Ecstasis and Philosophy as the Practice of Dying

Piero Di Cosimo, Incarnation of Jesus (c.1485−1505; detail)

RICHARD OF ST. VICTOR discusses a mystical state of consciousness he calls alienatio mentis (alienation of the mind). [1] This is a type of ecstasy in which one loses contact with bodily senses.  Typically, however, both consciousness itself and awareness of oneself remain intact. That is, it is neither a state of complete unconsciousness, nor identityless consciousness.

What is, this, exactly?  A preliminary survey of the literature shows there are many opinions on the matter, but no clear agreement or decisive conclusions.

It seems possible to me that this is not a psychological state resolved for the few, privileged individual who can devote their lives entirely to contemplation.  Rather, perhaps it is a mental ability that we all have the capacity for (for example, it seems similar to certain dissociative states experienced under the influence of medical anesthesia), and we can activate this natural ability without too much difficulty.

It also seems possible there is a connection between this condition and Plato’s assertion that true philosophy is the ‘practice of dying’ — in the sense, that philosophers seek (according to him) a temporary separation of the soul/mind from the body and sensation.

His most sustained discussion of this occurs in the dialogue Phaedo.  There, Socrates is in jail, in the hours leading up to his drinking the hemlock; he wishes to explain to his pupils why he is not afraid of death.  Other parts of the dialogue present Socrates’ arguments for the immortality of the soul.  But in the section below, he explains that the body and senses are great hindrances to cognition of Eternal truths.  Philosophy, he implies, involves  learning to experience one’s soul detached from physical senses.

1. Richard discusses this in Benjamin Major 5.5 and in On the Extermination of Bad and the Promotion of Good 3.18, among other places.  In the Four Degrees of Fervent Love 35−38 he distinguishes between levels of contemplation associated with the ‘second heaven’ and ‘third heaven.’  In the latter the soul experiences a more profound ecstasy: “in this state, the human mind, forgetful of all external things, forgets even itself and passes entirely into its God.” (Kraebel, p. 291)

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Phaedo 65−67 (tr. Jowett, 1892)

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Socrates: In matters of this sort philosophers, above all other men, may be observed in every sort of way to dissever the soul from the communion of the body.

Simmias: Very true.

Whereas, Simmias, the rest of the world are of opinion that to him who has no sense of pleasure and no part in bodily pleasure, life is not worth having; and that he who is indifferent about them is as good as dead.

That is also true.

What again shall we say of the actual acquirement of knowledge? — is the body, if invited to share in the enquiry, a hinderer or a helper? I mean to say, have sight and hearing any truth in them? Are they not, as the poets are always telling us, inaccurate witnesses? and yet, if even they are inaccurate and indistinct, what is to be said of the other senses? — for you will allow that they are the best of them?

Certainly, he replied.

Then when does the soul attain truth? — for in attempting to consider anything in company with the body she is obviously deceived.

True.

Then must not true existence be revealed to her in thought, if at all?

Yes.

And thought is best when the mind is gathered into herself and none of these things trouble her — neither sounds nor sights nor pain nor any pleasure, — when she takes leave of the body, and has as little as possible to do with it, when she has no bodily sense or desire, but is aspiring after true being?

Certainly.

And in this the philosopher dishonours the body; his soul runs away from his body and desires to be alone and by herself?

That is true.

Well, but there is another thing, Simmias: Is there or is there not an absolute justice?

Assuredly there is.

And an absolute beauty and absolute good?

Of course.

But did you ever behold any of them with your eyes?

Certainly not.

Or did you ever reach them with any other bodily sense? — and I speak not of these alone, but of absolute greatness, and health, and strength, and of the essence or true nature of everything. Has the reality of them ever been perceived by you through the bodily organs? or rather, is not the nearest approach to the knowledge of their several natures made by him who so orders his intellectual vision as to have the most exact conception of the essence of each thing which he considers?

Certainly.

And he attains to the purest knowledge of them who goes to each with the mind alone, not introducing or intruding in the act of thought sight or any other sense together with

[66]
reason, but with the very light of the mind in her own clearness searches into the very truth of each; he who has got rid, as far as he can, of eyes and ears and, so to speak, of the whole body, these being in his opinion distracting elements which when they infect the soul hinder her from acquiring truth and knowledge — who, if not he, is likely to attain to the knowledge of true being?

What you say has a wonderful truth in it, Socrates, replied Simmias.

And when real philosophers consider all these things, will they not be led to make a reflection which they will express in words something like the following? ‘Have we not found,’ they will say, ‘a path of thought which seems to bring us and our argument to the conclusion, that while we are in the body, and while the soul is infected with the evils of the body, our desire will not be satisfied? and our desire is of the truth. For the body is a source of endless trouble to us by reason of the mere requirement of food; and is liable also to diseases which overtake and impede us in the search after true being: it fills us full of loves, and lusts, and fears, and fancies of all kinds, and endless foolery, and in fact, as men say, takes away from us the power of thinking at all. Whence come wars, and fightings, and factions? whence but from the body and the lusts of the body? Wars are occasioned by the love of money, and money has to be acquired for the sake and in the service of the body; and by reason of all these impediments we have no time to give to philosophy; and, last and worst of all, even if we are at leisure and betake ourselves to some speculation, the body is always breaking in upon us, causing turmoil and confusion in our enquiries, and so amazing us that we are prevented from seeing the truth. It has been proved to us by experience that if we would have pure knowledge of anything we must be quit of the body — the soul in herself must behold things in themselves: and then we shall attain the wisdom which we desire, and of which we say that we are lovers; not while we live, but after death; for if while in company with the body, the soul cannot have pure knowledge, one of two things follows — either knowledge is not to be attained at all, or, if at all, after death. For then, and not till then, the soul will be parted

[67]
from the body and exist in herself alone. In this present life, I reckon that we make the nearest approach to knowledge when we have the least possible intercourse or communion with the body, and are not surfeited with the bodily nature, but keep ourselves pure until the hour when God himself is pleased to release us. And thus having got rid of the foolishness of the body we shall be pure and hold converse with the pure, and know of ourselves the clear light everywhere, which is no other than the light of truth.’ For the impure are not permitted to approach the pure. These are the sort of words, Simmias, which the true lovers of knowledge cannot help saying to one another, and thinking. You would agree; would you not?

Undoubtedly, Socrates.

But, O my friend, if this be true, there is great reason to hope that, going whither I go, when I have come to the end of my journey, I shall attain that which has been the pursuit of my life. And therefore I go on my way rejoicing, and not I only, but every other man who believes that his mind has been made ready and that he is in a manner purified.

Certainly, replied Simmias.

And what is purification but the separation of the soul from the body, as I was saying before; the habit of the soul gathering and collecting herself into herself from all sides out of the body; the dwelling in her own place alone, as in another life, so also in this, as far as she can;—the release of the soul from the chains of the body?

Very true, he said.

And this separation and release of the soul from the body is termed death?

To be sure, he said.

And the true philosophers, and they only, are ever seeking to release the soul. Is not the separation and release of the soul from the body their especial study?

Source: Jowett, Benjamin. The Dialogues of Plato in Five Volumes, 3rd ed. Oxford University, 1892. Vol. 2

Did Plato and Socrates regularly practice contemplation?  At least in Socrates’ case, we there are two suggestive examples from his life.  In one, before the Battle of Potidea, he was observed to stand motionless in a ‘meditative trance’ for an entire day.  In another, on his way to the dinner party recounted in Plato’s dialogue Symposium, Socrates dropped behind the others and fell into “a fit of abstraction.”

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Bibliography

Kraebel, Andrew. Richard of St. Victor: On the Four Degrees of Violent Love (De quatuor gradibus violentae caritatis).    In: Hugh Feiss (ed.), Victorine Texts in Translation Vol. 2: On Love, Brepols, 2011; pp. 287−300.

Németh, Csaba. Paulus Raptus to Raptus Pauli: Paul’s Rapture (2 Cor 12: 2–4) in the Pre-Scholastic and Scholastic Theologies. In: A Companion to St. Paul in the Middle Ages, Brill, 2013; 349−392.

Zinn, Grover A. (tr.). Richard of St. Victor: The Twelve Patriarchs, The Mystical Ark and Book Three of The Trinity. Paulist Press, 1979.

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