Walter Hilton’s Song of Angels

Bl. Fra Angelico, Dormition and Assumption of the Virgin (c.1424−1434), detail

IN the Introduction to her edition of the Cloud of Unknowing, Evelyn Underhill refers to “an exquisite fragment” by the English mystic Walter Hilton (c. 1340/1345 – 1396) called Song of Angels.  The first third is shown below.  Besides discussing angelic music, Hilton makes some valuable comments about the nature of the what Underhill and Christian mystics call unitive life, a condition in which the material world becomes sacralized.

Links to the entire work are supplied in the Bibliography, and a nice audio version is here.  As a side note, according to St. Hildegard of Bingen, she wrote her ethereal music in by divine inspiration in a trance-like state.  Surely, listening to it one cannot help but think of angels’ songs!

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Here followeth a devout treatise compiled by Master Walter Hilton of the Song of Angels

DEAR brother in Christ, I have understanding by thine own speech, and also by telling of another man, that thou yearnest and desirest greatly for to have more knowledge and understanding than thou hast of angel’s song and heavenly sound; what it is, and on what wise it is perceived and felt in a man’s soul, and how a man may be sure that it is true and not feigned; and how it is made by the presence of the good angel, and not by the inputting of the evil angel. These things thou wouldest wete of me; but, soothly, I cannot tell thee for a surety the soothfastness of this matter; nevertheless somewhat, as me thinketh, I shall shew thee in a short word.

Know thou well that the end and the sovereignty of perfection standeth in very oneness of God and of a man’s soul by perfect charity. This onehead, then, is verily made when the mights of the soul are reformed by grace to the dignity and the state of the first condition; that is, when the mind is stabled firmly, without changing and vagation, in God and ghostly things, and when the reason is cleared from all worldly and fleshly beholdings, and from all bodily imaginations, figures, and fantasies of creatures, and is illumined by grace to behold God and ghostly things, and when the will and the affection is purified and cleansed from all fleshly, kindly, and worldly love, and is inflamed with burning love of the Holy Ghost.

This wonderful onehead may not be fulfilled perfectly, continually, and wholly in this life, because of the corruption of the flesh, but only in the bliss of heaven. Nevertheless, the nearer that a soul in this present life may come to this onehead, the more perfect it is. For the more that it is reformed by grace to the image and the likeness of its Creator here on this wise; the more joy and bliss shall it have in heaven. Our Lord God is an endless being without changing, almighty without failing, sovereign wisdom, light, truth without error or darkness; sovereign goodness, love, peace, and sweetness. Then the more that a soul is united, fastened, conformed, and joined to our Lord, the more stable and mighty it is, the more wise and clear, good and peaceable, loving and more virtuous it is, and so it is more perfect. For a soul that hath by the grace of Jesus, and long travail of bodily and ghostly exercise, overcome and destroyed concupiscences, and passions, and unreasonable stirrings within itself, and without in the sensuality, and is clothed all in virtues, as in meekness and mildness, in patience and softness, in ghostly strength and righteousness, in continence, in wisdom, in truth, hope and charity; then it is made perfect, as it may be in this life. Much comfort it receiveth of our Lord, not only inwardly in its own hidden nature, by virtue of the onehead to our Lord that lieth in knowing and loving of God, in light and ghostly burning of Him, in transforming of the soul in to the Godhead; but also many other comforts, savours, sweetnesses, and wonderful feelings in the diverse sundry manners, after that our Lord vouchethsafe to visit His creatures here in earth, and after that the soul profiteth and waxeth in charity.

Some soul, by virtue of charity that God giveth it, is so cleansed, that all creatures, and all that he heareth, or seeth, or feeleth by any of his wits, turneth him to comfort and gladness; and the sensuality receiveth new savour and sweetness in all creatures. And right as beforetime the likings in the sensuality were fleshly, vain, and vicious, for the pain of the original sin; so now they are made ghostly and clean, without bitterness and biting of conscience. And this is the goodness of our Lord, that sith the soul is punished in the sensuality, and the flesh is partner of the pain, that afterward the soul be comforted in the sensuality, and the flesh be fellow of joy and comfort with the soul, not fleshly, but ghostly, as he was fellow in tribulation and pain.

This is the freedom and the lordship, the dignity, and the honor that a man hath over all creatures, the which dignity he may so recover by grace here, that every creature savour to him as it is. And that is, when by grace he seeth, he heareth, he feeleth only God in all creatures. On this manner of wise a soul is made ghostly in the sensuality by abundance of charity, that is, in the substance of the soul.

Also, our Lord comforteth a soul by angel’s song. What that song is, it may not be described by no bodily likeness, for it is ghostly, and above all manner of imagination and reason. It may be felt and perceived in a soul, but it may not be shewed. Nevertheless, I shall speak thereof to thee as me thinketh. When a soul is purified by the love of God, illumined by wisdom, stabled by the might of God, then is the eye of the soul opened to behold ghostly things, as virtues and angels and holy souls, and heavenly things. Then is the soul able because of cleanness to feel the touching, the speaking of good angels. This touching and speaking, it is ghostly and not bodily. For when the soul is lifted and ravished out of the sensuality, and out of mind of any earthly things, then in great fervour of love and light (if our Lord vouchsafe) the soul may hear and feel heavenly sound, made by the presence of angels in loving of God. Not that this song of angels is the sovereign joy of the soul; but for the difference that is between a man’s soul in flesh and an angel, because of uncleanness, a soul may not hear it, but by ravishing in love, and needeth for to be purified well clean, and fulfilled of much charity, or it were able for to hear heavenly sound. For the sovereign and the essential joy is in the love of God by Himself and for Himself, and the secondary is in communing and beholding of angels and ghostly creatures.

For right as a soul, in understanding of ghostly things, is often times touched and moved through bodily imagination by working of angels; as Ezekiel the prophet did see in bodily imagination the soothfastness of God’s privities; right so, in the love of God, a soul by the presence of angels is ravished out of mind of all earthly and fleshly things in to an heavenly joy, to hear angel’s song and heavenly sound, after that the charity is more or less.

Now, then, me thinketh that there may no soul feel verily angel’s song nor heavenly sound, but he be in perfect charity; though all that are in perfect charity have not felt it, but only that soul that is so purified in the fire of love that all earthly savour is brent out of it, and all mean letting between the soul and the cleanness of angels is broken and put away from it. Then soothly may he sing a new song, and soothly he may hear a blessed heavenly sound, and angel’s song without deceit or feigning. Our Lord woteth there that soul is that, for abundance of burning love, is worthy to hear angel’s song. […]

For if a man have any presumption in his fantasies and in his workings, and thereby falleth in to indiscreet imagination, as it were in a frenzy, and is not ordered nor ruled of grace, nor comforted by ghostly strength, the devil entereth in, and by his false illuminations, and by his false sounds, and by his false sweetnesses, he deceiveth a man’s soul. And of this false ground springeth errors, and heresies, false prophecies, presumptions, and false reasonings, blasphemings, and slanderings, and many other mischiefs. And, therefore, if thou see any man ghostly occupied fall in any of these sins and these deceits, or in frenzies, wete thou well that he never heard nor felt angel’s song nor heavenly sound. For, soothly, he that heareth verily angel’s song, he is made so wise that he shall never err by fantasy, nor by indiscretion, nor by no slight of working of the devil. [Source: Gardner, 1910; slightly modernized]

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Bibliography

Gardner, Edmund G. (ed.). The Cell of Self-Knowledge: Seven Early English Mystical Treatises Printed by Henry Pepwell in 1521. London, 1910. IV. A Devout Treatise compiled by Master Walter Hylton of the Song of Angels (pp. 63−73). [Google Books]

Underhill, Evelyn (ed.). The Cloud of Unknowing. London, 1922.

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Edward Herbert, Conjectures Concerning Heavenly Life

Edward  Herbert  (1583–1648) 

THE eminent metaphysical poet, George Herbert (1593–1633), had an even more famous brother, Edward (1583–1648).  Whereas George lived the life of a simple country parson, Edward was immersed in military and state affairs, first a friend of King James I (for which he was appointed 1st Baron Herbert of Cherbury) and later an opponent.  But like George, he had great literary ability and was deeply pious.  The following poem, composed originally in Latin, is a meditation on the possibility of infinite felicity in heaven, and what that might mean.  The English translation comes from the well-known American Transcendentalist and literary figure, Margaret Fuller (1810–1850; more on her below).  The Latin version can be found in Edward Herbert’s autobiography (ed. Horace Walpole) and his collected poems; links are supplied in the Sources section.

Conjectures Concerning the Heavenly Life (De Vita Cælesti Conjectura)

Purified in my whole genius, I congratulate myself
Secure of fate, while neither am I downcast by any terrors,
Nor store up secret griefs in my heart,
But pass my days cheerfully in the midst of mishaps,
Despite the evils which engird the earth,
Seeking the way above the stars with ardent virtue.
I have received, beforehand, the first fruits of heavenly life—
I now seek the later, sustained by divine love,
Through which, conquering at once the scoffs of a gloomy destiny,
I leave the barbarous company of a frantic age,
Breathing out for the last time the infernal air—breathing in the supernal,
I enfold myself wholly in these sacred flames,
And, sustained by them, ascend the highest dome,
And far and wide survey the wonders of a new sphere,
And see well-known spirits, now beautiful in their proper light,
And the choirs of the higher powers, and blessed beings
With whom I desire to mingle fires and sacred bonds—
Passing from joy to joy the heaven of all,
What has been given to ourselves, or sanctioned by a common vow.
God, in the meantime, accumulating his rewards,
May at once increase our honour and illustrate his own love.
Nor heavens shall be wanting to heavens, nor numberless ages to life,
Nor new joys to these ages, such as an
Eternity shall not diminish, nor the infinite bring to an end.
Nor, more than all, shall the fair favour of the Divine be wanting—
Constantly increasing these joys, varied in admirable modes,
And making each state yield only to one yet happier,
And what we never even knew how to hope, is given to us—
Nor is aught kept back except what only the One can conceive,
And what in their own nature are by far most perfect
In us, at least, appear embellished,
Since the sleeping minds which heaven prepares from the beginning—
Only our labor and industry can vivify,
Polishing them with learning and with morals,
That they may return all fair, bearing back a dowry to heaven,
When, by use of our free will, we put to rout those ills
Which heaven has neither dispelled, nor will hereafter dispel.
Thus through us is magnified the glory of God,
And our glory, too, shall resound throughout the heavens,
And what are the due rewards of virtue, finally
Must render the Father himself more happy than his wont
Whence still more ample grace shall be showered upon us,
Each and all yielding to our prayer,
For, if liberty be dear, it is permitted
To roam through the loveliest regions obvious to innumerable heavens,
And gather, as we past, the delights of each,
If fixed contemplation be chosen rather in the mind,
All the mysteries of the high regions shall be laid open to us,
And the joy will he to know the methods of God,—
Then it may be permitted to act upon earth, to have a care
Of the weal of men, and to bestow just laws.
If we are more delighted with celestial lave,
We are dissolved into flames which glide about and excite one another
Mutually, embraced in sacred ardours,
Spring upwards, enfolded together in firmest bonds,
In parts and wholes, mingling by turns,
And the ardour of the Divine kindles (in them) still new ardours,
It will make us happy to praise God, while he commands us,
The angelic choir, singing together with sweet modulation,
Sounds through heaven, publishing our joys,
And beauteous spectacles are put forth, hour by hour,
And, as it were, the whole fabric of heaven becomes a theatre,
Till the divine energy pervades the whole sweep of the world,
And chisels out from it new forms,
Adorned with new faculties, of larger powers.
Our forms, too, may then be renewed—
Assume new forms and senses, till our
Joys again rise up consummate.
If trusting thus, I shall have put off this mortal weed,
Why may not then still greater things be disclosed?

The poem appears to have never been translated into English before or since Margaret Fuller.  It appeared in an essay titled The Two Herberts, which was originally published in the short-lived literary journal, The Present (1844), and republished in various editions of her collected essays.  The essay is not very well known, but is one of her best.  In it she portrays an imaginary dialogue between George Herbert and Edward.  The dialogue is very engaging.  Instead of both figures merely serving as artificial mouthpieces for the authors own view, here we see two distinct personalities, with important similarities and divergences of thought.  Further, Fuller displays considerable sensitivity to their religious views.  Edward was one of the founders of English Deism, while George was a devout Anglican.  One main disagreement concerns the personal nature of ones relationship with God. The contrast between Edward, a man of action, and George, a pure contemplative, is also highlighted — biographers have noted the similarity here with this split in Fuller’s own personality (she eventually left New England for Italy, becoming active in the revolution there). But arguably the real significance of her essay is its religious dimension.  I could extol its praises and expand on its subtle points, but ultimately it’s a work of art, appreciated more by reading than analyzing it.

Sources

Fuller, Margaret. The Two Herberts.  In: Margaret Fuller, Art, Literature and the Drama, ed. Arthur B. Fuller, Boston, 1874; pp. 25−44. Orig. publ. in The Present, Vol. 1, March 1844, pp. 301−312.

Grey, Robin. Margaret Fuller’s “The Two Herberts,” Emerson, and the Disavowal of Sequestered Virtue. In: The Complicity of Imagination: The American Renaissance, Contests of Authority, and Seventeenth-Century English Culture, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997; pp. 87−106.

Herbert, Edward. The Life of Edward Lord Herbert of Cherbury. Horace Walpole (ed.).  London: Cassell, 1887; pp. 33−34. (First ed. Strawberry Hill, 1764).

Higginson, Thomas Wentworth. Margaret Fuller Ossoli. Houghton Mifflin, 1890.  Ch. 18. Literary Traits (pp. 281−298).

Smith, George Charles Moore. The Poems of Lord Herbert of Cherbury. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923; pp. 103−106.

1st draft: 17 Jan 2021

John Davies: Adversity Makes Us Look Within

JOHN DAVIES (1569 –1626) was an English poet and government official.  His poem Nosce Teipsum (Know Thyself) — an outstanding example of Elizabethan verse — enjoyed great popularity both during and after his lifetime and deserves more attention today than it receives.  The core of the work consists of a series of arguments for the soul’s immortality largely adapted from those of Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations 1.  Here Davies begins by commenting on how adversity has the compensation of forcing us to direct our attention within. The circumstances surrounding the composition of Nosce Teipsum not without interest. Davies wrote it during a period of seclusion and remorse after being disbarred for cudgeling a former friend in response to a public insult from the latter.

Adversity

And as the man loues least at home to bee,
That hath a sluttish house haunted with sprites;
So she impatient her owne faults to see,
Turnes from her selfe and in strange things delites.

For this few know themselves: for merchants broke
View their estate with discontent and paine;
And seas are troubled, when they doe revoke
Their flowing waves into themselves againe.

And while the face of outward things we find,
Pleasing and faire, agreeable and sweet;
These things transport, and carry out the mind,
That with her selfe her selfe can never meet.

Yet if Affliction once her warres begin,
And threat the feebler Sense with sword and fire;
The Minde contracts her selfe and shrinketh in,
And to her selfe she gladly doth retire:

As Spiders toucht, seek their webs inmost part;
As bees in stormes unto their hives returne;
As bloud in danger gathers to the heart;
As men seek towns, when foes the country burn.

If ought can teach us ought, Affliction’s lookes,
(Making us looke into our selves so neere,)
Teach us to know our selves beyond all bookes,
Or all the learned Schooles that ever were.

This mistresse lately pluckt me by the eare,
And many a golden lesson hath me taught;
Hath made my Senses quicke, and Reason cleare,
Reform’d my Will and rectifide my Thought.

So doe the winds and thunders cleanse the ayre;
So working lees settle and purge the wine;
So lop’t and pruned trees doe flourish faire;
So doth the fire the drossie gold refine.

Neither Minerva nor the learned Muse,
Nor rules of Art, nor precepts of the wise;
Could in my braine those beames of skill infuse,
As but the glance of this Dame’s angry eyes.

She within lists my ranging minde hath brought,
That now beyond my selfe I list not goe;
My selfe am center of my circling thought,
Onely my selfe I studie, learne, and know.

I know my bodie’s of so fraile a kind,
As force without, feavers within can kill;
I know the heavenly nature of my minde,
But ’tis corrupted both in wit and will:

I know my Soule hath power to know all things,
Yet is she blinde and ignorant in all;
I know I am one of Nature’s little kings,
Yet to the least and vilest things am thrall.

I know my life’s a paine and but a span,
I know my Sense is mockt with every thing:
And to conclude, I know my selfe a MAN,
Which is a proud, and yet a wretched thing.

Bibliography

Davies, John.  Nosce Teipsum (extract). In: Alexander B. Grosart, (ed.), The Complete Poems of Sir John Davies, 2 vols, Vol. 2, Chatto and Windus, 1876; 22−24.
https://archive.org/details/completepoemsofs01daviuoft

Cicero’s 28 Proofs of the Immortality of the Human Soul

MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO (109−43 BC) was a great Roman statesman and philosopher, a contemporary of Julius Caesar. As a young man he studied in Athens and Rhodes with many of the greatest Greek philosophers of his times, including Platonists, Aristotelians and Stoics.  In addition to his political, legal and rhetorical accomplishments (he served, for example as consul, the highest political office of the Roman Republic) he had an abiding interest in religious matters.

In 45 BC, during an intensive phase of writing, he produced in rapid succession four major works on religion:  (1) the Consolatio (a lost work, except for fragments), Tusculan Disputations (Book 1, the main focus of our discussion here, deals with immortality of the soul and Books 2−5 with Stoic philosophy), On the Nature of the Gods, and On Divination.  This final phase of his multifaceted career dedicated to writing was prompted by three factors. First was the untimely death of his beloved daughter, Tullia, during childbirth — an event which put Cicero in a profound depression. Second, during the tumultuous events and civil wars in the final years of the Republic (before Julius Caesar inaugurated the Roman Empire), Cicero — whose idealism was no match for the armies of Caesar and Pompey or the vast wealth of Crassus — fled into retirement and seclusion.  Third, as he tells us, fearful of Rome’s future, he wished to preserve and transmit the treasures of Greek philosophy to future generations of Romans.

The Consolatio was his most immediate ad direct attempt to console himself at the loss of Tullia.  Modeled on similar works that had been written at least since the time of Aristotle, it touched on a number of themes, including evidence of the soul’s immortality, the pains and problems of this life which death releases us from, and bearing loss of a loved one without undue pain or suffering.  A few months later Cicero produced a more concentrated and systematic study of the soul’s immortality, Book 1 of Tusculan Disputations.  In this dialogue Cicero follows two lines of thought, both aimed to relieve the fear of death: (1) the human soul is immortal; and (2) even if not, death is no harm (e.g., if we are no longer conscious, we cannot experience any pain).  Our main interest here is the many arguments Cicero invokes in Book 1 for the soul’s immortality.

As was his practice generally, in writing this Cicero had at hand a range of books by earlier philosophers, including handbooks summarizing the theories of many authors.  The views of Plato (especially his arguments for the soul’s immortality found in the dialogues Phaedo and Phaedrus), Aristotle, and certain Stoics (e.g., Posidonius, one of Cicero’s teachers, and Panaetius) are in the forefront.  Therefore we can learn a great deal about ancient views of immortality from this work.  Additional, related material can be found in On the Nature of the Gods, On Divination, and On Old Age. Although Tusculan Disputations 1 is our main concern here, arguments in these other sources will be noted when appropriate.

As he wrote in dialogue form, it’s sometimes not especially easy to identify Cicero’s own views on a particular topic.  Concerning immortality of the soul and on religion generally, the most typical persona he presents is that of an Academic (i.e., Platonist) skeptic.  Like more radical Pyrrhonists, Academic skeptics claimed that absolute certainty on any philosophical question was impossible; however, unlike Pyrrhonists, the allowed for probabilistic conclusions to be drawn based on a preponderance of evidence.  Nevertheless, it’s hard to read Cicero’s religious works without suspecting his personal belief in the gods and the immortality of the human soul.  On the latter point, we also know that he seriously considered building a shrine dedicated to Tullia after her death, expressing the belief that this might help to achieve her deification.

As in the case of Plato’s discussions of the soul’s immortality, none of the many arguments Cicero presents are fully logically compelling. However, also like Plato, Cicero aims for something potentially more important than logical proof: to elevate our mind and raise our consciousness such that we may gain an intuitive insight into the soul’s immortality.  This is done by (1) focusing our attention and interest on what the soul is, and (2) sharpening the critical discernment (what the Greeks called diakrisis) of our higher intelligence.  As we do this, we’re simultaneously forced to withdraw our attention from worldly concerns, which drag down, distract and confuse the Intelligence.

Cicero — like Plato — is a great artist.  Indeed, he is one of the greatest rhetoricians in human history. Reading his works is itself meant to be a transformative experience.  Reading and reflecting on the lofty themes he presents, we regain our true condition as contemplative beings with exalted souls.  Not only may this enable us to glimpse our soul and see its immortality, but also, as long as we are doing this, we become that very part of our soul which is immortal.

For convenience, arguments below are presented in the order in which they appear in Tusculan Disputations 1.  Here the effort has been made to identify as many separate arguments as possible, rather than to (as most commentators have done) aggregate them.  Among other things, this more atomistic approach (see Uebersax, 2015) will facilitate tracing the history of individual proofs through later centuries.

A helpful online edition of Tusculan Disputations 1 can be found here.

Notation: References to Tusculan Disputations 1 are given as paragraph numbers, preceded by the symbol §; these should not be confused with chapter divisions. References to other works of Cicero are given as book.chapter.paragraph, or (for works comprised of a single book) chapter.paragraph.  The following abbreviations/titles are used:

Amic. = De amicitia (On Friendship)

Fin. = De finibus (On Ends)

Leg. = De legibus (On Laws)

N.D. = De natura deorum (On the Nature of the Gods)

Off. = De officiis (On Moral Duties)

Rep. = De republica (On the Republic)

Sen. = De senectute (On Old Age)

Arguments from Tradition and Consensus

1. Argument from antiquity
§ 26 f.; cf. Amic. 4.13

Our ancestors — wiser than us — instituted rites and memorials for the dead, motivated by a belief in the soul’s immortality.

2. Deified humans
§ 28 f.; cf. N.D. 2.24.62

Many traditional immortal gods (e.g., Hercules) are deified human beings, whose existence is verified by appearances in visions and intervention in human affairs. See Hesiod, Works and Days 121−126, 252–255, where souls of the righteous may return to earth as guardian spirits (daimones hagnoi; δαίμονες ἁγνοὶ). Cf. cures, miracles, visions, etc.  attributed to Christian saints.

3. Argument from general consensus
§ 30, § 35 f.; cf. N.D. 2.2.4; Div. 1.1.2

All nations perform funeral rites, memorialize the dead, and believe in survival of the soul. The agreement of all peoples implies a natural instinct and is to be viewed as ‘the voice of Nature’ (omnium consensus naturae vox est). According to Stoic philosophy, all Nature is providentially and purposefully directed; a tacit minor premise here, therefore, is that Nature would not implant a false instinctive belief. Stoics used this argument to prove the existence of the gods, and Cicero adapts it to immortality of the soul.  Although Cicero does not state this, implicit in the argument is that each person can verify by introspection that they possess this instinctive belief.

Interestingly, Cicero states that the reason people wail and prostrate themselves at funerals is not to express anguish at their personal loss, but in grief for the deceased soul which must now survive without the accustomed comforts of earthly existence and is sensible of this loss.

4. Interest in future
§ 31

All people are deeply and instinctively concerned about what will happen in the world after their death: they beget children, write wills, compose epitaphs, design monuments, etc.  This would make no sense if our consciousness simply ceased; rather, it implies some form of ongoing awareness of events, of others’ welfare, etc.

5. A ‘bodhisattva instinct’
§ 32

The most virtuous and wise people regard themselves as having come into the world to protect and serve humanity. We revere such individuals as the finest members of our species.  This argument is subtly different from 7 below. There, noble self-sacrifice is itself evidence of an immortal soul. Here the proof is psychological: that we instinctively regard this as the ideal of human nature — that is, our reverence for such people and their actions is a separate proof.

6. Military heroism
§ 32

Especially revealing are the actions of those who heroically sacrifice their lives in battle or even voluntarily undergo torture (Off. 3.26.99) for the sake of their country.  “No one would ever have exposed himself to death for his country without good hope of immortality.”

7. Other great personal sacrifices 
§ 34 ff.

Again, but for expectation of future reward and glory, nobody would pass their life in toil and peril to accomplish great things. “Even philosophers who teach contempt for fame place their names on their books.” Unlike the modern view — i.e., that such actions are motivated by pure altruism and love of others — Cicero asserts that such sacrifices are made at least partly with the aim of attaining eternal life and glory. Neither is the goal merely to be remembered and honored by future generations, but for the soul to survive and enjoy the benefits of its glory.  Earthly fame will in any case eventually fade and is negligible in comparison to eternal favor of the gods and immortality earned as a reward for great virtue, heroism and self-sacrifice.

8. Argument from authority
§ 38 f.; cf. Sen 21.77, 21.83; Amic. 4.13

The wisest and most virtuous (Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato are mentioned by name) assert the immortality of the soul.

Miscellaneous Arguments

9. Physical arguments
§§ 40−43

Cicero begins with a fairly diffuse set of observations which, while by no means comprise a syllogistic argument, do converge on the notion that the soul’s ultimate destiny is celestial. He begins by positing as uncontested facts of (ancient) science that (1) the earth is in the center of the universe, located between a subterranean realm and the sky regions; and (2) all things consist of four elements: earth, water, air and fire. The rapidity of the soul’s operations rules out its consisting of earth or water, so it must consist of air and/or fire (or Aristotle’s hypothetical fifth element).  As air and fire naturally rise, so must the soul after death.  To facilitate this ascent and to penetrate any barriers between regions, the soul (Cicero states) must remain intact. Hence it remains after death.

10. Celestial order and splendor
§ 47, § 62, §§ 68−70; cf. N.D. 2.2.4 f.; N.D. 2.15.40−17.44; N. D. 2.56.140; Rep. 3.2.3; Rep. 6.15.15; Leg. 1.9.26; cf. Scipio’s Dream = Rep. 6.9.9−6.26.29

The spectacle of the night sky and orderly movements of stars and planets plainly reveal the wisdom, goodness and power of God. An all-powerful, all beneficent God would not deny human beings an immortal soul. While Cicero doesn’t make this argument in so many words, it runs just below the surface of his religious works so consistently that we should include it.

Throughout his works Cicero notes our intense interest in beholding the celestial vault and in astronomical science — suggesting some basic affinity between our souls and stars. A revealing discussion of the doctrine of sidereal immortality in Greco-Roman religion, including Cicero’s treatment of it in Tusculan Disputations 1, is found in Cumont (1912; 92−110).  In his late teens Cicero translated the Phaenomena of Aratus (315−240 BC), a poem on the constellations, from Latin into Greek — with sufficient skill that the translation was known to Lucretius.

11. Consciousness in soul, not senses
§ 46

Loss of conscious sensation during intense absorbed thought or sickness, despite functioning sense organs, shows that perception occurs in the soul.

12. Common sensory pathway
§ 46

Similarly, using the same mind/soul we have conscious perception of things as diverse as sights, sounds, smells, etc.

13. Know Thyself a divine mandate
§ 52; more fully developed in Leg. 1.22.59

“Know Thyself” would not have been given to us by the gods themselves unless the human soul were divine: “For he who knows himself will realize, in the first place, that he has a divine element within him, and will think of his own inner nature as a kind of consecrated image of God; and so he will always act and think in a way worthy of so great a gift of the gods, and, when he has examined and thoroughly tested himself, he will understand how nobly equipped by Nature he entered life, and what manifold means he possesses for the attainment and acquisition of wisdom.” (Leg. 1.22.59)

Platonic Arguments

We now move to more distinctively Platonic proofs — viz. proofs Plato explicitly presents in Phaedo (which relates Socrates’ conversations immediately before his death) and other dialogues, or which are otherwise directly implied by Platonic doctrines.

14. Self-moving
§§ 53−55, § 66; cf. Sen. 21.78; N. D. 2.12.32; Plato Phaedrus 245

The soul moves the body, but is itself not moved by anything else. Therefore nothing external could have first initiated its motion, nor can anything external cause its activity to cease.

15. Indivisibility
§ 56, § 71; cf. Sen. 21.78; Plato Phaedo 78b-d; Plato Republic 611b

The soul is uncompounded, unitary and indivisible.  Therefore it is not subject to decay or dissolution.

16. Recollection argument
§57 f.; Sen. 21.78; Plato Phaedo 72e–77d

Plato asserts that the most important kinds of human knowledge (e.g., principles of mathematics, logic and morality) are not taught, but are innate and merely remembered or recollected (anamnesis = unforgetting).  Plato famously illustrates this in his dialogue, Meno (83−85), where an uneducated slave boy is able to prove a sophisticated theorem of geometry by merely giving common sense answers to a series of prompting questions. This suggests to Plato a pre-existence; and if our souls existed before this life, they will exist after this life.

17. Soul a Form
§41; cf. Plato’s affinity argument in Phaedo 78b–84b

Cicero briefly mentions the Pythagorean notion that the soul is a “number” — by which is meant a unique, ideal and perfect pattern or set of relationships (which could, in theory, all be expressed mathematically).  As such it would be a Platonic Form, eternal and existing in the realm of pure Being, outside space and time.  Cicero does not develop the argument, however.

18. Scale of Existence
§ 56, § 65 ff.; N.D. 2.12.33−14.39; Leg. 1.7.22−8.25; see Dougan 242 f.

There is a scale according to which all existing things (inanimate objects, plants, animals, man, gods) are ordered.  Man and gods are kindred by virtue of their shared capacity for Reason. Cicero presents the argument more clearly in De legibus.

19. Infinite yearning for knowledge
§§ 44−47; cf. Plato Phaedrus 247c

Nature has planted in our minds an insatiable longing to see truth.” This can be satisfied only after the soul escapes the confinement and inherent limitations of the body.  This applies not only to new intellectual and spiritual knowledge, but, also, Cicero suggests, in an actual physical sense: “What, pray, do we think the panorama will be like when [from a celestial vantage point] we shall be free to embrace the whole earth in our survey.”

Divine Powers of  Soul

Cicero next discusses various powers of the human mind which suggest a divine — and, by extension, an immortal — nature.

20. Capacity of memory
§ 59 ff.; cf. Sen. 21.78

Besides its possible connection with pre-existence, the sheer capacity of our memory supplies, Cicero suggests, evidence of our soul’s divinity.  What material substance, Cicero asks, could store such a large, virtually infinite amount of information, instantly retrievable.  Given what we now know of brain physiology, this argument is less persuasive for us than it might have been in antiquity.

21. Rapidity of thought
§ 70; cf. Sen. 21.78

The speed of thought processes seems inconsistent with a physical basis.  Again, this argument is less persuasive to modern readers.

22. Human genius
§ 61 ff.; cf. Sen. 21.78

Human beings have a vast and incredible capacity to invent (inventio) and discover in fields as diverse as literature, science, art, music and government.  Indeed, our creative imagination appears limitless. His litany of humankind’s accomplishments is supremely eloquent, itself an example of genius: “In order to persuade us of the divinity of the soul, Cicero extols the splendour of the universe and raises the tone of his language to match the lofty topic” (Kennedy, p. 95).

23. Astronomy
(see 10 above)

Especially because of its prevalence throughout his religious works, we may single out astronomy for special consideration.  Nature, Cicero tells us, providentially supplied the heavenly bodies and their orderly movements.  It also designed the human body with an upright posture, our heads raised, to make the sky more visible.  We first charted the movements of stars of necessity, to mark seasons and time agriculture.  From this came mathematics, and from that all further sciences and technology that rely on mathematics.

24. Inspired philosophy, religion, poetry
§§ 64−67; cf. Leg. 1.22.58; Amic. 57; Sen. 40; Off. 2.5

Poetry, philosophy, and especially religion are divine activities, things worthy of gods.

25. Divination
§ 66; cf. Div. 1; Sen. 21.78; Sextus Empiricus Phys. 1.20−23. = Aristotle On Philosophy Ross fr. 12a

Cicero had considerable interest in divination.  His views on the topic, as inferred from his discussion in many writings, are subject to some debate.  In On Divination he distinguishes two varieties of divination:  natural (e.g., dreams and prophecies uttered in ecstatic trances) and technical (e.g., ceremonial interpretation of animal entrails or flights of birds).  A reasonable hypothesis that might accommodate his various statements is that he accepted the validity of natural divination, but was more skeptical of the technical kind.

In Div. 1.5.9, he argues that if divination exists, it means the gods exist (since they use this means to communicate knowledge of future events to us).  While he does not state it explicitly, it seems straightforward to extend this reasoning by adding “and if the gods exist and communicate with us, it means we are divine — and if divine, then immortal.”

By divination Cicero chiefly means supernatural prediction of future events.  However other forms of extrasensory perception, like telepathy and clairvoyance, might equally be taken as evidence of the soul’s divinity and immortality.

26. Affinity with God’s nature
§ 66 f.; cf. N.D. 2.15.40−42; Fin. 4.5.11; Rep. 6.15.15

“And indeed God Himself, who is comprehended by us, can be comprehended in no other way save as a mind unfettered and free, severed from all perishable matter, conscious of all and moving all and self-endowed with perpetual motion.. Of such sort and of the same nature is the human mind.” Cicero also alludes to the possibility than both gods and human souls are composed of Aristotle’s hypothetical fifth element.

27. Unseen Governor analogy
§ 68 ff.; cf. N.D. 2.32.81–35.90

While we cannot see God, we infer God’s existence from what we can see: the order, beauty and wonder of the universe.  Analogously, while we do not see our own divine nature, we may infer it from the vast, orderly and wonderful extent and coordination of its activities.  More of Cicero’s eloquence is on display here.

Direct Awareness

28. Introspection and existential experience
§ 55; cf. § 52

In § 55 Cicero writes, “The soul then is conscious that it is in motion, and when so conscious it is at the same time conscious of this, that it is self-moved by its own power and not an outside power, and that it cannot ever be abandoned by itself; and this is proof of eternity.”  This and similar statements might be interpreted to mean that, by means of introspection, one may gain some form of experiential proof of the soul’s divinity and immortality.  Concerning this passage Wynne (2020) quotes Carlos Lévy as writing, “Ainsi s’effectue le passage entre l’immédiateté de la sensation intérieure et l’éternité,” although Wynne does not agree.

Brittain (2012) suggests that virtually the entire point of the work is to stimulate introspection, leading to intuitive insight into ones immortality, setting the stage for St. Augustine’s introspective proofs of the souls immortality. (Augustine, of course, was a dedicated reader of Cicero). Nevertheless, Cicero is no  mystic.  He doesn’t describe a experiential revelation of the soul’s divinity such as found in the Hermetic literature, or a startling and profound I AM experience.that settles the question of the soul’s immortality once and for all.

Conclusion

As with Plato, none of Cicero’s arguments individually constitute a logically irrefutable proof of the soul’s immortality, although considered collectively we might allow they supply probabilistic scientific support (cf. N.D. 2.65.163).  The real power of Tusculan Disputations 1, however, lay in its performative aspects: as a work of art, a product of genius, inspired by sources deeper than rationalistic thought, it awakens instinctive conviction, stimulates introspection, and directs our attention to subjective intuitive and experiential evidences of divinity and immortality.  Our summary here is insufficient to fully convey this.  Rather, it’s best appreciated by reading the work itself.

So much, then for Cicero. The next proposed steps will be to consider arguments for the soul’s immortality presented by St. Augustine in De Immortalitate Animae and De Trinitate, and in the Hermetic literature.  After that we will jump ahead many centuries to Marsilio Ficino’s Theologia Platonica de immortalitate animorum (1482), and then to John Davies’ Nosce Teipsum (1599) and Edward Young’s Night Thoughts (1742−1745).  Since Young’s time, pervasive skepticism, materialism and atheism have so much dominated academic thinking that serious discussions of immortality are hard to come by.

Bibliography

Bels, Jacques. La survie de l’âme de Platon à Posidonius. Revue de l’histoire des religions, 199, 2, 1982, 169−182.
https://www.persee.fr/doc/rhr_0035-1423_1982_num_199_2_4714

Brittain, Charles. Self-knowledge in Cicero and Augustine (De trinitate, X, 5, 7-10, 16). Medioevo, 37, 2012, 107−136.
https://www.academia.edu/9271891

Bruwaene, Martin van den. La théologie de Cicéron. Louvain, 1937; 59 f.

Ciafardini, Emanuele. L’immortalità dell’anima in Cicerone (il primo libro delle Tusculane). Rivista di Filosofia Neo-scolastica, 13, 1921, 245−263.

Cumont, Franz. Astrology and Religion Among the Greeks and Romans. New York: Putnam, 1912. (See Lecture VI. Eschatology, pp. 92−110).
https://www.sacred-texts.com/astro/argr/argr11.htm

Degraff, Thelma B. Plato in Cicero. Classical Philology, vol. 35, no. 2, 1940, 143–153.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/264959

Dougan, Thomas Wilson (ed.). Tusculanarum Disputationum Libri Quinque. Vol 1. Cambridge University Press, 1905.
https://books.google.com/books?id=XaUzAQAAMAAJ

Douglas, A. E. (ed.). Cicero: Tusculan Disputations: Book I. Oxford University Press, 1985.
https://books.google.com/books?id=LlbwDwAAQBAJ

Englert, Walter. Fanum and philosophy: Cicero and the death of Tullia. Ciceroniana online 1.1, 2017, 41−66.
https://www.ojs.unito.it/index.php/COL/article/view/2202

Falconer, William Armistead (tr.). Cicero: On Old Age, On Friendship, On Divination. Loeb Classical Library 154. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1923.
https://books.google.com/books?id=5H0tAAAAIAAJ

Jones, Roger Miller. Posidonius and Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations i. 17−81. Classical Philology, 18.3, 1923, 202−228.
https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1086/360514

Kennedy, Steven M. A Commentary on Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, Book 1. Diss., University of Exeter, 2010.
https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/handle/10036/3166

Keyes, Clinton Walker (tr.). Cicero: De re Publica (On the Republic) , De Legibus (On the Laws).  Loeb Classical Library 213. New York: Putnam, 1928.
https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.182802

King, John Edward (tr.). Cicero: Tusculan Disputations. Loeb Classical Library 141. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1927.
https://www.stoictherapy.com/resources-tusculan-king

Kühner, Raphael (ed.). Tusculanarum disputationum libri quinque. 5. ed. Hanover, 1874.

Nutting, Herbert Chester (ed.). Cicero: Tusculan Disputations, I, II, V. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1909.
https://archive.org/details/tusculandisputa00nuttgoog

Long, A. G. Death and Immortality in Ancient Philosophy. Cambridge University Press, 2019.
https://books.google.com/books?id=jzCdDwAAQBAJ

Peabody, Andrew Preston (tr.). Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1886.
https://books.google.com/books?id=iJhfAAAAMAAJ

Pohlenz, M. (ed.). M. Tullius Cicero: Tusculanae Disputationes. Leipzig: Teubner, 1918.
http://data.perseus.org/citations/urn:cts:latinLit:phi0474.phi049.perseus-lat1:1

Rackham, Harris (tr.). Cicero: De Natura Deorum, Academica. Loeb Classical Library 268. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933.
https://archive.org/details/denaturadeorumac00ciceuoft
https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Cicero/de_Natura_Deorum/2A*.html

Setaioli, Aldo. Cicero and Seneca on the Fate of the Soul: Private Feelings and Philosophical Doctrines. In: Jörg Rüpke (ed.), The Individual in the Religions of the Ancient Mediterranean. Oxford University Press, 2013; 455-488.
https://books.google.com/?id=XeKdAAAAQBAJ

Stull, William. Reading the Phaedo in Tusculan Disputations 1. Classical Philology, 107.1, 2012, 38−52.
https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/663216?journalCode=cp

Sullivan, Francis A. Intimations of Immortality among the Ancient Romans. Classical Journal, vol. 39, no. 1, 1943, 15–24.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3291954

Uebersax, John. Plato’s 19 Proofs of the Immortality of the Human Soul. Christian Platonism website. 8 Sep. 2015. Accessed 25 Nov. 2020.
https://catholicgnosis.wordpress.com/2015/09/08/platos-various-proofs-of-the-immortality-of-the-human-soul/

Wynne, J. P. F. Cicero on the Soul’s Sensation of Itself: Tusculans 1. 49–76. In: Brad Inwood & James Warren (eds.), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 2020, 199−230.
https://books.google.com/?id=g147zAEACAAJ&pg=PA199

First draft: 3 December 2020

Preface to Traherne

Art: Thomas Denny, Thomas Traherne windows (Hereford Cathedral, 2007) 

SINCE the rediscovery of Thomas Traherne’s work around the turn of 20th century, there has been wide consensus that he is a significant writer. There has been less agreement, however, on why he is significant — i.e., what his main contributions, especially for present times, consist of.

Somewhat unfortunately, many early commentators focused attention on his poetry, classifying him narrowly as an English metaphysical poet.  However, while his poetry is excellent, it is arguably,not quite as technically sophisticated as that of George Herbert or Henry Vaughan. Traherne’s best work is not his verse, but his Centuries of Meditations, which we might classify as prose-poetry.

Other writers sought to interpret Traherne as a critic of the newly emerging rationalism, especially of Hobbes.  More recently (e.g., Inge, 2009) attention has been drawn to his significance for Christian doctrinal theology.

Somewhat less attention, however, has been paid to simply understanding Traherne’s writings at face value:  as devotional works intended to stimulate and deepen the religious experience of readers. What if we simply allow that Traherne is authentically inspired?   In that case, perhaps we ought to be more interested in how he describes his work and mission than in historical or technical criticism.

Traherne’s two most sublime and famous works — the poems of the Dobell folio (Dobell, 1906) and Centuries of Meditations (Dobell, 1908) have been transmitted in manuscript form only and lack author prefaces.  However Traherne did prepare another work, Christian Ethicks, for publication (it reached print a year after his death) and this is prefaced with a ‘Note to the Reader.’  Here Traherne carefully and concisely explains his purpose.  Christian Ethicks is a systematic work, but it treats the same subjects as his poems and Centuries of Meditations.  Therefore his ‘To the Reader’ gives us insight into his intentions for these other works as well.

To the Reader, copied from the 1675 edition of Christian Ethicks is supplied below. Original spelling is retained.  Page numbers have been added in braces ({}) and paragraphs numbered in brackets ([]).  Some key points are as follows:

In the first paragraph he announces his aim to elevate the soul and inflame the heart.  He is interested in ethics not as a dry academic exercise or as theories developed by force of rational argument.  Rather he seeks to excite the intelligence and arouse the will, enabling people to seek and directly experience the religious and moral truths contained.  Here he follows the tradition of Plato — to achieve moral transformation by an ascent of the mind and heart and by recollection (anamnesis) of already known truths — and not the rationalism of Aristotle or scholasticism.

In [2−3] he contrasts his method with discussions that approach ethics either (1) dogmatically, as ‘things we must do because God so ordains’, or (2) based on practical expedience.  Indeed, a hallmark feature of Traherne’s philosophy is that ethics is what produces our greatest good, which he calls Felicity.  Felicity includes happiness, but is something more.  It also carries the sense of joy, illumination and holiness.  For Traherne, Felicity is the telos of human beings, our ethical summum bonum.  It unites in a single principle our greatest happiness, our duty, expedience, God’s will, love of God and charity to others.

Traherne has sometimes been criticized as being an impractical optimist, with no significant theory of evil.  He addresses this point in paragraph [4], taking the position that virtues are so good, beautiful and attractive in themselves that, if we can see them truly, they will by their own force overcome any attraction to baseness or sin. Hence explicit discussion of vice is a digression and a distraction from topics that matter more.

Traherne is clearly promoting what we would today call virtue ethics. In the subsequent paragraphs he alludes to a number of specific virtues, including the traditional cardinal and theological virtues.  Again in a characteristically Platonic way, he recognizes a fundamental unity amongst virtues.  At the center of them all is Goodness, the source of which is God.

The final paragraph emphasizes two things.  First, the essence of his entire system is to exhort us to God’s praise and glory.  God’s glory, for Traherne, is the essential fact of the universe.  This fact is not only virtually a logical necessity, but something Traherne claims to have experienced himself many times.  Further, we cannot doubt that it is his personal, passionate aim to convey this message to us so that we may achieve the Felicity of which he speaks.  Traherne presents his writings as a charitable outreaching to his readers, seeking to further God’s glory by making us want to further God’s glory, achieving, in the process, our own Felicity.  This kind of self-reinforcing circularity is recurring theme in his writings.

Finally and tellingly, he is careful to emphasize that we must not only understand these high truths intellectually, but “sense” them.

TO THE READER.

[1] THE design of this Treatise is, not to stroak and tickle the Fancy, but to elevate the Soul, and refine its Apprehensions, to inform the Judgment, and polish it for Conversation, to purifie and enflame the Heart, to enrich the Mind, and guide Men {ii} (that stand in need of help) in the way of Vertue; to excite their Desire, to encourage them to Travel, to comfort them in the Journey, and so at last to lead them to true Felicity, both here and hereafter.

[2] need not treat of Vertues in the ordinary way, as they are Duties enjoyned by the Law of GOD; that the Author of The whole Duty of Man *hath excellently done: nor as they are Prudential Expedients and Means for a mans Peace and Honour on Earth; that is in some measure done by the French Charon {iii} of Wisdom**. My purpose is to satisfie the Curious and Unbelieving Soul, concerning the reality, force, and efficacy of Vertue; and having some advantages from the knowledge I gained in the nature of Felicity (by many years earnest and diligent study) my business is to make as visible, as it is possible for me, the lustre of its Beauty, Dignity, and Glory: By shewing what a necessary Means Vertue is, how sweet, how full of Reason, how desirable in it self, how just and amiable, how delightful, and how powerfully conducive also {iv} to Glory: how naturally Vertue carries us to the Temple of Bliss, and how immeasurably transcendent it is in all kinds of Excellency.

[3] And (if I may speak freely) my Office is, to carry and enhance Vertue to its utmost height, to open the Beauty of all the Prospect, and to make the Glory of GOD appear, in the Blessedness of Man, by setting forth its infinite Excellency: Taking out of the Treasuries of Humanity those Arguments that will discover the great perfection of the End of Man, which he may atchieve {v} by the capacity of his Nature: As also by opening the Nature of Vertue it self, thereby to display the marvellous Beauty of Religion, and light the Soul to the sight of its Perfection.

[4] I do not speak much of Vice, which is far the more easie Theme, because I am intirely taken up with the abundance of Worth and Beauty in Vertue, and have so much to say of the positive and intrinsick Goodness of its Nature. But besides, since a strait Line is the measure both of it self, and of a crooked one, I conclude, That the very Glory of {vi} Vertue well understood, will make all Vice appear like dirt before Jewel, when they are compared together. Nay, Vice as soon as it is named in the presence of these Vertues, will look like Poyson and a Contagion, or if you will, as black as Malice and Ingratitude: so that there will need no other Exposition of its Nature, to dehort Men from the love of it, than the Illustration of its Contrary.

[5] Vertues are listed in the rank of Invisible things; of which kind, some are so blind as to deny there are any existent {vii} in Nature: But yet it may, and will be made easily apparent, that all the Peace and Beauty in the World proceedeth from them, all Honour and Security is founded in them, all Glory and Esteem is acquired by them. For the Prosperity of all Kingdoms is laid in the Goodness of GOD and of Men. Were there nothing in the World but the Works of Amity, which proceed from the highest Vertue, they alone would testifie of its Excellency. For there can be no Safety where there is any Treachery: But were all {viii} Truth and Courtesie exercis’d with Fidelity and Love, there could be no Injustice or Complaint in the World; no Strife, nor Violence: but all Bounty, Joy and Complacency. Were there no Blindness, every Soul would be full of Light, and the face of Felicity be seen, and the Earth be turned into Heaven.

[6] The things we treat of are great and mighty; they touch the Essence of every Soul, and are of infinite Concernment, because the Felicity is eternal that is acquired by them: I do not mean Immortal only but worthy to be Eternal: and it is {ix} impossible to be happy without them. We treat of Mans great and soveraign End, of the Nature of Blessedness, of the Means to attain it: Of Knowledge and Love, of Wisdom and Goodness, of Righteousness and Holiness, of Justice and Mercy, of Prudence and Courage, of Temperance and Patience, of Meekness and Humility, of Contentment, of Magnanimity and Modesty, of Liberality and Magnificence, of the waies by which Love is begotten in the Soul, of Gratitude, of Faith, Hope, and Charity, of Repentance, Devotion, {x} Fidelity, and Godliness. In all which we shew what sublime and mysterious Creatures they are, which depend upon the Operations of Mans Soul; their great extent, their use and value, their Original and their End, their Objects and their Times: What Vertues belong to the Estate of Innocency, what to the Estate of Misery and Grace, and what to the Estate of Glory. Which are the food of the Soul, and the works of Nature; which were occasioned by Sin, as Medicines and Expedients only: which are {xi} Essential to Felicity, and which Accidental; which Temporal, and which Eternal: with the true Reason of their Imposition; why they all are commanded, and how wise and gracious GOD is in enjoyning them. By which means all Atheism is put to flight, and all Infidelity: The Soul is reconciled to the Lawgiver of the World, and taught to delight in his Commandements: All Enmity and Discontentment must vanish as Clouds and Darkness before the Sun, when the Beauty of Vertue appeareth in its {xii} brightness and glory. It is impossible that the splendour of its Nature should be seen, but all Religion and Felicity will be manifest.

[7] Perhaps you will meet some New Notions: but yet when they are examined, he hopes it will appear to the Reader, that it was the actual knowledge of true Felicity that taught him to speak of Vertue; and moreover, that there is not the least tittle pertaining to the Catholick Faith contradicted or altered in his Papers. For he firmly retains all that was established in the {xiii} Ancient Councels, nay and sees Cause to do so, even in the highest and most transcendent Mysteries: only he enriches all, by farther opening the grandeur and glory of Religion, with the interiour depths and Beauties of Faith. Yet indeed it is not he, but GOD that hath enriched the Nature of it: he only brings the Wealth of Vertue to light, which the infinite Wisdom, and Goodness, and Power of GOD have seated there. Which though Learned Men know perhaps far better than he, yet he humbly craves pardon for casting in {xiv} his Mite to the vulgar Exchequer. He hath nothing more to say, but that the Glory of GOD, and the sublime Perfection of Humane Nature are united in Vertue. By Vertue the Creation is made useful, and the Universe delightful. All the Works of GOD are crowned with their End, by the Glory of Vertue. For whatsoever is good and profitable for Men is made Sacred; because it is delightful and well-pleasing to GOD: Who being LOVE by Nature, delighteth in his Creatures welfare.{xv}

[8] There are two sorts of concurrent Actions necessary to Bliss. Actions in GOD, and Actions in Men; nay and Actions too in all the Creatures. The Sun must warm, but it must not burn; the Earth must bring forth, but not swallow up; the Air must cool without starving, and the Sea moisten without drowning: Meats must feed but not poyson: Rain must fall, but not oppress: Thus in the inferiour Creatures you see Actions are of several kinds. But these may be reduced to the Actions of GOD, from whom they {xvi} spring; for he prepares all these Creatures for us. And it is necessary to the felicity of his Sons, that he should make all things healing and amiable, not odious and destructive: that he should Love, and not Hate: And the Actions of Men must concur aright with these of GOD, and his Creatures. They must not despise Blessings because they are given, but esteem them; not trample them under feet, because they have the benefit of them, but magnifie and extol them: They too must Love, and not Hate: They must not kill and murther, {xvii} but serve and pleasure one another: they must not scorn great and inestimable Gifts, because they are common, for so the Angels would lose all the happiness of Heaven. If GOD should do the most great and glorious things that infinite Wisdom could devise; if Men will resolve to be blind, and perverse, and sensless, all will be in vain: the most High and Sacred things will increase their Misery. This may give you some little glimpse of the excellency of Vertue.{xviii}

[9] You may easily discern that my Design is to reconcile Men to GOD, and make them fit to delight in him: and that my last End is to celebrate his Praises, in communion with the Angels. Wherein I beg the Concurrence of the Reader, for we can never praise him enough; nor be fit enough to praise him: No other man (at least) can make us so, without our own willingness, and endeavour to do it. Above all, pray to be sensible of the Excellency of the Creation for upon the due sense of its Excellency the life of {xix} Felicity wholly dependeth. Pray to be sensible of the Excellency of Divine Laws, and of all the Goodness which your Soul comprehendeth. Covet a lively sense of all you know, of the Excellency of GOD, and of Eternal Love; of your own Excellency, and of the worth and value of all Objects whatsoever. For to feel is as necessary, as to see their Glory.

* Anonymous, The Whole Duty of Man. London: Henry Hammond, 1658.  A popular 17th century Anglican devotional work.

** Pierre Charron, De la sagesse (translated into English as Of Wisdome, 1612).  Charron, a disciple of Montaigne, defended virtue on the basis of practical expedience.

Bibliography

Balakier, James, J. Thomas Traherne and the Felicities of the Mind. Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, 2010.

Dobell, Bertram (ed.). The Poetical Works of Thomas Traherne. London, 1903; 2nd ed. 1906.

Dobell, Bertram (ed.). Thomas Traherne: Centuries of Meditations. London, 1908.

Hunter, Stuart Charles. Prophet of Felicity: A Study of the Intellectual Background of Thomas Traherne. Diss. McMaster University, 1965.

Inge, Denise. Wanting Like a God: Desire and Freedom in Thomas Traherne. London: SCM Press, 2009.

Margoliouth, H. M. (ed.). Centuries, Poems, and Thanksgivings. 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958.

Marks, Carol L. Thomas Traherne and Hermes Trismegistus. Renaissance News, vol. 19, no. 2, 1966, 118–131.

Martz, Louis. The Paradise Within: Studies in Vaughan, Traherne, and Milton. New Haven and London, 1964.

Traherne, Thomas. Christian ethicks, or, Divine morality opening the way to blessedness, by the rules of vertue and reason. London, Jonathan Edwin, 1675. [Orig. edition]

1st draft: 1 Sep 2020

A Beautiful Mind: Joseph Addison’s Religious Essays

EADERS of this blog may download a free copy of my new book, a collection of religious and metaphysical essays by Joseph Addison which appeared in the The Spectator in 1711 and 1712. These are certain to delight and edify.  Addison is well known as one of the most skilled prose stylists in the English language; but few today are aware of the sublime quality of his religious essays.

Addison’s influence on both the English and American minds is considerable, yet largely unacknowledged today.

Download the ebook in pdf format here.

Plato’s 19 Proofs of the Immortality of the Human Soul

Is man immortal, or is he not? If he is not, all our disputes are mere amusements, or trials of skill. In this case, truth, reason, religion, which give our discourses such pomp and solemnity, are … mere empty sound, without any meaning in them. But if man is immortal, it will behove him to be very serious about eternal consequences; or, in other words, to be truly religious.
~ Edward Young, Night Thoughts

Art: William Blake, The Spirit of Plato unfolds his Worlds to Milton in Contemplation.

N earlier article proposed the cataloging of Plato’s various proofs for the immortality of the human soul. A fair effort to survey earlier literature has failed to uncover previous systematic attempts; the relative scarcity of studies on this topic generally is unfortunate (and not a little puzzling) given how central the soul’s immortality is for Plato’s philosophy.

As Plato’s proofs are many and subtle we shall proceed incrementally, adding little by little to the present article, until something like a thorough survey is accomplished.

To begin with, some general points.

First, we may in this context distinguish between two kinds of proofs: (1) logical arguments and (2) experiential demonstrations. By an argument we mean a set of propositions or premises, which, by formal rules of logic, imply a definite conclusion; or a set of propositions that together increase the probability that a conclusion is true (i.e., a probabilistic argument.)

By a demonstration we mean an attempt by Plato to bring to our conscious awareness an insight by means other than logical argument. In many cases with Plato this amounts to eliciting an anamnesis (an un-forgetting or recollection) of some previously known or latent knowledge. For example, we previously considered how Plato’s contemplation of the Form of the Good in Symposium 211–212 can be seen as a demonstrative proof of the existence of God. Similarly, some passages of Plato seem intended to evoke in the reader an experiential awareness of the soul’s immortality.

Second, some of Plato’s proofs are more distinct and easy to identify and characterize than others. What may at first seem a single proof may have several variations or senses that merit separate consideration. Here, inasmuch as we are approaching the topic at a data-gathering stage, we will incline more towards separating than aggregating potentially distinct proofs.

Third, some proofs appear in more than one dialogue. Initially we shall be content to, mostly, associate each proof with the dialogue in which it occurs most prominently.

A Bibliography, also to be developed over time, is added. In general the 20th century literature on immortality of the human soul is meager — an indication of the radical materialism that has lately dominated.

One motivation for pursuing the present project is to inform investigation of a related question, namely: have later philosophers introduced many new and original proofs for the immortality of the human soul, or have they, in this area as in many others, more or less only added ‘footnotes’ to Plato? To anticipate somewhat, it is tentatively proposed that one productive way to address this question is to consider three relevant works from different time periods: (1) Book 1 of Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations (which makes frequent reference to Plato’s main work on the soul, Phaedo), (2) Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology (prominently subtitled, On the Immortality of the Soul), and (3) Edward Young’s Night Thoughts (Nights 6 and 7; “Containing The Nature, Proof, and Importance of Immortality.”)

Plato’s Proofs of Immortality

1. Cyclicity argument.

Source: Phaedo 70c–72e.

Summary: All things proceed from their opposites. Just as death proceeds from life, life must proceed from death. Therefore the soul cannot permanently perish.

2. Recollection (or innate knowledge) argument.

Source: Phaedo 72e–77d; cf. e.g., Meno.

Summary: It appears that we know things that we have not learned in this lifetime — as shown by the fact that when they are made salient, we grasp them immediately and they seem already familiar. This suggests to Plato that we have lived before in a pre-existence; and if our souls existed before this life, they will exist after this life.

3. Affinity argument.

Source: Phaedo 78b–84b.

Summary: There are two levels of reality — the temporal and changing, and the Eternal and immutable; the soul has an innate affinity for eternal things (e.g., Platonic Forms; Truth, Beauty and Moral Goodness; mathematical and religious truths); therefore its own nature must be eternal.

4. Form of Life argument.

Source: Phaedo 102b–107b.

Summary: The soul is not only alive itself, but gives life to the body. Therefore it is intimately connected with the essence or Form of Life. Hence it would be illogical or inconsistent for the soul itself to perish.

5. Vitiating principle argument.

Source: Republic 10.608e–611a.

Summary: Every thing has its own principle of destruction, unique to it and innate (e.g., for a body, disease); if a thing is destroyed, it is only by this unique, endogenous principle. The soul has a unique destructive principle, namely vice; yet even the worst vice is not sufficient to completely kill the soul; and since nothing else besides a thing’s internal destructive principle can make it totally perish, the soul must be immortal.

6. Justice argument.

Source: Republic, Book 10 (e.g., 10.612−4, and the Myth of Er that follows).

Unless there are rewards or punishments after this life, it would violate our innate sense of justice. For example, an evil man could avoid punishment for misdeeds by dying. In short, an afterlife of the soul is required to reconcile our strong and innate sense of fairness with the seeming disregard of Fate to moral justice in this life.

7. Simplicity argument.

Source: Republic 611b, Phaedo 78b-d; cf. Plotinus, Enneads 1.1.2, 1.1.9, 1.1.12.

Summary: A thing composed of many elements is susceptible to decomposition; but the soul is a single substance, uncompounded and hence incorruptible.

8. Self-moved mover.

Source: Phaedrus 245c–246a.

Summary: While the soul moves the body, and it moves itself, it is itself not moved by anything external to it. Since being destroyed would imply movement of some sort, the soul, not moved by anything extrinsic, cannot be destroyed and must be imperishable.

9. Universal interest and yearning; begetting of children.

Source: Symposium 201–212; cf. Laws 4.721.

Diotima’s speeches in Symposium revolve around the subject of immortality. Several senses of immortality are pursued, such as the begetting of children and the imparting of ideas or virtue to other people, leading up to the addressing of immortality in the religious sense. The overall drift is that human beings seem exceptionally interested in immortality and orient much of their lives to striving for it. This would not be logical unless immortality is possible.

10. Proof via purification.

Source: Republic 10.611b–612a; cf. Plotinus Enneads 1.1.12 and especially 4.7.10.

A proof by demonstration. One who is suitably purified, intellectually and morally, may obtain immediate awareness of the soul’s true nature and its immortality.

11. Replenishment argument.

Source: Phaedo 72a-e; cf. Republic 10.611b-d
Summary: Unless the world were not replenished with living souls, eventually all things would be dead; rather, the world is continually replenished with living souls, who must exist somewhere outside of this world before entering. As Socrates puts it, ” if all things that have life should die, and, when they had died, the dead should remain in that condition, is it not inevitable that at last all things would be dead.” (Phaedo 72c). Whether this is merely another statement of, or implicit in, the cyclicity argument is a topic for further consideration.

12. Afterlife testimonies.

Source: Republic Book 10 (Myth of Er).

If we take the Myth of Er literally, then it purports to be an eye-witness account of someone who has personally observed the extra-mundane life of souls. It seems fairly clear that Plato intend us to take the Er myth more than literally; nevertheless, it does serve more or less as an implicit reference by Plato to the genre of survival testimony, of which numerous examples, ancient and modern, exist.

13. Trusted authority.

Source: Meno 81a-b.

Among the Plato’s lesser arguments for the soul’s immortality is an appeal to authority: honored and trustworthy figures of the past have taught it.  The wisest and best of men are the most confident of survival of soul.

14. Tradition and custom.

Source: ?

Widespread or universal tradition implies that belief in immortality is in our common human nature.   This is conceptually different from the proof by trusted authority, though the two clearly go together. (E.g., one function of trusted authority is precisely to articulate most clearly the common knowledge or tradition.) I do not have a definite source for this in the dialogues, but include it here, tentatively, because another source mentioned it in connection with Plato. (Both the tradition and the trusted authority proofs, however, are taken up by Cicero.)

15. Limitless capacity.

Source: ?

Human beings seem to have a limitless capacity for knowledge, which would serve no purpose if the soul did not outlive the body. Here again, I have no definite source for this yet, but the idea is implicit in Plato’s general view of Man’s innate divinity and noetic and moral capabilities; and the Neoplatonist view (derived from Plato) that each human soul contains a copy of all Forms.

16. Example of Socrates.

Source: Apology, Phaedo, Crito.

Socrates’ absolute and unfeigned confidence in the face of death, his nonchalance, and what even approaches an eagerness to shuffle off the mortal coil constitute a demonstrative proof. His actions, that is, testify at least as eloquently as his words to the soul’s immortality.

17. Socrates’ desire to convince others.

Source: Phaedo

Beyond his own confidence in immortality, Socrates is intensely concerned to convince others of it. Such benevolent zeal is indicative of well-founded sincerity and possession of an important truth.

18. Socrates’ sign.

Source: Apology.

One reason Socrates gives for his confidence is that his habitual sign or daemon, which customarily warns him in case of danger, did not oppose him in attending his trial. This, Socrates, fully expecting a death sentence, took as strong evidence that his execution posed no harm. Insofar as Socrates believed his sign, and Socrates is a trusted source, this constitutes evidence for the immortality of the soul. Moreover, insofar as, from the testimony of others, we are persuaded of the sign’s trustworthiness independently of Socrates’ own evaluation of it, that is additional positive evidence for immortality.

19. Conviction of Plato.

Plato also seems intensely concerned with convincing readers of the soul’s immortality. His arguments are clearly presented in a spirit of something more than detached speculation. Cicero puts it well.

Even if Plato gave no reasons for his belief — see how much confidence I have in the man — he would break down my opposition by his authority alone; but he brings forward so many reasons as to make it perfectly obvious that he is not only fully persuaded himself, but desirous of convincing others.
~ Cicero, Tusc. Disp. 1.21.49

Thus Cicero alludes here to two different proofs:  Plato’s authority, and his desire to convince others; and the sheer number or proofs Plato produces is seen as evidence of the latter.

Bibliography

Suggestions are welcome. The goal, however, is not to produce a comprehensive bibliography, but mainly to include works that attempt to consider Plato’s arguments in their totality.

Apolloni, David. Plato’s Affinity Argument for the Immortality of the Soul. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 34(1), 1996, 5–32. (Study of the argument in Phaedo 78b-80d.)
https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_the_history_of_philosophy/v034/34.1apolloni.pdf

Bett, Richard. Immortality and the Nature of the Soul in the Phaedrus. Phronesis, 31(1), 1986, 1–26.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182241

Chase, Thomas. Cicero on the Immortality of the Soul. Cambridge, MA 1851 (repr. 1872).
https://books.google.com/books?id=T8INAAAAYAAJ

Connolly, Tim. Plato: Phaedo. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Web, 13 June 2015. (See also References therein.)
http://www.iep.utm.edu/phaedo/

Cornford, Stephen (Ed.). Edward Young: Night Thoughts. Cambridge, 1989 (repr. 2008). https://books.google.com/books?id=-2Q2MgAACAAJ

DeGraff, Thelma B. Plato in Cicero. Classical Philology, 35(2), 1940, 143–153.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/264959

Elton, Matthew. The Role of the Affinity Argument in the Phaedo. Phronesis, 42(3), 1997, 313–316.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182565

Ficino, Marsilio. Platonic Theology, On the Immortality of the Soul. Michael J. B. Allen (Trans.), James Hankins (Ed.). 6 vols. Cambridge, MA, 2001–2006.
https://books.google.com/books?id=cQZrkQEACAAJ

Frede, Dorothea. The Final Proof of the Immortality of the Soul in Plato’s Phaedo 102a–107a. Phronesis, 23(1), 1978, 27–41.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182027

Gallop, David. Plato’s ‘Cyclical Argument’ Recycled. Phronesis, 27, 1982, 207–222.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182153

Gaye, Russell K. The Platonic Conception of Immortality and its Connexion with the Theory of Ideas. Cambridge, 1904 (repr. 2014).
http://books.google.com/books?id=XwWuAgAAQBAJ

Gertz, Sebastian Ramon Philipp. Death and Immortality in Late Neoplatonism: Studies on the Ancient Commentaries on Plato’s Phaedo. Leiden, 2011.
http://books.google.com/books?id=Kzgca5UpTFwC

Geddes, W(illiam) D(uguid). Platonis Phaedo. 2nd ed. London: MacMillan, 1885.
https://archive.org/details/phaedopla00plat

Gilfillan, George (Ed.) Young’s Night Thoughts. Edinburgh, 1853.
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/33156/33156-h/33156-h.htm

Gould, Richard. Cicero’s Indebtedness to the Platonic Dialogues in Tusculan Disputations I. Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1968.

Hackforth, R. Immortality in Plato’s Symposium. Classical Review, 64(2), 1950, 43–45.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/703569

King , J. E. (Trans.) Cicero: Tusculan Disputations. Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, MA, 1927 (rev. 1945).
http://www.amazon.com/dp/0674991567

MacKenna, Stephen (Trans.), Plotinus: The Enneads. 1st edition. London, 1917. Internet Sacred Text Archive. Web, 16 June 2015.
http://sacred-texts.com/cla/plotenn/index.htm

MacKenna, Stephen (Trans.); Page, B. S. (Ed.), Plotinus: The Enneads. 2nd edition. London, 1956.

O’Brien, Michael J. Becoming Immortal in Plato’s Symposium. In: Douglas E. Gerber (Ed.), Greek Poetry and Philosophy: Studies in Honour of Leonard Woodbury. Chicago, 1984, pp. 185–205.
http://commonweb.unifr.ch/artsdean/pub/gestens/f/as/files/4610/26399_133233.pdf

Patterson, Robert Leet. Plato on Immortality. University Park, PA, 1965.
http://books.google.com/books?id=GRtDAAAAIAAJ

Peabody, Andrew P. (tr.) Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations. Boston, 1886.
https://archive.org/details/cicerostusculand00ciceiala

Shorey, Paul. Review of The Platonic Conception of Immortality, and its Connexion with the Theory of Ideas, by R. K. Gaye. Philosophical Review, 14(5), 1905, 590–595.
http://books.google.com/books?id=MJZJAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA590

Shorey, Paul (Tr.). Plato’s Republic. 2 vols. (Loeb Classical Library: Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6). Cambridge, MA, 1935 (repr. 1969).
http://data.perseus.org/citations/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg030.perseus-eng1:1.327a

Smith, John. A Discourse Demonstrating the Immortality of the Soul. In: John Smith, Select Discourses, London J. Flesher, 1660; repr. in E. T. Campagnac (ed.), The Cambridge Platonists, Oxford, 1901, pp. 99-157.
https://books.google.com/books?id=CC8qAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA99

Snyder, James G. Marsilio Ficino. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Web, 22 June 2015.
http://www.iep.utm.edu/ficino/

Spring, Charles. On the Essence and Immortality of the Soul. London, 1865. http://books.google.com/books?id=xnwXAAAAYAAJ

Stanford, Charles S. A Catalogue of Books Treating on the Immortality of the Soul. New York, 1853. (Also appended to: Charles S. Stanford, Phaedo: Or, The Immortality of the Soul, New York, 1854.)
http://books.google.com/books?id=n4k0JOmmsJYC&pg=PA231

Stuart, Moses. Cicero on the Immortality of the Soul (Questionum Tusculanaram, Liber 1). With Notes and Appendix. Andover, MA, 1833.
https://books.google.com/books?id=VQeTJX8ARXoC

Stull, William. Reading the Phaedo in Tusculan Disputations 1. Classical Philology, Vol. 107, No. 1 (January 2012), pp. 38-52.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/663216

Uebersax, John S. Plato Divinus: Is Plato a Religious Figure? Web, 15 June 2015.
http://www.john-uebersax.com/books/Uebersax-Divinus-Plato-draft-June-2015.pdf

Westerink, Leendert. G. (Trans.). The Greek Commentaries on Plato’s Phaedo. Vol. 1 (Olympiodorus) & Vol 2 (Damascius). Prometheus Trust, 2009.
https://books.google.com/books?id=68ZOAQAAIAAJ

The Theory of Human Collective Memory and the Atonement of Jesus Christ

On this Good Friday, the points below try to tie together in a new way two different concepts:  the theory of the sacrificial atonement of Jesus Christ, and the theory of a human collective mind or collective memory.

1. Many psychologists (Jung and Freud included) have believed in the possibility of a collective mind or memory pool for the entire human race, such that, by some as-yet unspecified non-physical means, a mental experience of one person, once had, may become available for all other human beings to experience.  Some (limited) experimental evidence supports this theory.

2. The principle of a collective memory or collective mind is also found in many esoteric traditions (e.g., the Akashic Records of theosophy, the Adam Kadmon in the Kabbala, etc.)

3. Such a principle of a metaphysical collective mind would supply a possible mechanism for understanding in a new way the meaning of the theological principle of the ‘substitutive atonement of Jesus Christ’.

4. The theological doctrine of Jesus’ substitutive atonement holds that, by his life, passion, and death on the cross, Jesus Christ accomplished the actual or potential reconciliation (at-one-ment) of all human beings to God.

5. The atonement doctrine has several variants.  One especially problematic, but common, version is that Jesus literally, by his death, paid a ‘blood guilt’ or penal debt or which mankind incurred through disobedience to God. The difficulty with this is that it relies heavily on the terrible Calvinist doctrine of the innate depravity of human beings.  It also makes God out to be rather ungenerous, if not outright malicious, in requiring that a ‘blood guilt’ price be paid.

6. The collective mind theory supplies a potentially new perspective on the atonement of Christ:  by willingly accepting death, and completely subordinating his own personal will, Jesus of Nazareth achieved a level of humility, unselfishness, and union with God’s will entirely new for the human race. It set a new precedent of egolessness.

7. Jesus Christ having done this, then the thoughts, judgments, and insights by which he reached this peak of moral attainment, being those of a human being, would be deposited in the collective mind of humanity.  Thenceforth, all other human beings could potentially tap into this new mindset, and imitate it.

8. If so, this would potentially explain *why* God would want to incarnate as a human being, Jesus Christ.  In order to deposit those insights, judgments, etc. of Jesus Christ that enabled him to completely overcome his human ego into the collective mind of humanity, God would need to become a man himself.

9. Further, this model would help explain how individual Christians may follow in Christ’s steps.  Each person, by engaging in some new moral precedent or new sacrifice for the sake of humanity, would deposit new material in the collective mind, and thereby enable other human beings to do likewise.

10.  This mechanism would operate in addition to that of the historical and social example set by Jesus Christ, as transmitted by oral and written tradition, which is also a means by which the life, passion, and death of Jesus may be imitated and contributes to the atonement of humanity with God.

Neoplatonism and Christian Iconography

One picture is indeed worth a thousand words.  Once someone asked me for a simple definition of Neoplatonism, and I was surprised to find myself at an almost complete loss for words.  It’s not that the principles of Neoplatonism are too complicated, but more that they involve so different a way of looking at things  that simple definitions do not readily suggest themselves.  Christian Neoplatonism seems at least as difficult, and perhaps more so, to define in a few words as Neoplatonism.

Therefore I was quite pleased to discover this illustration, which appeared quite by accident in the course of other pursuits, and which expresses several basic premises of Christian Neoplatonism.

About this work I know nothing – not the artist, source, or even original medium.  The style is suggestive of late 19th century British or American Christian art.

The literal scene, in any case, is the Transfiguration of Jesus (Matt. 17:1-9, Mark 9:2-8; Luke 9:28-36):

1. Jesus appears as the main figure, flanked left and right by Moses and Elijah.
2. Kneeling in the foreground are the apostles John (with folded hands), who kneels beside his brother James, and Peter kneeling by himself.
3. Surrounding Jesus is an almond-shaped ‘aura’, known technically as a mandorla.  This artistic motif is analogous to a nimbus or halo, but surrounds the body of a divinity rather than the head.  An oval mandorla around Jesus is a staple of Transfiguration art.

Now for the Neoplatonic elements.  We hasten to remark that whether the artist knew something of Neoplatonism, or if instead these elements derive solely from unconscious inspiration, is not known.  A third possibility, imitation of other works, cannot be excluded, but the uniqueness of the iconography here tends to suggest originality.

The work can be parsed as a set of intersecting or overlapping circles:

4. The largest circle, encompassing most of the area, could be interpreted as the material world.  This area itself is composed of concentric rings.  Notice, for example, the band containing radiating tongues of flame, suggesting the Sun.  Beyond that is the celestial, starry realm.  This much reminds us of ancient ‘concentric spheres’ models of the universe.
5. Coming from above is a second circle (or set of circles).  This clearly seems to correspond to God, or God the Father.   Note, though, the similarity of elements between this circle and the larger one.  The similarity could be understood as God containing the archetypes of all that is present in the material world.  That is, everything in the material realm — the earth, Sun, stars, etc. — first exists as ideas in the mind of God, or what Neoplatonists called the noetic cosmos.
6. Connecting the two circles of God and the material world is Jesus.  The viewer’s eye is drawn to the large and elaborate halo of Jesus as distinct from his body.  The halo again contains the details found in the God and earth circles; this would fit with the idea of Jesus, as the Word (Logos) of God, being in a sense an ‘image’ or ’emanation’ of God. (We use these words very loosely,  however; Christian theologians expressly deny that Jesus Christ is an emanation of God the Father; all we are really considering here is the idea of possible structural homologies between God, Jesus Christ, and the material world).
7. The God circle includes a smaller circle, which (a) again, structurally recapitulates the elements of the other circles, and (b) contains a prominent hand.  The hand seems to be connecting God the Father and Jesus.  The placement of this circle and hand seems to suggest their mediating relationship between God and Jesus.  One feature of Neoplatonism (e.g. Proclus) and Christian Neoplatonism (e.g., Dionysius the Areopagite) is the frequent postulation of mediating levels or agents between other levels or agents.

Whether the hand is meant to suggest the Holy Spirit is not clear.  It’s placement just above Jesus’ head would be consistent with such an interpretation; however the artist must have intentionally chosen to place a hand, rather than a dove here,  and perhaps with greater artistic effect.

The Communion of Saints

A search for a clear exposition of this distinctive and sublime Christian teaching revealed Wyllys Rede’s book, The Communion of Saints (Longmans, 1893). This charming devotional work has three special virtues:

First, it is plainly a labor of love.  Rede discloses that he lost both parents in infancy and felt a later spiritual connection with them; this interest, and the study and reflection pursuant to it, formed the earnest foundation of the book.

Second, a generous, diverse and interesting selection of quotes from earlier literature is supplied.

Third, the material was first delivered as a series of lectures; this often has, as here, the effect of enhancing the content, reasoning, and organization of a work.

Rede consistently appeals to the instincts and intuitions of the readers, diplomatically sidestepping and deflecting certain historical contentions that have sometimes surrounded the topic.

Though an Episcopalian cleric, Rede takes a non-denominational perspective.

An interesting detail from the author’s life is that, at age 3, he sat on the knee of President Lincoln and was entertained with stories immediately preceding to the latter’s delivery of the Gettysburg Address.

The chapters are as follows:

1. What is the Communion of Saints?

2. Is there a Life after Death?

3.Where are the Souls of Departed Saints?

4. Do the Saints departed Live a Conscious Life?

5. What is the Relationship of Departed Saints to us?

6. What is our Relationship to Departed Saints?

7. What is the Relationship of all Saints to God?

As seen, the book is structured in the form of questions which, the author candidly observes, are those which people naturally wonder about.  Below we excerpt the principle questions of each chapter, and the author’s conclusions concerning them.

1. What is the Communion of Saints?

What is the Communion of Saints?

The word “communion” is not difficult to define. It means a common share or fellowship. When used in a religious sense, it means a mystical partnership in some supernatural grace or life. [p. 4]

By the communion of saints we mean the spiritual relationship which knits together all God’s saints in the mystical Body of Christ. [p. 4]

To whom can we properly apply the title of “saints”?

I claim the name of saint for every soul [living or dead] that has been baptized into Christ and tries to live up to its baptismal vows. I claim it for every life that can with any degree of truth be called a consecrated life. I claim it for every one (however frail, however full of faults) who yet looks longingly before where Christ has gone and tries to follow Him. [p. 11]

2. Is there a Life after Death?

[His answer is yes. This chapter mainly sets the stage for subsequent discussion. Iit can be skipped or lightly read without limiting understanding or appreciation of later chapters.]

3. Where are the Souls of Departed Saints?

Rede affirms the traditional teaching that souls must await the Last Judgment at the end of the world before reaching a final reward with God in heaven.  This period(?) between death and the Last Judgement is termed the intermediate state.  For the virtuous, it is envisaged as a kind of Paradise, more a ‘school for souls’ than a place of punishment.   Supporting this view, Rede cites the words of Jesus on the cross to the penitent thief: Verily I say unto thee, To day shalt thou be with me in paradise. (Luke 23:43) Rede draws particular attention to the words today, which implies something immanent, not delayed until after the Last Judgment; and with me, which suggests a continuing connection or relationship of the soul to Jesus in this paradisiacal state.

The possibility that souls of the unjust go to another place, and undergo a purgatorial purification, is also considered.

Do they [departed souls] go at once to their final abode?

Every human soul must wait until its body has been raised from the grave, and God’s general judgment passed before it can enter on its final state. [p. 49]

Is there an intermediate state in which the spirit lives and waits the coming of God’s own good time ?

Our Church, our Creed, and our Bible tell us that there is. The Church in all ages, especially her earliest, has believed in such a state of life. [p. 51]

Where is their [just souls’] abode, and what their life between the hour of death and the judgment-day?

The Holy Scriptures teach us distinctly, though somewhat indirectly, of the existence and character of the intermediate state. [p. 52]

By Paradise He [Jesus] must have meant some intermediate state preparatory to the heavenly life into which He was later on to ascend. [p. 53]

The conclusions to be drawn from this parable [the rich man and Lazarus]; seem to me to be partly these: that the life of the soul goes on after death in some place or state provided by God for disembodied souls; that this has two divisions or states of life widely separated from each other, at least in the tenor of their existence. In one of them the spirits of the saints (represented by Lazarus) enjoy rest, refreshment, and companionship. In the other, those who have squandered their lives and hardened their hearts to the extent of final impenitence, await with apprehension the just and final judgment of their God. [pp. 59 – 60].

They have entered a new cosmical sphere of life, which differs totally from this material sphere of time and space. [p. 64]

“an inward realm where life lays bare its root, whereas in this world it shows only the branches of the tree.” [quoting Hans Lassen Martensen; p. 65]

“a kingdom of calm thought and self-fathoming, a kingdom of remembrance in the full sense of the word.” [quoting Hans Lassen Martensen; p. 65]

They are spending “a school-time of contemplation,” as in this world they endured “a discipline of service.” [quoting Bl. John Henry Cardinal Newman; p. 65].

This word [Paradise] our Lord used, and ever since it has been a consecrated word, and has been understood to mean the outer court of heaven, the gardens of delight which stretch about the dwelling-place of God, the pleasant land in which all faithful souls shall dwell until they enter in through the everlasting doors into the palace of the Great King. Its beauty must be transcendent, its delights infinite. It must be worthy of that city of God which it surrounds, worthy to be the royal road that leads up to gates of pearl and into streets of gold. [pp. 62-3]

4. Do the Saints departed Live a Conscious Life?

Is the life of the soul in the Intermediate State a conscious life?

In His [Jesus’] promise to the penitent thief upon the cross He distinctly asserts the continuance of consciousness.… It must imply that the soul is not shorn of its powers in Paradise. [p. 74]

Having, as I trust, established the fact of consciousness in the future life, we want to know what are its activities. With what is it occupied? How is it limited?

At death soul and body separate, and the soul begins to live alone. It no longer receives its impressions through sensations of the body…. The mind acts, but no longer through bodily media. The result is a great quickening of the mental and spiritual faculties. [p. 76]

The intellectual and spiritual life is unhindered now, and a magnificent horizon opens before it in which it is free to range. [p. 76]

What are the occupations of the life beyond the grave? With what are souls busy in the unseen world?

I answer, they are undergoing a process of soul-growth and ripening, a progressive sanctification, a purification from the defilements of this world. [p. 77]

Does the soul in Paradise remember the past?

Without the contrast which memory would draw between the “evil things ” which he had suffered in his earthly life and the “good things ” which he now enjoyed, he would be deprived of a large part of his reward. [p. 82]

The pure and precious loves of this life are not forgotten in the life to come. God is love, and He will not quench any love that has a right to live. [pp. 82-3]

And if there come thoughts of penitence and visions of past sins, as come they must, with them will come a fuller knowledge of the loving mercy of their Lord to soothe the self-accusing pangs of memory. [p. 83]

Shall God, who gave man knowledge, hide it from him at the very time when He is perfecting him for an entrance into the very fulness of knowledge? I know not. What will be the limits of that knowledge we may not dare to define; but that in its gradual growth it will far surpass the knowledge possible in this world we may rest assured. [pp. 84-5]

5. What is the Relationship of Departed Saints to us?

How much do they know of our present life and needs? Are all the events of the world’s history and of our individual experience known to them?

Knowledge of all that goes on here might be rather a hindrance than a help [p. 105]

While they do not know by their own powers of perception what passes here, such knowledge may be conveyed to them through other avenues. Their numbers are increasing day by day, and each soul that goes hence carries with it into the other world some news from this. The angels, as they go to and fro upon their ministries from God to men, let fall by the way so much as God permits them to tell of what is going on here. Finally, our Lord Himself imparts to the souls which dwell in His nearer presence something, as much as it is best for them to know, of what is happening to those whom they have loved and left behind. Thus, while we have no proof that they know of themselves all that is passing here, we are at liberty to think that their loving Lord lets them have such knowledge of us as they need. [pp. 107-8]

While we do not suppose that the saints in Paradise are directly cognizant of what is said or done by us, we are led to think that our Lord reveals to them so much of it as is best for them to know. [p. 120]

Do the saints in Paradise pray?

The souls in Paradise are with Christ, in a closer fellowship than was possible on earth. Their speech with Him must, therefore, be freer than it was before. It must be frequent, frank, and unrestrained. [p. 110]

Do they pray for us?

The  souls in Paradise are still the same souls. They have not lost their identity. Their traits of character and their affections are the same as before, only exalted and purified. All that was good in them remains unchanged, except for the better. They love us still, they think of us, they long for the time when we shall join them in their holy home. Therefore they must pray for us. They must often and earnestly ask God to work His will in us and bring us safe home to them. They must plead with Him to protect us from harm and pardon all our sins. They do not need to be spurred on by a full knowledge of all that is happening to us. Out of their own experience they can guess our needs well enough. Their warm true love for us, and their realization of the joy that awaits us, must drive them on resistlessly. They know, as they never did before, the tremendous issues of human life. They see our dangers clearer than we do. And so they pray for us. [pp. 110-111]

And are their prayers effectual for our good?

Their loud unceasing cry goes up to God for us. Will God not hear that cry? Will He turn away His face and make as though He heard it not ? Does He not love to hear it ? [pp. 111-12]

“The effectual fervent prayer of a righteous man availeth much.” What, then, must be the power of the ceaseless prayers of a Paradise full of holy souls ? The mind of man cannot measure the blessings God shall give in answer to the prayers of Paradise. [p. 112}

The saints departed pray for us, but can we ask them for their prayers? Can we in any sense pray to them ?

[Rede cautions against attributing] to the saints powers and prerogatives which encroach upon the [unique] mediatorial office of Christ. [p. 118]

The earlier and purer doctrine of the post-Nicene age, namely, that of prayer for prayer, the Ora pro nobis [pray for us; addressed to deceased saints] of the old service-books, has never been condemned in any part of the Church Catholic. [p. 119]

How good it is to think of the mighty chorus of prayer which is ever going up from the saints in Paradise… I love to think of it, and try to catch some far-off echo of its harmonies. [pp. 123-4]

6. What is our Relationship to Departed Saints?

May we pray for those who are gone, or are they beyond the need and the reach of our prayers?

The same love which binds together the three Persons of the Blessed Trinity, when God has permitted it to bind human hearts, must be as eternal in the one relationship as in the other. [p. 129]

In this life one of the strongest bonds that holds together human-kind is the mutual ministry of prayer. Nothing unites us closer to a friend than to pray for him. Nothing stirs us more deeply than to know that some one is praying for us. [p. 132]

If, then, our hearts and minds are full of those who have gone out from our midst, and our desires seem to be centred and summed up in them, are we not praying for them anyhow? … Such is the natural yearning and reasoning of the human heart. Must it be repressed? Is there anything to forbid us to carry out these natural inclinations which are so strong? [p. 133]

I think no honest mind can doubt that His silence gives consent. We seem to hear Him say, “I would have told you, if it were not so.” (John 14:2). The Second Book of Maccabees tells us that some two centuries before our Lord became incarnate in the flesh it was customary to pray for the dead.  The records of ancient Hebrew life and the testimony of the best Jewish scholars assure us that prayers for the dead were common when He was fulfilling His earthly ministry.  In every synagogue they were offered as a matter of course, and are to-day. They formed a part of the Temple worship, where sacrifices were offered for those who had departed this life in a state of imperfect holiness. [p. 134]

All the liturgies of the Primitive Church contain prayers for the dead. [p. 137]

What is accomplished by such prayers, and for whom may we offer them?

One of the popular difficulties of our times is to understand how such prayers can benefit those whose earthly life is at an end. If you believe that their probation-time is past and that they are at rest in Paradise, why do you pray for them? So the world asks us. We reply, Yes, we know that they are at rest, we suppose that their time of probation is fulfilled, that they have entered on their reward. But they are not made perfect yet. They still need blessings from the hand of God. They need to be purified and drawn closer to Him day by day, and there will come a time when they with us must stand before their Judge. There is, therefore, much which we may ask of God for them. [p. 141-2]

7. What is the Relationship of all Saints to God?

It consists chiefly, on the one side, in the communication of a divine supernatural life from God to men; on the other, in the offering of an individual and united worship by men to God. [p. 153]