ascent and to penetrate any barriers between regions, the soul (Cicero states) must remain intact. Hence it remains after death.

10. Celestial order and splendor
§ 47, § 62, §§ 68−70; cf. N.D. 2.2.4 f.; N.D. 2.15.40−17.44; N. D. 2.56.140; Rep. 3.2.3; Rep. 6.15.15; Leg. 1.9.26; cf. Scipio’s Dream = Rep. 6.9.9−6.26.29

The spectacle of the night sky and orderly movements of stars and planets plainly reveal the wisdom, goodness and power of God. An all-powerful, all beneficent God would not deny human beings an immortal soul. While Cicero doesn’t make this argument in so many words, it runs just below the surface of his religious works so consistently that we should include it.

Throughout his works Cicero notes our intense interest in beholding the celestial vault and in astronomical science — suggesting some basic affinity between our souls and stars. A revealing discussion of the doctrine of sidereal immortality in Greco-Roman religion, including Cicero’s treatment of it in Tusculan Disputations 1, is found in Cumont (1912; 92−110).  In his late teens Cicero translated the Phaenomena of Aratus (315−240 BC), a poem on the constellations, from Latin into Greek — with sufficient skill that the translation was known to Lucretius.

11. Consciousness in soul, not senses
§ 46

Loss of conscious sensation during intense absorbed thought or sickness, despite functioning sense organs, shows that perception occurs in the soul.

12. Common sensory pathway
§ 46

Similarly, using the same mind/soul we have conscious perception of things as diverse as sights, sounds, smells, etc.

13. Know Thyself a divine mandate
§ 52; more fully developed in Leg. 1.22.59

“Know Thyself” would not have been given to us by the gods themselves unless the human soul were divine: “For he who knows himself will realize, in the first place, that he has a divine element within him, and will think of his own inner nature as a kind of consecrated image of God; and so he will always act and think in a way worthy of so great a gift of the gods, and, when he has examined and thoroughly tested himself, he will understand how nobly equipped by Nature he entered life, and what manifold means he possesses for the attainment and acquisition of wisdom.” (Leg. 1.22.59)

Platonic Arguments

We now move to more distinctively Platonic proofs — viz. proofs Plato explicitly presents in Phaedo (which relates Socrates’ conversations immediately before his death) and other dialogues, or which are otherwise directly implied by Platonic doctrines.

14. Self-moving
§§ 53−55, § 66; cf. Sen. 21.78; N. D. 2.12.32; Plato Phaedrus 245

The soul moves the body, but is itself not moved by anything else. Therefore nothing external could have first initiated its motion, nor can anything external cause its activity to cease.

15. Indivisibility
§ 56, § 71; cf. Sen. 21.78; Plato Phaedo 78b-d; Plato Republic 611b

The soul is uncompounded, unitary and indivisible.  Therefore it is not subject to decay or dissolution.

16. Recollection argument
§57 f.; Sen. 21.78; Plato Phaedo 72e–77d

Plato asserts that the most important kinds of human knowledge (e.g., principles of mathematics, logic and morality) are not taught, but are innate and merely remembered or recollected (anamnesis = unforgetting).  Plato famously illustrates this in his dialogue, Meno (83−85), where an uneducated slave boy is able to prove a sophisticated theorem of geometry by merely giving common sense answers to a series of prompting questions. This suggests to Plato a pre-existence; and if our souls existed before this life, they will exist after this life.

17. Soul a Form
§41; cf. Plato’s affinity argument in Phaedo 78b–84b

Cicero briefly mentions the Pythagorean notion that the soul is a “number” — by which is meant a unique, ideal and perfect pattern or set of relationships (which could, in theory, all be expressed mathematically).  As such it would be a Platonic Form, eternal and existing in the realm of pure Being, outside space and time.  Cicero does not develop the argument, however.

18. Scale of Existence
§ 56, § 65 ff.; N.D. 2.12.33−14.39; Leg. 1.7.22−8.25; see Dougan 242 f.

There is a scale according to which all existing things (inanimate objects, plants, animals, man, gods) are ordered.  Man and gods are kindred by virtue of their shared capacity for Reason. Cicero presents the argument more clearly in De legibus.

19. Infinite yearning for knowledge
§§ 44−47; cf. Plato Phaedrus 247c

Nature has planted in our minds an insatiable longing to see truth.” This can be satisfied only after the soul escapes the confinement and inherent limitations of the body.  This applies not only to new intellectual and spiritual knowledge, but, also, Cicero suggests, in an actual physical sense: “What, pray, do we think the panorama will be like when [from a celestial vantage point] we shall be free to embrace the whole earth in our survey.”

Divine Powers of  Soul

Cicero next discusses various powers of the human mind which suggest a divine — and, by extension, an immortal — nature.

20. Capacity of memory
§ 59 ff.; cf. Sen. 21.78

Besides its possible connection with pre-existence, the sheer capacity of our memory supplies, Cicero suggests, evidence of our soul’s divinity.  What material substance, Cicero asks, could store such a large, virtually infinite amount of information, instantly retrievable.  Given what we now know of brain physiology, this argument is less persuasive for us than it might have been in antiquity.

21. Rapidity of thought
§ 70; cf. Sen. 21.78

The speed of thought processes seems inconsistent with a physical basis.  Again, this argument is less persuasive to modern readers.

22. Human genius
§ 61 ff.; cf. Sen. 21.78

Human beings have a vast and incredible capacity to invent (inventio) and discover in fields as diverse as literature, science, art, music and government.  Indeed, our creative imagination appears limitless. His litany of humankind’s accomplishments is supremely eloquent, itself an example of genius: “In order to persuade us of the divinity of the soul, Cicero extols the splendour of the universe and raises the tone of his language to match the lofty topic” (Kennedy, p. 95).

23. Astronomy
(see 10 above)

Especially because of its prevalence throughout his religious works, we may single out astronomy for special consideration.  Nature, Cicero tells us, providentially supplied the heavenly bodies and their orderly movements.  It also designed the human body with an upright posture, our heads raised, to make the sky more visible.  We first charted the movements of stars of necessity, to mark seasons and time agriculture.  From this came mathematics, and from that all further sciences and technology that rely on mathematics.

24. Inspired philosophy, religion, poetry
§§ 64−67; cf. Leg. 1.22.58; Amic. 57; Sen. 40; Off. 2.5

Poetry, philosophy, and especially religion are divine activities, things worthy of gods.

25. Divination
§ 66; cf. Div. 1; Sen. 21.78; Sextus Empiricus Phys. 1.20−23. = Aristotle On Philosophy Ross fr. 12a

Cicero had considerable interest in divination.  His views on the topic, as inferred from his discussion in many writings, are subject to some debate.  In On Divination he distinguishes two varieties of divination:  natural (e.g., dreams and prophecies uttered in ecstatic trances) and technical (e.g., ceremonial interpretation of animal entrails or flights of birds).  A reasonable hypothesis that might accommodate his various statements is that he accepted the validity of natural divination, but was more skeptical of the technical kind.

In Div. 1.5.9, he argues that if divination exists, it means the gods exist (since they use this means to communicate knowledge of future events to us).  While he does not state it explicitly, it seems straightforward to extend this reasoning by adding “and if the gods exist and communicate with us, it means we are divine — and if divine, then immortal.”

By divination Cicero chiefly means supernatural prediction of future events.  However other forms of extrasensory perception, like telepathy and clairvoyance, might equally be taken as evidence of the soul’s divinity and immortality.

26. Affinity with God’s nature
§ 66 f.; cf. N.D. 2.15.40−42; Fin. 4.5.11; Rep. 6.15.15

“And indeed God Himself, who is comprehended by us, can be comprehended in no other way save as a mind unfettered and free, severed from all perishable matter, conscious of all and moving all and self-endowed with perpetual motion.. Of such sort and of the same nature is the human mind.” Cicero also alludes to the possibility than both gods and human souls are composed of Aristotle’s hypothetical fifth element.

27. Unseen Governor analogy
§ 68 ff.; cf. N.D. 2.32.81–35.90

While we cannot see God, we infer God’s existence from what we can see: the order, beauty and wonder of the universe.  Analogously, while we do not see our own divine nature, we may infer it from the vast, orderly and wonderful extent and coordination of its activities.  More of Cicero’s eloquence is on display here.

Direct Awareness

28. Introspection and existential experience
§ 55; cf. § 52

In § 55 Cicero writes, “The soul then is conscious that it is in motion, and when so conscious it is at the same time conscious of this, that it is self-moved by its own power and not an outside power, and that it cannot ever be abandoned by itself; and this is proof of eternity.”  This and similar statements might be interpreted to mean that, by means of introspection, one may gain some form of experiential proof of the soul’s divinity and immortality.  Concerning this passage Wynne (2020) quotes Carlos Lévy as writing, “Ainsi s’effectue le passage entre l’immédiateté de la sensation intérieure et l’éternité,” although Wynne does not agree.

Brittain (2012) suggests that virtually the entire point of the work is to stimulate introspection, leading to intuitive insight into ones immortality, setting the stage for St. Augustine’s introspective proofs of the souls immortality. (Augustine, of course, was a dedicated reader of Cicero). Nevertheless, Cicero is no  mystic.  He doesn’t describe a experiential revelation of the soul’s divinity such as found in the Hermetic literature, or a startling and profound I AM experience.that settles the question of the soul’s immortality once and for all.

Conclusion

As with Plato, none of Cicero’s arguments individually constitute a logically irrefutable proof of the soul’s immortality, although considered collectively we might allow they supply probabilistic scientific support (cf. N.D. 2.65.163).  The real power of Tusculan Disputations 1, however, lay in its performative aspects: as a work of art, a product of genius, inspired by sources deeper than rationalistic thought, it awakens instinctive conviction, stimulates introspection, and directs our attention to subjective intuitive and experiential evidences of divinity and immortality.  Our summary here is insufficient to fully convey this.  Rather, it’s best appreciated by reading the work itself.

So much, then for Cicero. The next proposed steps will be to consider arguments for the soul’s immortality presented by St. Augustine in De Immortalitate Animae and De Trinitate, and in the Hermetic literature.  After that we will jump ahead many centuries to Marsilio Ficino’s Theologia Platonica de immortalitate animorum (1482), and then to John Davies’ Nosce Teipsum (1599) and Edward Young’s Night Thoughts (1742−1745).  Since Young’s time, pervasive skepticism, materialism and atheism have so much dominated academic thinking that serious discussions of immortality are hard to come by.

Bibliography

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Brittain, Charles. Self-knowledge in Cicero and Augustine (De trinitate, X, 5, 7-10, 16). Medioevo, 37, 2012, 107−136.
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Bruwaene, Martin van den. La théologie de Cicéron. Louvain, 1937; 59 f.

Ciafardini, Emanuele. L’immortalità dell’anima in Cicerone (il primo libro delle Tusculane). Rivista di Filosofia Neo-scolastica, 13, 1921, 245−263.

Cumont, Franz. Astrology and Religion Among the Greeks and Romans. New York: Putnam, 1912. (See Lecture VI. Eschatology, pp. 92−110).
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Degraff, Thelma B. Plato in Cicero. Classical Philology, vol. 35, no. 2, 1940, 143–153.
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Dougan, Thomas Wilson (ed.). Tusculanarum Disputationum Libri Quinque. Vol 1. Cambridge University Press, 1905.
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Douglas, A. E. (ed.). Cicero: Tusculan Disputations: Book I. Oxford University Press, 1985.
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Englert, Walter. Fanum and philosophy: Cicero and the death of Tullia. Ciceroniana online 1.1, 2017, 41−66.
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Kennedy, Steven M. A Commentary on Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, Book 1. Diss., University of Exeter, 2010.
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Long, A. G. Death and Immortality in Ancient Philosophy. Cambridge University Press, 2019.
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First draft: 3 December 2020

St. Augustine on the Esoteric Meaning of the Beatitudes

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Whosoever heareth these sayings of mine, and doeth them, I will liken him unto a wise man, which built his house upon a rock. (Mat 7:24)

THE THEME of Jesus’ teachings in the Gospels is the kingdom of heaven.  This kingdom is not of this world (John 18:36; cf. Luke 17:21), but is within.  Nowhere is the message of the kingdom, and its role in attaining to holy, happy and blesssed living, presented more directly than in the Sermon on the Mount, of which the Beatitudes (Matthew 5:3−10) are the essence.  The Beatitudes are one of the great prayers of the Christian tradition.  Unfortunately they are too often regarded as mere platitudes, or else as moral commands to change the exterior world by promoting social justice, peace and so on.    But while things like social justice are undeniably important, the Beatitudes seek something greater still:  the union of the individual soul with God, which is the essence of beatitude and the purpose of true religion.

St. Augustine — always mindful in his writings of the soul’s journey to God — supplies a beautiful and insightful commentary on the interior meaning of the Beatitudes in Book 1 of his Commentary on Matthew, shown belowThe translation here is that of Jepson (1948).

Matthew 5

[3] Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.
[4] Blessed are they that mourn: for they shall be comforted.
[5] Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth.
[6] Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after righteousness: for they shall be filled.
[7] Blessed are the merciful: for they shall obtain mercy.
[8] Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God.
[9] Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called the children of God.
[10] Blessed are they which are persecuted for righteousness’ sake: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.

CHAPTER 1

The Sermon on the Mount is the perfect pattern of the Christian life. The poor in spirit. [Note 1]

3. Now, what does He say? Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. We read in the Scriptures concerning the craving for temporal things: All is vanity and presumption of spirit. [Qoh 1:14; LXX]. Presumption of spirit means boldness and haughtiness. In common parlance, too, the haughty are said to have “high spirits”; and rightly, since spirit is also called “wind.” Whence it is written: Fire, hail, snow, ice, stormy wind. [Psa 148:8] And who has not heard the haughty spoken of as “inflated,” blown up, as it were, with wind? So, too, the expression of the Apostle: Knowledge puffeth up, but charity edifieth. [1 Cor 8.1] For this reason the poor in spirit are rightly understood here as the humble and those who fear God, that is, those who do not have an inflated spirit. And there could be no more felicitous beginning of blessedness, whose ultimate goal is perfect wisdom: The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom. [Pro 1:7; cf. Sir 1: 14; Psa 110:11] Whereas, on the contrary, we have the attribution: The beginning of all sin is pride. [Sir 10:13] Let, therefore, the haughty seek and love the kingdom of the earth; but Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.

CHAPTER 2

The other Beatitudes.

4. Blessed are the meek, for they shall possess the land by inheritance. [Notes 2, 3] The land I take in the sense of the Psalm: Thou art my hope, my portion in the land of the living. [Psa 142:5] It stands for something solid, the stability of an undying inheritance, where the soul in a state of well-being rests as in its natural environment, as the body does on earth; and thence draws its food, as the body from the earth. This is the life and rest of the Saints. The meek are those who yield before outbursts of wickedness and do not resist evil, but overcome evil with good. [Cf. Rom 12:21] Therefore let those who are not meek struggle and contend for earthly and temporal things; but blessed are the meek, for they shall possess the land by inheritance from which they cannot be expelled.

5. Blessed are the mourners, for they shall be comforted. Mourning is sadness for the loss of dear ones. But when people turn to God, they dismiss what they cherished as dear in this world; for they do not find joy in those things which before rejoiced them; and until there comes about in them the love for what is eternal, they feel the sting of sadness over a number of things. They, therefore, will be comforted by the Holy Spirit, who especially for this reason is named the Paraclete, that is, the Consoler, that disregarding the temporal they may enjoy eternal happiness.

6. Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice, for they shall have their fill. Here He means those who love the true and unshakable good. The food with which they will be filled is the food that the Lord Himself mentions: My meat is to do the will of my Father, [John 4:34] which is righteousness; and the water, of which whoso shall drink, as He Himself says, it shall become in him a fountain of water springing up into life everlasting. [John 4:14]

7. Blessed are the merciful, for mercy shall be shown them. He pronounces them blessed who come to the aid of the needy, since it is paid back to them so that they are freed from distress.

8. Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God. How senseless, therefore, are they who look for God with bodily eyes, since He is seen by the heart, as elsewhere it is written: And seek Him in simplicity of heart. [Wis 1.1] For this is a clean heart, one that is a simple heart; and as the light of this world cannot be seen save with sound eyes, so God cannot be seen unless that is sound by which He can be seen.

9. Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God. Perfection lies in peace, where nothing is at war; and the children of God are peaceful for the reason that no resistance to God is present, and surely children ought to bear a likeness to their father. And they are at peace with themselves who quell all the emotions of their soul and subject them to reason, that is, to the mind and spirit, and have their carnal passions well under control; these make up the kingdom of God. In this kingdom everything is in such perfect order that the noblest and most excellent elements in man control without opposition the other elements which are common to us and animals. Moreover, what is most distinguished in man—mind and reason—is subject to a higher being, which is Truth itself, the only-begotten Son of God; for it cannot control the lower unless it puts itself in subjection to its superior. And this is the peace which is given on earth to men of good will; [cf. Luke 2:14] this is the life of a man who is rounded out and perfect in wisdom. From a kingdom of this sort enjoying greatest peace and order has been cast out the Prince of this world who lords it over the perverse and disorderly. With this peace set up and established in the soul, whatever onslaughts he who has been cast out makes against it from without, he but increases the glory which is according to God. He weakens nothing in that structure but by the very ineffectiveness of his machinations reveals what strength has grown within. Hence it follows: Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice’ sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. [Mat 5:10]

CHAPTER 3

The Beatitudes mark the stages traversed towards perfection.

10.  … [Note 4]

For blessedness starts with humility: Blessed are the poor in spirit, that is, those who are not puffed up, whose soul is submissive to divine authority, who stand in dread of punishment after this life despite the seeming blessedness of their earthly life.

The soul next makes itself acquainted with Sacred Scripture according to which it must show itself meek through piety, so that it may not make bold to censure what appears a stumbling block to the uninstructed and become intractable by obstinate argumentation.

The soul now begins to realize what a hold the world has on it through the habits and sins of the flesh. In this third step, then, wherein is knowledge, there is grief for the loss of the highest good through clinging to the lowest.

In the fourth step there is hard work. The soul puts forth a tremendous effort to wrench itself from the pernicious delights which bind it. Here there must be hunger and thirst for righteousness, and there is great need for fortitude, for not without pain is the heart severed from its delights.

At the fifth step it is suggested to those who are continuing their energetic efforts how they may be helped to master their situation. For unless one is helped by a superior power, he is incapable of freeing himself by his own efforts from the bonds of misery which encompass him. The suggestion given is a just proposition: If one wishes to be helped by a more powerful person, let him help someone who is weaker in a field wherein he himself holds an advantage. Hence, Blessed are the merciful, for mercy will be shown them.

The sixth step is cleanness of heart from a good consciousness of works well done, enabling the soul to contemplate that supreme good which can be seen only by a mind that is pure and serene.

Finally, the seventh step is wisdom itself, that is, contemplation of the truth, bringing peace to the whole man and effecting a likeness to God; and of this the sum is, Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God.

The eighth maxim [Note 5] returns, as it were, to the beginning, because it shows and commends what is perfect and complete. Thus, in the first and the eighth the kingdom of heaven is mentioned: Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven; and, Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice’ sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven — when now it is said: Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? Shall tribulation? or distress? or persecution? or hunger? or nakedness? or danger? or the sword? [Rom 8:35]

Seven in number, therefore, are the things which lead to perfection. The eighth maxim throws light upon perfection and shows what it consists of, so that, with this maxim beginning again, so to speak, from the first, the two together may serve as steps toward the perfection of the others also.

Notes

1. In paragraphs 1 and 2, omitted here for brevity, Augustine gives a brief introduction.  He suggests that the Beatitudes supply a perfect perfect pattern of the Christian life and embrace all the directives we need.  Jesus states that those who hear and shape their lives according to his words spoken on the mount are like the man who built his house upon a rock. [Matt. 7:24-27].  Augustine proposes that the reference to Jesus “opening his mouth” [Matt.5:2] implies these are these are His words, i.e., the New Law, whereas previously in His ministry He was wont to open the mouth of the Prophets, i.e., the Old Law.

2. by inheritance.  These words appear in the Old Latin version of the Gospels that Augustine used at the time of writing this (ca. 394).  He didn’t routinely use the Vulgate until around 400.

3. He inverts the order of the 2nd and 3rd  Beatitudes.

4. We omit a paragraph wherein Augustine remarks on the grammatical difference between seven Beatitudes (Mat. 5: 3−9) and the two further maxims in Mat. 10−11.

5. That is, Mat. 5:10.  Again, he considers this verse relevant to the present theme, but not one of the seven Beatitudes themselves.

Bibliography

Augustine, Saint, Bishop of Hippo: De sermone Domini in monte. CCSL 35 (1967). J. P. Migne (Paris, 1845), Patrologia Latina (PL) 34:1229−1308 (Latin text).

Findlay, William (tr.). Saint Augustine: Our Lord’s Sermon on the Mount. In: Philip Schaff (ed.), A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, First Series 6. New York, 1903; repr. 1979.

Jepson, John J. (tr.). Saint Augustine: The Lord’s Sermon on the Mount. Ancient Christian Writers 5. Newman Press, 1948.

Kavanagh, Denis J. Saint Augustine: Commentary on the Lord’s Sermon on the Mount, with Seventeen Related Sermons. Fathers of the Church 11. New York 1951.

Paffenroth, Kim (tr.). The Sermon on the Mount (De sermone Domini in monte). In: Boniface Ramsey (ed.), Saint Augustine: New Testament I and II. New City Press, 2014.

Pryse, William. Praying the Beatitudes as a Spiritual Exercise. Satyagraha: Cultural Psychology.  2017.  Accessed 13 Oct 2020.

1st draft, 15 Oct 2020

Mental Ascent in St. Augustine’s De quantitate animae

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THROUGHOUT his works St. Augustine presents descriptions of the ascent of the mind through fixed levels or stages (Van Fleteren, 2009).  These are of interest not only because of their influence on later Christian contemplative thought, especially in the Middle Ages (for example, in the Victorines and St. Bonaventure), but also for their possible practical relevance today as aids for mindfulness and contemplation.

His earlier writings especially show the influence of Plotinus’ Enneads and possibly a lost of work of Porphyry, De regressu animae (On the Return of the Soul).  An important example is Chapter 33 of De quantitate animae (On the Greatness of the Soul).  In this work, purporting to describe a dialogue Augustine had with his friend, Evodius, several questions about the ‘magnitude’ of the soul are considered.  Magnitude is understood in two senses: (1) in regard to extension in space and time, and (2) concerning the soul’s power and capacity.  Chapter 33 — the work’s centerpiece — proposes a seven-fold categorization of the soul’s powers, which can also be interpreted as a scheme for ascent to contemplation, the highest activity of the mind.

The first level, animatio (animation) corresponds to simple vegetative and regulatory processes — which plants also possess.  Next are sensus (sensation) and ars (arts); ars is construed very broadly and encompasses directed thought, planning, and constructive activity.  Animals also, Augustine notes, possess these two powers.  It is the last four levels, however, that are of most interest.

In the fourth stage, virtus (moral virtue), the soul turns its interest away from vain and empty worldly concerns, realizing that its true treasure and source of happiness is itself.  It therefore sets out with a fervent desire for self-purification.

As a result, the soul reaches the fifth level, tranquillitas (tranquility).  Tranquility is indispensable for the mind of the eye to see clearly, so that the soul may advance further.

Once tranquility is attained, the soul must now exert itself to advance towards higher cognitions.  That is, an act of will is required.  This is the stage of ingressio, or approach.

Finally, the seventh level, contemplatio (contemplation) is reached.

Relative to the traditional three stages of Western mysticism — as, for example, found in the writings of St. John Cassian — virtus and tranquillitas roughly correspond to purification, ingressio to illumination, and contemplatio to union.

Augustine allows that contemplation has varying degrees.  The pinnacle is an ultimate mystical experience of union with God, such as “great and peerless souls” reach; for example, Porphyry reports that Plotinus attained this four times.  At this point in his life, young Augustine was very intent on achieving this ultimate experience.  However I believe his system might be applied to daily experience as we continually struggle to rise from our usual vain preoccupations with transient, delusory, worldly concerns to spiritual mindedness.  In a more secular sense, we can interpret this as an ascent from what the humanistic psychologist Abraham Maslow called ‘deficiency cognition’ to ‘Being cognition’, from distraction to mindfulness, or from various forms of folly to right cognition.

Note:  The translation here is that of Colleran (1950).

CHAPTER 33. The seven levels of the soul’s greatness.

The Fourth Level of the Soul (virtus)*

73. Take hold now and swing yourself onto the fourth level, which goodness and all true worth call their home. Here it is that the soul ventures to take precedence not only over its own body, acting some part in the universe, but even over the whole body of the universe itself. The goods of the world it does not account its own, and comparing them with its own power and beauty, it keeps aloof from them and despises them. Hence, the more the soul turns to itself for its own pleasure, the more does it withdraw from sordid things and cleanse itself and make itself immaculately clean through and through. It steels itself against every effort to lure it away from its purpose and resolve. It shows high consideration for human society and desires nothing to happen to another which it does not wish to happen to itself. It submits to the authority and the bidding of wise men and is convinced that through them God speaks to itself. Yet, this performance of the soul, noble as it is, still requires strenuous effort and the annoyances and allurements of this world engage it in a mighty struggle, bitterly contested. […]**

Yet, so great is the soul that it can do even this, by the help, of course, of the goodness of the supreme and true God — that goodness which sustains and rules the universe, that goodness by which it has been brought about not only that all things exist, but that they exist in such a way that they cannot be any better than they are. It is to this divine goodness that the soul most dutifully and confidently commits itself for help and success in the difficult task of self-purification.

The Fifth Level of the Soul (tranquillitas)

74. When this has been accomplished, that is, when the soul will be free from all corruption and purified of all its stains, then at last it possesses itself in utter joy and has no fears whatever for itself nor any anxiety for any reason. This, then, is the fifth level. For it is one thing to achieve purity, another to be in possession of it; and the activity by which the soul restores its sullied state to purity and that by which it does not suffer itself to be defiled again are two entirely different things. On this level it conceives in every way how great it is in every respect; and when it has understood that, then with unbounded and wondrous confidence it advances toward God, that is, to the immediate contemplation of truth; and it attains that supreme and transcendent reward for which it has worked so hard.

The Sixth Level of the Soul (ingressio)

75. Now, this activity, namely, the ardent desire to understand truth and perfection, is the soul’s highest vision: it possesses none more perfect, none more noble, none more proper. This, therefore, will be the sixth level of activity. For it is one thing to clear the eye of the soul so that it will not look without purpose and without reason and see what is wrong; it is something else to protect and strengthen the health of the eye; and it is something else again, to direct your gaze calmly and squarely to what is to be seen. Those who wish to do this before they are cleansed and healed recoil so in the presence of that light of truth or that they may think there is in it not only no goodness, but even great evil; indeed, they may decide it does not deserve the name of truth, and with an amount of zest and enthusiasm that is to be pitied, they curse the remedy offered and run back into the darkness engulfing them and which alone their diseased condition suffers them to face. Hence, the divinely inspired prophet says most appositely: Create a clean heart in me, O God, and renew a right spirit within my bowels. [Psalms 51: 10] The spirit is “right,” I believe, if it sees to it that the soul cannot lose its way and go astray in its quest for truth. This spirit is not really “renewed” in anyone unless his heart is first made clean, that is to say, unless he first controls his thoughts and drains off from them all the dregs of attachment to corruptible things.

The Seventh Level of the Soul (contemplatio)

76. Now at last we are in the very vision and contemplation of truth, which is the seventh and last level of the soul; and here we no longer have a level but in reality a home at which one arrives via those levels. What shall I say are the delights, what the enjoyment, of the supreme and true Goodness, what the everlasting peace it breathes upon us? Great and peerless souls — and we believe that they have actually seen and are still seeing these things, have told us this so far as they deemed it should be spoken of. This would I tell you now: if we hold most faithfully to the course which God enjoins on us and which we have undertaken to follow, we shall come by God’s power and wisdom to that supreme Cause or that supreme Author or supreme Principle of all things, or whatever other more appropriate appellative there may be for so great a reality.

And when we understand that, we shall see truly how all things under the sun are the vanity of the vain. For “vanity” is deceit; and “the vain ” are to be understood as persons who are deceived, or persons who deceive, or both. Further, one may discern how great a difference there is between these and the things that truly exist; and yet, since all the other things have also been created and have God as their Maker, they are wonderful and beautiful when considered by themselves, although in comparison with the things that truly exist, they are as nothing. […] Furthermore, in the contemplation of truth, no matter what degree of contemplation you reach, the delight is so great, there is such purity, such innocence, a conviction in all things that is so absolute, that one could think he really knew nothing when aforetime he fancied he had knowledge. And that the soul may not be impeded from giving full allegiance to the fullness of truth, death — meaning complete escape and acquittal from this body — which previously was feared, is now desired as the greatest boon.

* We omit here his discussion of animatio, sensus and ars, which are not directly related to contemplation.
** In the omitted material St. Augustine describes how at this stage an exaggerated fear of death may arise as a person, increasingly aware of faults, fears condemnation by God.  This concern seems rather foreign to the thought of Plotinus and Porphyry.

Bibliography

Augustine, Saint, Bishop of Hippo: De quantitate animae. J. P. Migne (Paris, 1841), Patrologia Latina (PL) 32:1035−1080 (Latin text). CSEL 89 (1986), pp. 129−231.

Colleran, Joseph M. (tr.). St. Augustine: The Greatness of the Soul, The Teacher. Ancient Christian Writers 9. Newman Press, 1950; 1−112.

Fokin, Alexey. St. Augustine’s paradigm: ab exterioribus ad interiora, ab inferioribus ad superiora in Western and Eastern Christian mysticism. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7.2 (2015): 81−107.

Garvey, Mary Patricia. Saint Augustine: Christian or Neo-platonist? Marquette University Press, 1939. (See pp. 146−160.)

Maslow, Abraham H. (1971). The farther reaches of human nature. New York: Viking (republished: Arkana, 1993). Ch. 9. Notes on Being-Psychology. pp. 121−142.

McMahon, John J. The Magnitude of the Soul. Fathers of the Church: Writings of Saint Augustine 2. New York, 1947; 51−149.

Tourscher, Francis Edward. De Quantitate Animae: The Measure of the Soul; Latin Text, with English Translation and Notes. Peter Reilly Company, 1933.

Van Fleteren, Frederick. Ascent of the Soul. In: Allan D. Fitzgerald (ed.), Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, Eerdmans, 2009; pp. 63−67.

1st draft, 13 Oct 2020

Philo – Higher Pleasures

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Philo – Higher Pleasures

On the Giants 10.40

X. (40) And the sentence which follows, “I am the Lord,” is uttered with great beauty and with most excessive propriety, “for,” says the Lord, “oppose, my good man, the good of the flesh to that of the soul, and of the whole man;” therefore the pleasure of the flesh is irrational, but the pleasure of the soul and of the whole man is the mind of the universe, namely God; (41) and the comparison is an admirable one, and one difficult to be instituted, so as for any one to be deceived by the close similitude, unless any one will say that living things are in reality the same as lifeless things, rational things the same as irrational things; well adapted the same as those ill adapted; odd numbers identical with even ones; light with darkness, and day with night; and in short every thing that is contrary the same as its contrary. (42) And yet even although these things have some kind of union and connection together by reason of their being created, still God is not in any respect like the very best of created beings, inasmuch as these have been born, and are liable to suffering; but he is uncreated, and always acting not suffering. (43) Now it is well not to desert the ranks of God, in which it follows inevitably that all who are arrayed must be most excellent, and it would be shameful to quit those ranks, to fly to unmanly and effeminate pleasure, which injures its friends and benefits its enemies, for its nature is a very singular one; for all those to whom it chooses to give a share of its special advantages, it at once chastises and injures; and those whom it thinks fit to deprive of its good things, it benefits in the greatest possible degree, for it injures them when it gives, but it benefits them when it takes away. (44) If therefore, O my soul, any one of the temptations of pleasure invites you, turn yourself away, and directing your views towards another point, look at the genuine beauty of virtue, and having surveyed it, remain, until a desire for it has sunk into you, and draws you to it, like a magnet, and immediately leads you and attaches you to that which has become the object of your desire.

via Philo: On the Giants at Early Jewish Writings.

Written by John Uebersax

April 26, 2009 at 2:26 pm