Archive for the ‘Stoicism’ Category
Many people who call themselves agnostics are arguably dogmatists. Why do I say this? Because today atheistic-materialism is a received opinion, a dogma. And the dominant cultural assumption, as expressed in higher education and mass media, is that Christianity is obsolete, disproven, and all but finished as a paradigm. Someone like the comedian, Bill Maher, can get on television and make snide jokes about Christians, and imply by innuendo that all Christians are basically stupid bigots, and everyone accepts these statements as completely ordinary, or even ‘cool’. Nobody expects him to defend his accusations with intelligent arguments.
The problem is that this so-called conclusion is very far from the truth. Christianity has not been refuted or debunked. Rather, the logical fallacy of ‘demolishing a straw man’ has been committed on a massive scale. The poorest examples of Christianity (e.g., fundamentalists) are held up as the examples, and these are ridiculed.
The problem is that Christianity is not defined by it’s poorer examples. In the same way, if we wanted to ridicule democracy as a principle, we could easily find examples where democracy is abused, ridicule those, and thereby conclude that all democracy is bad. The same principle applies to any ideology or institution. The simple truth, evident at least since the time of Socrates, is that *most people* are deeply confused. Christianity is no exception to this rule. In fact, one could argue that confused people *should* join a religion — since the express purpose of religion is to un-confuse people. But no religion claims to do that without a long process. Hence, it is perfectly consistent with the principles of Christianity that, at any given point in time, most Christians are poor Christians!
A true agnosticism would embrace the principle of intellectual humility. An intellectually humble person doesn’t follow the scenario outlined above. Intellectually humble skeptics or agnostics would recognize their ignorance as a liability, and therefore make a determined effort to investigate all plausible possibilities that might lead them to a definitive, or at least probable, opinion.
The first prerequisite of such an orientation, therefore, would be to struggle heroically to divest oneself of prejudice — for all people, being inclined to self-interest, habitually distort and select evidence in self-serving ways. Next, a virtuous skeptic, in the Socratic tradition, would seek out not the worst examples of an opposing viewpoint, but the best.
Here then is my challenge to skeptics or agnostics who want to exert themselves manfully (or womanfully). I propose that the work of the Roman philosopher, Cicero, titled On Moral Duties (De officiis) expresses, even though it is not an explicitly Christian work, essentially the same religious world view on morality as Christianity does. What I’m suggesting is that the work is something extraordinary, sublime, beyond the merely rational, or, if you will, inspired. Cicero’s eclectic synthesis of Platonic, Stoic, and Aristotelian ethics was integrated into Christianity via the later writers such as Ambrose of Milan, St. Augustine, and many others. The spirit of Christian morality is in it. That is, Cicero’s philosophical writings contain much of what is best in the Christian moral tradition. Yes, Christianity assimilated it from a non-Christian writer, but this was done, for the most part, in conscious recognition and admiration of Cicero.
Cicero’s work is also extremely interesting and entertaining to read. It is a literary masterpiece, and ought to be read by everyone. Nor can I imagine anyone reading without their feeling edified.
That is the proposal I would make to the sincere skeptic or agnostic. Read this work, and having your mind placed on a higher plane, as reading the work should do, then in that light you will have a more solid and unprejudiced basis for evaluating the plausibility of the Christian tradition. If the moral principles advocated by Cicero in the work, for example, are laudable and socially constructive, that would be something to factor into an evaluation of the merits and truth of Christianity, which has preserved this moral tradition, and taught it to countless millions of people.
This page has links to several translations of On Moral Duties that can be read online or downloaded. The Peabody translation is excellent.
I made this timeline to help with my research and am uploading it in case others might fight it useful. Several birth or death dates are conjectural.
Errata. (1) Cicero is more of an Academic Platonist, but deserves honorable mention as a major transmitter of Stoic doctrine; (2) need to add Attalus, a teacher of Seneca, to figure.
For more information :
- Zeno of Citium
- Zeno of Tarsus
- Crates of Mallus
- Diogenes of Babylon
- Antipater of Tarsus
- Panaetius of Rhodes
- Posidonius of Apamea
- Apollonius of Tyre
- Antipater of Tyre
- Athenodorus Cananites
- Quintus Sextius
- Arius Didymus
- Lucius Seneca
- Musonius Rufus
- Marcus Aurelius
Often when we think of Socrates we think of Plato almost exclusively, and forget that Socrates’ other pupils made important contributions. Each of these schools emphasized some important aspect of Socrates’ teachings. Rather than focus on one school, such as Platonism, Stoicism, or Epicureanism, exclusively, we do well to study them all, seeking to integrate the insights associated with each.
From: Evagrius of Pontus: Talking Back, A Monastic Handbook for Combating Demons. Translated with an Introduction by David Brakke. Cistercian Publications, 2009
In the prologue to Talking Back [Antirrhêtikos] he [Evagrius Ponticus] cites Qoheleth: “No refutation [antirrhésis] comes from those who perform evil quickly; therefore, the heart of the children of humanity has become confirmed with them for the doing of evil” (8:11) [Ecc. 8:11. Because sentence against an evil work is not executed speedily, therefore the heart of the sons of men is fully set in them to do evil.]
Evagrius interprets this and related verses (Ezek 18:4; Prov 26:4-5) to mean that one should refute an evil thought as soon as possible after it occurs to one, before “it is firmly set in one’s thinking”; if the monk does so, “sin is easily and swiftly handled.” But if the thought is allowed to persist, it leads the soul from merely thinking about sin to actually performing sin and thus to death (Prol.2). By repelling the evil thought, antirrhēsis prevents the monk from performing the evil deed.
Evagrius inherited the idea behind this practice fiom his predecessor Origen (ca. 185-254) and his contemporary Didymus the Blind (ca. 313-98), both of whom adapted to Christian ethics the Stoic notion of a“proto-passion” (propatheia) or “first movement”58
In the Stoic view morally culpable passions such as anger or lust result from our making poor judgments and assenting to an impulse or impression beyond what is natural or reasonable. All people are subject to involuntary “first movements,” which we may either control and use to good ends or allow to develop into a morally culpable passion. For example, I may have a visceral rush of anger when I learn of some injustice (first movement), but I can control it and respond appropriately by, say, calmly rebuking the offender. But if I assent to the impulse unreasonably and allow the full-blown passion of anger to develop, then I become guilty of the passion. First movements may come from the movements of the body (for example, the sexual urge), but they may also arise as responses to external stimuli (for example, the news of some injustice), which Stoics sometimes called “impressions” (phantasiai). The Stoics argued that we encounter a wide range of impressions, incoming images and ideas, which we must sort out as true or false, leading to virtue or vice, and the like. However a first movement arises, it is the persons rational faculty, the intellect, that forms a judgment about the movement and either arrests it or allows it to develop into a full-fledged passion.
58. On this topic see Richard Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Margaret R. Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 85-108; Richard Layton,“Propatheia: Origen and Didymus on the Origin of the Passions,” Vigiliae Christiansae 54 (2000): 262-82; Brakke, Demons and the Making of the Monk, 38-41, 54-56.